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This PhD thesis is an in-depth investigation of the ways academic 
disciplines shape scientific practice in health equity research, a sub-
specialisation of population health. Whilst covering many contexts and 
aspects of research practice, the thesis is centrally concerned with the way 
disciplinary training shapes knowledge construction, and the tension this 
produces in multi-disciplinary research domains.  
 
Specifically, the thesis aimed to: 1) identify the blend of formal disciplinary 
training present among health inequalities and health disparities 
researchers;  2) explore how disciplinary training appears to shape 
epistemological approaches to this area of research, manifest in the design 
and evaluation of research studies, and 3) assess the impact of these 
differences on interdisciplinary and collaborative research efforts.  
 
To address the first aim, a bibliometric analysis was undertaken using data 
from 29,212 publications. The resulting visualisation of the 250 most-
connected health equity scholars illustrates the area’s general structure, and 
was used as a sampling frame for semi-structured interviews carried out 
with 45 researchers, representing 16 disciplines, located in eight countries. 
To address the second and third aims, interview data were analysed using a 
Kuhnian theoretical lens, anticipating that disciplinary difference operates 
via what Kuhn termed disciplinary paradigms, and can be understood to 
manifest as variability in what Kuhn termed the disciplinary matrix. 
Specificity and detail is added to this general Kuhnian framework via a 
broad set of theoretical and conceptual tools drawn from diverse literatures 
including the sociology of scientific knowledge,  sociology of professions, 
higher education research, linguistics, and science and technology studies.  
 
Results suggest that disciplinary training powerfully and enduringly shapes 
the choices which feel ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ for scientists, with multiple kinds 
of ‘normal’ coexisting within the multidisciplinary domain of health equity 
research. Specifically, variation was apparent in the kind of knowledge 
researchers seek, formation of research questions, selection and 
employment of methods, evidentiary standards, conceptualisations of 
health, use of theory, approaches to complexity, and the broad purpose of 
scientific research. These features mapped predictably (though imperfectly) 
onto interviewees’ disciplinary training, and aligned quite neatly with the four 
epistemological styles previously described by Lamont in a study of 
multidisciplinary grant panels (2009). 
 
Disciplinary training interacts and intersects with other factors, including 
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national and institutional research foci, funding opportunities, pathways to 
promotion and publication norms. These factors served to amplify (and, in 
some cases, were amplified by) epistemological styles. In particular, 
epidemiological norms and standards emerged as especially important in 
population health, for researchers working inside and outside epidemiology.  
 
While a strong desire to obtain ‘useful’ knowledge cut across disciplines, 
this was not a unifying epistemological feature as ideas about what is useful 
varied across disciplinary groups. Interdisciplinary collaboration was 
presented as important, and desirable, but as being complicated by the 
challenge of communicating with members of other disciplines. The 
integration of disciplinary perspectives appears to depend on researchers 
who speak multiple disciplinary ‘languages’, however this was not felt to be 
highly valued within (mono-disciplinary) evaluative contexts, such as peer 
review and academic promotion. Repeatedly, diversity in terminology and 
meaning appeared to be grounded within (and to reflect) diverse 
epistemological commitments and disciplinary paradigms. 
 
Collectively, findings demonstrate the presence of diverse ways of knowing 
within health equity research, and the role of disciplinary training in 
establishing and sustaining these varied epistemological styles. Differences 
between disciplines are not incidental, but reflect diversity in fundamental 
epistemological commitments and diverse strategies for selecting and 
accessing objects pre-supposed to be valuable, and relevant to health. 
Disciplines have been framed in some literatures as monolithic or obsolete, 
however, results of this PhD project support a rehabilitation of the Kuhnian 
view of disciplines: As well as being social entities, academic disciplines are 
cognitive enterprises which powerfully shape 21st century research about 











Lay Summary  
 
This thesis is about the way academics from different disciplines 
conduct, design, and make sense of  health equity research (studies of 
differences in health between social groups). It has previously been 
suggested that researchers from different disciplines approach this area in 
different ways, but research has not yet focused on the impact of 
disciplinary training on the study of health equity.  
 
The thesis had three aims, to a) identify the blend of formal disciplinary 
training present among health equity researchers, enabling analysis of the 
distribution of disciplines across this area;  b) explore diversity in the ways 
researchers seek and generate knowledge about health equity, including 
considering how such diversity corresponds with disciplinary background, 
how such difference is reflected in the design and evaluation of research 
studies, and intersects with other factors (such as geographical location, 
and funding opportunities); and c) assess the impact of disciplinary 
differences on interdisciplinary and collaborative research efforts.  
 
To address the first aim, an analysis of published research was undertaken, 
using data from 29,212 publications. The resulting visualisation of the 250 
'most connected' health equity scholars illustrates the area’s general 
structure, and was used as a sampling frame for a set of semi-structured 
interviews carried out with 45 researchers, representing 16 disciplines, 
located in eight countries. To address the second and third aims, interview 
data were analysed via the theory of Thomas Kuhn theoretical lens, 
anticipating variability in the elements of what Kuhn termed the 'disciplinary 
matrix'. 
 
The thesis finds that disciplinary training appears to shape the design, 
conduct and evaluation of research about health equity in interconnected 
ways. Disciplinary training seems to influence research via shaping research 
questions, research methods, and the kind of evidence researchers find 
persuasive. Analysis of interview data revealed varied conceptualisations of 
health, diverse forms of knowledge, use of theory, view of methods, and 
approaches to complexity which mapped predictably (though imperfectly) 
onto interviewees’ disciplinary training.   
 
The interaction and intersection of disciplinary training with other factors 
(e.g. national and institutional research foci, funding opportunities, pathways 
to promotion, publication norms) was also carefully considered. These 
factors were found to amplify (and, in some cases, were amplified by) 
particular ways of approaching research. Norms and standards within 
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Epidemiology emerged as especially important, both inside and outside that 
discipline.  
 
While a strong desire to obtain useful knowledge cut across disciplines, 
this was not a unifying feature, as ideas about what is useful varied across 
disciplinary groups. Similarly, the concept of ‘statistical significance’ was 
broadly viewed as lacking meaning, but no consensus was evident 
regarding what kind of significance should replace it 
(‘social’/‘clinical’/‘practical’). Findings suggest that resolution of ongoing 
debate within health equity regarding the meaning of terms such ‘robust 
evidence’ is unlikely, as diversity in meaning appears to be grounded within 
(and to reflect) diverse epistemological commitments and disciplinary 
paradigms. 
 
Interdisciplinary collaboration was presented as important, and desirable, 
but also as being complicated by the challenge of communicating with 
members of other disciplines. While the integration of disciplinary 
perspectives appears to depend on researchers who speak multiple 
disciplinary ‘languages’, this was not felt to be highly valued within (mono-
disciplinary) evaluative contexts, such as peer review and applications for 
promotion.  
 
Collectively, findings lend empirical support and detail to general claims that 
disciplinary paradigms inform different approaches to population health, and 
reveal the ways such differences can manifest in the design, conduct and 
evaluation of research projects. Disciplines have been framed in some 
literatures as obsolete, however, results of this PhD project support a 
rehabilitation of the Kuhnian view of disciplines: As well as being real social 
entities, academic disciplines are real cognitive enterprises which shape 
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Prologue: My Interest in the Topic  
 
My undergraduate training, undertaken in Australia, was a ‘double’ 
degree in Biomedical Science and Economics,  a program designed to 
produce Health Economists fluent in the biomedical languages of anatomy, 
physiology and biochemistry. However, simultaneously studying health from 
these two angles proved extremely challenging, and over 90% of enrolees 
had dropped one degree by the fourth year. 
 
I found the experience interesting, because the two streams of lectures 
seemed to be taking place in different worlds. In biophysics I learned that 
empirical observation has the last word; if objects stopped falling towards 
the earth then the theory of gravity will be revised. In economics, the 
relationship between theory and observation felt different, and challenges to 
the discipline’s fundamental ideas seemed less welcome. In epidemiology, 
individuals were members of populations whose health was determined by a 
combination of known ‘risk-factors’ and random chance. In Health 
Economics, individuals were self-optimising agents in control of their own 
health, who elected to invest (or not) in health, according to a set of 
preferences, subject to budget constraints. These contrasts interested me, 
and seemed important, even crucial, for the progress of research about 
population health.  
 
I attended an international conference on the topic of health inequalities 
during my undergraduate training. Research about social inequalities in 
health seemed to involve a particularly rich blend of disciplines, with 
epidemiologists, medical doctors, sociologists, psychologists, geographers 
and economists answering the same basic question; why does health seem 
to vary with social variables like income, education, and postcode? And how 
can we take action to level the distribution of health across these groups? 
Being young and rather self-possessed, I thought it would be helpful to 
highlight the obvious (to me) interdisciplinary tensions at play. I assumed 
others would be interested in and keen to discuss the way views of 
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population health varied across disciplines. To try and stimulate dialogue, I 
asked questions of presenters at the event, such as:  
“Someone with economic training would probably reach the opposite 
conclusion you have reached, based on these data, as the behaviour you’re 
describing may be viewed as rational according to economic theory. Given 
this, how is the change in policy you have suggested is necessary going to 
be achieved?” 
Or, to an economist:  
“Researchers without economic training would probably not agree that a 
reduction in rent should be treated as ‘income’ in this analysis, because it is 
not income, it is an avoided cost. How would you justify this choice to 
researchers outside economics?”  
The awkward silences and sideways looks I received were telling. A 
researcher I had never met took me aside, saying something like “I 
understand what you’re trying to achieve here, and it is important, but you’re 
only going to frustrate people and cause people to dislike you.”  
 
Ten years have now passed, and, professionally, I settled into what I 
perceived as the neutral territory of statistics after completing my dual 
undergraduate degrees. I have a clearer sense of why my questions were 
not enthusiastically tackled by conference presenters, as I have myself 
experienced the strong pull to work within rather than between academic 
disciplines. But, having worked as a statistician in departments of 
epidemiology and economics, my sense that disciplinary differences are 
important has only increased. I have been watching and waiting for 
somebody to publish a detailed analysis of how the epistemologies 
underpinning the various disciplines which study population health 
(especially health equity) fit together, or don’t. Waiting for someone to sketch 
the disciplinary landscape of health inequalities research, to ask whether 
long-standing tensions and debates are supported by the epistemic pillars 
of dominant disciplines. Waiting for someone to explain how genuinely 
interdisciplinary research might be approached in the presence of apparent 
division.  





Chapter 1: Introduction & Aims  
Disciplinary cultures are a readily acknowledged condition of the profession 
[…] this is not to say that we understand the implications of disciplinary 
differences.     Ruscio, 1987:p33. 
1.1 Academic Disciplines & Population Health  
 
Population health1 is a multidisciplinary research domain, including 
researchers from the natural, biomedical and social sciences. Progress in 
understanding the health of populations might therefore depend on 
cooperation and communication between members of different disciplines.  
However, even as the study of interdisciplinarity expands apace (LERU, 
2017; Bammer, 2013), this has not developed atop an established set of 
theories describing what disciplines are (Krishnan, 2009), or systematic 
empirical accounts detailing how (or even whether) disciplines condition the 
content of 21st century science. Disciplines are an obvious feature of the 
academic landscape, but their specific study has been limited, perhaps 
because (as the above quotation from Ruscio suggests) they are at once 
obvious and invisible. While disciplines take grand institutional forms, their 
influence on specific scientific outputs is challenging to tease out and clearly 
describe.  
 
When disciplinary difference is encountered in population health 
research, it is often in the form of general reference to diversity in 
disciplinary “norms” (Stuckler et al., 2015) or “cultures” (Pilkington et al., 
2016). These vague references reflect how little evidence is available 
describing the substance of disciplinary difference in population health. In 
addition, it is not clear which disciplines participate, and in what ratio. 
Epidemiology is clearly a central and dominant discipline (Reubi, 2017; 
 
1 There is some debate about what "population health" means, and whether it is a synonym 
for "public health" (Kindig, 2007). I use the term here with the meaning explicated by Kindig 
and Stoddart (2003: p.381), who define population health as including research concerned 
with “the health outcomes of a group of individuals, including the distribution of such 
outcomes within the group”. 
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Pearce, 1996), but population health includes representatives from distant 
(e.g., engineering) as well as neighbouring (e.g., medicine) domains, and 
epidemiology itself may be splintering into sub-specialisations (Pearce, 
1996). Such diversity likely has consequences for knowledge construction, 
evaluation, and collaboration. Population health may therefore represent a 
setting where key similarities and differences between disciplines play out in 
a manner which can be observed and analysed, and also a domain where 
insight gained from such analysis would be of significant practical benefit.  
 
In this thesis, this possibility is explored within the specific setting of 
health inequalities and health disparities research, a multi-disciplinary field 
within population health. The thesis provides a detailed account of the 
widely acknowledged but poorly-described differences between key 
disciplines in this area (and the forces which appear to sustain and 
moderate them), and explores the challenges researchers face producing 
multi- and interdisciplinary research in the context of these differences.  
 
In this chapter I introduce health inequalities and disparities research, 
and outline the heterogeneous (disciplinary) approaches apparent in the 
literature. I outline key debates and suggested underlying disciplinary 
tensions, and summarise existing empirical studies of this research area. 
The aims and outline of the thesis are presented in the concluding section.   
1.2 Health inequalities and health disparities research (HIDR)  
Health inequalities research and health disparities research (hereafter HIDR 
or ‘health equity research’) aim to understand, explain and reduce the 
unequal distribution of health across groups defined by socio-demographic 
factors such as education level, income and ethnicity. Differences in health 
outcomes associated with socioeconomic position have been extensively 
documented, and those with fewest resources (variously defined) tend to 
have the poorest health (Graham, 2009).  Such inequalities have been 
documented in all developed nations (Crombie et al., 2004). For example, 
recent data suggest life expectancy and all-cause mortality improvement in 
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the UK has stalled since the early 2010s, with increased mortality among the 
most deprived populations (Walsh et al., 2020). 
 
Analysis of these observed differences in health has led researchers to study 
the social, economic and environmental factors which influence health 
throughout a person’s life-course, collectively referred to as the Social 
Determinants of Health (SDoH). The SDoH include factors such as, income, 
education, stress, early-life experiences, social exclusion, employment, 
social support, available nutrition, and access to transport.  
1.2.1 Upstream, Downstream  
Health equity scholarship is frequently guided by a conceptual model 
whereby inequity in health is understood to be caused by underlying 
inequality in the distribution of the SDoH (Carey & Crammond, 2015). Within 
this model, SDoH are termed ‘upstream’ determinants, considered to be 
outside individuals’ control. These include income, education, early-life 
experiences and social class. The 'downstream' determinants (such as diet, 
smoking, and physical exercise) have clearer physiological impacts, but are 
also understood to be connected to upstream determinants. An influential, 
formal model describing the relationship between upstream and 
downstream determinants is the “rainbow” model, pictured below (Figure 
1). In this model, macro and upstream determinants influence the 
downstream determinants of health, which in turn impact human 
physiology.   
 
Figure 1 - The rainbow model of health. Source: Dahlgren & Whitehead 1991 
Quantitative analyses describing strong associations between upstream 
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determinants and health outcomes accumulated throughout the 1980s and 
1990s (e.g. Lynch et al., 1998).   
 
Elucidating the causal pathways by which ‘exposures’ (e.g. drugs, 
treatments, risk-factors) impact health is the central aim of  epidemiology 
(Susser, 1985:p.171), and randomised studies are the gold-standard for 
determining whether such relationships are causal. However, individuals 
cannot be randomised into social classes, childhoods, or cultures.  The 
apex of the ‘evidence pyramid’ (Petticrew & Roberts, 2003) is therefore out 
of reach, complicating the evaluation of scientific claims about the SDoH.   
Early studies presenting upstream factors as independent, causal 
determinants of cardiovascular disease and mortality (Barker & Osmand, 
1986; Marmot et al., 1984; Kaplan & Salonen, 1990) were criticised for 
inconsistent estimates, and for the handling of confounding factors such as 
social and material disadvantage. A review of 19 such studies (Elford et al., 
1991) concluded that results failed to support the existence of a causal 
connection between early-life exposures and adult cardiovascular 
outcomes, and warned that “the very nature of the hypothesis represents 
methodological problems that may prove to be insurmountable” (p.833), 
reflecting the uneasy fit of questions about the SDoH within a classical (i.e., 
clinical) epidemiological framework. Health equity researchers countered 
that causal pathways are likely to be complex, varied and multifactorial, and 
that a lack of definitive understanding along the causal chain should not 
lead to the conclusion that upstream factors are unimportant, or less 
important than ‘downstream’ determinants (e.g., House, 1996).  
Today it is more widely accepted that some determinants of health cannot 
be feasibly or ethically randomised, and Social Epidemiology has emerged 
as an epidemiological specialisation to tackle “the study of how the social 
world influences–and in many cases defines–the fundamental determinants 
of health” (Berkman et al., 2014). However, debate about the presence and 
direction of 'causal' links between upstream and downstream determinants 
persists in HIDR (Mackenbach, 2020; Mackenbach & De Jong, 2018; 
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Lundberg, 2020), and the early scepticism about upstream determinants 
suggest that claims about population health are not evaluated within a 
vacuum, but stand or fall based on alignment with dominant 
epistemological frameworks, a possibility which this thesis explores. 
1.2.2 Terminology  
Diverse terminology is employed within HIDR, and was evident in the 1970s 
and 1980s, as researchers described observed differences in rates of illness 
between groups in the post-war UK and US. Disentangling the precise 
definitions of key overlapping terms is not straightforward, however Table 1, 
below, provides a guide.  






“Systematic differences in 
health between different 
socioeconomic groups 
within a society. As they are 
socially produced, they are 
potentially avoidable and 
are widely considered 
unacceptable in a civilised 
society” (Whitehead, 2007: 
p.473) 
UK, Europe  
Differences in health 
outcomes  between 
better- and worse-off 
groups defined by the 
social hierarchy,  e.g. 
Class, educational 
attainment, income, etc 
Health 
Inequity  
“Refers to those inequalities 
in health that are deemed to 
be unfair or stemming from 
some form of injustice.” 




Generally, disparity means 
‘difference’, however its 
usage in public health 
research refers to the 
subset of differences in 
health outcomes which are 
perceived as inequitable, as 
per Whitehead’s definition 
above (Braveman, 2006)  
USA 
Inequitable ethnic or 
racial differences in 
health 
Table 1 Health inequalities, health disparities and health Inequity. Definitions and 




The terms in Table 1 each refer to mature and active academic 
specialisations, wherein authors from various academic disciplines and 
clinical specialties report their findings in top medical, epidemiological, and 
public health journals (Bouchard et al., 2015). Understanding the extent of 
connectivity between these communities, and the origins and sustained use 
of so many similar terms is one topic of focus in this thesis. Rather than 
selecting a single term to refer to the field, I jointly describe ‘Health 
Inequalities’ ‘Health Disparities’ and ‘Health Inequity’ research under the 
umbrella term ‘health equity research’. 
In referring to the kinds of differences in health which HIDR aims to describe 
and understand, I refer to ‘health inequalities’, as this is the term which 
dominates in the UK. However, in using this term I include the kinds of 
differences which health disparities researchers study and describe. 
1.3 Heterogeneity in HIDR 
 
Despite many decades of research activity, health equity is not improving at 
the pace researchers wish (Mackenbach, 2020; Garthwaite et al., 2016). The 
perceived failure of health equity scholarship to produce policy change 
and/or demonstrable improvement in health inequalities has generated 
critical and reflexive discussion (Bambra et al., 2011; Lynch, 2017), 
revealing tensions which appear to reflect disciplinary difference in 
approaches to research. Chief among these is tension between 
explanations for health inequalities framed in terms of factors operating at 
the level of the individual, and explanations which focus on structural or 
group-level attributes. The various positions are briefly sketched in the 
following paragraphs, including supporting theory, where relevant.   
1.3.1 Individualist approaches  
“From the atomistic or individualist point of view, the individual is the source 
of all new characteristics or transformations, so that the group or population 
is nothing but the additive outcome of such initiative by the individual.” 
(Piaget, 1967: p393)  
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Individualist approaches focus on characteristics belonging to individuals, 
and conceptualise individual outcomes and/or behaviour as the result of 
factors operating on, and activating processes within individuals. Groups or 
populations might be studied, but these are conceived as collections of 
individuals. Within HIDR, this includes analytic approaches which locate the 
causes of health inequity within the behaviour of individuals (the 
'behavioural thesis'), and approaches which frame health as the result of 
rational choices made by individuals, such as classical microeconomic 
approaches.  
Historically, a third strand of research also fits under this category. The 
‘selection thesis’ proposed that poor health is a determinant of an 
individual’s position in society, contrasting with the view that material 
deprivation leads to poor health, and not the other way around. While there 
is widespread acknowledgement that poor health does contribute to 
material deprivation (Pantazis et al., 2006), the empirical focus within HIDR 
has tended to fall upon the ways in which income and social circumstance 
shape health. Reflecting this, the idea that social position is determined by 
health status is referred to as ‘reverse causation’ within HIDR (e.g. Marmot, 
2017). The selection thesis contains echoes of the eugenics movement of 
the Victorian era, wherein civic worth was considered a hereditary trait, and 
“poverty, crime and stupidity arose from the hereditary weakness of the 
poor, the criminal and the mentally-defective” (MacKenzie, 1981:p.33). Due 
to desire to maintain intellectual distance from eugenic ideas and 
essentialist assumptions about those experiencing disadvantage, there has 
been some reluctance within HIDR to fully explore the possibility that health 
influences position within the social hierarchy (Marmot, 2017). 
Interest in genetic explanations for health inequalities has re-emerged, 
especially the field of epigenetics which studies how genetic expression 
may be altered during the life-course, and also whether and how these 
alterations are transmitted to subsequent generations (Relton & Smith, 
2010). Excitement about the anticipated contribution of epigenetic research, 
and a desire to understand how the SDoH get “into the body” (Williams & 
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Mohammed, 2008 : p.39) occur in the context of a strong desire to maintain 
political pressure for ‘upstream’ action on health inequalities and disparities, 
creating concern about potentially mixed messages to policy makers. This 
concern was expressed by prominent HIDR researcher Mackenbach (2006), 
who offered the tentative conclusion that genetic determinants “may play a 
part,  albeit a rather distal and modest role, in the explanation of health 
inequalities”( ibid, p.271) alongside explicitly articulated anxiety about 
resurrecting eugenic ideas, and diverting attention from social determinants. 
In addition, studies of migrant populations have demonstrated that 
immigrants quickly achieve health profiles more similar to their country of 
residence than country of origin (Guendelman & Abrams, 1995), cutting 
against genetic explanations for health inequalities. Epidemiological 
methods have been positioned as being poorly suited to the nuanced 
exploration of contextual and contingent cultural factors (Nazroo, 1998). 
1.3.2 Structuralist Approaches  
“From the holist or totalist point of view, everything happens at the 
population level, so that the individual is nothing but a passive reflection or, 
at best, a partial one, of processes which are quite independent of him [sic] 
and belong to quite a different genetic scale” (Piaget, 1967: p.393) 
From the structuralist perspective, health inequalities arise due to 
processes largely independent of individuals. Key processes are emergent, 
arising from relations, therefore relationships between individuals, 
institutions and other social entities are a focus of study. Two prominent 
strategies for accessing these relations within HIDR have epistemological 
origins within the structuralist thought-style; the importance of place, and 
the value of studying lived-experience.  
 
The importance of place 
Places were recognised as important by the earliest researchers of health 
equity, for example, Chadwick’s focus on the concentration of disease 
within neighbourhoods, or homes (Chadwick, 1842). However this interest 
was not sustained throughout the 20th century (Mechanic, 1993). Beginning 
 
24 
in the 1990’s, renewed interest in contextual effects and regional variations 
in health emerged, though not without debate regarding the magnitude of 
these effects (Macintyre et al, 2002; McCulloch, 2001, 2001a) and quality of 
empirical studies (Pearce, 2013). More recent efforts focus on moving 
beyond this context versus composition debate, to focus on the 
interactions between people and places. For example, studies of 
neighbourhoods and health explore the ways neighbourhoods mediate 
between structural drivers (social, environmental, geographic and 
economic) and health equity (Pearce, 2013). Within this research area, place 
is conceived as a way to expose and understand sociological phenomena, 
and also as permitting a theoretically sophisticated approach to social 
concepts such as class and social capital, via study of the ways in which 
these forces “work themselves through into the dynamics of everyday life.” 
(Popay et al, 1998: p.635).  
 
Lived experience  
Quantitative representations of health inequity are viewed as ‘hollow’ by 
some researchers who approach HIDR from a structural perspective (Elliot 
et al., 2016). Felt to be missing is adequate representation of “experiences 
of hardship, subjugation and alienation which cannot easily be captured 
and weighed via ratios, metrics and indices” (Trahair, 2014: p.6). 
Articulations of such experiences are considered analytically valuable from 
a structural perspective, because the meanings which individuals attach to 
experiences are understood to shape social action (Popay et al., 1998) 
which in turn influences health and wellbeing. Within this “new enthusiasm 
for the fine grain” in social HIDR (Williams, 2003 :p.141), expressions of 
meaning in narrative form are considered especially valuable (Baum 1995, 
Popay et al, 1998), as the narrative is “an ontological condition of social life” 
(Somers, 1994: p.614) viewed as a format within which the relationship 
between social structures and individual agency is revealed. Identity is an 
important concept and focus of study within this framework. Somers (1994) 
argues that individuals develop their identities by locating themselves within 
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a ‘repertoire of emplotted stories’ (ibid: p.614). Therefore, the collection and 
analysis of stories about health inequalities in narrative form is viewed as 
providing a richer understanding of mechanisms at play than quantitative 
approaches.  
 
1.3.3 Epidemiological Approaches   
Historically, Epidemiology is a scientific offshoot of medicine (Susser, 1985). 
Despite ecological origins (as environments and community characteristics 
were identified as principal drivers of infectious disease through the 19th and 
early 20th-century) over time, emphasis in epidemiology has shifted to focus 
on individual, biological determinants of health (Diez-Roux, 1998; Pearce, 
1996). Authors approaching HIDR from the structuralist perspective have 
criticised epidemiology for what they perceive as an overt individualistic 
epistemology. This criticism may seem odd, as epidemiology is the study of 
populations (Last, 2001).  However, epidemiological populations are 
typically conceived as simple aggregates of individuals, with analytical 
emphasis on individualised measures of difference (Shim, 2002; Diez-Roux, 
1998; Pearce, 1996; Krieger, 1994). Social variables are routinely 
investigated, but are typically individualised, operationalised as if analogous 
to characteristics such as age or gender (McMichael, 1999). Nevertheless, it 
is possible to investigate extra-individual determinants via epidemiological 
methods (this is the goal of social epidemiology, a growing sub-
specialisation within epidemiology discussed in the next chapter). As norms 
governing the ‘proper’ use of scientific methods are socially determined and 
sustained (Barnes, 1982), disentangling the epistemology of methods from 
epistemological commitments held by researchers requires careful analysis. 
Such analysis is one goal of this thesis.  
 
1.3.4 Intermediate positions   
Tension regarding the importance of individual and social determinants 
within HIDR includes ground well-trod as part of the structure and agency 
debate (Frolich & Potvin, 2010), including perspectives attempting to 
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balance the individual and the social, and positions from which one is 
understood to dominate. This summary would be incomplete without 
acknowledgement of the intermediate position, perhaps more common in 
practice than either extreme, which allows for both individually- and 
socially-located determinants of health. However, rather than resolving the 
structure-agency question, this raises the question of how (or whether) 
researchers manage the intermingling of determinants operating at different 
levels (individual, environmental, social) in designing research projects. Also 
unclear is the extent to which the methods employed to manage these 
multiple ‘levels’ reflect researchers’ understandings and beliefs about the 
causes of health equity.  
1.4 Tension within HIDR  
 
In the 1990s, researchers favouring structural, sociological explanations for 
health inequalities were increasingly frustrated by perceived research focus 
on individual-level factors, characterised by some (Kelly & Charlton, 1992; 
Stott & Kinnersley et al, 1994) as ‘victim blaming’. Several researchers 
directed criticism toward methodologies used to generate individual-level 
explanations, especially the collection of methods known as risk-factor 
epidemiology (Williams, 2003).  
Writing from a structural, ecological perspective, Nancy Krieger (1994) 
views the biomedical individualism underpinning epidemiology as 
problematic, leading to a focus on behavioural explanations at the expense 
of wider forces shaping the ‘web’ of individual risk-factors. Medical 
sociologist Leonard Syme similarly rejected individual, behavioural 
explanations for health inequalities in his article “To Prevent Disease” 
(Syme, 1996). British sociologist Jenny Popay and colleagues (1998) 
expressed disappointment that “by far the most numerous of the studies 
directed at understanding inequalities in health have been focused on 
exploring the role of [individual] risk factors” (p622), arguing that 
epidemiological frameworks in general, and risk-factor epidemiology in 
particular “fail to capture the complexity of causal explanation in the health 
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inequalities field” due to neglect of social structures (Popay et al, 1998: 
p.627).  
Over 20 years after the publication of “To Prevent Disease”, Syme published 
a paper with a very similar title, articulating an identical set of frustrations 
with the dominant model of population health (Syme, 2007). Tension 
between individual and social accounts of health equity apparent in the 
1990’s seem to have persisted throughout intervening decades. In a recent 
study, one academic interviewee referred to the expectation that research 
about inequalities should be conducted via quantitative, epidemiological 
methods as an intellectual “straightjacket” (Garthwaite et al., 2016: p.466).  
A schism within HIDR is therefore apparent, and might be crudely sketched 
as consisting of researchers with social science training on one side and 
‘risk factor epidemiologists’ on the other. Understanding the 
epistemological basis of this tension and its impact on interdisciplinary 
collaboration is one goal of this thesis.  
Positioning health economics within this dynamic is not straightforward, as 
economics is a social science but has its own particular epistemology, and 
is overwhelmingly dominated by quantitative methods, to be explored 
further in Section 1.6, following a brief review of empirical studies 
concerned directly with HIDR. 
1.5 Empirical studies of HIDR  
 
Smith and Eltanani (2014) describe understanding division among health 
inequalities researchers as being “crucial to understanding the difficulties of 
trying to achieve evidence-informed policy” to combat inequity in health 
(Smith & Eltanani, 2014: p.567). To my knowledge, all existing studies of 
HIDR have occurred within the UK, and have focused on the relationship 
between HIDR and the UK policy context (Bartley, 1992; Smith, 2008; 
Smith, 2013; Smith & Eltanani, 2014; Garthwaite et al, 2016). These studies 
have variously identified division within academic HIDR relating to  (1) 
political-ideological outlook/position; (2) methodological approach; and (3) 
medical credentials/status.  
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Bartley (1992) focused on debates about the impact of unemployment on 
health (an important strand of early HIDR within the UK) and analysed the 
academic and policy contexts within which the first evidence that 
employment status impacts health was produced. Bartley identified three 
key (academic) communities; “Statisticians working on public health 
issues... Economists involved in work on either health or labour market 
issues [and] medical sociologists” (ibid: p.217) and concluded that friction 
between these groups established a series of boundary disputes inside 
government and academia, as the epistemology and professional 
ideologies of each group influenced their position in relation to ‘the facts’ 
about unemployment and health. Medical doctors emerged as a fourth 
important group, with policy influence not accessible to other disciplines. 
Bartley concluded that it appears difficult for any non-medical discipline to 
gain 'secure status' in medical research (p.130), especially where the 
problem of health inequity is framed (politically) as relating to the supply of 
medical care, rather than to upstream (social) policy.  
Bartley presents economists (documented as actively establishing and 
nurturing political alliances and providing rapid, conclusive ‘answers’ to 
stakeholders) as the “natural competitor” of the epidemiologist and 
biostatistician (p.176), for whom cautious interpretation, scientific accuracy 
and objectivity were the highest priority. Bartley argues that individualist, 
behavioural accounts of poor health among the unemployed gained 
influence as a result of this entrepreneurial activity by health economists. 
Where she anticipated that her study would validate anecdotal claims that 
‘the media’ were the originators of individualist accounts, her analysis led 
her to conclude that:  
“It was the entrepreneurial activities of some economists, their established 
alliances and new enrolments which they sought, which produced an 
account of the poor health of the unemployed as a product of individual 
characteristics” (p.222) 
Bartley documented a clear split, along disciplinary lines, on the question of 
whether poor health outcomes among the unemployed are explained by the 
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causal, upstream impact of unemployment on health (as argued by 
epidemiologists and biostatisticians) or by the selection of unhealthy people 
into unemployment, or unemployed people consuming more health-harming 
products such as tobacco and alcohol (as was argued by some 
economists).  
This debate never fully resolved, with both individual and structural 
perspectives persisting. As many actors from both sides of the debate 
moved into HIDR (e.g. Alex Scott-Samuel, Adrian Sinfield, Adam Wagstaff, 
Jennie Popay) it is possible that this dynamic persists. However, no study to 
date has attempted to articulate, investigate or understand the precise 
epistemological tensions between economics, sociology and 
epidemiology/biostatistics in present-day HIDR, a gap this thesis seeks to 
address.  
Smith (2008) analysed policy documents and interviewed 61 individuals (25 
academics, 36 non-academics) to investigate the extent to which evidence 
about health inequalities had travelled into policy in England and Scotland, 
in the decade following the 1997 election of the Labour government. 
Smith found that notions of credibility appeared to vary in important ways 
across academic groups, and that ‘perceptions about the political and 
ideological commitments of researchers’ (p.189) were central to 
interviewees’ sense of who had credibility and who was an ‘amateur’. 
Smith’s interviewees were keen to spell out their own political values, 
revealing political and ideological division among the UK-based academics 
interviewed. This division extended to the extent to which academics felt it 
important to engage directly with policy processes, or to work at arm’s 
length from policy, preserving scientific ‘objectivity’. In addition to political 
ideology, credibility was connected to some methodological approaches, 
and not others. No interviewee in Smith’s study subscribed to a ‘hierarchy 
of evidence’ (Petticrew & Roberts, 2003) but most interviewees displayed a 
clear preference for quantitative methods, and some were dismissive of 
qualitative methods. As in Bartley’s study, a split was apparent between 
medical and non-medical academics, and physicians were described as 
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having ‘higher status’ (Smith, 2008: p.193). The relationship between 
disciplinary and political identity was complex in this study, but at least 
some of the scientific boundary work seemed to relate to political-
ideological divisions (i.e. researchers who found other research politically or 
ideologically problematic tended to work to undermine the scientific and 
methodological credibility of that work). 
 
In an expansion of her 2008 study, Smith (2013) compared health 
inequalities research to tobacco control research, to tease out the 
complexity of the research-policy interface in population health and to 
highlight distinction and division among academics regarding orientation 
toward policy makers, and the role of government. Relevant to this thesis is 
the prominence of medicalised framings of population health in UK policy 
settings, which Smith illustrates as powerfully shaping the kind of evidence 
favoured in policy contexts. Medical framings of population health were 
apparent institutionally in two ways. First, in the structure and division of 
policy responsibility (health inequalities policy being an issue for resolution 
via health policy, not housing, education, or budgetary policy). Second, the 
medical framing was embedded within the efforts of disease-specific third-
sector organisations lobbying for focus on particular diseases (and the 
absence of any organised lobbying effort for the social determinants of 
health). Understanding the extent to which similar division is apparent within 
academic HIDR is one aim of this thesis.  
Smith’s (2013) data also pointed to tension between researchers with and 
without medical qualifications, and further division was evident between 
researchers strongly preferring quantitative (preferably experimental) 
research and others who desired more interdisciplinary collaboration, 
including qualitative methods.  
However, where Smith’s studies (2008, 2013) highlighted the importance of 
researchers’ political and ideological views, Bartley (1992), despite setting 
out initially to investigate researchers’ political stance, concluded that 
disciplinary training was the more important factor in establishing and 
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sustaining division among researchers on the question of unemployment 
and health. Whilst my primary aim is not to understand researcher’s political 
views, this thesis provides an opportunity to investigate the balance and 
possible interplay between disciplinary training and researchers’ political 
stance.  
Crucially, all of the studies discussed in this section were restricted to the 
UK context, and HIDR is much larger than UK-based research activity 
(Cash-Gibson et al., 2018). This thesis presents an opportunity to 
investigate the extent to which these divisions, consistent in the UK across 
multiple decades, are apparent in other contexts.   
Garthwaite and colleagues (2016) reinforced the conclusions of these earlier 
studies with the results of fourteen focus groups involving participants 
engaged in HIDR, policy, practice or advocacy. Results revealed “obvious 
methodological tension within the multidisciplinary field of health 
inequalities” (p.466). Like Smith’s (2013) interviewees, some participants 
criticised the dominance of randomised controlled trials and classical 
epidemiological methods, arguing important questions cannot be 
addressed within that framework. Interestingly, a perception that 
economists were much better at engaging in ‘entrepreneurial activities’ (as 
identified by Bartley 20 years prior), emerged in focus groups, with one 
participant noting: 
“We’re not hugely public and most of us don’t write commentaries for 
newspapers or letters to the papers, or do those sorts of media things that 
economists do all the time” (Garthwaite et al., p.471, emphasis added)  
The authors identified three ‘ideal types’ of health inequalities researcher, 
with distinct epistemological foundations: 
Policy-focused positivists expressed commitment to the pursuit of 
quantitative, experimental research to identify and evaluate effective 
interventions. This type of researcher prioritised scientific 
independence and methodological rigour over opportunity to engage 
with policymakers.  
Empathetic Ethnographers felt that HIDR needed to pivot in the 
direction of better understanding the lived experience of health 
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inequalities, studying what inequalities mean in peoples’ social 
worlds, and publishing the thoughts of those experiencing 
disadvantage.  
Critical Materialists expressed a desire that HIDR move away from 
attempts to elucidate the precise pathways by which the SDoH 
contribute to poor health, and instead focus on documenting the 
extent of inequalities, identifying actors influencing important 
decisions and describing important power relations.  
The Policy-focused Positivists seem reminiscent of the medical statisticians 
described by Bartley, who deeply valued scientific rigour and felt that 
maintaining scientific standards was more important than active political 
engagement. The epistemological commitments of this group appear to 
generally correspond with epidemiology, however this cannot be stated for 
certain since the focus of this study was methodological (rather than 
disciplinary). The Empathetic Ethnographers expressed concerns similar to 
some participants interviewed by Smith (2013), and also to Syme (1996, 
2007) and Popay (1998) when they expressed a desire for ‘better’ 
interdisciplinary work including qualitative methods. The commitments of 
this group seem to align with a sociological epistemology. It is unclear where 
the final type of researcher, the Critical Materialist should fit. The political 
focus of these researchers suggests political scientists (and members of 
related disciplines) are also important contributors within HIDR.  
Within Garthwaite’s study (and others discussed in this section) ‘disciplinary 
training’ is a resource in explanation, invoked to make sense of attitudes 
expressed by researchers, not the subject of specific study. This thesis aims 
to move beyond appeals to disciplinary training as an explanatory factor that 
contributes to understanding divisions in researchers’ preferences. Instead, 
in this project, disciplinary training is the central factor of interest, itself 
considered worthy of dedicated analysis and understanding.   
1.6 The Economic Approach  
 
Bartley’s (1992) conclusions point to economics as being an influential 
discipline, and economists as being somehow different to other academics 
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involved in HIDR. However, direct, critical engagement with economic 
theory is limited within the HIDR literature, and beyond one discussant 
labelling media engagement as a ‘thing economists do’, was not reported 
as a major theme in Garthwaite’s (2016) focus groups.  How does the 
economic approach to health inequalities differ from the sociological or 
epidemiological approach, and what is the consequence of such difference?  
A debate at the turn of the new millennium provided a glimpse into how an 
economic approach to HIDR might differ from sociological or 
epidemiological perspectives. The groundwork for this controversy was laid 
in the 1980's with the proposal (Illsley & Le Grand, 1987) that econometric 
methods (useful for the study of income distributions), could be extended to 
studying distributions of health. Le Grand (1987) suggested that the 
traditional approach of analysing health differences between social groups 
was vulnerable to “the vagaries of classification schemes” (p.183) and that a 
complementary approach could be borrowed from econometrics, focusing 
on the distribution of life expectancy among individuals, rather than on 
differences in average life expectancy between socially-defined groups. Le 
Grand clarified that this alternate method does not answer the same kind of 
question as traditional approaches, but nevertheless went on to articulate 
the somewhat explosive claim that health inequality in Britain was “low” in 
1982, and had decreased over time; a direct conflict with the government-
commissioned Black Report’s (1980) claim that inequality was significant, 
and had increased. Interestingly, this tension did not precipitate debate 
about the definition of health inequalities across disciplinary lines. The 
majority of the citations of this work prior to 1997 were attracted as part of a 
related but different debate about whether inequality in income directly 
causes inequality in health, a debate which continues today and will feature 
in this thesis.  
The distinct character of econometric approaches resurfaced in 2000, when 
a section of the WHO led by economist Emauella Gakidou proposed that 
“the quantity of interest for studying health inequality is the distribution of 
health expectancy across individuals in the population” (Gakidou, Murray & 
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Frenk, 2000:p.42). Gakidou and colleagues argued for a conceptual and 
operational approach which focused on individual difference, as was 
suggested by Illsley and Le Grand. The “World Health Report” (WHO, 2000) 
examined the distribution of health via measurement of what it termed 
“pure” health inequalities: differences in health outcomes between all 
possible pairs of ungrouped individuals. This stimulated a spirited exchange 
between researchers within the WHO and a group of HIDR academics, 
revealing epistemological commitments on both sides.  
Paula Braveman, Nancy Krieger and John Lynch (2000) took issue with the 
description of inequalities between individuals as ‘pure’, and described the 
individual measure as “a technical solution that discards key questions” 
(ibid p.78). Braveman and colleagues expressed concern about the ethical 
perspective underpinning the individual measure, and found the underlying 
question (‘what factors differ between individuals with better and worse 
health?’) restrictive, and inadequate for setting public health priorities.  
The architects of the new measure responded by characterising it as a 
“better” dependent variable for the investigation of health inequality, and 
asserting that it facilitates a “more rigorous” analysis of the social 
determinants, although no explicit justification was provided for these 
claims (Murray, Gakidou & Frenk, 2000). The defence of the new method, far 
more technical in tone than the impassioned critique of Braveman et al to 
which it responded, seemed to be underpinned by an underlying belief that 
understanding health inequalities between individuals is a more valid 
scientific endeavour than identifying factors which explain social inequalities 
in health. Murray and colleagues (2000) dismissed Braveman’s anxiety that 
examining the distribution of health among individuals could result in HIDR 
dropping off the policy agenda, and also rejected Braveman’s claim that 
inequalities between rich and poor will not be fully captured by this new 
approach. The logic of these claims is clearly not apparent to Braveman, 
Krieger and Lynch, and the whole exchange seems to suggest two groups 
of researchers understanding health equity (and, perhaps, “health” and 
“equity) in fundamentally different ways.   
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This debate about measurement is a variant of the 'individual vs social 
causes' debate. The new measure detected differences between pairs of 
(atomised) individuals, in contrast to traditional approaches which group 
individuals according to social variables. An individualist ontology is 
detectable in the writing of Gakidou and colleagues, who question the value 
of knowledge about socially-defined groups. This particular debate is 
interesting because it is not an example of the well documented 
qualitative/quantitative divide within population health (Baum, 1995; Krieger, 
2000), but represents diversity of epistemology among quantitative 
researchers, along disciplinary lines. The surrounding discourse is also 
suggestive. Marmot (2001) characterised the debate as being between 
economists, to whom this kind of analysis “seems logical”,  and “the rest of 
us” (p.1167) defining health inequalities as occurring between social groups. 
This othering of economists and economic ideas by one of the most 
influential HIDR scholars is telling, and combines with the limited 
engagement with economic theory in published HIDR literature to suggests 
that economic approaches are viewed as somehow distant or disconnected 
from other health equity scholarship. This may be partly explained by the 
belief (documented by Smith, 2015) that particular market and growth-
orientated discourses have tremendous power, and are insurmountable in 
policy settings. Whilst the economic epistemology is not wholly comprised 
of these discourses, the view that ‘economics’ is an obstacle to policy 
progress may explain the apparent reluctance to engage with economic 
theory, in research settings.  
1.7 Research Question & Thesis outline  
 
This chapter introduced the topic of the thesis, and discussed diverse 
approaches to one kind of population health research: health inequalities 
and disparities research (HIDR). Studies from the UK suggest that 
disciplinary training potentially helps to explain why certain debates have 
arisen and persisted within HIDR, rather than resolving. However, 
epistemological tensions have not been explored in detail, and disciplinary 
training has not been positioned as a specific focus of study. Existing 
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studies suggest the disciplines of sociology, economics and epidemiology 
have informed the thinking of authors who have made substantive 
contributions to the study of health equity. This published material 
combines with my own experience working in academic departments of 
economics and epidemiology (and now, more recently, social science) to 
suggest that these three disciplines conceptualise the determinants of 
health, and the processes by which these determinants lead to unequal 
health outcomes in fundamentally different ways, potentially limiting 
associated dialogue.  
Coming into the PhD program I assumed that existing literature would 
provide me with established reviews of and analytical approaches toward 
the role of disciplinary training in research, and my task would be the 
application of existing ideas and methods to HIDR. I quickly discovered that 
this fundamental work has not been undertaken, suggesting that the role of 
disciplinary training in the design, execution and interpretation of research is 
a neglected research topic (explored in the next chapter). In this thesis, I 
aim to contribute to the development of this area, and also to examine the 
ways disciplinary training shapes the questions researchers ask and answer 
within HIDR. Investigation and analysis in this thesis is therefore guided by 
the following main research question:  
What is the substance and consequence of disciplinary difference in 
research about health equity?  
 
This question is explored via a mixture of quantitative (bibliometric) and 
qualitative (interview) methods, drawing on data from diverse geographic 
and institutional settings. The thesis provides rich empirical data exploring 
the ways researchers with different disciplinary training approach the study 
of health equity, and population health more broadly. The question is 
approached analytically via three aims:  
Aim 1: Identify the blend of formal disciplinary training present among health 
equity researchers, enabling analysis of the distribution of disciplines across 
the research area 
Aim 2: Explore diversity in epistemological approaches to health equity 
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research, including considering how such diversity corresponds with 
disciplinary background, manifests in the design and evaluation of research 
studies, and intersects with other factors. 
Aim 3: Assess the impact of disciplinary differences on interdisciplinary and 
collaborative research efforts within HIDR. 
Before moving on to situate the thesis in the broader literature connected to 
the study of disciplines, this chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis. 
First, a brief note on terminology: The Anglo-Saxon world distinguishes 
between science and the humanities, whereas many European countries do 
not (Weingart, 2012). When referring to 'science' in this thesis, I include all 
areas of systematic research, as in the German 'Wissenschaft'.  
1.7.1 Thesis outline  
 
Chapter 2 steps away from health-related research to situate the thesis 
within a set of overlapping literatures considering, to varying extents, the 
role of disciplines within science. Chapter 3 is a brief statement of 
methodology, providing a rationale for the combination of ideas and 
concepts in my analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 present the specific research 
methods I apply, including discussion of challenges and mishaps. The thesis 
contains 5 empirical chapters, Chapters 6-10. Chapter 6 presents the results 
of a bibliometric analysis which maps the field of HIDR, and illustrates the 
diversity of participating disciplines, as well as the distributions of these 
disciplines in citation-space. In chapters 7 and 8 I draw on qualitative 
interview data to explore, in detail, the extent to which the disciplinary 
diversity suggested by the bibliometric analysis corresponds with diverse 
approaches to research conduct, evaluation and design.  Chapter 9 focuses 
on use of statistical methods, and interpretation of statistical results. 
Chapter 10 considers the implications of the findings presented in Chapters 
6-9 for interdisciplinary research, and details the benefits and challenges of 
collaborating across disciplinary boundaries. Chapter 11 draws together the 
findings, to summarise the key epistemological and practical differences 
between disciplines, and to position these insights with the literature. The 
thesis concludes with a discussion of this PhD project's contribution to the 
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Chapter 2: Studying Disciplines, Background & Key 
Concepts  
[The] modern system of scientific disciplines […] is one of the truly 
innovative social structures of the modern world.   
Stichweh, History of Scientific Disciplines (2001:p.13,729) 
2.1 Introduction: Considering disciplines  
 
Anecdotally, a host of ills are attributed to ‘disciplinary difference’ in 
research, but the substance of this difference cannot be easily located in the 
population health literature. A literature search for the co-occurrence of the 
terms “disciplinary difference” and “health” is overwhelmingly dominated by 
research on disciplinary variability in teaching practice and student attitudes.  
In clinical spaces, multidisciplinary teams are an established and well-
studied feature of the landscape, however the motives, incentives and 
challenges for a team delivering care are not necessarily the same as a team 
conducting research.   
 
In this chapter I introduce and review existing empirical approaches to 
the study of disciplinary difference, and the established insights upon which 
this thesis builds. After briefly reviewing the history of disciplined science in 
Section 2, in Section 3 I discuss four challenges which complicate the 
conceptualisation and empirical study of disciplines. In Section 4 I introduce 
four (disciplined) strands of research which have generated the insights, 
theories and concepts I draw upon; Sociology of Professions, Higher 
Education research, Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Science and 
Technology Studies. In Section 5 I briefly present relevant concepts from the 
study of interdisciplinary research, and in Section 6 I discuss literature 
arguing against my claim that disciplines are an important feature of modern 






2.2 The Origins of Disciplined Science 
The structures now recognised as scientific disciplines have existed for 
roughly two centuries. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the disciplina 
performed an archival function, representing: 
“a place where one deposits knowledge after having found it out […] not an 
active system for the production of knowledge.” Stichweh, 2001: p13,728 
Sciences, rather than being configured as a set of disciplines independently 
producing knowledge, were configured as a hierarchical sequence 
(Stichweh, 2001; Weingart, 2012) which individual scientists sought to scale. 
This hierarchy was chiefly contained and navigated within national 
Academies of Science, the dominant scientific institutions of the era. 
However, as scientific activity became increasingly concerned with the 
generation, collection and analysis of data (rather than the documentation 
and interpretation of naturally occurring events) the sheer quantity of 
information, analysis and commentary would eventually overwhelm these 
generalist scientific structures.   
In the final decades of the 18th century, scientists began to specialise in and 
organise around particular problems and sets of concepts (De Solla Price, 
1963). Such specialisation required a supportive social context, and the 
educational system provided a setting within which such specialised roles 
could be institutionalised as occupations (Stichweh, 2001). Therefore, the 
emergence of disciplines in science was closely coupled to the increasingly 
structured nature of higher education throughout the 19th century. 
Institutionally, scientific activity began to shift from societies and academies 
into universities (Weingart, 2012). One consequence of this shift was the 
‘closure’ of scientific communication: that which was previously presented 
for the general public was increasingly written for the exclusive consumption 
of fellow scientists.  
Scientific communication also began to take new forms. Where in the early- 
and mid-18th century a dizzying array of publication formats were evident 
(Bazerman, 1988), in the 1780s, French, German and (later) English 
 
41 
specialised journals emerged (Stichweh, 2001) and the structure of scientific 
text became more uniform. In this way, disciplinary communities of 
specialists also became communities of authors. By 1850, rather than 
scaling the hierarchy of faculties, authors were building a new kind of 
intellectual career, a disciplinary career which typically demanded migration 
between universities for advancement, rather than movement between 
departments of a single institution. 
This increasing specialisation and movement of scientists between 
institutions occasioned social change. Members no longer (necessarily) 
knew each other personally, and it became challenging to remain up-to-date 
with publications in a particular field. The fragmented state of science is the 
subject of frequent commentary (Porter & Rafols, 2009), however this is not 
a recent development: 
“A thousand busy ants are producing daily countless details… only 
concerned to attract attention for a moment and obtain the best price for 
their goods […] [the] stream of discovery is split into evermore and 
evermore unimportant trickles"  
Emil Du Bois Reymond, 1886:p450  
While the ‘stream’ of discovery continues to split (Leydesdorff et al., 2013), 
very few empirical studies supply detailed accounts of the growth of a 
discipline and subsequent specialisation within it (Weingart, 2012). This may 
be because disciplines are challenging to confront as research objects. In 
the next section I outline specific challenges which complicate the study of 
disciplines. 
2.3 Five Challenges to a Straightforward Study of 
Disciplines 
 
The preceding review illustrates the plural functions of academic disciplines. 
At a basic level, disciplines are unit-divisions of knowledge, but also 
communication systems, educational systems, professional accreditation 
systems and systems of socialisation. It is via these diverse activities that 
disciplines are stabilised within institutions, and within society more broadly 
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(Stichweh, 2001). However, this plurality poses significant challenge in 
analysis, and may partly explain why there is no coherent theory of 
disciplines, no well-defined “Discipline Studies” literature.  
The systematic study of scientific activity has many names, ranging from the 
long-established History of Science and Philosophy of Science, to the more 
recently established (and biomedically dominated) ‘Meta-Science’. These 
fields ask questions about science for the purpose of reaching diverse goals 
(for example, to chronicle, to contrast, to understand or to change scientific 
behaviour). A recently-established thread of enquiry describes the 
challenges and professional (dis)incentives for interdisciplinary work 
(discussed in Section 5). However, the conceptualisation of ‘discipline’ in 
this area is sometimes glossed over en route to definition of inter-, multi-, 
and trans- disciplinarity: 
The main problem with the notion of ‘interdisciplinarity’ seems to be that 
many people who use it do not make explicit what exactly they understand 
under a discipline or when exactly a disciplinary boundary is crossed with 
what kind of consequence.  
Krishnan, 2009:p6 
In sum, even into the 21st century, studying disciplines is “not altogether 
straightforward” (Becher & Trowler, 2001). Multiple authors refer to “the 
challenge” or “the problem” of studying disciplines (Hyland 2004, Becher & 
Trowler, 2001; Krishnan, 2009; Bazerman, 1988), and much of this 
discussion centres upon the heterogeneous nature of disciplines and the 
lack of universal criteria for their identification and categorisation. I review 
this challenge in detail below, as well as four others that I view as 
complicating the conceptualisation of disciplines in empirical study. 
2.3.1 Recognising Disciplines 
A diverse array of terms (domain, field, specialisation, specialism, sub-
specialism, sub-discipline, segment) signals the challenge of neatly 
identifying and defining disciplines and their parts. A popular and 
straightforward approach involves searching for institutional markers. Since 
institutional (i.e departmental) support for disciplines is usually essential 
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(Weingart, 2012), and the presence of specialised journals a key step in the 
development of disciplines (Kuhn, 1970), the existence of departments and 
journals is presented as a method for identifying disciplines (Evans, 1995). 
Indeed, as Giddens (1976) suggested, social structures exist only through 
manifestation in practice, and so attention to material manifestations seems 
sensible. This is the view of disciplines quite recently presented by Higher 
Education researcher Paul Trowler, whose empirical treatment of disciplines 
has evolved over 15 years writing on the topic (see Section 2.4).  
 Disciplines become apparent in their playing out in the world, in the 
process of institutionalisation and in the discursive and other practices 
which give them substance. Trowler (2014:p.1721)   
Trowler terms this a moderate essentialist view of disciplines, drawing upon 
Wittgenstein to present local instances of academic disciplines as displaying 
a strong ‘Family Resemblance’ originating from their ‘common background 
knowledge about key figures, conflicts and achievements’ (Trowler, 2014:p6) 
, whilst also allowing for the analytical treatment of disciplines as complex, 
dynamic and contextually-dependent social phenomena. I adopt this view of 
disciplines in this thesis. Trowler (2014) also draws attention to the ways in 
which disciplines as social-structures can wield substantial generative 
power, the power to shape surrounding social structures and social practice. 
This is significant for research practice, if accurate. However, as I discuss in 
Sections 2.4 and 2.6, this attribute of disciplines is debated within some 
literatures. 
The view of disciplines as flexible social structures does not necessarily 
imply that they are fragile. Disciplines (especially the large, old disciplines of 
interest in this thesis) are remarkably stable, representing social facts 
(Bazerman, 1988) with which scientists must reckon, and within which 
scientists are obliged to set their careers, despite the current push for 
interdisciplinarity (Lyall, 2019). 
Some scholars have argued that using institutional markers for the purpose 
of identifying disciplines is inappropriate, or sub-optimal, because the 
appropriate focus is the sub-specialty or specialism: 
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Specialist areas or segments seem to offer the most appropriate analytic 
currency […] The heart of the academic enterprise is the specialist field. 
Becher and Trowler, 2001: p64 
 
Undoubtedly, specialisms are the social site of knowledge construction. 
One reason there is so little literature about ‘disciplines’ may be that 
scientific controversy tends to be a major focus for scholarship (Rudwick, 
1985; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Bloor, 2011), and controversy typically arises 
within disciplinary specialties, not within ‘disciplines’. 
However, specialisms frequently lack the concrete institutional markers of 
established disciplines (e.g., medicine and economics), and these sub-
disciplinary units are, upon examination, themselves fragmented into what 
has been termed ’segments’ (Bucher & Strauss, 1961) further complicating 
analysis. Much conjecture regarding the analytical primacy of disciplines, 
sub-disciplines, specialisms and segments has proceeded under the 
assumption that big, old, concrete disciplines are relatively unimportant, and 
exercise limited influence. For example, Becher & Trowler (2001) agree with 
Chubin (1976) that the ‘Specialty’ is a useful concept 
“whose various representations capture better than conventional units of 
analysis, especially “disciplines”, the process and structure of research”  
(Chubin, 1976: p.73) 
Whilst understanding specialisms is important, and limiting the scope of 
enquiry to ‘disciplines’ introduces limitations for exploring the reality of 
science-in-action, it is surely unlikely that disciplines contribute nothing to 
the process and structure of research. However, the strong focus on 
specialisms in the empirical literature might suggest that disciplinary 
structures provide only mute institutional background to activities shaped 
wholly by sub-disciplinary, specialist concerns.  
In this thesis I take the existence of “disciplines” as given, visibilised via 
institutional markers. This is sufficient for my purpose because the 
disciplines under study here (such as epidemiology, sociology and 
economics) are well-established and do exhibit institutional, concrete 
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markers such as departments, professorial chairs and journals. Beyond this, 
I take an inductive approach to the detection of sub-disciplinary units, 
described in Chapter 4. I do not assume whether, how or to what extent 
‘parent’ disciplines exert influence over the content, process and structure 
of specialised research activity, as understanding this is one aim of the 
thesis. 
2.3.2 A fragmented, disciplined literature 
A further challenge to the approach and definition of disciplines stems from 
the disciplined, conceptually fragmented nature of the literature regarding 
disciplines, produced from what Krishnan (2009) refers to as diverse 
‘paradigmatic angles’. The conceptualisation of disciplines depends on the 
discipline of the thinker, and on the purpose for which they are reaching for 
disciplinary behaviour or identity as a topic or analytical resource (Biagioli, 
2009). The various directions from which disciplines have been approached 
include the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, Science and Technology 
Studies, Philosophy of Science , History of Science , English for Academic 
Purposes, Higher Education Studies, and the Sociology of Professions. 
Each disciplinary group has brought its own concepts, theories and aims to 
the study of disciplines, and for this reason there has been a significant 
amount of overlap and ‘re-inventing the wheel’ (Shapin, 1995). This is not 
necessarily a problem, as the plural social function of disciplines described 
in Section 2 suggests the study of disciplines may benefit from (or even 
require) a combination of analytical lenses. This point is made by Shiela 
Jasanoff, referring to the study of multi-disciplinary domains: 
“The traditional disciplines encounter frictions in their efforts to focus on 
phenomena… that seem to demand investigation from multiple 
perspectives.” (Jasanoff, 2012: p204) 
Therefore, in my approach to disciplines I draw on multiple bodies of 
scholarship. As my aim is empirical, to encounter disciplines as they 
manifest within health equity scholarship, I draw primarily upon strands 
which contain examples of empirical study of research contexts; chiefly, the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, Science and Technology Studies and 
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Higher Education Research. Among these, the thesis is grounded 
intellectually within the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, as practiced 
within what is referred to as the Strong Programme (‘Strong Programme 
SSK’, discussed in Section 4). 
Contributions from other disciplines (Philosophy of science, History of 
Science, English for Academic Purposes) enter the thesis via their overlap 
with these three fields. For example, English For Academic purposes, a sub-
specialisation of linguistics, contributes to my conceptualisation of 
disciplines via examples which overlap with the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge and Science and Technology Studies. I discuss the theoretical 
basis upon which such diverse traditions can be coherently combined in the 
next chapter. 
2.3.3 The Cognitive and The Social 
Once identified, there is the question of where a discipline begins and ends. 
While the knowledge produced by a discipline (frequently termed ’the 
cognitive’) is closely coupled to disciplinary community and culture (‘the 
social’), these are not one and the same (Kuhn, 1970). Said another way, the 
“tribe” is not the “territory” (Becher & Trowler, 2001). Disentangling analysis 
of disciplinary knowledge from the community generating and evaluating 
that knowledge is a major challenge, and also the site of disagreement 
between fields (Shapin, 1995). Specifically, diversity is apparent concerning 
the extent to which the separation of cognitive from social is desirable, 
and/or achievable. This diversity has clear disciplinary underpinnings, which 
I unpack below. 
Within the Philosophy of Science it has been uncontroversial to separate 
scientific reasoning (‘the cognitive’) from the social influence upon science 
(‘the social’) and viewed as desirable to draw a bright line between what is 
‘external’ to science and what is ‘internal’. This distinction was especially 
bright within the logical positivist tradition, wherein science is viewed as 
being guided by rationalism or logic (and not by social or cultural influences). 
A key development in the 20th century was the emergence of a descriptive 
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history of science as counterpoint to this normative philosophy of science 
(discussed in Section 4), which pushed against idealised models of how 
science should be practiced in favour of accounts describing how science is 
practiced. The normative slant endures within the Philosophy of Science 
(Kaiser, 2019), although more recently, the field has undergone what has 
been referred to as a “practice turn” (Soler et al., 2014), with increasing 
consensus that “philosophical theories about science must account for how 
science actually is done” (Kaiser, 2019:p.36). Thus, ‘Philosophy of Science in 
Practice’ has emerged as a sub-specialty within the Philosophy of Science 
(Ankeny et al., 2011). Despite this development and increasing attention to 
social norms in science, a normative undercurrent remains detectable. 
Kaiser (2019) notes that much of this work proceeds on the basis of 
normative assumptions, including assumptions about what constitute 
“good” examples of scientific practice. Similarly, descriptive, empirical 
studies are often rounded out with (normative) advice about how science 
should be conducted (Woodward, 2005; Craver, 2007), suggesting that the 
cognitive and the social continue to stand as separate, separable 
phenomena within the Philosophy of Science, and that ‘the social’ remains 
positioned as an unfortunate contaminant of ‘the cognitive’. 
 
In Higher Education studies, the cognitive and the social tend to be 
conceptualised as separate, however the utility of this separation in analysis 
is actively questioned. Becher and Trowler (2001:p.30) discuss ‘inter-
relationships between cognitive and social aspects of the academic 
enterprise’ while noting that it is extremely challenging to analyse these 
separately, or to determine a single direction of influence. Becher (1987) 
concluded 15 years earlier that “it is not productive to try and separate 
them” in analysis. Nevertheless, ‘they’ (plural) are understood to exist as 
theoretically distinguishable objects. 
 
In contrast, some scholars within the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and 
History of Science take a stronger position, challenging the 




“The problem of cognitive order is the problem of social order […] These are 
not two things […] they are one thing described from different points of 
view" (Bloor, 2011: p5) 
Here, disciplinary knowledge is itself viewed as a product and manifestation 
of socially-situated norms and forces.  
These conceptual differences reflect the differing fundamental commitments 
of the disciplines participating in research about disciplines, and further 
amplify the disciplined character of the literature surrounding disciplines, 
minimising the extent to which authors in one disciplinary strand can apply 
concepts or draw upon insights from the other strands. 
2.3.4 The Dominance of Physics & Natural Sciences 
Not all disciplines have enjoyed the same degree of empirical enquiry 
(Becher, 1987; Swales, 2001). Physics, while itself containing a diverse set of 
sub-specialties, has received an outsized focus compared to other 
disciplines (Bazerman, 1988; Trowler, 2014). This may be because of its 
status as the “queen” of sciences through the mid-to-late 20th century 
(Hacking, 2002). Many empirical studies focus exclusively on physics 
(Galison, 1997; De Lozano & Cardenas, 2002; Bloor, 2011; Shapin & 
Schaffer, 1985) or include physics among a small number of other 
disciplines (Ruscio, 1987; Becher, 1987; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). Disciplines 
other than physics are typically natural or biomedical sciences (e.g. Knorr-
Cetina, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Gilbert et al., 1984; Rudwick, 1985) 
leaving the social sciences and applied fields quite thinly represented. 
Whether and to what extent concepts and conclusions from case studies of 
physics (and natural sciences) can be unproblematically extended to the 
social sciences, or to applied disciplines like Epidemiology, is therefore 
unclear. 
2.3.5 Disciplinary Contexts: Research, Teaching and Practice 
Although the teaching and research contexts are connected (Barnes, 1982), 
and much research takes place in teaching settings, “disciplines as 
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articulated in a research context are different than when articulated in 
learning and teaching contexts” (Trowler, 2014: p1724, and also see Maton 
& Muller, 2007; Ashwin, 2009). Therefore, conclusions drawn about 
disciplines from the study of teaching may not necessarily transfer to 
research in a straightforward way, and it is important that studies of 
disciplinary difference are clear about the context(s) to which they relate. 
Philosophy of Science, History of Science and Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge have generally tended to focus on research contexts. Within 
Higher Education research, the empirical literature concerned with 
disciplines tends to focus on teaching (Neumann & Becher, 2002). However, 
studies of interdisciplinarity within Higher Education Research (discussed in 
Section 2.5) illustrate why teaching and research may be appropriately 
handled as separate academic domains. While interdisciplinary research is 
occurring (somewhat) and is generally recognised as valuable, 
interdisciplinary teaching remains a “nut” universities are trying to “crack” 
(Lyall, 2019). The incentives and reward structures driving interdisciplinary 
research do not appear to be driving interdisciplinary teaching, underscoring 
the separation of these activities within the academy, and perhaps pointing 
to diversity in the generative power of disciplines across contexts, even 
within a single institution. 
The same emphasis on educational contexts is present within the sub-
specialty of Linguistics known as English for Academic Purposes (EAP). In 
the edited volume “Academic Discourse Across Disciplines” (2004) Hyland 
makes a strong case for the role of disciplinary influence on the deployment 
of language in science, and the ways in which “rhetorical practices are 
inextricably related to the purposes of the disciplines” (Hyland, 2004: Ch1, 
p.36). However, in the same volume, Shaw (Ch3, p.103) notes that “much of 
the existing [EAP] literature is based on educational genres” such as 
Masters dissertations and PhD theses, leaving the analysis of research texts 
somewhat neglected. 
A third context within which disciplinary difference is relevant is that of 
“practice”. This last dimension seems particularly confused, as within the 
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Sociology of Knowledge, Science and Technology Studies and Philosophy 
of Science, “scientific practice” is typically employed as a synonym for 
research activity (E.g., Kuhn, 1962; Barnes, 1982; Knorr Cetina & 
Reichmann, 2015; Rudwick, 1985). This includes the diverse set of 
‘practices’ which make up research, including ‘social practice’ (Bloor, 2011), 
‘knowledge practice’ and ’expert practice’ (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), ‘craft’ and 
‘localised practices’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). However, “practice” may also 
refer specifically to applied research, set up in opposition to theoretical or 
pure research (Bloor, 2011:p.136 ; Becher & Trowler, 2001: Ch2). A further 
meaning concerns disciplines linked with vocational practice, such as 
Medicine, Teaching and Law (Campbell & Wiles, 1976; Becher & Trowler, 
2001:Ch3). Finally, within non-medical fields, studies of non-research 
practice might be identified via the term ‘professional practice’, however, in 
research about health, ‘practice’ refers typically to clinical practice and not 
to research, either pure or applied. 
Of course, there is no unified academic or scientific “practice”. However, 
such diverse meanings obstruct the straightforward mapping of concepts 
from one (disciplined) strand of research about disciplines onto another. 
This thesis is concerned exclusively with the research context, which may 
strike the reader as a narrow framing. I focus on research for two reasons; 
First, because the underlying cause of disciplinary difference is assumed to 
be located in the content and form of disciplinary knowledge, which, while 
perhaps evident in discussions of teaching and policy, originates from and is 
rooted most deeply within the research context. 
Second, for the disciplines involved with the study of population health, 
disciplinary knowledge (as constructed within the research domain) is the 
well from which a discipline’s generative power is drawn. It is no accident 
that disciplines are generally referred to as “knowledge communities” rather 
than “teaching communities” or “writing communities”. The heroic myths 
(Taylor, 1976) around which disciplines grow are rarely tales of excellence in 
teaching (rarer still are the legends of efficient organisational management); 
the ‘giants’ upon whose shoulders disciplines sit are almost invariably giants 
 
51 
of research (including originators of new theoretical and philosophical 
approaches). For this reason, disciplinary differences in the interpersonal 
dynamics of teaching, language, institutional culture and management seem 
very likely to reflect the way disciplinary difference manifests in research 
settings, and a detailed understanding of the latter may help to explain the 
former. However, the recent study of disciplines has generally turned away 
from research settings and knowledge construction, a turn discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
2.4. Research about Disciplines: Major Strands & 
Contributions 
In this section I present three strands of research that have established key 
insights regarding the general ways disciplines tend to vary. A recurring 
theme in this review is a dearth of enquiry regarding research activity and 
knowledge construction in contemporary research. While I do not present a 
systematic appraisal of these three fields, I present peer-reviewed accounts 
generated within each field suggesting that analysis of research activity and 
knowledge construction is minimal, and/or is declining. In addition, I am not 
aware of any research specifically focused on the function of disciplines 
within population health research. Collectively, these trends across multiple 
research domains point toward the gap filled by this thesis. 
2.4.1 The Sociology of Professions 
Since disciplines are communities of professionals, sociological insight into 
the study of professions and professional groups is potentially relevant. 
Sociological concern with medical professions (and professionalism more 
broadly) attracted the focus of prominent figures within sociology in the early 
and mid-20th century (Merton, 1958; Parsons, 1951). These approaches to 
professions tended to focus on the traditional professions of medicine, law, 
accounting, architecture, the clergy, science, and engineering (Gorman & 
Sandefur, 2011). Analysis has two major thematic foci (Adams, 2015), i) 
professions as occupations, professional work and labour markets; and ii) 




Gorman and Sandefur (2011) identify four key attributes of professionalism 
to emerge from the ‘Golden Age’ of enquiry into professions dating from 
1960-1990. First, professionals possess and employ expert knowledge, 
composed of formal abstract principles (Abbott, 1988). In controlling that 
body of knowledge, professionals exercise technical autonomy, as “no one 
outside the profession can legitimately dictate what those professionals do 
or how they do it” (Gorman & Sandefur, 2011: p.180). Professionals also 
share a normative orientation toward service, and receive high status, 
income and other rewards. 
While these four themes remain visible in contemporary study, 21st century 
approaches are less concerned with defining or ring-fencing “the 
professions” from non-professions. More important today is the demarcation 
of jobs and occupations requiring expert knowledge (‘knowledge workers’, 
Adams 2015) from those which do not, and investigation has shifted toward 
themes of inequality, organisational structure, insecurity in employment, 
power and control of employees, ethics, and identity (Gorman & Sandefur, 
2011). Researchers from diverse sociological traditions consider the role of 
professions, including the sociology of work, inequality, medicine, law, and 
organisations. In addition, there is a clear difference in research focus 
between the USA and Europe, especially in the area of regulation, frequently 
a focus of British and European work, but rarely examined in the USA 
(Adams, 2015). 
While this thesis is not grounded intellectually within the sociology of 
professions, my analysis proceeds with an awareness that most academics 
are employed by large, complex organisations, whose structures and 
policies influence research activity. Departmental structure and strategic 
aims impact the kind of research academics can do (Spurling, 2012). In 
addition, funders and other third-parties such as governmental agencies 
“make their presence felt” (Gorman & Sandefur, 2011) in ways which drive or 
dampen research on particular topics, or via particular methods. 
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The extent to which 21st century professionals possess technical autonomy 
is a relevant point of contestation. On one hand, the existence of the 
autonomous professional is questioned, viewed as a relic of the past 
undermined by social change (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011; Leicht & Fennell, 
2001), but, in some fields (notably medicine) the discretion of professionals 
appears to have been maintained in some contexts (Evetts, 2002). This 
question feeds into a strand of research regarding employers’ efforts to 
control workers and the extent to which workers accept or resist that 
control. In medicine, doctors have been shown to employ creative strategies 
to “do what they want” (Hoff & McCaffrey, 1996) and this may perhaps 
extend to academic and research settings. 
Professionals (including scientists) should not be treated analytically as 
homogenous groupings, and contemporary studies attribute variation within 
groups of workers to factors such as social background, diverse and 
stratified training, organisational cultures, and the emergence and 
proliferation of new work statuses (Granfield, 2007; Schleef, 2005). This 
thesis therefore proceeds with awareness that scientific groups are likely to 
exhibit this same diversity, in addition to diversity attributable to disciplinary 
background. 
Health care professions (especially nursing and medicine) seem the most 
intensively studied occupations (Adams, 2015). While the sociology of 
medicine is of relevance to population health research, a sociological 
account of medical practice is not an account of research practice. In the 
Sociology of Professions generally, specific interest in expert knowledge is 
declining; Adams (2015) summarised 500 published articles containing the 
phrases ‘sociology of professions’ or ‘professional employment’ and 
grouped these into 10 thematic areas. Of the ten themes, the “Knowledge 
and expertise” theme was the most thinly represented, at just 6% of 
publications, and this theme ranked last in all geographical regions except 
Europe, where it ranked second-last in terms of output. 
This suggests that sociological concern with workers and occupations is not 
currently focused on the development and application of knowledge. This is 
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further reflected in the exclusion of the research domain from discussions of 
employees who solve ‘concrete problems’: 
Most knowledge workers—other than those engaged solely in research 
and teaching—make use of expert knowledge to solve concrete problems. 
Gorman & Sandefur, 2011: p281-282 (emphasis added). 
Two well-known books cut against this trend, taking scientists and their 
expertise as a special focus. This section concludes with a summary of 
relevant material from Michele Lamont’s How Professors Think (2009) and 
Andrew Abbott’s Chaos of Disciplines (2001). 
How Professors Think 
Michèle Lamont observed grant peer-review panels to investigate evaluative 
culture(s) within academia and the processes via which academic standards 
of excellence are agreed upon in six disciplines; Philosophy, History, 
Anthropology, English Literature, Political Science, and Economics. In 
addition to observing deliberations, Lamont interviewed panel members, 
inviting frank appraisals of scientists’ own (and others’) fields to gain insight 
into the deeper commitments of these disciplines. 
Drawing upon Whitley and Bourdieu, a recurring theme was the way in 
which disciplines 
“shine under different lights, are good at different things, and are best 
located on different matrixes of evaluation, precisely because their objects 
and concerns differ so dramatically.” Lamont (2009) p.9 
Knowledge seems to have a different character in these six fields, and these 
diverse knowledges in turn demand diverse analytical approaches, and 
methods. Lamont concludes that epistemology and notions of quality are 
not parallel or separate features of disciplines, but that they are linked, and 
diversity in academic criteria for excellence is a consequence of 
epistemological diversity. 
Lamont identifies four “epistemological styles” (p57-58) employed when 
evaluating grants; which she labels comprehensive, constructivist, positivist, 
and utilitarian. These styles are summarised in Table 1, below. The 
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comprehensive style values the study of wholes, attention to detail, and 
contextual specificity. The constructivist style emphasises proposals which 
witness the lived experience of various groups, and values reflexivity. The 
positivist style favours generalizability, and hypothesis testing. The utilitarian 
style resembles the positivist style, but with clear preference for the 
production of instrumental knowledge. Lamont’s aim was to investigate the 
diverse evaluative cultures within six humanities and social sciences, and for 
this reason Lamont did not connect these epistemological styles to the 
content of the disciplines concerned, or speculate why this diversity arises, 
or persists. To my knowledge Lamont’s epistemological styles have not been 
specifically investigated or searched for in the context of health-related 
research, although these do map neatly onto the ‘types’ of health 
inequalities researcher described by Garthwaite and colleagues (2016, see 
Section 1.5). 
Epistemological Style Favoured Attributes in Evaluation 
Comprehensive Strong rational and theoretically informed agenda  
Values verstehen (study of whole phenomena, not 
decomposition into parts), attention to detail, complexity and 
contextual specificity.  
Constructivist Emphasizes proposals that “give voice” to various groups, 
values reflexivity 
Positivist Favours formal models, generalizability, testing or disproving 
theory, and hypothesis testing. 
Utilitarian Resembles the positivist style (above), but with clear preference 
for instrumental knowledge and attention to “real world” 
problems.  





Another important difference between disciplines emerging in Lamont’s 
study was related to their varied capacity for consensus regarding 
definitions of quality. Historians and economists were distinctive for their 
ability to agree, rapidly, on what kind of work was “excellent”. As economics 
is a discipline featured in this thesis, Lamont’s explanation for this (which 
agrees with my own experience as an undergraduate student) is of 
relevance: 
Economists’ cohesion is grounded in a cognitive unification that was largely 
achieved by the 1960s, as mathematical economics triumphed over other 
approaches (institutionalist, Marxian, and anti-mathematical institutionalist, 
for instance). This ascendance of mathematical economics has translated 
into a homogenization of the core courses in every major institution […] 
Perhaps owing to their discipline’s epistemological cohesiveness, 
economists seem much less concerned with (or even aware of) the 
constructed nature of excellence.  
Lamont, 2009:pp.100-101 
English Literature and Anthropology stood in contrast to the cohesive 
disciplines of History and Economics. From the outside, these fields were 
perceived as existing in constant turmoil, seeming to perpetually debate the 
nature and content of the field.  
This apparent difference in disciplinary cohesion is a recurring feature within 
the literature about disciplines. Two other key differences identified in 
Lamont’s study were the role of subjectivity in the pursuit of knowledge, and 
disciplinary preference for pure versus applied insight. 
In analysing the process via which multi-disciplinary panels arrive at 
consensus, Lamont identified a necessary precedent to consensus which 
she terms cognitive contextualization: the use of “criteria of evaluation most 
appropriate to the field or discipline of the proposal under review“ (p.106). 
Panel members reached consensus by applying different definitions of 
quality to different proposals, and this required them to mute their own 
“disciplinary prejudice” (p.135). 
This flexibility was achievable only within settings which engendered trust 
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and respect between participants, actively managed by a skilled panel chair. 
Cognitive contextualisation may be more difficult in research settings, and 
harder still when decisions relate to scholars’ own projects, not proposals 
from individuals whom they do not know, and will never meet. In particular, 
population health researchers are likely to be competing for the same pools 
of funds, which may introduce a competitive dynamic not observed in 
Lamont’s study. 
Chaos of Disciplines 
Andrew Abbott (2001) uses the discipline of sociology to frame a general 
argument about the self-similar nature of cultural distinctions, and to 
advance a general account of how knowledge changes in the social 
sciences. As sociology is a discipline which features in this thesis, Abbott’s 
insights into the nature of knowledge in sociology are relevant. 
Abbott notes that, unlike some other fields with ‘strong boundaries’, 
sociology has no intellectual basis for excluding strands of enquiry which 
claim to merit sociological attention, and that this produces extreme 
diversity, ’not one sociology but many’ (Abbott, 2001:p4). Such diversity is 
brought about via distinction (e.g., “Culture” vs “Social Structure”) repeated 
at multiple levels. ‘Fractal distinction’ refers to the way in which, for 
example, the culture arm of the ‘Culture vs Social Structure’ distinction in 
sociology itself contains a Culture/Social Structure split, visualised in Figure 
2. Abbott argues that Self-Similarity, ‘the idea that a subset of a larger unit 
can contain scaled-down versions of structures and processes in that larger 
unit’ (p.3), is an important general feature of social structure, and provides 
examples of theoretical and methodological distinctions cascading as in 




Figure 2 - Sociology is characterised by a set of repeating, self-similar 
distinctions. (Figure 1.3 from Chaos of Disciplines) 
 
Abbott presents this intellectual-crawl-via-repeated-distinction as giving rise 
to a cultural tendency for ignorance regarding the distant limbs of a 
discipline’s fractal tree, and to an associated tendency for scientists to 
“know one’s close relatives well and one’s distant relatives not at all” (p.20). 
Abbot’s central conclusion is that the social sciences are destined to cycle 
around a repeating pattern of concerns and principles, rather than to 
“progress” in a linear manner. Indeed, in Sociology, ninety-one articles or 
books have “brought something or other ‘back in’” since 1964 (p.16). The 
tendency for certain disciplines to return to fundamental questions has been 
noted by other authors (most specifically Becher, 1987), and Abbott’s 
conclusion that the content of the social sciences is cyclical is consistent 
with Lamont’s study, wherein one interviewee noted that they are wrestling 
with very traditional problems that [have] defined the subject for, you know, 
thousands of years. It’s not that entirely new problems come up that haven’t 
been studied or investigated before. (Lamont, 2009:p.69) 
In this thesis, disciplines which repeatedly circle back to foundational 
concerns are referred to as disciplines possessing integrative codes, after 
Bernstein (1971, discussed in Section 3.4.2). 
Abbott’s attention to the function of self-similar, cascading distinctions in 
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science is a unique contribution, with applicability and consequence for the 
disciplines making up population health. For example, there is a distinction 
within epidemiology between clinical epidemiology (concerned with biology, 
disease process, and the efficacy of medical treatments) and population 
epidemiology (concerned with environmental exposures, non-modifiable 
risk, and the impact of health policy or population-level interventions). 
However, according to Abbott’s thesis, each of these sub-fields should be 
expected to contain its own clinical/population split. Status as “clinical” is 
likely to be relative, determined by the degree of clinical-ness usual in a 
specific setting. In another example, while researchers might distinguish 
themselves as “qualitative” or “quantitative”, I should expect to find 
quantitative scholars who lean qualitative, and vice versa. Such distinctions 
can also unfold simultaneously across disciplines. Abbott provides the 
example of “Historical Sociology” and “Social-Science History”, 
independent products of the History/Sociology distinction playing out in 
different disciplines. Examples of this phenomenon within population health 
might be “Medical Sociology” and “Social Epidemiology” or “Genetic 
Epidemiology” and “Population Genetics”. 
In sum, the sociology of professions provides important background 
understanding regarding the conditions which define the role of modern 
academics, and also contributes to my conceptualisation of disciplinary 
difference in both a specific (e.g. Lamont’s epistemological styles) and 
general (Abbott’s fractal distinction) way. 
2.4.2 Higher Education Research 
Higher Education Research is a heterogeneous field of study concerned with 
the Higher Education system, the role of that system within society, the 
theory and practice of higher education, and higher education policy. The 
field does not have a precise or global definition (Teichler, 2015) and its 
status as a “discipline” is debated (Tight, 2020).  
A recent review identified 86 journals specific to Higher Education research 
(Tight, 2020). Like the sociology of professions, Higher Education Research 
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tends to have a national or regional focus. Studies with a global focus or 
involving international comparison are not frequent (Kosmützky & Krücken, 
2014) and the size of the field also varies across countries, being very strong 
in US and China but comparatively less-visible in European countries. The 
role of the English language within a country also determines the visibility of 
literature relating to that country (Teichler, 2015). 
Thematic Areas 
Jung & Horta (2013) present Higher Education as involving two major 
themes; 1) Teaching and Learning, and 2) Education policy and organisation. 
Other analyses describe the field as having three major themes; 1) Teaching 
& Learning, 2) Governance & Management, and 3) The Higher Education 
System and its Social Context (Tight, 2012).  
Teichler (1996) described four “Spheres” of Higher Education knowledge; (1) 
Quantitative-structural aspects, (2) Knowledge and subject-related aspects, 
(3) Person-related and teaching and learning-related aspects and (4) 
Aspects of institution, organisation and governance. ‘Research’ does not 
appear in any of these two, three or four-themed summaries of the field, 
suggesting it is not a major focus. 
Tight (2012) pursued a summary of Higher Education publications within 
specialised journals, organised via eight themes: Teaching/Learning, Course 
Design, Student Experience, Quality, System Policy, Institutional 
Management, Academic Work, Knowledge and Research. Of 567 
publications reviewed, just 2% (n=15) fit within the “Knowledge and 
Research” theme, reinforcing a sense that the construction of knowledge in 
research is not a central concern within Higher Education Research. 
Furthermore, a longitudinal survey of members of the Consortium of Higher 
Education Researchers undertaken in 1992 and 2012 (Kehm & Teichler, 
2013) found that while substantially more researchers expressed an interest 
in the themes of international mobility, governance, and management in 
2012 than in 1992, interest in ‘Knowledge and Research’ shrank over the 
two-decade study period. 
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Becher & Trowler’s book “Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual inquiry 
and the culture of disciplines” (1989) and the expanded second edition 
(2001) cuts against this trend, and material from the second edition relevant 
to this thesis is summarised below, followed by discussion of the follow-up 
publication “Tribes and Territories in the 21st century”. 
Academic Tribes and Territories 
Tribes and Territories built upon early work specifically concerned with the 
academic profession and higher education system (Clark, 1987). Becher and 
Trowler (2001) drew on data collected in the mid 1980’s in the US and UK to 
describe a turbulent, marketised, heterogeneous Higher Education system, 
wherein disciplinary knowledge structures condition, even determine, the 
behaviour and value-systems of academics. 
The ‘Tribe and Territory’ metaphor in the title is employed throughout, 
referring to intellectual boundaries as demarcating “territorial possessions 
that can be encroached on, colonised and reallocated” and contrasting 
disciplines with strong and weak “borders” and senses of “nationhood”. The 
central question is how the nature of knowledge (the territory) is related to 
the cultures of those who explore it (the tribe). However, the analytical focus 
is more squarely upon the latter than the former. 
In agreement with the findings of How Professors Think (Lamont, 2009), a 
key variance between disciplines to emerge in Tribes and Territories is the 
extent to which consensus and agreement regarding quality, questions, and 
methods is possible. Fields with strong boundaries tended to display 
predictable cultural characteristics: 
“The more closely defined and better-defended the boundaries are between 
hard specialisms, and the more tightly knit the groups associated with them, 
the easier it is to maintain the integrity of received doctrines by the 
ostracism or expulsion of internal dissidents and the refusal to provide entry 
permits to outsiders with dubious credentials”  
Becher & Trowler, 2001:p.85 
Becher and Trowler’s findings reinforce the plural character of disciplines, 
and demonstrate that, within the institutions studied, teaching tends to be 
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undervalued, that ‘hard knowledge domains are regarded more highly than 
soft ones, and pure than applied’ (p.81). Foreshadowing Abbott’s discussion 
of self-similar distinctions in academic culture, institutional preference for 
pure vs applied knowledge was also shown to manifest within disciplines: 
“Mathematical economists were considered the creme de la crème” (p.81). 
Additionally, bid-and-deliver funding models were presented as having 
epistemological impact, although the specific consequence of this impact 
on research projects was not explored in detail. 
Academia as a profession emerges as being distinctive for its constant 
gradings and rankings: of journals, institutions, departments, and students. 
The ‘pervasive process of evaluating intellectual worth’ (p.82) is likewise 
deeply ingrained within the culture of most academic institutions. 
Becher & Trower’s analysis also suggests that individual eminent scientists 
matter in academic culture, in all disciplines. Self-amplifying processes 
surround these elite individuals, who are visible and so attract citations, 
grants and invitations, which further increases their visibility. 
These findings may seem, in 2020, to be rather obvious. However, Tribes 
and Territories represented an early empirical approach to modern academic 
and disciplinary culture as situated within universities, and the international 
scale of the study remains unusual within Higher Education research, and 
the study of disciplines (Tight, 2012). However, while affirming the 
importance of disciplines in shaping academic culture, Tribes and Territories 
says little regarding the importance of disciplines in shaping approaches to 
research, and is not a study of the ways in which disciplinary training shapes 
the design, conduct and evaluation of research output. 
In the 2012 volume edited by Paul Trowler; Tribes and Territories in the 21st 
century: Rethinking the Significance of Disciplines, three essays are included 
under the “Disciplines and Research” theme which purportedly analyse the 
enduring importance (or unimportance) of disciplines in research practice 
(globally, and within law, art and design, and sociology). Despite appearing 
under the banner of research practice, these contributions are focused on 
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disciplinary differences in the balance between time allocated to research 
and teaching, debate regarding the purpose of research, diversity in 
educational ideology, and in departmental culture. In addition, this work is 
not comparative, preventing the use of one discipline to learn about another, 
limiting conclusions to the particular disciplines studied. 
In the same section, Brew & Manathunga (2012) advance a global critique 
on the salience of disciplines in 21st century scholarship, and 
“suggest that disciplinary boundaries are no longer of great significance […] 
other drivers have taken over and interdisciplinary has become the leitmotif 
of this century. Territorial boundaries have largely gone - insofar as they ever 
really existed.” (p.41) 
In this book chapter, the rise of interdisciplinarity is positioned as a 
“liberating force” supporting academics to escape their disciplinary “cages” 
which serve to control and regulate them. To support this claim, Brew & 
Manathunga note that their interviewees tend to adopt a range of 
disciplinary identities depending on context, suggesting that statements like 
‘I am a sociologist’ do not serve scientists well. This flexibility is interpreted 
as signalling “a diminution of the significance of professional identity 
associated with a particular discipline” (p.47), and is linked to what the 
authors perceive as a “decline in the relevance of distinct disciplinary 
knowledge in research” (p.42). 
Evidence presented for these claims is sourced from collaborative projects 
which produce “Mode 2 objects” (Mode 2 science is discussed in Section 
2.6). Within such projects (e.g., the Human Genome Project) disciplines are 
“completely ignored” and are “no longer of relevance” (p.46). As the majority 
of scientists do not work on (or train within) bleeding-edge, trans-
disciplinary, multi-year projects, I question whether such projects rightfully 
serve as meaningful examples for elucidating the role of disciplines, and 
disciplinary identity in 21st century science. 
Brew & Manathunga question the metaphor of disciplines as tribes 
occupying territories, as an analogy which “traps us in the past”, preferring a 
vision of disciplines as more fluid entities. Brew & Manathunga argue that 
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21st century knowledge and its complex and multi-layered problems require 
interdisciplinary approaches, and ways of thinking (and being) which go far 
beyond what traditional, disciplined science can support. 
As I will argue in Section 6, writings which present visions of interdisciplinary 
science as being more-fit for the complexity of modern life than traditional, 
disciplined science should not be confused with empirical confirmation that 
scientists are able, prepared, or prefer to work in an interdisciplinary manner. 
Analyses which present disciplines as constrictive intellectual “cages” also 
downplay the advantages of disciplined scholarship, documented within 
Science & Technology Studies (STS) for over 50 years.  
2.4.3 Science & Technology Studies 
21st century STS is the fusion of two 20th century streams of scholarship 
(Jasanoff, 2012): 
1. The study of the nature of science, scientific practice and 
technology as social institutions. These institutions possess distinct 
structures, practices and discourses which change over time and 
vary across cultural contexts. 
2. The study of the impact and control of science and (especially) 
technology, with a particular focus on associated risks to health, 
safety, democracy, development and the environment. 
As the first tradition is itself divided into three strands, a figure is helpful. 
Jasanoff’s (2012) account of the development of STS is visualised in Figure 
3, depicting the ‘impact and control’ strand on the left, and the ‘nature of 
science’ strand on the right, itself comprised of three research traditions: 
Strong Programme SSK, ethnographic studies of science, and cultural 




Figure 3, the Emergence of STS, my visual summary of Jasanoff (2012)  
 
Intellectually, this thesis is located on the right hand side of Figure 3.  
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
The emergence of STS is generally understood to have begun with Thomas 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962 hereafter, Structure). 
Structure presented a challenge to the presupposition that science is united 
and undergirded by a cumulative, unbroken set of facts. Kuhn challenged 
the ‘central metaphor’ of positivism (Galison, 1999), that empirical 
observations stand independent from the theory, instruments, and scholars 
who generate and interpret them. 
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, historians (including Kuhn) accumulated examples 
of scientific theory changing in advance of experimental data, and 
observations and experiments were retro-fitted to agree with emerging 
theory. These examples suggested that observations did not underpin 
science like a bedrock, but that observations themselves were theory-laden. 
In Structure, Kuhn argued this point via multiple historical examples from the 
natural sciences. In the Kuhnian model, observation does not continue 
unbroken underneath evolving theory, because new theory occasions the 
understanding of new observations, but also updated understanding of ‘old’ 
observations. This view of theory as shaping both what is observed and how 
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observations are interpreted represents Kuhn’s seminal, originating 
contribution to STS (Hacking, 2012; Barnes, 1982; Galison, 1999). 
Therefore, the context and circumstances surrounding theory-change 
emerged as objects of scholarly interest in the 1960’s. In the following 
decades, society and culture entered the study of science, and the 
boundary presumed to separate ‘science’ from ‘society’ began to perforate 
under scrutiny. Three streams of ‘nature of science’ STS (Figure 3, Right-
Hand side) emerged during this period, tackling this new problem-set via 
diverse methods. 
Strong Programme SSK 
Structure paved the way for the treatment of scientific facts as products of 
scientists’ own beliefs, theories, and contexts. British scholars began to 
probe the extent to which questions about the nature of science (previously 
the domain of philosophers) could be re-framed and answered using 
sociological and historical methods (i.e via empirical investigation). This was 
the basis for a distinctively British Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), 
located primarily in Edinburgh and Bath. This strand of SSK sought to render 
social what was previously considered epistemic, an aim met with fierce 
opposition from several philosophers of science, who also criticised Kuhn 
(see Section 2.4.4.5). In this thesis I draw upon the methodological tenets of 
Strong Programme SSK (outlined in the next chapter) to set up my approach 
to disciplines. 
Ethnographic Studies of Science 
Around the same time, detailed ethnographic studies of laboratory scientists 
began to emerge in print. An early, influential example is Bruno Latour and 
Steven Woolgar’s ‘Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific 
Facts’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Latour was embedded within a molecular 
biology laboratory for two years, and Latour and Woolgar used the resulting 
ethnographic data to study the motivations and ‘currencies’ appearing to 
drive scientific activity, the mechanisms by which scientific claims are 
transformed into scientific facts, and the central role of technology. Specific 
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concepts from Laboratory Life are employed in this thesis, specifically in 
Chapters 9 and 10.  
With colleague Michael Callon, Latour continued to critique the distinction 
between the human and non-human (or, social and material) elements of 
science. This work is the basis for Actor Network Theory, and foregrounded 
technology as being worthy of careful and dedicated study, a focus which 
continues in STS today Jasanoff (2012) as well as within geography (Truffer, 
2008) and sociology (Gunderson, 2016). 
Science and Technology as Cultural Formations 
The third strand of ‘nature of science’ STS emerged in the 1980’s, and 
positioned science and technology as cultural formations. Drawing on the 
humanities, anthropology (e.g. Haraway, 1989), feminism (e.g. Fox Keller, 
1986), and theorists of language and power, this strand was distinctive for 
its focus on the meanings attached to science, and to scientific products. An 
influential output of this strand is Karin Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) Epistemic 
Cultures. Knorr-Cetina conducted simultaneous ethnographies in two 
settings, High Energy Particle Physics and Molecular Biology, revealing 
diversity in the underlying cultural ’machineries of knowing’. Specific 
concepts and theory developed in Epistemic Cultures are applied in this 
thesis, in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Science Studies 
The second broad tradition within STS (Left hand side of Figure 3) is 
concerned not with the nature of science or construction of knowledge, but 
with its interface and impact upon society, politics and culture. Following the 
conclusion of the Cold War, students worldwide began to advocate for 
scholarship of scientists’ complicity in war and the impact of technology on 
society. Several centres of ‘Science, Technology and Society’ were 
established in the late 1960’s, motivated by concerns that science and 
technology were developing in ways contrary to the public interest (Jasanoff, 
2012). Study of science and technology policy also gained momentum 
during this period. This PhD project is focused on the research context, and 
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not on the societal impact of research. However, whilst I do not draw 
specifically on this strand of STS, I am aware that there is no impermeable 
barrier between issues ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to science. 
4.3.2 Technoscience & The ‘Turn to Technology’ 
A unifying development for STS occurred in the mid 1980’s. The 
presentation of evidence that society shapes technology, and technology in 
turn shapes society (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999), plus the demonstration 
that the sociology of technology could be studied using the tools and 
theories of SSK (Pinch & Bijker, 2016) unified the strands depicted in Figure 
3 around a focus on technology and materiality, and the society-technology 
interaction whereby the socio-technical and natural/material co-produce 
each other. This ‘turn to technology’ (Woolgar, 1991) continues today 
(Jasanoff, 2012), with particular focus on biomedicine (such as Carl 
May, Annemarie Mol, Nelly Oudshoorn, and Andrew Webster), ecology (such 
as Bruno Latour, Sheila Jasanoff, Matthias Gross, S. Lochlann Jain, and 
Jens Lachmund), and climate science. 
As a result, the close study and description of knowledge construction is 
much less common within STS than before this turn; 
For me it’s not an “either/or,” it’s a “both/and,” but I still think that putting 
‘society’ in there [In STS as “Science, Technology and Society] underlines 
what to me is the ultimate raison d’être of the field: it’s not simply a re-
description of science in our discipline’s specialist language, it’s also the 
vehicle through which we reflect on what it means to be rational societies, 
manufacturing societies, or inventive societies. 
Pickersgill & Jasanoff, 2018: p321-322 
One possibility for this thesis would be to draw on the post-1980 Science, 
Technology and Society framework, searching for technological 
manifestations of the particular ways expertise is accredited within, or 
diffuses across disciplines. Different disciplines may have varying 
conceptions of risk, or different connections to institutional and political 
structures of power, with consequence for knowledge-societies. These are 
interesting and important questions, but their answers partly depend on 
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assumptions about the way disciplinary training acts to shape the design, 
conduct and interpretation of research activity. While the focus of the field 
has shifted away from knowledge construction, this is not because the 
puzzle of knowledge construction has been fully resolved. There remain 
‘vast spheres’ about which ‘next to nothing’ is known (Schyfter & 
MacKenzie, 2018: p.345) 
I consider population health one such sphere, and it is for this reason that I 
draw most heavily upon the study of science as exemplified by STS 
scholarship on the right hand side of Figure 3, concerned specifically with 
research activity and the construction of knowledge. This includes early 
work concerned with knowledge construction now associated with the 
technoscience movement (e.g., Laboratory Life).  
As the conceptual foundation for these three strands (Strong Programme 
SSK, Ethnographic Studies, and Cultural studies of science) was laid by 
Thomas Kuhn, it is also necessary to revisit Kuhn and ask what contribution 
his work might make to a 21st century study of disciplines. 
2.4.4 Revisiting Thomas Kuhn 
Kuhn’s concepts are frequently cited in the medical and public health 
literature, and Structure garners 500-700 citations each year in PubMed. 
However, only rarely are these ideas engaged with in a deep or substantial 
way. Many papers referencing Kuhn do so in their concluding paragraph, 
calling for a “paradigm shift”. Three illustrative examples are included below: 
“…we recommend the adoption of a radically new cooperation paradigm.” 
(Chang & Fraser, 2017) 
“This discussion highlights the need for a paradigm shift” (Bagozzi, 2007) 
“[We] recommend that it is time for a paradigm shift .” (Nowak, 2011) 
This usage of ‘paradigm’ suggests that the term has evolved away from 
Kuhn’s original meaning. In the Kuhnian sense, paradigm shifts cannot be 
‘recommended’, they are the unavoidable and highly disruptive conclusion 
of scientific revolutions, which only occur once it has become 
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uncontroversial (within a scientific community) to state that dominant tools 
and theories do not adequately explain or represent reality. Very generally, 
science is not in the habit of discarding established principles, perhaps 
because the wholesale re-tooling required to achieve a paradigm shift 
exacts an enormous intellectual and energetic cost on scientific 
communities (Kuhn, 1970). As such, the structure of most scientific activity 
is biased against revolutionary processes.  
      The above calls for paradigm shifts gloss over what must be overcome 
in order to start the requisite revolution. In Kuhnian terms, what must be 
overcome is normal science, a strongly disciplined pattern of practice which 
conditions the form and content of scientific knowledge. This thesis is 
concerned with disciplinary approaches to research conduct, and not with 
the nature of scientific progress per se. For this reason I leave aside the 
mechanics of scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts, and focus on Kuhn’s 
foundational concepts of normal science, the paradigm, and disciplinary 
matrix. 
2.4.4.1 Paradigm 
In Structure, Kuhn argues that, above all, normal science (defined below) is 
supported by a common set of puzzle-solving procedures employed as 
models or pedagogic examples. This set of procedures derives from a 
common tradition of exemplary past achievements, or ‘Paradigm’. 
This framing of the paradigm as a tradition of ‘exemplary past achievement’ 
was not made clear in Structure’s first edition. In the postscript to the 
second edition, Kuhn (1970) regrets causing “gratuitous difficulties and 
misunderstandings”, by having used the term in two distinct ways: 
“On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On 
the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete 
puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace 
explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science. The first sense of the term, call it the sociological […] [the second 
sense, ] paradigms as exemplary past achievements.” Kuhn, 1970: p.175 
Kuhn finds the second usage deeper (philosophically), and makes clear that 
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his model of scientific revolution rests primarily on paradigm-as-past-
achievement (rather than paradigm-as-constellation of methods or beliefs). 
Confusion notwithstanding, Kuhn’s dual uses of the term do not conflict, 
because the constellation of beliefs and techniques scientists hold in 
common originates from the tradition of scientific excellence which they, as 
a group, uphold and seek to emulate. Figure 5, below, contains an 
illustrative example I have assembled from the discipline of epidemiology. 
When discussing a disciplinary paradigm, we might do so by laying out the 
values, beliefs, or preferred methods of a discipline, a selection of which 
appear in the top half of Figure 5 (labelled I). However, this is only a partial 
account. These particular study designs did not suddenly and 
spontaneously appear attractive to epidemiologists as productive 
endeavours. They derive their status as valid, reliable mechanisms for 
generating solutions to epidemiological problems from the historic, 
successful studies which pioneered their use. The methods are 
paradigmatic because of the exemplary past achievement with which they 
are connected (Labelled II in Figure 5). The circular arrows in Figure L4 
reflect the way in which the two understandings of paradigm are self-
amplifying: a method’s continuing use reinforces the status of the original 





Figure 5. The Paradigm is the shared set of methods, beliefs and commitments (I), but also 
the tradition of excellence which established them as valid problem-solutions (II).  
 
What of the human figures in Figure 5? Kuhn was clear that a paradigm is 
not a scientific community, and that disentangling the two is challenging, yet 
analytically important. A scientific community might be identified by its 
common paradigm, because “a paradigm is what members of a scientific 
community share… a scientific community consists of men [sic] who share a 
paradigm” ibid p.176. However, in unusual circumstances (a paradigm shift) 
a scientific community may discard its paradigm in favour of another. In 
such cases the scholarly community may endure, and outlast its paradigm. 
Such examples reinforce the ways in which paradigms do not float in the 
ether, sustaining themselves, paradigms endure via the action of living 
scholars, the continued application of paradigmatic methods, and the 




Paradigms and Disciplines 
The word “paradigm” appears in Structure over 500 times, and “discipline” 
only 11 times. Kuhn’s articulation of the paradigm finds its most obvious 
application within disciplines, but the terms are not synonymous. 
Disciplinary communities almost always possess a paradigm, and Kuhn 
argues that the development of a paradigm is an essential step in the 
development of a discipline, because: 
“In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the 
facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are 
likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gathering is a far more 
nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific development 
makes familiar.” (Kuhn, 1962:p15) 
The paradigm therefore provides a framework for fact-gathering. For this 
reason, when a group of scientists adopt a common paradigm, the 
trappings of disciplinarity often follow. The group initiates some forum to 
share results (a journal), begins to schedule meetings and conferences, and 
to carve out institutional space by forming laboratories, departments and 
research centres. A discipline’s pre-paradigm phase is dominated by intense 
debate over disciplinary fundamentals, which can be all-consuming and 
exhausting, getting in the way of data collection and analysis. When a group 
of scientists coalesce around a paradigm (a shared set of problems, 
methods and concerns) such debates are put to rest, and the group can set 
off in the same intellectual direction, with agreed criteria for evaluating 
knowledge-claims. This thesis is concerned with disciplines in this second, 
stable phase. 
Paradigms and Scientific Training 
Disciplines are increasingly splintering into sub-fields (Weingart, 2012), each 
of which might be characterised by its own paradigm. In an era in which the 
disciplines are specialising at an exponential rate, and where scientists are 
increasingly accountable to publics outside academia, the relevance of 
overarching paradigms like “physics”, “economics” and “sociology” is 
contested (see Section 2.6), and something I investigate in this thesis. 
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Disciplinary splintering notwithstanding, scientific education generally 
retains a traditional mono-disciplinary structure (Weingart, 2014; Lyall, 2019; 
Evans, 1995), and Kuhn’s account of scientific training suggests this should 
serve to sustain the influence of traditional disciplinary paradigms in 
research. 
Kuhn argues that scientific education familiarises students with a pattern of 
investigative practice, which in turn shapes and determines which questions 
are considered acceptable, and the form acceptable answers should take. 
According to Kuhn, scientific training is dogmatic, a process of socialisation 
accompanied by “transformations of vision”, allowing the student to inhabit 
the scientist’s world, “see what the scientist sees and respond as the 
scientists does” (p.111). 
Therefore, for Kuhn, scientific training results in a transformed worldview, 
because researchers under different paradigms have different “ways of 
seeing the world and practicing science in it” (Kuhn, 1970:p.4). By gaining 
familiarity with scientific paradigms, students develop a particular sense of 
what kinds of objects make up the world, and how these objects interact. 
These ideas 
“are firmly embedded in the educational initiation that prepares and licenses 
the student for professional practice. Because that education is both 
rigorous and rigid, these answers come to exert a deep hold on the 
scientific mind” (Kuhn, 1970:p5) 
Kuhn’s account of academic training is the thinnest and most weakly 
substantiated part of Structure (Barnes, 1982). It is supported by no 
empirical research, but neither is its target, the assumption that scientific 
training fosters creativity and open-mindedness toward non-paradigmatic 
approaches. Kuhn’s view of scientific training is formed exclusively via case 
studies within the natural sciences, disciplines with clearly defined ‘borders’ 
and cohesive pictures of excellence. Within these fields (described in the 
next chapter as being ‘strongly classified’) training is more prescriptive and 
rigid than in ‘weakly-classified’ fields. I treat adherence to paradigm within 
less strongly-classified fields as an open question. 
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2.4.4.2 Normal science 
The paradigm contains information about what constitutes a good question, 
good methods and good answers. In short: what good science looks like. 
Having grasped a paradigm, researchers can identify opportunities to apply 
paradigm-sanctioned methods to problems within their disciplinary domain. 
This is normal science, the quest for the familiar in the unfamiliar (Barnes, 
1982) the routine swing of the disciplinary hammer and the mechanism by 
which researchers break nature into manageable, manuscript-sized pieces 
(Collyer, 2018). 
If normal science is the search for opportunities to deploy paradigmatic 
methods, and most science is normal science, science might “seem an 
attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that 
paradigm supplies” (Kuhn, 1970: pp24-25) . This is not to suggest a cookie 
cutter approach, as each study presents idiosyncrasies and analytical 
challenges. Nor is this a suggestion that normal science is easy. Finding the 
familiar within the unfamiliar can be extremely difficult, requiring creativity 
and intellectual flexibility. But the goal is nevertheless straightforward: to 
attack a new, unseen problem by identifying at least one key similarity with a 
previously solved problem or successful study. For this reason, Kuhn 
presents normal science as aiming not for novelty, or discontinuous 
discovery. Rather, normal science provides the next link in an established 
chain of enquiry: 
“In so far as he [sic] is engaged in normal science, the research worker is a 
solver of puzzles, not a tester of paradigms.” (Kuhn, 1970: p144) 
Addressing the fundamentals of the discipline is not the business of normal 
science, because normal science “is predicated on the assumption that the 
scientific community knows what the world is like” (p5) and that they agree 
what the world is like. If Kuhn’s characterisation of normal science is 
accurate, there should be a clear difference in normal science as practiced 
in different disciplines. In addition, if normal science is underpinned by 
paradigm in the way Kuhn describes, the paradigm should be working 
(though, perhaps to varying degrees) to restrict the methods researchers 
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apply, and also the kinds of questions researchers ask and answer. In this 
project I conducted qualitative interviews to explore normal science and the 
extent to which disciplinary paradigms appear to shape and restrict it in the 
study of health equity. 
2.4.4.3 Incommensurability & Scientific Progress 
“A great deal depends on how far this concept accurately captures 
situations of theoretical rivalry in science” Benton & Craib (2010:p.30) 
In a multi-disciplinary domain such as health equity, the question of what 
transpires when paradigms come into contact is important. Put simply, Kuhn 
argues that because paradigms contain their own standards for 
demonstration, and criteria for evaluating competing theories, there are no 
objective decision-procedures to justify the superiority of one paradigm over 
another. Sets of conventions cannot provide a basis for their own evaluation, 
and 
“proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about the list of 
problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve. Their standards or 
their definitions of science are not the same.” Kuhn (1970:p.148) 
The conclusion that paradigms are incommensurable also follows from 
Kuhn’s description of scientific training, which provides scientists with a 
mode of perception, not simply a toolkit. The paradigm is a sense of what 
the world is like, and a template for conducting good science in it. From a 
Kuhnian standpoint, to prefer one paradigm over another is to do much 
more than prefer a set of methods, or a particular theory, it is to express a 
preference for a particular account of reality. For these reasons, Kuhn argues 
that scientists working under different paradigms cannot communicate fully, 
because if agreement is achieved on all important points, scientists are then 
working under a common paradigm. In practice, there are significant barriers 
to such agreement because 
“neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other 
needs in order to make its case… they are bound partly to talk through each 
other” (Kuhn, 1970:p.148) 
The doctrine of incommensurability precipitated an ‘immense philosophical 
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dog-fight’ in the decades following Structure’s publication (Hacking, 2012). 
However, both sides took positions more extreme than Kuhn himself . It is 
‘full’ communication which Kuhn claims is restricted, and researchers 
‘partly’ talk past one another. Kuhn also stressed that limitations on 
communication do not prevent researchers sharing and comparing technical 
results, and he ‘“do[es] not believe it [incommensurability] is ever total or 
beyond recourse” (Kuhn, 2000:p.124). 
In this thesis I do not aim to confirm or refute Kuhn’s account of paradigms 
as generally incommensurable. However, this aspect of the Kuhnian model 
casts doubt on the assumption that the epistemic task of interdisciplinary 
work is straightforward. In addition, where communication between 
disciplinary groups is consistently unproductive, it may be helpful to 
consider the extent to which the paradigms are commensurable. 
2.4.4.4 The Disciplinary Matrix 
Following a paper critical of Kuhn’s plural usage of ‘paradigm’ in Structure 
(Masterman, 1970) Kuhn (1970: postscript) clarified that a scientific 
community is identifiable by its shared disciplinary matrix, a set of elements 
which includes accepted theoretical and empirical laws, beliefs, values and 
symbolic representations. This includes the “collective metaphysics of the 
group […] the entities and powers which appear in or are used to explain the 
laws” (Kuhn, 1967:Card 13). For Kuhn, the most important element within 
the matrix is the paradigm, the shared set of valid puzzle-solving procedures 
derived from a discipline’s traditions of exemplary past achievement. In this 
thesis, a literal disciplinary matrix is assembled to guide analysis, laid out in 
the next chapter. 
 
2.4.4.5 Criticism of Kuhn 
 
Kuhn’s writings continue to have a “profound effect” (Benton & Craib, 
2010:p.58) on scholarly and public perception of scientific activity. Structure 
generated its own critical literature, and has attracted over 120,000 citations 
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since publication in 1962, including whole books on the topic of its 
significance (e.g Barnes, 1982; Richards & Daston, 2016). 
Initially, Structure met with significant critical reception, primarily among 
philosophers. Some lines of criticism resolved as Kuhn clarified his position, 
or changed his stance. As the critiques of Kuhn’s work are vast, it is not 
possible for me to review them all. Rather, I focus on persisting avenues of 
criticism relating to my use of Kuhn; to the claim that paradigms cannot be 
neutrally evaluated, the validity of normal science, and the application of the 
Kuhnian model to science after 1945. 
Kuhn’s description of normal science was immediately criticised, most 
notably by Karl Popper, J.W.N Watkins, and Steven Toulmin. Popper (who 
viewed science as in constant revolution via bold statements which are 
vigorously tested) viewed Kuhnian normal science as unscientific, and found 
Kuhn’s “normal” scientist a pathetic, poorly-educated creature (Popper, 
1970). Popper also disputed Kuhn’s claim that there is no neutral territory 
from which to evaluate competing paradigms. 
Watkins charged that normal science describes science at its worst (‘hack 
science’) and is accurate only for periods of scientific stagnation, mere 
‘defensive metaphysics’ (Watkins, 1970: p28). Both Watkins and Popper 
rejected the notion of distinct scientific communities unified by dogma, 
favouring instead a vision of science as a single, open community. Steven 
Toulmin asked whether the normal and revolutionary sciences are really 
specific modes distinguishable in the manner Kuhn suggests. 
Kuhn responded to these critiques in a lengthy reply published alongside 
seven critical essays (from which the above quotations come) in “Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge” edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave 
(Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). 
Neutral Evaluation of Paradigms 
Against the charge that rationality and logic serve as neutral tools for the 
evaluation of paradigms, Kuhn clarifies his view that while scientists have 
good reasons for selecting one theory over another, what is missing is a 
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neutral language to discuss the basis for such a decision. In a prelude to his 
later writings concerned with disciplinary lexica (discussed and applied in 
Chapter 10), Kuhn clarified his position as referring to the existence of an 
observational language shared in its entirety by two paradigmatic 
perspectives, which he denies. He argued that this stance is grounded in a 
view of language which ‘fits the world’, reflecting how the meaning arises 
and circulates within scientific language communities. Kuhn charges his 
critics from the Philosophy of Science as having demonstrable lack of 
interest and awareness of such real-world use of language, central to the 
function of paradigms, as Kuhn defines them. 
Normal Science 
Responding to criticism of normal science, Kuhn argues that if scientific 
revolutions exist (which Popper and Watkins did not dispute) some other 
scientific state must fill the gaps between them, and normal science is this 
other state. Kuhn also positions normal science as following in an 
uncomplicated way from Popper’s own statement that theoretical 
frameworks are a prerequisite for research; “scientists necessarily develop 
their ideas within a definite theoretical framework” (Popper, 1970: p51). If 
revolution is the rejection of framework, then normal science is adherence to 
framework, something which all scientists do (not only plodding, uncritical 
minds). For Kuhn, Normal Science is not merely the absence of revolution, 
scientific frameworks ‘must be lived with and explored before they can be 
broken’ (Kuhn, 2000: p136) and this exploring and inhabiting comprises 
normal science. 
Application to Science Post-1945 
Science has changed radically since the 1960’s when Structure was written, 
and is unrecognisable when contrasted with the 18th century activities which 
formed Kuhn’s source material. Today, biotechnology rather than physics is 
the scene of rapid, controversial development, and the arrival of the 
computer and internet have transformed scholarly communication and 
dissemination. For these reasons, the straightforward application of Kuhn’s 
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account of science to 21st century research has been questioned (Hacking, 
2012). Mario Biagioli's  (2009) critique of the Kuhnian notion of paradigms as 
being 'too holistic' is illustrative of a common line of argument against Kuhn 
within science studies:  
The fast-paced rise, decline, and recombination of scientific disciplines and 
departments indicates that Kuhn’s concept of paradigm is no longer 
descriptive of most current scientific practices [...] Kuhn’s paradigm is 
simply too holistic a construct and puts too much emphasis on the 
intellectual and social cohesion of a group and on the uniformity of its 
training to match the remarkably diverse and mutating scenarios of 
contemporary research. (Biagioli, 2009:p.819)  
In a similar vein, Galison (2016:p.66) charges that the paradigm is too 
'monolithic' to be fruitfully applied to present-day research settings, 
characterising Structure as a 
Valiant and productive analysis of the physics of the 1930’s, done in the 
1940’s about the science of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries.  
The central argument is that due to the rapid pace of evolution within the 
modern academy, differences within disciplines now overwhelm differences 
between disciplines. This does not agree with my own experience in 
population health research, but if even if it did, the absence of cohesion 
within a discipline does not necessarily imply the absence of important 
distinctions between disciplines. And, where disciplines coexist in 
multidisciplinary domains, power imbalances between disciplines may mean 
that understanding such epistemological and cultural difference is key to 
understanding the field. Scholars focused on the history of a single 
discipline may naturally become finely attuned to the extent of disagreement 
within that discipline, and the notion of paradigm may be of limited use for 
the description of such heterogeneity. However, it may also be true that the 
paradigm captures something important about  the differences between 
disciplines. In addition, the Kuhnian lens is much more than disciplines-as-
paradigm (in Kuhn’s writing, and in this thesis). Even if 'disciplines' are not 
describable with reference to a single paradigm, the Kuhnian model of 
scientific practice may still, fruitfully, apply. In “paradigms and exemplars 
 
81 
meet biomedicine” (2016) Angela Creager notes that Kuhn’s model works 
“surprisingly well” within her field, and that Kuhn’s description of scientific 
training as “learning to see a problem as like a problem already 
encountered” (p.159) resonates, despite being written some 50 years prior, 
and based on scholarship from previous centuries. Even in a setting where 
methods progress rapidly, 21st century biomedical scientists do 
“reconfigure their local experimental systems to mimic the success achieved 
by others” (p.159). 
Kuhn’s account of how disciplinary training shapes perception, guides 
scientific practice and inhibits communication is powerful in its generality, 
but certainly lacking in fine-grained detail. Perhaps this “maddeningly 
malleable” (Creager, 2016: p.162) quality is a strength, allowing empirical 
detail to be added on top of Kuhn’s original picture, painted as it was in 
broad-stokes. As was discussed in Section 2.4.3 (and visualised in Figure 3) 
such detail has been added gradually, by various scholars over several 
decades. These scholars headed in the direction suggested by Structure, 
and fleshed out mid 20th century generalities about ‘science’ with 
contemporary observations in numerous settings. When combined with 
Kuhn’s own writing, these subsequent strands of work help to bring the 
Kuhnian model into the present, and create a richer picture of science as 
practiced today. 
 
2.5 Interdisciplinarity  
 
Just as the literature regarding ‘disciplines’ is fragmented, the literature 
concerning interdisciplinarity is also ‘disjointed and dispersed’ across a 
number of strands (Lyall, 2019:p.7). A complete review of the literature 
relating to interdisciplinarity is outside the scope of this thesis. However, 
the question of how apparent differences might impede researchers’ 
efforts to collaborate is important. Indeed, during field work, many 
interviewees expressed the hope that the implications of my findings for 
the pursuit of interdisciplinary knowledge would be dealt with in this 
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thesis. Chapter 10 addresses this question, and some specific literature 
supporting and contrasting with my findings is presented in that chapter. 
To provide a more general context, I now sketch an outline of the study 
of interdisciplinarity, and specify the terminology I employ.  
 
2.5.1 Terminology  
 
In analysis of interdisciplinary research, a variety of terms are available. 
Before turning to the set of terms used to discuss interdisciplinary work, I 
first note that interdisciplinary research is not always collaborative. That is, 
the integration of disciplinary perspectives can happen within the mind of a 
solitary scholar (Thompson-Klein, 2012).  In a late essay, Kuhn seems to 
suggest this is the only way full communication across paradigmatic 
boundaries can happen, because communication from one disciplinary 
lexicon into another requires a ‘bilingual’ individual (Kuhn, 2000). I explore 
this possibility in Chapter 10.   
 
Figure 6, below, is Alexander Jensenius’ visualisation of the terms intra-, 
multi-, cross-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary research as defined by Zeigler 
(1990) and Stember (1991).  
 
 
Figure 6, Reproduced from Disciplinarities: Intra, Cross, Multi, Inter, Trans. A.R 
Jensenius, 2012. 
 
According to this framework, intradisciplinary work draws on a single 
disciplinary perspective. Multidisciplinary research involves more than one 
(mono)disciplinary perspective, but no attempt is made to synthesise 
approaches. In cross-disciplinary research, a problem located within one 
(central) discipline is addressed from the perspective of other disciplines. 
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Stember defines Interdisciplinary research as the “integration of disciplinary 
approaches bring[ing] interdependent parts of knowledge into harmonious 
relationships” (Stember, 1991:p.4). Therefore, simply involving members of 
different disciplines does not meet the standard implied by this definition, 
some integration of disciplinary perspectives is required. Finally, the term 
transdisciplinary applies to particularly successful instances of 
interdisciplinary integration, which result in the new, unified frameworks 
(perhaps giving rise to a stand-alone discipline, as per the dotted arrow in 
Figure 6)2.  I employ the above definitions in my analysis, with an awareness 
that the term ‘interdisciplinarity’ is used in everyday contexts to refer in a 
rather more general way to any and all of the panels in Figure 6 (Frodeman, 
2017). Indeed, this is how my interviewees seemed to use the term.   
2.5.2 The Promise and Challenge of Interdisciplinary Research 
 
      Interdisciplinary research has become a central, load-bearing plank of 
research policy internationally (Bammer, 2013), but also presents a 
significant organisational problem for universities (Weingart, 2014). The 
practical obstacles to interdisciplinary careers are well-documented 
(Lyall, 2019) and include the low valuation of interdisciplinarity in 
academia, difficulties associated with publishing interdisciplinary 
research, and the lack of funding and career opportunities outside 
disciplined trajectories (LERU, 2017). These challenges originate from 
the structures and norms of academic organisations (Lyall & Fletcher, 
2013) which strongly favour intradisciplinary career progression.  
 
      The disconnect between the exciting idea and challenging reality of 
interdisciplinary research has been written about for over 20 years 
(Thompson-Klein, 1996) and the importance of disciplined structures 
within universities appears to persist 'unfettered' (Weingart, 2012). In 
interviewing interdisciplinary Early Career Researchers (ECRs) and 
University administrators in the UK, Lyall (2019) identified ‘a manifest 
 
2 An alternative, common definition of “transdisciplinary” refers to research that includes non-
academic partners as co-creators.  
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misalignment’ between the strategic pronouncements regarding 
interdisciplinarity and the practical challenges of forging a career as an 
interdisciplinary scholar. Cutting through stated enthusiasm for 
interdisciplinary research was 
“the mantra of disciplinary excellence that characterises research-led 
universities. Despite the prevalence of the interdisciplinary rhetoric within 
their institutions and from their funders […] the ethos within their universities 
is one where the hegemony of disciplines triumphs, and interdisciplinarity 
still risks being seen as ‘too soft for real tough minds’ “  Lyall, 2019: p.91 
(quotation from Weirngart, 2000: p.29) 
 
      Lyall’s study suggests that disciplinary (institutional) structures 
meaningfully shape research, and research careers. Additionally, these 
structures serve as formidable barriers to cross- multi- and 
interdisciplinary collaboration. Several studies of interdisciplinary cited in 
this section (including Lyall’s) include health-related researchers, and 
note that interdisciplinary research is especially challenging for 
researchers straddling the social-science/medicine divide. However, I am 
not aware of any thoroughgoing account exploring these differences as 
connected to the content of disciplinary knowledge about population 
health, and/or explaining why it is so difficult for these disciplinary 
epistemologies to fruitfully coexist within a department, or project team. 
This thesis will contribute to this evidence gap.   
 
2.6 Against Disciplines 
In apparent contrast to the literature just presented, disciplinary structures 
and norms have been positioned as relatively unimportant features within 
the academic landscape, as relics of a simpler time and simpler science. 
While few authors make this claim, dedicated scholarship about disciplines 
is unusual, and so this kind of statement does represent a sizable proportion 
of the discourse surrounding academic disciplines.  As was discussed in 
Section 2.4.2, non-disciplinary factors are presented as having eclipsed 
disciplinary norms in terms of influence on research output (Brew & 
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Manathunga, 2012). Several models of ‘new’ science have been proposed 
(Hessels & van Lente, 2008) and in this final section I discuss two well-
known models which make specific claims regarding the dwindling influence 
of disciplines. 
Mode-2 Knowledge: Gibbons 1994/ Nowotny et al. 2003 
Gibbons and colleagues (1994) presented a picture of Mode 2 knowledge 
production, subsequently clarified in 2003 (Nowotny et al., 2003). Mode 1 
Knowledge Production, “an internally-driven taxonomy of disciplines” 
(p.179), is framed as the ‘Old Paradigm’ of scientific discovery, now 
superseded “by a new paradigm of knowledge production (Mode 2) which is 
socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to 
multiple accountabilities” (p.179).  
Rather than originating within disciplinary paradigms, Mode 2 knowledge is 
generated and evaluated within the context of its application. Gibbons and 
colleagues (1994) further characterise Mode 2 knowledge as being 
transdisciplinary, integrating a range of theoretical perspectives and 
practical methodologies “not necessarily derived from pre-existing 
disciplines” (Nowotny et al., 2003: p.186). 
Under Mode 2 knowledge production, research is valued according to the 
extent to which it applies to and solves real-world problems. Under this 
model, criteria which determine research quality are not established by 
disciplinary communities, rather, they are defined outside the academy and 
are social, political and economic. Nowotny and colleagues argue three 
trends have driven this change: 
I) The steering of research priorities by funding agencies 
II) The increasing commercialisation of research 
III)    Science being increasingly accountable to a variety of publics 
 
The three trends identified as driving Mode 2 science (especially the steering 
of research priorities by funding agencies) have already been documented 
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as impacting HIDR within the UK (Garthwaite et al., 2016; Smith, 2010). 
However, no data are provided by Gibbons and colleagues (1994) to support 
the claim that scientists are more responsive to external notions of research 
quality than internal (i.e disciplinary) standards. Nowotny and colleagues 
(2003) are careful to position their model as a ‘reflective essay’ and not an 
empirical study, however the widespread existence of Mode 2 knowledge-
producing communities “has not been supported by theoretical 
considerations or by systematic empirical evidence” (Weingart, 2012).  
 
Post-Normal Science: Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993 
‘Post-Normal’ Science is not a model of science as such, but rather the kind 
of science felt necessary to tackle a class of problems which, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz argue, are not amenable to solutions via Kuhnian normal science. 
Post-normal problems are characterised by urgency, uncertain facts, 
disputes regarding values, and high stakes. In practice, enacting Post-
Normal science requires the extension of the notion of scientific “peer” in 
two ways. First, multiple disciplines should be assumed to have bearing on 
the issue from the outset. Second, the wider community, including lay-
actors are invited to participate, thereby democratising science. 
While employing a combination of disciplinary lenses seems desirable, if the 
Kuhnian characterisation of science is correct there is no neutral territory 
from which to balance or evaluate diverse disciplinary approaches to an 
urgent, high stakes challenge. Similarly, if the Kuhnian view of scientific 
training is accurate, scientists are not well-prepared for the kind of science 
Funtowicz and Ravetz advocate, and it is to be expected that the 
implementation of Post-Normal science is extremely challenging in practice. 
Finally, the ‘closure’ of scientific communication discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter (scientific communication, once written for general 
consumption, has pivoted toward specialised audiences ) would be 
expected to significantly complicate the inclusion of members outside the 
discipline and outside science within the research process. This PhD project 
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provides an opportunity to sketch in some detail the potential barriers to 
combining disciplines and extending the notion of scientific “peer” in the 
way Funtowicz and Ravetz suggest is required to tackle complex problems 
via Post-Normal science. 
The description of Mode-2 and call for Post-Normal science appear to me to 
represent examples of discourse emerging from the empirical appraisal of 
science which minimises the potentially important role of disciplinary 
structures. I do not argue that disciplinary identity is the most important 
factor shaping current research practice, but rather, in this thesis, seek to 
highlight what is lost when disciplines are ignored or overlooked in 
discussions of general trends within science, and academia. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I reviewed the multi-stranded literature surrounding the form 
and function of academic disciplines. The study of disciplines is 
complicated by five challenges: the difficulty of defining and identifying 
disciplines; the fragmented nature of the literature about disciplines; various 
approaches to the separation of the ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’ elements of 
disciplines; an unbalanced focus on physics and natural sciences; and 
important variation across academic contexts (I discussed research, 
teaching, and practice). To navigate these challenges, I adopt Trowler’s 
(2014) view of disciplines as exhibiting strong family resemblance across 
contexts, whilst also understanding that the structure and culture of 
individual departments and laboratories is contextually-dependent. The 
Sociology of Professions, Higher Education Research, and Science and 
Technology Studies were reviewed in detail, and key contributions 
highlighted from each strand. Within all three strands, studies focused on 
the research context appear to be increasingly unusual, however this does 
not reflect a complete or total understanding of the construction of scientific 
knowledge within disciplines. 
To sharpen my focus on the research context, and on the construction of 
knowledge within that context, I turned in Section 4 to the three streams of 
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‘Nature of Science’ STS as practiced in the 1960’s-1990’s. The Kuhnian 
model of science (the common foundation of these streams) was also 
reviewed in detail. Much seems to depend on whether the Kuhnian 
description of disciplines as adherent to paradigm holds true, as it cannot 
simultaneously be the case that disciplines “don’t matter” (as in Section 4) 
and also that disciplinary structures, conventions and norms are the 
principle barrier to interdisciplinary scholarship (as in Section 5). In noting 
this conundrum I return to the plural character of disciplines: simultaneously 
obvious and invisible, apparently weak drivers in a complex academy but 
also powerful limiters of interconnectivity and integration between academy 
members. 
In the next chapter, I outline the specific concepts and theories which guide 
my analysis of disciplines in this thesis, and explain the basis upon which 
such diverse material can be coherently combined. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 will present the research design choices that supported 
my approach to answering the research question and analytical aims 
outlined in Chapter 1 (p.38). Before beginning that description, in this brief 
chapter I present the principles and presuppositions which informed my 
selection of these methods. 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, focusing on Kuhn’s originating 
contribution to STS allows ideas from multiple disciplinary strands of enquiry 
to be usefully synthesised, and simultaneously employed, as elements 
within what Kuhn termed the disciplinary matrix. However, synthesizing 
disparate literatures poses an epistemological hazard, risking incoherence.  
 
Charles Bazerman described this precise difficulty in the introduction to 
his book on academic genres “Shaping Written Knowledge”: 
“In order to understand what I needed from the sociology of science or the 
philosophy of science or the history of science I had to encounter them in 
the context of their own problematics. To steal random parts of different 
engines leaves one with a junkpile, even if one can create the 
appearance of a coordinated assembly”  
(Bazerman, 1988: p.9, emphasis added) 
 At the beginning of this PhD, even arriving at a convincingly 
‘coordinated assembly’ seemed impossible. However, the picking and 
mixing from diverse traditions in this project is not random, or haphazard. 
My approach to the question of disciplinary difference is grounded in the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Shapin, 1995) and the methodological 
principles of an approach to SSK known as the Strong Programme  
(hereafter ‘Strong Programme SSK'), outlined in the next section. This 
tradition emerged early in my reading as being appropriate for supporting 




In particular, my aim is to glimpse the causes of disciplinary diversity, not 
simply to describe disciplinary difference. This demands a particular set of 
theories and concepts, drawn from prior scholarship which goes beyond the 
description of difference in science.  To make clear what I mean by this 
distinction I very briefly present three examples.  
 
Bazerman’s “Shaping Written Knowledge” (1988) takes a linguistic 
approach to disciplinary diversity, and might have been a descriptive 
catalogue of disciplinary writing styles. However, Bazerman’s aim was 
sociological, not textual. Rather than describing how use of language tends 
to vary across disciplines, Bazerman asks what such variation portends, and 
employs theory from STS and SSK to understand the ways scientific 
language signals diverse ways of knowing.   
 
Similarly, in the Enigma of the Aerofoil (2011) David Bloor notes that 20th 
century German and British scholars of aerodynamics arrive at different 
answers to the question of how aeroplanes fly. Rather than describing this 
difference, Bloor explores how and why this difference arose, and the ways 
in which scientific cultures preconditioned their members to respond to 
certain kinds of ‘proof’.  
 
In Epistemic Cultures (1999) Karin Knorr-Cetina notes that High Energy 
Physicists tend to work in a cooperative manner, while Molecular Biologists 
do not. In painting a picture of how this difference is connected to, and 
rooted within the content of the two sciences, Knorr-Cetina moves beyond 
description toward explaining the origin, function and consequence of this 
difference. 
 
Of these three works, only one (Bloor’s) is identified as an example of 
Strong Programme SSK. However, in moving beyond description toward 
explanation, all three adhere to the ‘Causal’ tenet of Strong Programme 
SSK, which I also adhere to in this thesis. The methodological tenets of 




3.2 Strong Programme SSK  
 
The methodological tenets of Strong Programme SSK (Bloor, 1976) are:  
   
Impartiality: with respect to the ‘correctness’, ‘rationality’ or 
success of a particular knowledge claims. Claims which are 
‘wrong’ are not more interesting (sociologically) than claims which 
are ‘right’.  
 
Causality: Concerned with the conditions which bring about 
beliefs, or knowledge. This includes but is not limited to social 
causes.  
 
Symmetry in explanation:  The same causes, including social 
causes, must explain both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science, both ‘true’ 
and ‘false’ statements. There are not special causes of bad 
science.  
 
Reflexivity: Any explanations must apply to sociology. 
 
The Impartiality tenet prescribes that work should aim at the outset to 
study all scientific practices, not only good, bad or improper practice. This is 
connected to a directive from historian of science Martin Rudwick  that 
studies of science must include 
 “not only star performers but also minor actors, and walk on 
parts" (Rudwick, 1985: p.14).  
The tendency of empirical studies of science to focus on 'star 
performers' was raised and critiqued by Becher & Trowler (2001), who 
rejected the conceptualisation of science as a ‘snake-like procession’ driven 
by elite institutions. Similarly, in interdisciplinary studies, scholars are calling 
for attention to both ‘loud’ and ‘soft’ voices (Lindvig, 2019). In this thesis I 
made effort to include researchers at varied career stages, and with high 
and low public profiles (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
As was mentioned in the thesis introduction, existing research tends to 
point to disciplinary difference as a resource in explaining some other 
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feature of science (language, professional culture, publication norms). Such 
treatment of disciplinary difference as an analytical resource rather than 
topic can lead to the uninspiring conclusion that disciplines are different 
‘because they are different’. Applying the Causal tenet of Strong Programme 
SSK permits a more satisfying interrogation of disciplinary difference, 
because noting that researchers from different backgrounds approach 
science differently is not sufficient, some answer is required regarding why 
researchers write, hire, teach and publish differently. Said another way, 
rather than concluding that members of different disciplines appear to follow 
different rules, in following this principle I ask why the rules are being 
followed, and both how and why different disciplinary communities arrived 
at and sustain their diverse rule-sets (Bloor, 2011).  
 
I view the causal tenet of Strong Programme SSK as helping to generate 
conclusions which are useful to researchers working within health equity 
scholarship, and population health. It is of little practical use to inform 
researchers that they experience difficulty in multi- and inter- disciplinary 
settings because of ‘disciplinary culture’ (less useful still for economists, 
epidemiologists and medical doctors who may lack familiarity with what a 
reference to ‘culture’ might specifically indicate.) Therefore, I follow the 
causal tenet in order to maximise the specificity of my findings, with the 
expectation that their potential usefulness for researchers is also 
maximised3.  
 
The symmetry tenet has been the subject of much comment and debate 
(Bloor, 2011). A common misconception is that in order to practice Strong 
Programme SSK scholars must abandon their understanding of the natural 
world, including all notions of ‘true’ and ‘false’, and adopt a view of reality as 
a social construction. Rather, what the symmetry principle requires is a 
willingness to entertain the view that the drivers of ‘bad’ science are the 
same as drivers of ‘good’ science, and that there are not special (i.e., social) 
 
3 Findings presented in Chapter 7 suggest this preference for useful findings may be rooted 
within my training in epidemiology. 
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causes of bad science absent in good science. This thesis is not specifically 
concerned with questions of true and false, or good and bad, but the 
symmetry tenet shapes my approach to the question of disciplinary 
difference in two ways. 
  
First, rather than supposing that it is possible a priori to determine good 
research from bad research (or that there is a universal definition of 'good' 
science), the project has been purposefully designed to generate data 
regarding the type of research individual scholars view as ‘good’ or bad’ 
(see Chapter 5). Secondly, these data are viewed as a window into 
fundamental epistemological commitments, not as a test of who 
understands what kind of research is really ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This allowance 
for multiple perspectives draws upon the established notion within SSK that 
appropriate scientific conduct, “is tied to place and purpose” (Shapin, 1995: 
p.304), and that being 'right' and 'wrong' in science is frequently more 
complicated than initially appears to be the case (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; 
Kuhn, 2000).  
 
Finally, the thesis adheres to the Reflexivity tenet by including sociology 
among the disciplines analysed.  
 
3.3 Strong Programme SSK and Thomas Kuhn  
 
It is common (e.g., Hacking, 2012) to dismiss the Strong Programme with 
reference to Kuhn’s 1991 Lecture “The trouble with the historical philosophy 
of science” wherein Kuhn identifies Strong Programme SSK as anti-science:  
“The most extreme form of the movement, called by its proponents “the 
Strong Program”, has been widely understood as claiming that power and 
interest are all there are. Nature itself, whatever that may be, has seemed to 
have no part in the development of beliefs about it […] I am among those 
who’ve found the claims of the strong program absurd: an example of 
deconstruction gone mad” (Kuhn, 1991: p.110)  
This seems difficult to square with Kuhn’s own emphatic insistence that 
there can be no ‘objective’ discussion of nature. In any case, Strong 
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Programme SSK does not ignore the natural world, or reduce science to 
power and interest:  
“those who follow the Strong Programme do not treat the social world as 
something to which scientists respond instead of responding to the Natural 
World. The cultures, institutions, and interests that I have identified did not 
block the active involvement with material reality, but were a vehicle of that 
involvement, and gave a specific meaning to it." (Bloor, 2011:p.402)  
Read closely, the tenets of the Strong Programme do not conflict with a 
Kuhnian model of science. In particular, Structure seems to precisely 
anticipate the Symmetry condition:  
“...if these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be 
produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of 
reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge.” Kuhn, 1962: p.2 
I perceive no conflict between the Kuhnian model of science and Strong 
Programme SSK. Major empirical landmarks of nature-of-knowledge STS 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) have drawn upon Kuhn whilst 
also adhering to the strong programme's methodological tenets (Latour & 
Woolgar specifically describe an aim 'to pursue the strong programme', 
p:152) In addition, Bartley (1990), a health equity researcher, has called 
specifically for more widespread attention to knowledge construction, via 
application of the Strong Programme in health-related sociology.  
3.4 Populating the Disciplinary matrix  
 
My use of Kuhn’s ideas does not depend on the resolution of the 
longstanding arguments surrounding his work. I do not attempt resolve 
debate surrounding the nature of truth in science, or attempt to provide a 
general model of scientific progress. Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability 
is relevant, but assumptions about the incommensurable nature of 
paradigms do not underpin my analysis, rather I seek to explore the extent 
to which disciplinary perspectives appear commensurable in HIDR. This 
PhD project is further motivated by an awareness that the Kuhnian model  
(developed as it was upon centuries-old physicists) may be of limited use in 
understanding  21st century research about health. A model of science built 
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upon paradigmatic change may prove to be irrelevant to the case of HIDR 
where multiple (established) paradigms simultaneously coexist.  
 
Nevertheless, the concept of the disciplinary matrix provides a helpful 
scaffold within which to hang specific dimensions along which (disciplinary) 
normal science might vary. The chapter concludes with a description of the 
concrete disciplinary matrix which guided my analysis.  
 
3.4.1 Extant Disciplinary Taxonomies  
 
3.4.1.1 The Biglan Taxonomy (1973) 
 
Biglan (1973) noted a rise in scholarly interest in the organisation of 
university departments, but also the curious neglect of differences in the 
nature of research across disciplines. To get at these differences, 168 staff 
members at the University of Illinois were posted 30 pieces of paper bearing 
the names of various fields, and asked to staple disciplines which they 
judged to belong to ‘the same category’. After the sorting task, participants 
were asked to rate each field on a set of bipolar dimensions: a) 
Pure/Applied, b) Physical/Non-Physical, c)Biological/Non-Biological d)”Of 
interest to me”/“of no interest to me” e)”Traditional”/“Non-Traditional” and f) 
life/non-life.  
 
Biglan then analysed the resultant groupings, and arrived at three  
dimensions which he judged to reflect fundamental differences in the 
content of academic disciplines. These were: 
 
• Life /Non-life: Whether or not a science concerns living organisms 
 
• Pure/Applied: Concern (or not) with application to practical 
problems. 
 
• Hard/Soft: Discussed Below 
 
The Hard/Soft dimension was Biglan’s  own summary of emergent 
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findings, and, while awareness of Biglan’s paper is not widespread, the 
terms “Hard” and “Soft” have endured. Crucially, however, much usage of 
these terms does not reflect Biglan’s intended meaning. By “hard science” 
Biglan did not mean concerned with concrete facts, rather, he meant 
strongly governed by a paradigm (and cited Structure in his discussion). By 
“soft”, Biglan referred to disciplines within which content and methods are 
less uniform. Biglan subsequently abandoned the Life/Non-Life dimension, 
resulting in a 2 x 2 classification scheme for disciplines along the Hard-Soft 
and Pure-Applied dimensions. 
 
The stability of disciplinary positions within the 2 x 2 Biglan schematic 
has been repeatedly demonstrated (Smart & Elton, 1982; Stoecker, 1993). 
Studies have shown that hard/soft and pure/applied differences align with 
differences in other properties, including students’ theories of knowledge 
(Paulsen & Wells, 1998); job stress (Barnes et al., 1998) and variation in 
training for academic leadership (Favero, 2006). 
 
Simpson (2017) sought to empirically test the relevance of the Biglan 
schematic in the UK, by analysing the kinds of courses which tend to be 
delivered at the same university. Using data from 23,000 courses delivered 
at over 100 universities, Simpson’s first two explanatory dimensions 
corresponded with the pure/applied and hard/soft dimensions4.  
 
 The stability of disciplines’ status as pure/ applied, or hard/ soft 
suggests that these attributes may meaningfully shape research practice, 
and I add these elements to the disciplinary matrix.  
 
3.4.1.2 The Kolb Taxonomy (1981)  
 
Educational psychologist David Kolb (1981) did not cite Kuhn in “Learning 
styles and Disciplinary Differences” but presented a distinctly Kuhnian view 
 




of disciplines as possessing “different patterns of power and authority, and 
differing criteria for attaining status […] A sense of historical continuity and 
in most cases a historical mission” (p.233). Kolb also echoed Kuhn by noting 
that there is no neutral standpoint from which to evaluate and compare 
disciplines. 
Kolb’s intent was to focus on learning styles, and to demonstrate the way in 
which these distribute in a predictable manner across undergraduate 
majors. Kolb administered his Learning Style Inventory to 800 
undergraduates, then to 32,000 graduate students and faculty. Results 
highlighted two dimensions: The Abstract/Concrete dimension (students 
were asked to rate how important proficiency in mathematics was within 
their discipline), and the Active/Reflective dimension (derived from 
investigation of the extent to which teaching staff engage in consulting).   
These dimensions seem to echo the Biglan dimensions, and were combined 
by Becher (1987) to form a single taxonomy, however they are not truly 
analogous (Simpson, 2017) and some oddities in Kolb’s original paper cast 
doubt upon their usefulness. For example, Sociology’s closest disciplinary 
neighbours are found to be Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics, which 
seems curious. Physics emerges in Kolb’s data as the most abstract of all 
disciplines, suggesting that, in Kolb’s sample, command of mathematics 
was judged more important in physics than in mathematics. Finally, nursing 
is not a “profession” in Kolb’s analysis, it is considered a Social Science 
because nurses rarely engage in consulting activities. Simpson (2017) was 
unable to reconstruct the Kolb dimensions in his study. For these reasons I 
do not incorporate the Kolb dimensions into my matrix. However, despite 
these issues, and lack of empirical support, in his discussion Kolb (1981) 
highlighted three additional, specific ways disciplines might be expected to 
vary upon empirical scrutiny, and these have been supported in subsequent 
study.  
First, Kolb notes apparent variation in preference for simplicity or 
complexity, subsequently discussed and investigated by others (Daston & 
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Galison, 1992: Bloor, 2011). Second, Kolb discusses a variation in the sense 
of what constitutes valid knowledge, variation in what he terms knowledge 
structure. Nearly 20 years later, working within the Cultural Studies strand of 
STS, Karin Knorr-Cetina presented a highly detailed picture of this kind of 
variation between two disciplines (Knorr-Cetina, 1999). 
Finally,  Kolb discussed the ways different fields approach the trade-off 
between workability (or ‘usefulness’) and intellectual coherence, a trade-off 
at the heart of Bloor’s comparative study of engineers and mathematicians 
(Bloor, 2011).  
These three dimensions are added to my disciplinary matrix.  
3.4.2. Additional Concepts  
3.4.2.1  Basil Bernstein: Disciplinary Classification Strength & Code  
 
Linguist and sociologist of education Basil Bernstein made a significant 
contribution to the study of communication via his sociolinguistic theory of 
language codes. Bernstein presented two types of language codes, the 
‘restricted code’ for use within contexts where speaker and listener share 
assumptions and understanding on the topic, and the ‘elaborated code’, for 
use where less is presumed to be held in common (Bernstein, 1971). 
Scientific communication within a discipline may therefore be understood as 
a restricted code.  
 
In addition to this conceptual framing of communication, Bernstein 
considered the nature of educational knowledge and curriculum (Robertson, 
2003). Two concepts from this strand of enquiry have implications outside 
the classroom setting, and represent dimensions along which all disciplines 
might vary (Becher, 2001) 
   
Strong & Weak Classification  
 
Disciplinary classification relates to the strength of borders and 
boundaries between categories, and the extent to which categories (or other 
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parts within a knowledge-system) are insulated from one another. Strong 
boundaries require maintenance, and the effort expended on such 
maintenance suggests well-maintained boundaries perform some valuable 
function within strongly-classified fields. Bernstein tied this characteristic to 
power relations in educational settings, arguing that power relations create, 
legitimise and reproduce boundaries between categories or groups within 
knowledge systems (Robertson, 2003).  
 
Strong classification may be accompanied by strong ‘framing’ (Bernstein, 
1996: p.27) clear delineation regarding the locus of control (i.e who has 
control over the selection and evaluation of sanctioned content). The 
combination of strong classification and strong framing in a discipline has 
been presented as helping to explain varying power dynamics across 
disciplinary cultures (Becher, 2001).  
 
Similar ideas are present elsewhere in the literature. Biglan’s “hard” and 
“soft” dimensions capture the extent of agreement among members about 
acceptable problems and methods, what Kuhn might describe as the 
flexibility or rigidity of a discipline’s paradigm. These ideas connect with 
Bernstein’s theory of classification, as ‘strongly classified’ disciplines are 
bound together tightly with a common core of methods and topics, while 
‘loosely classified’ disciplines are not.  
 
Of the available terms, Bernstein’s discussion of classification does not 
depend on comprehension of underlying theory (as Kuhn’s does) and does 
not have normative connotations in the way Biglan’s Hard and Soft labels 
do. Therefore, in this thesis I refer to strongly and weakly classified 
disciplines, and Classification is added to the disciplinary matrix. 
 
Cumulative & Integrative codes  
 
Together, classification and framing strength determine a field’s ‘code’,  
a regulative principle, tacitly acquired, which selects and integrates: 
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a) relevant meanings 
b) forms of their realisation 
c) evoking contexts                 (Bernstein, 1996: p.14) 
 
The collection (or ‘cumulative’) code is characterised by strong 
classification, and sometimes by strong framing. The integration code is 
characterised by weak classification, and sometimes weak framing. Whether 
research activity is conceptualised as the collection of knowledge, versus 
the integration of knowledge into some whole, therefore represents another 
dimension along which disciplines might vary.  
 
Becher & Trowler (2001) draw on Bernstein and discuss disciplines as 
having either “strong” or “weak” collection codes (pp.37-38), slightly 
distorting the original concept.  Becher (1994), while not citing Bernstein or 
specifically mentioning codes, appears to connect this same idea to the 
nature of knowledge in disciplined research. In fields with a collection code, 
knowledge is described as cumulative and atomistic, accumulating as in a 
crystalline structure, advancing a frontier.  In fields governed by integrative 
codes, knowledge is described as reiterative and holistic, being integrated 
and combined with existing knowledge, tending to re-address a set of 
fundamental questions. It is this elaboration of ‘code’ in disciplined science 
which I add to my disciplinary matrix.   
3.4.2.2 Disciplines’ Generative Power  
 
I further anticipate that disciplines display vary in what Trowler (2014) terms 
their generative power; the power of disciplinary structures and cultures to 
affect other phenomena. In research, such power might manifest via 
success in obtaining funding, influencing policy, or the extent to which a 
discipline shapes academic practice in other disciplines (a possibility not 
anticipated by Kuhn’s model). 
This power does not accompany disciplinary labels in all cases, and may not 
be present in every instance, and is therefore best understood as variable 
and contextually contingent (Trowler, 2014). 
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3.4.2.3   Virtues and Transgressions 
 
Two final elements emerge from consideration of disciplinary paradigms 
(which, as a reminder, I take to mean the set of problem-solving strategies 
rooted within a tradition of previous achievement).  
When responding to queries regarding how scientific paradigms might be 
analytically accessed in practice, and within contemporary science, Kuhn 
responded:  
“Whatever scientific progress may be, we must account for it by examining the 
scientific group, discovering what it values, what it tolerates, what it disdains.” 
(Kuhn, 2000:p.131) 
 
Therefore, features of research valued highly within disciplines (what I term 
‘virtues’) and features disdained (what I term ‘transgressions’) are added to 
the matrix, as these are likely to signal fundamental epistemological 
commitments. 
3.4.3 A Concrete Disciplinary Matrix 
 
The concepts presented in the previous section can be conceptualised as 
elements within a disciplinary matrix, depicted in Table 3, Below.  




Preference for simplicity/complexity 
Knowledge Structure 
Preference for usefulness / coherence 






Table 3, Elements within the disciplinary matrix informing analysis in this thesis 
The rows of Table 3 represent the dimensions along which, at the beginning 
of data analysis, I anticipated that disciplines may vary.5 I treat the question 
of their specific relevance to health equity as open, to be explored in the 
results.  
 
The following two chapters present the specific research methods 
employed, bibliometric analysis (Chapter 4) and semi-structured qualitative 



























5 The rows in Table 3 are visually connected to their supporting literature in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 4: Bibliometric Analysis Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
To make any comment on the disciplinary backgrounds present within health 
inequalities and disparities research (HIDR), and to sample appropriately for 
my interviews, reliable data describing the disciplinary makeup of the area is 
required. Bibliometric analysis is the application of statistical methods to 
data describing scientific texts and the citations among them (Gmür, 2003; 
Sugimoto & Larivière, 2018). I employed bibliometric analysis to map the 
intellectual territory “Research about Health inequalities and disparities” and 
to algorithmically subdivide the field into communities on the basis of 
citation patterns. Concrete outputs of the analysis included a list of the 250 
most-connected authors working within HIDR, and a network representation 
of these authors. Next, a data collection process (described in Section 4.4) 
identified the disciplinary backgrounds of these 250 researchers, who 
became the population from which interviewees were sampled.  
The employment of bibliometric analysis in this thesis had three purposes; 
to delineate the field of HIDR and map its disciplinary topography, to 
generate data describing the disciplinary mix of authors, and also to serve 
as the sampling frame for interviews. A detailed description of the method 
now follows. 
4.2 Bibliometric Analysis  
Bibliometrics is a branch of scientometrics, the “quantitative study of 
science, communication in science, and science policy” (Hess, 1997: p.75). 
Like history of science, philosophy of science and sociology of scientific 
knowledge, scientometrics turns the tools of science upon science itself 
(Leydesdorff, 2001). 
Scientometrics tends to distinguish sharply between research ‘inputs’ 
(funding, technology) and ‘outputs’ (publications, patents) (Sugimoto & 
Larivière, 2018). Data regarding research input tends to be locally managed, 
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and comparison across countries or disciplines is hampered by variation in 
methods and context. The social sciences and humanities are very rarely 
included in surveys of research inputs (Sugimoto & Larivière, 2018), as 
correspondence between inputs and outputs for these disciplines is not 
straightforward. Collection of detailed data describing scientific inputs also 
tends to be obtrusive, manual, and time consuming. Conversely, data 
regarding research output is widely available, and less variable between 
scientific and geographical contexts. Data can be collected unobtrusively, 
and collated into large databases. Therefore,  
“Despite issues in coverage (e.g., by discipline, language, and country), 
citation databases have become the standard for measuring research, 
primarily using the tools of bibliometrics […] They can be used both to 
complement other studies of science as well as to provide additional 
understanding of how knowledge is produced over time, across disciplines, 
and across the globe “ (Sugimoto & Larivière, 2018: pp2-3) 
Bibliometric methods are the set of statistical techniques used to analyse 
datasets which describe scientific outputs. By a variety of means (see 
Section 4.3.4) data relating to individual articles, authors, institutions and 
countries can be analysed, and mapped (Rip, 1988). The method has 
various strengths and weaknesses, discussed in the following section. 
4.2.1 Advantages and Limitations 
Advantages  
HIDR is vast, and diverse, meaning the most active researcher could not 
have a birds-eye appreciation of the field. Bibliometric analysis provides an 
efficient and reproducible method for summarising data about published 
texts, and creating pictorial representations of a research area. Bibliometric 
methods can help to avoid distorted pictures of a field arising from 
researchers’ local standpoint (Gagné et al., 2018). Additionally, “a 
bibliometric analysis covering an extended period of time can help us to 
pinpoint the most influential ideas/schools of thought (as proxied by 
associated authors) and the interrelationships among them.” (Nerur et al., 
2008: p.320). Bibliometric analysis is especially useful when the volume of 
relevant data exceeds what a human can read, and, even for small datasets, 
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understanding bibliometric data without visualisation is challenging 
(Sugimoto & Larivière, 2018). 
Limitations 
Bibliometric analysis relies on repositories of citation data, often 
demonstrably incomplete and/or incorrect (De Battisti & Salini, 2013; Rafols 
& Meyer, 2007). The format of these data is also challenging (De Battisti & 
Salini, 2013) as bibliometric data are textual (lists of names and references), 
not numeric. Manipulating and cleaning text in large volumes is challenging 
because interacting manually with text is time consuming, and fraught, as a 
misplaced comma or semicolon can corrupt the data in some formats (as I 
discovered, see Section 4.3.2). Software can now receive data directly from 
repository databases (see Section 4.3.6) removing the necessity of 
interacting with data directly. However this introduces other difficulties, as 
feeding bibliometric data directly into an algorithmic process without 
cleaning or checking potentially provides misleading results (Sugimoto & 
Larivière, 2018).   
Bibliometric analysis at the level of individual authors is especially 
challenging, as in addition to the challenges described above, names might 
be misspelled, middle initials are sometimes omitted, or multiple authors can 
have the same name. Future analyses will be greatly assisted by numeric 
author identifiers such as ORCID, but, for now, the cleanliness of 
bibliometric data is a significant issue, and peer-reviewed guidance for 
managing these difficulties in author-level analyses is limited. However, 
these problems, while challenging, are not catastrophic. The apparently 
random nature of author misspelling and misattribution allows this to be 
conceived as noise rather than bias, and the sheer volume of data which 
can be analysed helps overcome this noise. Nevertheless, some examples 
are not random (e.g. authors from certain countries are more likely than the 
rest of the field to share a surname). I emphasise that this project was 
conducted within the general limits of bibliometric data sources, and as 
such results are not definitive.  
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Beyond issues of data cleanliness, early-career researchers are 
disadvantaged by bibliometric methods, as time is required for citation to 
occur. Additionally, publications attract citations for a variety of reasons, and 
not all citations reflect approval or endorsement. The meaning of citation 
requires consideration; but a comprehensive theory of citation remains 
elusive (Leydesdorff, 2001). In this study, my aim is not to study the “best” 
HIDR researchers, but to identify and analyse the disciplinary backgrounds 
of the most-connected set of authors, as this provides a sense of the field’s 
structure, and organisation in citation-space. 
Variation in citation patterns between disciplines (Fanelli & Glänzel, 2013) is 
an important consideration in this project. On average, social science 
articles cite more sources than natural sciences articles. This tendency 
could result in more links, and therefore a bias toward social scientists. 
However, there are more natural science articles, and average citation rates 
in the natural sciences are higher, perhaps balancing out their shorter 
reference lists. This is a complex issue and, regrettably, there is little peer-
reviewed guidance on conducting bibliometric analyses at the level of 
authors rather than documents. The length of reference lists within my 
dataset is available for analysis, and could be investigated in detail, in future.  
Finally, from a conceptual standpoint, ‘science’ cannot be reduced to the set 
of variables and indicators within bibliometric datasets (Leydesdorff & 
Milojević, 2012). The price of drastic simplification in science can be 
significant (Bloor, 2011) and careful attention to the trade-off between 
tractability and simplification is necessary. For this project, even given the 
limitations above, bibliometric analysis does represent the best method for 
scoping HIDR. However, this analysis, while aspiring to be an accurate 
picture, can only represent an abstraction built by traces left by certain 
scientific activities.  




4.3 Detailed Description of the method 
Bibliometric analysis requires:  
• A database describing relevant features of a collection of scientific 
articles, including references between them  
• A search string to sample records from that database  
• A unit of analysis, which form the ‘nodes’ of the network (e.g. individual 
authors, papers, countries, institutions)  
• A method for calculating the appropriate ‘distance’ between nodes  
• Agreed criteria for deciding which nodes should be included in the 
network (if the data contain more than is visually manageable)  
• Software to take these data and produce a network 
• An algorithm for detecting communities within the network 
 
These elements are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 
4.3.1 Data Source 
The Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus are two, large bibliometric 
databases frequently used in bibliometric analysis projects, each with 
strengths and weaknesses (Sugimoto & Larivière, 2018). Both databases 
have a demonstrated bias toward journal articles compared to books 
(Mongeon & Paul-Hus, 2016). As articles are the principle method of result 
dissemination in the natural, engineering and biomedical sciences, this 
produces a bias toward these disciplines and away from the social sciences, 
arts, and humanities in bibliometric data (Norris & Oppenheim, 2007). As this 
project focusses on research about health (disseminated most-typically via 
peer-reviewed articles rather than book chapters) this bias seems 
acceptable.  
Previous bibliometric studies of interdisciplinarity have drawn upon WoS 
data (Porter & Rafols, 2009; Rafols & Meyer, 2007). WoS imposes a more 
rigid data structure and has a superior journal classification schema (Wang & 




However, Mongeon & Paul-Hus (2016) compared the active journals covered 
by Scopus (n= 20,346) and the WoS (n= 13,605) with Ulrich’s index of 
70,644 journals. Many of the almost 7,000 additional journals covered by 
Scopus are in the area of biomedical research, and so this difference is 
significant. Scopus also demonstrates superior coverage of the social 
sciences, and as HIDR is comprised of both biomedical and social scientists 
this difference is potentially significant for my study. Structural barriers to 
combining data sources necessitated the selection of a single database, and 
so on the basis of superior journal coverage, Scopus was selected.  
4.3.2 Search String 
 
The search string evolved as the project progressed, in consultation with my 
supervisors, and a librarian. 
Initial analysis in 2017  
The first iteration was completed in March 2017, quite early in the PhD. This 
early analysis utilised data from WoS, as I had not adequately researched 
the differences in coverage between databases. Similarly, the search string  
(below) was not thoughtfully developed (i.e. not developed via consultation 
with a librarian or my supervisors): 
“Health Inequalities” OR “Health inequality” OR “health equity” OR “social 
determinants of health” OR “Health disparities” NOT “cancer statistics”(title) 
The exclusionary term was introduced in order to remove large, annual 
cancer incidence reports published in the US. These publications have a 
very large number of authors and attract many citations. At the time, I 
viewed this as a distortion of the network, and added the exclusionary term 
to reduce the influence of these atypical papers. 
Repetition of the analysis in 2018  
In 2018, a group in Barcelona published a bibliometric analysis of the health 
inequalities field spanning 1966-2016 (Cash-Gibson et al., 2018). The search 
string adopted by these authors seemed less restrictive and likely to include 
a higher proportion of relevant papers than my early effort. Having learned 
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more about the superior coverage of Scopus, I took the opportunity to revisit 
and improve the analysis. 
I reached out to the lead author of this publication to seek her advice 
regarding potential changes to my search string. She, my supervisors, and I 
agreed that the following change was desirable, as by searching for parts of 
phrases rather than entire phrases a larger number of relevant papers could 
be detected: 
(("health inequ*") OR ("health equal*") OR ("health equit*") OR ("health 
disparit*") OR ("social determin* of health”)) 
Rather than using an exclusionary term designed to act on a particular, small 
set of papers, the whole analysis was limited to papers containing fewer 
than 15 authors. In this way, papers with extremely long author lists on all 
topics would be excluded from analysis. 
This decision meant that the bibliometric analysis needed to be repeated, 
along with demographic data collection for 50 new authors who appeared in 
the network following these changes. This process took approximately two 
months and delayed other parts of the PhD. However the additional work 
was felt to be worthwhile because the new search string included several 
thousand additional papers clearly related to health inequalities and 
disparities. Additionally, being new to bibliometric analysis, the opportunity 
to repeat the task with more understanding and experience was an 
opportunity to consolidate my skills. 
Repetition of the analysis in early 2019  
In early 2019 I discovered that one of the data files extracted from Scopus 
was unknowingly corrupted during data cleaning by a set of stray commas. 
Over 1,000 papers published in 2006 had been inadvertently omitted from 
both prior analyses. Additionally, I obtained funding to travel to Europe to 
meet with a leading scientomatrician in the Autumn of 2018, who, while 
stating that the existing analysis was ‘fine for your PhD’, felt additional 
cleaning and checking of author names would be expected by specialised 
peer-reviewers. When the above issue with the analysis was discovered I 
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decided to implement the suggestion of further data cleaning, and repeated 
the analysis. As this operation would further increases the chance of data 
corruption, I decided that the eccentricities of bibliometric data required a 
more sophisticated approach to data management than the manual 
manipulation of 29,000 rows of text (i.e, editing a document 15,000,000 
words long).  
I therefore moved the data into a Structured Querying Language (SQL) 
database. A detailed discussion of this technology is outside the scope of 
this chapter, but SQL works similarly to a connected chain of Excel 
Spreadsheets, with rigid enforcement of rules which facilitate safe 
interaction with parts of the data at a time (e.g., papers by a particular 
author, or titles containing a particular word). Having to learn a new 
programming language and repeat the analysis was arduous, but 
worthwhile, as the finished network is clearly superior to the two which 
proceeded it (see Appendix C for previous iterations).  
4.3.3 Unit of Analysis 
Bibliometric analysis almost always occurs at the level of publications or 
documents (e.g. Merigó & Núñez, 2016; Soteriades & Falagas, 2006), 
including three previous studies of HIDR (Almeida-Filho et al., 2003; 
Bouchard et al., 2015; Cash-Gibson et al., 2018). These analyses take the 
document as the entity of interest, and links between documents are 
detected and visualised. As the aim of my study is to improve understanding 
of the disciplinary trainings which inform the conduct and content of HIDR, 
and it is authors who possess disciplinary trainings, authors are the objects 
of analysis in this study.  
 
4.3.4 Method for calculating distance 
 
The network visualisation is created by examining the strength of citation 
links between all pairs of authors within the source data. Several alternatives 
for calculating link strength between authors are available, the most 








• Bibliographic Coupling: How often does each pair of authors 
reference a given common third author? 
 
 
• Co-citation: How often are two authors cited within the same paper 
by a third author? 
 
 
• Direct Citation: How often does a paper authored by one author cite 
another particular author?) 
 
 
Figure 7, three ways to calculate the link between authors A and B. (Solid arrows 
represent citation links) 
Co-authoring articles seemed a narrow and inappropriate measure, because 
this approach ignores information contained within citations, and 
researchers can only be linked if they have co-authored an article.  
Co-citation and Bibliographic coupling are considered superior to direct 
citation for most applications (Boyack & Klavans, 2010; Fanelli & Glänzel, 
2013) because they access information from a larger number of reference 
lists when calculating link strength. These methods are particularly suitable 
for analyses of small datasets, which may not contain a sufficient number of 
direct citation links to appropriately calculate distances between all pairs of 
authors, producing a 'sparse' network.  My sample is quite large (29,212 
papers), and so all three methods could conceivably be used.  
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I perceived two advantages of direct citation; It is the simplest method to 
explain and understand, an important factor as the audience for this analysis 
is not scientometric experts. Additionally, as the name suggests, direct 
citation directly reflects the ways in which citations (which stand variously 
for a kind of scientific currency or as proxies for ideas; Leydesdorff & 
Milojević, 2012) flow across a research area. For these reasons, I opted for 
direct citation, after confirming that my data were sufficiently large to avoid a 
sparse network.  
4.3.5 Criteria for including nodes (authors)  
HIDR is too vast to allow the visualisation of every active author. The pool of 
eligible authors was narrowed in two ways: First, authors needed to have at 
least five eligible documents (publications including relevant keywords in the 
title/abstract) to be included. This criterium excludes authors whose main 
body of work is outside HIDR. The inclusion of such “interlopers” within the 
project was a concern expressed by some interviewees (see Chapter 6) and 
so it proved important to be able to describe the sample of authors as being 
established within HIDR to this extent. 
Second, the final network is not the entire, global HIDR network but the 250 
most-connected set of authors. This means that “satellite” communities of 
researchers who cite familiar literature among themselves, but do not (ever) 
cite the HIDR ‘mainland’ are excluded. 250 was selected as the maximum 
size of the network as this was felt to be at the upper limit of what was 
logistically and visually manageable. 
4.3.6 Software 
I considered general network analysis tools Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 2004) 
and Gephi (Bastian et al., 2009), as they have powerful analysis and 
visualisation capabilities, however the work required to prepare data output 
from Scopus into these programs is not trivial. Also considered were the 
specialised bibliometric analysis programs VOSviewer and CitNetExplorer 
(Van Eck & Waltman, 2014). VOSviewer was designed especially for 
bibliometric networks, has the shallowest learning curve and can receive 
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data exported directly from Scopus and WoS. VOSviewer can produce a 
variety of bibliometric networks, and has a strong focus on visualisation, but 
also text-mining capabilities. CitNetExplorer visualises only direct citation 
networks and offers more powerful analysis capabilities than VOSviewer. 
CitNetExplorer can also receive output from Scopus and WoS directly, and 
permits the editing of data during analysis (very useful when names are 
spelled incorrectly or inconsistently). 
For this project the additional power of general network analysis software 
was felt to be outweighed by the steeper learning curve and data conversion 
requirements. I chose VOSviewer for this analysis as it is very easy to use, 
does not require data conversion, supports the algorithm I wished to use 
(see below), produces visually appealing results, and can generate a variety 
of network types. 
4.3.7 Algorithm for detecting communities 
‘Communities’ (clusters of connected authors) can be detected within a 
network via clustering algorithm. Algorithms of this sort seek to place nodes 
(here, authors) into groups in order to maximise the modularity of the 
configuration. Modularity is a statistic which compares the performance of a 
clustering algorithm with a worst-case scenario baseline; a randomly 
generated set of groups (where ‘performance’ is the proportion of citations 
which do not cross cluster boundaries, explained below).  




Figure 8, a sample network. 
This network might be bisected (into two clusters) at the following 5 points: 
 
Figure 2a, 5 ways of dividing a sample network into two clusters. 
The fourth location might be randomly selected, and the following groups 
constructed: 
 
Figure 2b, calculating modularity for two clusters 
With these random groups, 11/16 links (69%) are contained within the 
clusters, and 5/16 links (31%, dotted) cross the cluster boundary. Moving 





Figure 2c, Alternative clusters with higher modularity 
Now 14/16 links (87.5%) are contained within clusters, and 2/16 (12.5%) 
cross the boundary. This configuration has a higher modularity and so would 
be preferred by a clustering algorithm. 
Waltman and Van Eck’s (2013) Smart Local Moving algorithm was used in 
this study. This algorithm initialises by assigning each author to a cluster of 
which they are the only member (i.e, begins with 250 clusters), and moves 
authors between clusters until no increase in modularity is achievable. This 
algorithm was selected as it can be implemented within VosViewer, and has 
been documented obtaining modularity values as high or higher than more 
popular local moving algorithms (Blondel et al., 2008; Rotta & Noack, 2011). 
4.4 Collecting Author-Level Characteristics 
Following identification of the 250 most-connected researchers, I collected 
demographic data for each author including the discipline of undergraduate 
and postgraduate training, doctoral qualification and country of residence. 
This information was collected from online sources (unobtrusively) for the 
vast majority of researchers. Where information was not publicly available (or 
conflicting information was available) I requested it via email. Complete data 
were collected for 89% of authors. 
This detailed author-level dataset supports and augments the bibliometric 
analysis, which has access only to citation data and is blind to factors such 
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as geography and discipline. The careful manner in which this data were 
collected (including confirming with authors in the event that data were 
ambiguous or missing) represents a major improvement over existing 
attempts to discuss disciplinary training via bibliometric methods, which 
typically rely on institutional affiliation or address data contained within the 
bibliometric dataset, notoriously messy and incomplete (D’Angelo et al., 
2010). 
4.5 Data Cleaning 
Bibliometric analysis at the author level requires a high standard of data-
hygiene. As the unit of aggregation (authors) is small, typographical errors 
can significantly distort results. Unfortunately, systems which ensure authors 
are identifiable across multiple publications have been only recently 
developed, and large datasets present many inconsistencies. For this 
reason, consideration and effort was devoted to the cleaning of the source 
data for the final analysis.   
A large number of small problems presented early in analysis. Misspellings 
of author names, missing initials, the presence or absence of ‘Jr’ created a 
number of “authors” who were not really distinct individuals. These were 
quite easily dealt with via the ‘thesaurus’ function in VOSViewer, which 
permits the user to read a table of required replacements alongside source 
data. In total, 132 misspellings were identified by scrutinising the list of 
included authors, sorting by publication count and examining outliers. 
4.5.1 Authors with the same name  
The biggest problem encountered was the fact that multiple researchers had 
the same name and initial. Where this occurs, there is no basis upon which 
to discriminate between individuals. 
This is a challenging problem to solve, as not only do names need to be 
changed within records relating to these authors’ publications, every 
reference to each paper needs to be manually reviewed and adjusted. In this 
study, the following names represented more than one author in the Scopus 
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source data: Chen, J., Kim, J., Lee, J., Lynch, J., and Jones L. 
 This difficulty has been acknowledged by previous authors (Wagstaff & 
Culyer, 2012;  Jonnalagadda & Topham, 2010) but few workable solutions 
are available. D’Angelo (2010) proposed algorithms using address or 
institutional affiliations to ’normalise’ authors, however inconsistencies in the 
ways these fields are reported, combined with the fact that authors regularly 
move institutions, or hold concurrent appointments complicates this 
approach. Without painstaking manual review (impractical for a sample this 
size) it is not possible to systematically identify every example where authors 
share a common name within the dataset. As a workable alternative, I 
adopted the approach of Wagstaff & Culyer (2012) and manually checked all 
names appearing within the network, updating source data as required. This 
means that it can be stated confidently that all authors within the final 
network visualisation are unique individuals. Over 800 manual changes were 
ultimately made to source data files. 
4.6 Disciplinary diversity 
 
The analysis detailed so far identifies the blend of disciplinary 
backgrounds present within HIDR, but provides no way to summarise that 
diversity. Stirling (2007)  provided a framework for measuring and discussing 
diversity widely utilised in ecology and scientometrics. Stirling’s three 
components of diversity are  
 
I)  Variety  
2) Balance, and  
3) Disparity  
 
Variety describes how many options are represented within the dataset: 
For example, do researchers all come from the same single, two or ten 
disciplines? Balance describes the extent to which these different options 
are present. Are most researchers from a small number of disciplines (with 
perhaps a handful of exceptions), or more evenly distributed? Disparity 
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reflects the extent to which the options present are different from one 
another. Have researchers trained within a neighbourhood of closely-related 
disciplines (medicine, epidemiology), or a set of more diverse disciplines 
(engineering, linguistics)? An ideal measure of diversity accounts for all three 
features.  
 
The Shannon Index (Spellerberg & Fedor, 2003) captures the uncertainty 
of predicting from among a set of options, exploiting the fact that as 
diversity increases, uncertainty of prediction also increases. In my study, 
Shannon diversity reflects the uncertainty surrounding prediction regarding 
the discipline of a researcher’s PhD (or other highest degree), within the 
network clusters. The more diverse the cluster, the greater the uncertainty 
about the discipline of a randomly selected researcher.  
 
The Shannon index is unit-free, and is therefore difficult to directly interpret 
(i.e., a Shannon diversity of “2” has no natural interpretation). Furthermore, a 
doubling (or halving) of the number of categories/individuals in a dataset 
does not produce the expected, equivalent change in the Shannon index. 
Jost (2007) suggests taking the exponent of the index to produce a ‘number 
equivalent’ which has these desirable qualities. The number equivalent 
Shannon index is presented in my analysis, and can be interpreted as 
reflecting the number of (equally-balanced) disciplines represented by an 
author group6.  
The Shannon index accounts for variety and balance, but not disparity. 
The integration index (Rafols & Mayer, 2009) utilises a matrix of journal 
Subject Categories to incorporate information about how close or distant 
disciplines are (in citation space). I employed Rafols & Meyer’s mapping in 
this project. To facilitate comparison with other studies using the integration 
measure, authors were classified into a subject category using the discipline 
 
6 E.g. A group of 100 authors with a Number Equivalent Shannon Index of 6 implies that there is 
diversity equivalent to 6 balanced disciplines present, meaning 6 disciplines of (100/6 ) ~17 authors 
each. A group of 100 authors with an index of 7 is more diverse, suggesting 7 disciplines of 100/7~14 
authors each.  
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of their PhD or highest degree. Of the 244 Web of Science subject 
categories, 36 categories are represented by members of the final HIDR 
network. 
 
The Subject Category “Public, Environmental and Occupational health” 
contains researchers trained in Epidemiology (n=39) ,  Public Health (n=17), 
Social Epidemiology (n=3),  Health Promotion (n=2), Health Education (n=3) 
Health Behaviour (n=4), Environmental Health Science (n=2), and 
Community health (n=1). This subject category is perhaps too general for 
application within a health-specific field such as HIDR, and a future study 
might generate a set of health-specific subject categories and mappings. 
Nevertheless, the categories as originally published are adequate for 
comparing disciplinary diversity between the bibliometric clusters. 
Chapter 5: Qualitative Interview Methods 
In this chapter I describe the approach taken to sampling, conducting, 
coding and analysing interviews. I describe interview conduct and analysis, 
and discuss the challenges and mishaps arising along the way. 
5.1 Sampling  
Interviewees were selected from the 250 researchers included in the 
bibliometric network, generated via the method described in the previous 
chapter. A full list of network members is contained in Appendix D. My 
approach to sampling from the 250 potential interviewees is described 
below.  
5.1.1. Recruitment Priorities: A Wide Net  
 
The sampling strategy was purposive, jointly informed by the following 
five recruitment priorities: 
 
-   Represent all clusters 
-   Represent a range of disciplines  
-   Represent a range of geographic locations 
-   Represent a range of career stages  




Alternative strategies may have been more targeted, focused intensively 
on a small number of clusters and/or disciplines. This will be an analytically 
productive design for future studies, however I felt there was not sufficient 
theoretical or empirical basis for ignoring any region of the network, and so I 
favoured surveying the network more broadly. This allowed me to remain 
open to all kinds of variation, and to lay a general empirical foundation for 
future, potentially more-narrow projects. Additionally, due to the lack of 
international comparative studies discussed in Chapter 2, it is an open 
question whether and how the influence of disciplinary paradigms varies 
across geographic or institutional contexts. I viewed being able to 
demonstrate that findings do (or don’t) cut across a range of institutions and 
countries as beneficial. Finally, it was not known in advance which debates 
and questions were important to members of the network, and what kinds of 
professional and scientific challenges they experience. As existing research-
on-research within HIDR has focused heavily on the UK and Europe, I felt it 
inappropriate to assume these findings extend to other contexts, other 
disciplines, institutions and career stages. Sampling widely across the 
network allowed me to potentially identify salient disciplinary dynamics 
which cut across diverse contexts, as well as to identify those which seem 
context-specific.  
 
Prioritising inclusion of lesser-known researchers 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2I did not want to limit my study to unusually large 
or expensive projects, or to prominent members of HIDR. 
 
Commencing the project it was my sense that researchers appear to form 
opinions about ‘the field’ based on their own local networks, plus high-
profile figures from other disciplines, and countries. An interview corpus 
dominated by the perspectives of well-known, highly-cited researchers (who 
have a platform to express their views, should they wish to) seemed like a 
missed opportunity to incorporate diversity. In addition, the difficulty of 
obtaining high quality individual-level data for scientometric work has 
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tended to result in the summary of research domains via ‘league tables’ 
which rank only the most highly-cited authors. This can skew perception of 
a research area, because researchers at late career stages whose work is 
highly cited may have different experiences and hold different opinions 
about the state of their field. I felt that limiting data collection to ‘big names’ 
would waste an opportunity to gain insight into the views and perspectives 
of ‘up and coming’ researchers, or researchers whose work intersects 
between HIDR and other areas. I therefore prioritised recruitment of these 
researchers, by first inviting authors who are  
I) located at the perimeter of their cluster  
  and/or 
II) have published (relatively) fewer papers 
Despite this effort, it is important to note that the bibliometric 
analysis already excluded researchers on the periphery of HIDR, and those 
emerging researchers who have published very few (1-4) relevant articles.  
5.1.2 Restrictions on Sampling  
 
Recruitment priorities and aims were balanced against the following 
restricting factors:  
 
• An anticipated sample size of 30 interviewees  
• Limited resources for travel to conduct interviews in-person  
• Evolution of the bibliometric network (and therefore a changing pool 
of potential interviewees)  
 
The sample size of 30 was selected as being reasonable in the time 
available. Mapping this into the network, keeping the five recruitment 
priorities in mind, I set recruitment targets for each cluster and identified a 
set of researchers to invite. The sample was ultimately expanded to 45 in 
order to increase the number of included researchers from the US, where 
responses to my invitations were slow, and few (see 5.1.3, below).  





I travelled to conduct research interviews on three occasions, including 
five interviews conducted during a trip home to Australia. Feeling it was 
important to expand the sample beyond English-speaking Anglo-Saxon 
countries, I applied for funding from Edinburgh University’s Principal’s Go 
Abroad Fund to travel to the Netherlands and Spain, where I conducted nine 
interviews. These countries were chosen because they contained 
researchers in multiple network clusters and disciplines, and also because 
travel to these two countries was feasible, given the size of the grant. A 
fourth overseas trip to the US would have been ideal, however as network 
members in the US are spread across a very large geographic area there 
was not an obvious single location to visit, and resources did not permit a 
tour of multiple locations, and so a trip to the USA was not feasible.  
An evolving network  
To complete data collection within the timescale of a PhD, recruitment for 
interviews could not be delayed until after the bibliometric network was 
finalised. Recruitment therefore began based on an early iteration of the 
network completed in late 2017. For this reason, nine invited researchers do 
not appear among the 250 authors listed in Appendix D. Interviews were 
conducted with two of these nine (see Cluster=N/A in Table 4, below). One 
interview was with an economist, who generally expressed positions quite 
similar to other economists interviewed. The other interviewee was a 
statistician, who no longer works in an academic setting. Their data was not 
included in analysis.  
5.1.3 Contacting Researchers  
In total, 112 researchers were contacted via a blend of email and hard-copy 
invitations (explained in more detail below), with the first invitation sent in 
April 2018 and the last in May 2019. Invitations and acceptance rates are 




Cluster Invitations Interviews Response Rate 
1 18 7 39% 
2 16 9 56% 
3 27 7 26% 
4 18 11 61% 
5 4 0 0% 
6 5 3 60% 
7 3 3 100% 
8 12 3 25% 
(N/A) 9 2 - 
Total 112 45 40% 
 
Table 4, Invitations and Interviews by Cluster 
5.1.3.1 Interviewee Response to Recruitment  
Responses to invitations varied by network cluster. Figure 2 depicts the 
distribution of interviewees across the HIDR network. 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of interviewees across the bibliometric network 
Low rate of response from North American Researchers 
Response rates among North American researchers (especially Clusters 3, 5 
and 8) were low. After very few researchers responded to my initial email 
invitation and follow-up email, hard-copy letters were sent and followed up 
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via email, which proved a more effective approach.  
The last interview I conducted was with an American epidemiologist, who 
commented on the length of time I had asked for:  
I think asking for an hour is really off-putting. I would suggest you ask for “a 
short time”,  20 minutes or something. Everyone is so busy, to someone 
they dont know, it’s like asking for $1000. 
Health Equity Researcher (Nursing PhD) 
Attempting to schedule interviews with North American researchers  
(more likely than researchers from the UK or Europe to be clinicians and/or 
working in clinical settings) I did get a sense that the pace of academic life is 
rapid, and that asking for 1 hour really was like asking for $1000. This may 
explain the difficulty I faced in recruiting researchers from the US, and points 
to the manner in which my study design selects against researchers with 
packed schedules, who may have a particular kind of experience missing 
from my interview data.   
Cluster 5, comprised chiefly of public servants and career statisticians at the 
National Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute, proved 
especially challenging. Some members of Cluster 5 have retired and could 
not be contacted. All members of Cluster 5 whose email addresses are 
public were repeatedly contacted, however none responded.  
Interviewee Characteristics 
In total, 45 interviews were conducted across eight countries, seven clusters 
and 16 doctoral disciplines. Interviewee location and mode of conduct are 
presented in Table 5, and interviewee’s PhD disciplines are listed in Table 6. 
Country In Person Phone Skype Total 
UK 8 1 5 14 
USA  2 11 13 
NED 3  2 5 
AUS 2  2 4 
CAN   3 3 
SPAIN 3   3 
NOR   2 2 
NZ   1 1 
Total 15 3 28 45 




PhD Discipline N 
Epidemiology 9 
Economics 5 







Nursing  2 
Psychology 2 
Public/Social Policy 3 
Health Policy 1 
Health Promotion 1 
Health Services Research 1 
Political Science 1 
Total 45 
Table 6, Interviewee PhD disciplines 
While Table 3 presents a general sense of interviewees’ disciplinary 
trainings, interviewees’ disciplinary identity did not always align with their 
PhD discipline. Several interviewees holding PhDs in epidemiology or public 
health identified as members of their undergraduate or Masters discipline 
(Such as Political Science, Sociology, Geography, History or Medicine), and 
vice versa. To provide as much detail without identifying interviewees, in the 
thesis I refer to interviewees via the field contained in their title at the time of 
interview (e.g., ‘Research Fellow, Biostatistics’ becomes "Biostatistics"), 
plus the discipline of their PhD, and (where relevant) the bibliometric cluster. 
PhD discipline was categorised on the basis of either:  
I) Description of interviewees' PhD in their CV or most-recent online 
profile 
II) Description of PhD during the interview.   
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Where interviewees did not discuss their PhD in the interview, the former 
data source was relied upon.  
Four social scientists interviewed are clearly identifiable via the combination 
of their current title and PhD discipline. After contacting two of these 
interviewees7  requesting input into the way they are identified, I elected to 
refer to this group as holding “Social Science” PhDs, rather than naming the 
specific social science. 
5.2 Interview duration   
The majority of interviews lasted between 50 and 65 minutes. Four 
interviewees had just 30 minutes to spare, thankfully I knew this in advance 
and was able to prepare. Three interviewees had a lot to say and discussion 
lasted in excess of 90 minutes. 
5.3 Interview content  
Each interviewee received a consent form (Appendix E) to read and sign 
prior to the date of interview. The main points of the consent form were 
repeated orally at the beginning of the interview, and interviewees’ right to 
terminate the interview was reinforced. Consent was separately obtained 
from all interviewees for me to record the conversation (See section 5.2.7 for 
a discussion of how interviewee identification was presented on the consent 
form).  Interviews had a semi-structured approach where a general set of 
topics were explored using a thematic interview schedule (described in 
detail in Appendix A) covering the following: 
1. Overview of interviewee’s academic background, disciplinary 
identity, perceived strengths and weaknesses of own-discipline, 
management of disciplinary identity. 
2. Mental models of processes which cause health inequalities/ 
disparities 
 




3. Perceived key debates/methodological issues within HIDR 
4. Experiences collaborating with researchers from other disciplines 
5. Reactions to the literature: The hallmarks of ‘good’ and ‘frustrating’ 
research.  
6. Discussion of statistical issues and experiences with statistical 
collaborators. 
7. Looking to the future; ideas, methods or individuals perceived as 
likely to be important within HIDR in the coming years. 
I developed a short activity to provide an additional way for participants to 
talk about their own discipline, and other disciplines, and to provide a 
change of atmosphere toward the end of the interview after interviewees 
had been talking for some time. Researchers were asked to identify a 
determinant of health which they had studied or were studying, and invited 
to imagine they had funding to allocate among five potential research 
projects. Interviewees were asked to rank the studies below by moving 
printed cards around the table. For Skype interviews, researchers were 
emailed a Word document containing these studies and asked to rank them.  
• A biomedical study seeking to understand the physiological pathways 
impacted by X 
• A geographic study focused on the spatial distribution of X  
• A randomised implementation of an awareness campaign about X  
• A qualitative study exploring the lived experience of individuals 
exposed to X  
• A secondary analysis of administrative data, investigating the link 
between education, income and X 
 Several researchers objected to one or all of the above studies, wanted to 
add an extra study, or to make changes to the prescribed designs. This 
proved a valuable way to begin a discussion about research methods and 
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forms of evidence. Some interviewees reflected that they had been 
confronted with similar choices during experience on grant funding panels, 
and then went on to discuss the disciplinary dynamics of such panels. 
Others commented that the activity was a useful thought-experiment, which 
they enjoyed: 
That was interesting, that was a good thought-experience, to go through 
that.  
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
The inclusion of a qualitative study among the five options was particularly 
important, as this prompted quantitative researchers to reflect on qualitative 
research methods without me having to ask “Do you value qualitative 
research?” directly. A qualitative study concerned specifically with lived 
experience is not the only kind of qualitative research of relevance to HIDR, 
and I could have included other kinds of qualitative research, however this 
was sufficient to begin a useful conversation.  
Where time was limited this activity was not conducted, or I asked 
researchers about their “dream project” which they would conduct if funding 
was unlimited.  
5.4 Interview Conduct 
5.4.1 Pilot Phase  
As I did not have any experience with or exposure to qualitative research 
prior to this PhD, I conducted a set of pilot interviews to improve my 
familiarity with the method and iron out any practical issues (e.g., with 
recording equipment). Four pilot interviews were conducted in-person with 
academics from the University of Edinburgh in different disciplines, helping 
to build my confidence with the methodology and refine the interview 
schedule. Prior experience in market research helped me steer interviewees 
towards areas of interest and away from irrelevant topics. Feedback from 
pilot interviewees was used to improve my awkward handling of interview 
logistics such as ‘small-talk’ before and after the interview, and delivery of a 
pithy summary of the project to help orient interviewees. One pilot 
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interviewee (themselves an experienced qualitative researcher) generously 
met with me to discuss areas for improvement. Pilot data are not included in 
the results, as pilot interviewees were not HIDR researchers (or members of 
the bibliometric network).  
5.4.2 Interview Mode: Skype and In-Person Conduct  
The majority of interviews were conducted via Skype (see Table 2). This is 
perhaps unfortunate, as online meetings do feel different to in-person 
encounters. I was not able to travel to the US to conduct in-person 
interviews, a clear limitation of my data. Verbal and non-verbal cues are 
accessible via Skype (Sullivan, 2012), but meeting in-person with 
interviewees in Spain, the Netherlands, the UK and Australia, I was able to 
get a sense of their professional environments and a short glimpse into their 
academic institutions, helping to understand the ‘small lifeworlds’ (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999) within which research is conducted. Building rapport also felt 
easier in person. Reviewing my field notes, in two cases I specifically 
mentioned that a Skype encounter felt superficial. Having said this, 
academics are a social group with significant experience conducting 
meetings online. Most interviewees had no trouble with the technology, and 
seemed very comfortable with the format. Many interviewees spoke with me 
from their homes, with pets, children and spouses occasionally wandering 
into view. This is perhaps a different kind of small lifeworld, equally 
important in an academic career, which I could not have accessed via 
another method. The distance between interviewer and interviewee during 
an online discussion may also increase candidness compared with in-
person interviews (Bargh et al., 2002, Ellison et al., 2006). I certainly felt a 
sense of comfort and confidence being able to conduct interviews from my 
own desk, or my own home.  
 Additionally, I was able to freely write during these interviews without 
distracting the interviewee, which meant I could carefully formulate follow-
up questions and make a note to clarify an interesting point. In person, 
some interviewees seemed put-off by me scribbling notes during the 
discussion, and I found myself occasionally forgetting which points I 
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intended to probe if I did not keep notes (especially late in the day). Another 
advantage of the online format was that interviews could occur at any time 
of day or night, and if an interview needed to be rescheduled with little 
notice (as happened several times) I had not wasted time or resources 
travelling to the interviewee’s location. 
Due to technical issues, or interviewees not having access to 
videoconference technology, three interviews were conducted by phone and 
these were quite challenging. Without visual cues it is difficult to cut-off or 
redirect an interviewee without appearing rude, and so I was not able to 
make the best use of the time available. Nevertheless, these phone 
interviews yielded interesting insights and all three have extracts included in 
the thesis.   
At the time of submission, COVID-19 has normalised videoconference as a 
social encounter. My experience conducting a large number of interviews 
digitally in 2018/2019 feels quite valuable now, and I have enjoyed sharing 
my experience with other PhD students as they prepare to collect their data 
digitally. 
5.5 Evolution of the interview schedule   
The interview schedule evolved as interviews progressed, three major 
changes are discussed below. 
5.5.1 Disciplinary Strengths and Weaknesses   
One interviewee spontaneously offered some reflection on the strengths and 
weaknesses of their home discipline early in the interview, which struck me 
as a useful window into my areas of interest. For this reason, I began asking 
some variation on the following in the introductory section of the interview: 
“If there was one concept from [your discipline] which you could snap your 
fingers and have understood more widely within population health, what 
would it be?”  
This proved a good way to get interviewees talking about what they 
perceived as the strength of their discipline (which all interviewees could do 
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with clarity and confidence) and also their views about where that discipline 
sits within the wider landscape of population health, within HIDR, key 
contrasts with other disciplines, and the extent to which their discipline is 
misunderstood.  
5.5.2 Debates   
Like other students conducting interviews for the first time, I began with 
certain ideas about my topic which proved to be laughably simplistic. I had 
originally identified one debate which I planned to ask researchers to 
comment upon, but it became apparent that researchers from different 
disciplines and countries not only had different positions within this debate, 
but also had different perspectives on whether the debate was happening. 
As the latter was just as interesting as the former, this theme became more 
open-ended as data collection progressed, and I simply asked whether 
interviewees were following any particular debates.  
5.5.3 Statistics   
Having trained as a statistician I was extremely interested in interviewees’ 
views on statistical issues, and disciplinary variation in those views. As the 
sociology of statistical practice does not currently exist as a mature 
specialty (see Chapter 9), support in the literature to guide questioning on 
this theme was scarce. Questions were developed more out of my own 
professional experience than by previous empirical work. Perhaps for this 
reason this theme evolved throughout data collection. It became 
immediately apparent that even experienced researchers with advanced 
statistical training felt unsure when discussing statistical issues, especially 
“with a statistician”. Rather than asking about specific methods or issues, I 
found that simply saying “now I would like to discuss statistical issues” was 
sufficient to begin an interesting discussion in most cases. For researchers 
without quantitative research experience, I began by asking what they 
looked for in a statistical collaborator, and what led them to trust a 
statistician. Data generated by this line of questioning was so interesting 
that I began asking every interviewee this question.  
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5.6 Challenges  
5.6.1 Politics   
As this thesis is focused on research contexts, I was initially concerned 
when some interviewees discussed engagement with policy makers, as this 
ground has been covered by other researchers, at least in the UK (e.g. 
Garthwaite et al., 2016). I initially considered the realm of policy to be 
separate from research, outside the scope of my project. However, as data 
collection progressed (and my own understanding of the relationship 
between research and policy became more nuanced) I saw that researchers’ 
orientation toward or away from political engagement represented a point of 
variation across disciplines, reflecting underlying commitments about what it 
means to ‘do science’. While I did not ask interviewees directly about 
engagement with policy, I did not discourage interviewees from sharing 
views and experiences on this subject. 
5.6.2 Mishaps and avoidance 
Thankfully, no catastrophes occurred during my interviews. I was offered 
employment on the strength of my statistical background the end of two 
interviews, which was surprising, but no overtly inappropriate or awkward 
exchanges took place. No interviews became heated, and, reviewing the 
transcripts and my field notes I cannot detect any instances of obvious 
evasion or avoidance. Several times it was obvious I was taking the 
discussion in a direction my interviewee was reluctant to go, for example:   
There may be reasons why those studies weren’t well designed. Our public 
health colleagues more than the epidemiological colleagues, in my view, 
have a proclivity for rejecting scrutiny. [Pause] That was pretty strong, 
wasn't it?  
TC: It’s a more interesting interview if you tell me what you really think. So 
I’m clear, that distinction between ‘public health’ and ‘epidemiological 
researchers’, what kind of training do those ‘public health’ researchers 
have?  
Arrrrggh. [Pause]. We are starting to stray into difficult territory here.  
[Long pause]. They may not have the same quantitative skills or the same 
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deductive thinking about causal inference, that concerns me.   
Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD) 
In cases, like the above, interviewees did eventually share their opinions (at 
no time did an interviewee refuse to answer a question). Generally, 
interviewees were enthusiastic about the project and seemed to enjoy the 
discussion:  
I think it's going to be a really interesting study.  I enjoyed the conversation.  
Public Health Researcher (Demography PhD) 
This topic interests me a lot, I would love to read your dissertation.  
Public Health Researcher & Medical Doctor (Health Policy PhD)  
This was very interesting. Difficult questions sometimes, but still good to 
think about. Really interesting. I am looking forward to what comes out.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
This seems like a really interesting study. I’m glad you’re doing this.  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD)  
My lack of familiarity with the field of geography led to some unfortunate 
exchanges where I repeatedly confused geography with geology, however 
these interviewees were graciously forgiving.  
One interviewee who had trained and worked solely in clinical epidemiology 
struggled with almost all of my questions and did not appear to have 
reflected on the status of epidemiology within public health, or been 
exposed to critical views of epidemiology. This was a very interesting 
discussion but in hindsight I could have better minimised the sense of 
awkwardness.  
Some minor mishaps included neglecting to take a pen to one interview and 
forgetting several follow-up questions as a result, travelling to the wrong city 
for one interview (which was subsequently rescheduled), a mix up with a 
room booking resulting in an interrupted Skype interview, and my digital 
recorder’s hard-drive failing during one interview, which was remedied by a 
hasty switch to the recorder on my phone. These last two mishaps were 
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rattling, and distracting, but in the spectrum of possible issues I could have 
faced, my interviews went extremely well, especially given my lack of 
experience with this methodological approach. 
5.6.3 Embracing Qualitative Research   
I struggled initially to envisage how interview data could be harnessed 
analytically. My statistical training  instilled in me a persistent, nagging 
concern about collecting the “right” data to answer my research questions. 
While I had read, and was assured, that it was not essential to ask every 
interviewee exactly the same questions, due to my inexperience I didn’t 
understand how interviews could produce analysable data in the absence of 
such structure. For this reason a deep panic set in toward the end of my 
pilot interviews (which in hindsight were really a sort of oral survey) that 
nothing interesting would come from my interviews. Gradually, as 
interviewees began to contradict each other and themselves in interesting 
ways, I realised that I was making headway relevant to my aims. I began to 
understand that it cannot be known in advance what the “right” kind of 
interview data is, and that one strength of interviews is that they can reveal 
the complexity of social experience, and challenge simplistic assumptions 
held by the researcher.  
Later, as I entered the analysis phase, I experienced the challenges of 
moving beyond simple description in qualitative analysis. I struggled with 
the balance between interview extracts and my own analysis, and also with 
the challenge of finding a coherent analytical path through interviewees’ 
diverse perspectives. But ultimately, connecting theory, my research interest, 
and the experiences of my interviewees has been a deeply rewarding 
experience. 
5.7 Preparing for Analysis  
5.7.1 Preparing & Anonymising Interview Transcripts   
I transcribed all 43 included transcripts. References to specific individuals, 
degree programs, institutions and cities were replaced with [Blank]. 
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Additionally, all disciplines are spelled via UK conventions (e.g., ‘health 
behaviour’ not ‘health behavior’). In the consent form (Appendix E), 
interviewees could express a preference for being associated by name with 
their comments. However, as less than a quarter of interviewees expressed 
this preference, and this inconsistency felt quite distracting as the chapters 
took shape, and for this reason, I decided not to name any interviewee in the 
thesis.  
The consent form also provided interviewees with the option to review the 
transcript of their interview, and comment on issues relating to anonymity 
and accuracy. Nineteen interviewees requested their transcripts and these 
were sent in May 2019, requesting a response within two weeks (and noting 
that I would interpret a lack of response as an indication that the interviewee 
was happy with the transcript). No interviewee requested substantive 
changes their transcript, although two interviewees were concerned about 
being potentially identified in publications, and wished me to check specific 
extracts prior to submitting, which I have done.  
Whilst I made every effort to protect the identity of my interviewees I am 
aware of a small number disclosing their participation to other interviewees. 
For example, on one overseas trip I interviewed multiple members of the 
same institution, and overheard them discussing the project on my way out. 
Additionally, I discovered that two of my interviewees were married to each 
other, however I had not realised this connection at the time of interview.  
Other than the nineteen interviewees who requested their transcripts, only I 
have seen the interview transcripts. My supervisors assisted me in making 
decisions about how to maintain anonymity whilst providing sufficient 
context for the reader, and on a few occasions helped to select the best 
extract relevant to an analytical point (from a small number of candidates), 
but otherwise I did not discuss the content of interviews with my 
supervisors, or provide them with any extracts outside the analysis 
described in this thesis. 
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5.7.2 Data analysis  
Early in the PhD, analysis of qualitative data seemed mysterious. I 
completed mandatory data analysis training, and was overwhelmed by the 
analytical options. I went down several methodological rabbit-holes, and 
grew enthusiastic about some specialised approaches (sociolinguistics, 
semiotics, discourse analysis), however I ultimately abandoned these in 
favour of thematic analysis. Thematic analysis seemed to be the approach 
taken to produce work I greatly admired, including work which had 
addressed questions similar to my own (Smith, 2007; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; 
Rudwick, 1985; Lamont, 2009; Bloor, 2011). Braun and Clarke (2006) 
elaborate a 6-step guide to thematic analysis, which I followed. Whilst Braun 
and Clarke stress the ‘fuzziness’ and non-linearity of the method in their 
article, it is only now, at the end of the project, that I have a sense of what 
this means in practice. 
Even with this training and guidance I struggled to locate (and to imagine) 
the intermediate products of thematic analysis, and the diagnostic tools 
which could assure that my conclusions appropriately reflected the data. 
Weekly tutorials in my data analysis course frequently involved a session 
where analytical or methodological ideas about a topic were written onto 
post-it notes and organised into groups on a white board8. I found this way 
of working extremely helpful, and liked that early- and late-breaking ideas 
were clearly visible alongside one another. I also liked physically engaging 
with ideas in this way, without a computer screen  
I used the same approach in my thematic analysis. To build results chapters, 
codes were reviewed and all relevant extracts summarised on post-it notes. 
These were then shuffled around into groups, and summarised via excel 
spreadsheets, which informed the outline of draft chapters. An example of 
one spreadsheet (informing the discussion of theory in Chapter 8) is 
included as Appendix G.  
When drafting results chapters I was mindful of the below guidance from 
 
8 The point was not to demonstrate this methodology, but to assist in arriving at a position or set of 
positions which the tutorial group would then investigate, in small groups.  
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Fontana & Frey: 
Many studies using unstructured interviews are not reflexive enough about 
the interpreting process; common platitudes proclaim that the data speak 
for themselves, that the researcher is neutral, unbiased, and "invisible." […] 
there are no contradictory data and no mention of what data were excluded 
and/or why. […] The main concern seems to be the proper, if unreflexive, 
filing, analyzing, and reporting of events. But anyone who has engaged in 
fieldwork knows better (Fontana & Frey, 2000: p.87) 
I therefore approached my interview data with an awareness that it was 
generated via a process I designed, and that I determine, at least via 
inclusion or omission, what data are permitted to ‘say’ in this thesis. To try 
to report as transparently as possible, I began each analysis by exhaustively 
reviewing relevant codes, summarising each potentially relevant extract onto 
a post-it note. This ensured that all available data was (literally) on the table 
at the beginning of analysis. I actively searched for interview data 
complicating or cutting against my main findings, and, after finalising the 
thesis draft, confirmed that all interviewees do have data included in the 
thesis.  
5.7.3 Coding  
Transcripts were coded using the open-source R package RQDA (Huang, 
2008; v0.3.1). RQDA is clunky, however has the advantage of being free, and 
situates coded extracts, memos and journal entries within an SQL database 
which can be subjected to complex queries, exported for backup, and 
analysed via other tools. During transcription I kept notes of broad themes 
which seemed important, and was able to begin coding with a list of initial 
codes. As is inevitable, I returned to early interviews having added codes 
part-way through analysis. In total I coded all transcripts at least twice and 
used 169 codes (listed in Appendix F).  
5.8 Strengths & Limitations  
I have discussed strengths and limitations throughout these methods 
chapters, but briefly summarise them here. First, the inclusion of 
interviewees from a variety of countries and continents is a major strength, 
allowing me to identify trends and contrasts cutting across geographical 
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contexts. Secondly, sampling interviewees from a bibliometric analysis 
(rather than convenience or snowball sampling) is likely to provide a better 
view of the field. However, bibliometric data has major limitations, discussed 
in Chapter 4. In addition, this geographical breadth has resulted in a survey 
of the field which may be viewed as shallow. However, the bibliometric 
analysis provides a sampling frame for future, more in-depth projects.  
5.9 My Disciplinary Training  
A thesis focused on the impact of disciplinary training on knowledge 
construction demands some reflection on the author's own training. My 
background has clearly shaped the focus and content of this thesis. From 
the beginning of my undergraduate training I have been simultaneously 
studying health from multiple disciplinary perspectives, but nobody can 
study health from all perspectives, and so there is a slant toward 
understanding the disciplines with which I have first-hand experience.  
Epidemiology and economics feature prominently in the thesis, perhaps 
where other disciplines may have been the focus had I trained in other 
fields. I had originally intended to focus exclusively on epidemiology and 
economics (to focus on the ‘schism’ identified in Chapter 1) but when 
reviewing results of the bibliometric analysis it became clear that this was an 
unacceptably narrow account of the disciplines contributing to HIDR. 
I have more experience in epidemiology and biostatistics than the other 
disciplines covered in the thesis, and more than once my supervisors noted 
an apparent lack of balance in some sections, where I seemed to be taking 
the epidemiological position as the ‘default’ which did not require 
explanation or careful analysis. This is something which many of my 
interviewees trained in epidemiology did in interviews. In this way, my own 
gradual transition from a disease-focussed statistician to social scientist 
lead me to encounter many of the issues discussed by interviewees who 
attempt to blend sociological and epidemiological accounts of health in their 
research. 
My statistics background has influenced the thesis in several obvious ways, 
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including the focus on method throughout the results, and the presence of a 
chapter dedicated to statistical methods. My experience in biostatistics 
consulting initially suggested that researchers from different disciplines 
approach the same method in different ways. Perhaps tellingly, it was in 
Chapter 9 (focused on statistics, the discipline with which I identify most 
closely), that I struggled most to maintain a balanced analytical stance, and 
to sufficiently explain my analytical choices. In that chapter, interviewees are 
divided into four groups on the basis of their use of statistics, and in initial 
drafts I neglected to provide any explanation of this process, as the validity 
of my chosen groupings seemed obvious (to me).  Additionally, my training 
in statistics clearly prepared me to recognise the diverse balances 
disciplines strike between positive and negative knowledges (Knorr-Cetina, 
1999) discussed in Chapter 7. 
My training in economics does not mean I bring an un-critical eye to that 
discipline, but I am certainly more sympathetic to economic approaches 
than most interviewees seemed to be. According to my own analysis (see 
Chapter 8) this is likely because I have a detailed understanding of the kinds 
of questions economic approaches were developed to answer, and view 
those approaches as appropriate and useful for answering those questions, 
even if they are not questions central to HIDR. My experiences observing 
the way economics is perceived by researchers from other backgrounds in 
population health drew me initially to consider the Kuhnian lens, as that lens 
seemed to make sense of my own experiences.   
Generally, my training and experience working diverse in research contexts 
served as an important resource in the thesis, including in motivating the 
research question. There is no existing literature to read which describes the 
near-total epistemological disconnect I experienced studying health 
economics and biomedical science as an undergraduate, and, despite the 
challenges of striving for balanced analysis (despite my unbalanced 
background), were it not for that training and those experiences, the thesis 
would not exist. 
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Chapter 6: The Tribe and The Territory - The Health 
Inequalities and Disparities Research Network  
”There are disadvantages in relying solely on the description of an area 
delineated in terms of publications and citations ... it is all too easy ... to 
think of its boundaries as objectively independent of participants”  
Latour & Woolgar, Laboratory Life (1986:p.114) 
 In this chapter, I address the first aim of the thesis via presentation of the 
author-level bibliometric analysis results, and demographic data capture. 
This analysis provides a detailed picture of the field’s 250 most-connected 
authors, their arrangement in citation-space and their disciplinary 
backgrounds. Results demonstrate that an extremely diverse range of 
disciplinary trainings are present within HIDR, and that due to geographic, 
institutional and disciplinary ‘siloing’ , disciplinary diversity is not equally 
distributed across the field. I also draw upon interview data to place the 
bibliometric network within a historical context, which helps to inform 
understanding of the network’s structure.9  
6.1 The Network 
Figure 10 is the result of the network-generation process described in 
Chapter 4. In total, 29,212 papers containing relevant keywords were 
extracted from Scopus, from over 8,500 authors. Citation flows between 
pairs of authors were analysed and the 250 most-connected authors were 
identified, and arranged in space such that authors with strong citation links 
are located close together, producing Figure 10, below. 
 
9 Appendix H is a peer-reviewed manuscript published in Social Science and Medicine 
drawn from this chapter.  This paper is co-authored by one of my supervisors, but, as is 
reflected in the contribution statement, her contribution was limited to the introduction and 
concluding discussions, which are not reproduced in this thesis. 
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Figure 10, The 250 most-connected researchers within global HIDR.  
Nodes represent authors who have published at least 5 papers with relevant keywords. The size of the node/circle represents the number of papers each author 
has published. Width of lines indicates the number of citations between authors. The colour of the nodes represent different clusters (numbered 1-8) of authors 


















Figure 10 depicts the 250 most-connected authors publishing research in 
English about health inequalities or disparities between 1976 and 2016 
(hereafter, “researchers” or “authors”).  Despite spanning 40 years, 25,165 of 
the 29,212 papers (86%) used to create Figure 10 were published between 
2008 and 2016, reflecting the exponential increase in publications, noted by 
existing reviews of the field (Cash-Gibson et al., 2018). To investigate the 
extent to which disciplinary training is evenly distributed, the network was 
divided algorithmically into eight citation clusters, regions of the network 
where a high proportion of citations are local (see Section 4.3.7). 
6.1.1 Network Morphology  
The left and right halves of the network have different spatial arrangements 
and citation structures; the left being made up of five densely connected, 
partly-overlapping10 clusters (labelled 1, 2, 6, 7 and 4 in Figure 10). The right 
hand side comprises three non-overlapping clusters with relatively sparse 
interconnectivity (labelled 5, 8 and 3). Generally, though with multiple 
exceptions, researchers from the US appear on the right hand side of Figure 
10 and researchers from the UK, Europe, Australia, Canada and Europe on 
the left. Citation flows appear to be determined by a mixture of geographic, 
methodological, institutional and disciplinary factors. For example, a group 
of social scientists from the UK appears in the bottom left-hand region, and 
a group of economists from various countries are located at the top of 
Figure 10. Cluster 8 is comprised almost exclusively of co-investigators from 
a single project, and Cluster 5 from researchers affiliated with the National 
Institutes of Health and National Cancer Institutes. Demographic information 
about network members may help explain the form of Figure 10,  presented 
in the next section. 
 
10 Figure 10 is a 2-dimensional presentation of a three-dimensional object. Whilst it appears 
that some members of cluster 4 (yellow) are embedded among researchers in Cluster 2 
(green), it is more likely that these researchers jump out of the page toward the reader, and 
that Clusters 4 and 5 wrap around the central cluster. 
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6.2 Network Geography, and Academic Degrees 
 
 
Country Count % 
US 108 43% 
UK 59 24% 
Canada 19 8% 
Australia 12 5% 
Netherlands 8 3% 
Germany 7 3% 
Spain 7 3% 
Sweden 5 2% 
Brazil 3 1% 
Finland 3 1% 
Norway 3 1% 
Belgium 2 1% 
Chile 2 1% 
Japan 2 1% 
South Korea 2 1% 
New Zealand 2 1% 
Switzerland 2 1% 
Other 4 2% 
Grand Total 250 100% 
Table 7: Network Members’ Geographical Location 
The geographic location of the network’s membership is summarised in 
Table 7. Two thirds of researchers are based in the US or UK, and an 
additional 13% in Canada or Australia. 
The remainder of the network comprises of researchers from Europe, Latin 
America and South East Asia. The prominence of researchers from the US 
and UK is expected, as the most established HIDR research and training 
programmes are in these countries. Cash-Gibson and colleagues (2018) 
reported that the Anglo-Saxon nations (US, UK, Canada, Australia) 
produced around 70% of HIDR’s scientific output between 1966 and 2015, 
and the most-connected 250 authors within HIDR appear similarly 
concentrated. No low- or low-middle-income countries are represented in 
the network (with the exception of Brazil, an upper-middle income country, 
only high-income countries are represented). No researchers are located in 
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China, Russia, or the African continent. Since bibliometric methodology 
favours established authors (who have been publishing for longer) these are 
more likely to have accumulated the citations required to appear in the 
network. It may be that recent contributors from other geographic regions 
not captured in Figure 10. However, some authors within the network 
published their first paper in HIDR as recently as 2013, ruling this out as a 
complete explanation. In analysis of geographic and regional trends within 
HIDR, Cash-Gibson and colleagues report that geographical disparities in 
HIDR production are extant, and widening (Cash-Gibson et al., 2018). 
Table 8 includes a breakdown of first degree and highest degree (MD, Juris 
Doctor, DPhil, etc.) by subject category. A wide range of natural, medical 
and social sciences are represented in network members’ first degrees, as is 
geography, mathematics, statistics, literature, and engineering. 
Unsurprisingly, the most common category for highest degree is ‘Public, 
Environmental & occupational health’ (which includes epidemiology, health 
promotion, health behaviour and health education), followed by sociology, 
medicine, psychology, economics/health economics, and political science. 
Almost one in five network members have a medical qualification. 
 
This study is the first detailed picture of the disciplinary backgrounds 
underpinning a population health research sub-field. From Anthropology to 
Zoology, Theology and Leather Technology, almost every subject area is 
represented in the background of researchers in Figure 10. The presence of 




Subject Category  First Degree  PhD (Or Highest Degree)  
Public, environmental & occupational health 6 74 
Sociology 27 32 
Medicine, general & internal 44 22 
Psychology 26 13 
Economics 11 12 
Political Science 8 11 
Geography 12 8 
Social sciences, biomedical 3 8 
Statistics & probability 3 8 
Psychology, clinical  7 
Nursing 8 5 
Demography  4 
Health policy & services  4 
Biochemistry & molecular biology 2 3 
Health care sciences & services 8 3 
Medicine, research & experimental 2 3 
Social sciences, interdisciplinary 7 3 
Anthropology 2 2 
Behavioural sciences  2 
Dentistry, oral surgery & medicine 3 2 
Ecology 1 2 
History 7 2 
Social work 2 2 
Urban Studies  2 
Biology 15 1 
Business  1 
Communication  1 
Education & educational research  1 
English/Literature 7 1 
Family studies  1 
Genetics & heredity 1 1 
Information science & library science 1 1 
Law  1 
Nutrition & dietetics  1 
Philosophy  1 
Planning & development  1 
Chemistry 6  
Design 1  
Engineering 2  
Management 1  
Mathematics 5  
Microbiology 2  
Multidisciplinary sciences 3  
Neurosciences 1  
Pharmacology & pharmacy 2  
Public administration 3  
Religious Studies 2  
Veterinary sciences 1  
Zoology 2  
Unknown 13 4 
Total 250 250 
Table 8 : First Degree and PhD/Highest Degree by Subject Category 
Data obtained from CVs, online profiles, and (where necessary) from researchers directly via email 
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presence of diverse ideas about health and health equity, and Table 8 
suggests that the most common ideas may be grounded in epidemiological, 
sociological, medical, psychological, economic, and political science 
paradigms. In the next section I investigate the distribution of these trainings 
across Figure 10.  
6.3 Network Clusters 
The 8 clusters identified represent regions where a (relatively) high 
proportion of citations are local. Combining the demographic dataset with 
the citation network, it is possible to describe how certain author 
characteristics distribute across Figure 10, including the extent to which 
disciplinary diversity is uniform across the network. Table 9 contains key 
details for each cluster, including its size, proportion of researchers located 
in the US/UK, proportion of researchers with medical training, and a 
breakdown of cluster members’ highest degree by subject category.  The 
data in Table 9 allow each cluster to be examined in detail, however these 




Table 9 includes two statistical measures of diversity (described Section 
4.6): the Integration Index and Shannon Number Equivalent (SNE) Index The 
Integration Index accounts for the abundance, evenness and similarity11 of 
disciplines within each cluster.  The SNE index accounts only for the 
abundance of disciplines and the evenness of their representation. As a 
reminder, the SNE index can interpreted as the number of equally-
represented disciplines required to achieve the diversity of each community 
(Jost, 2007).  The entire network of 250 authors has a SNE of 14.15, 
diversity equivalent to approximately 14 equally-represented disciplines (250 
/ 14 ~18 examples of
 
11 For example, using this measure, the combination of medicine and physics within a 
cluster counts as being ‘more diverse’ than the combination of more similar disciplines, 
such as medicine and biology. 
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Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
(n) 57 31 76 42 7 15 8 14 250 
 Number Equivalent Shannon Index 9.68 4.53 9.68 13.07 3.6 8.33 4.01 3.42 14.15 
Integration Index 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.72 0.45 0.61 0.61 0.46 0.68 
% US 7% 19% 96% 0% 86% 26% 0% 93% 43% 
% UK 40% 19% 1% 52% 0% 0% 88% 0% 24% 
% Any Medical Degree 18% 32% 20% 12% 29% 40% 13% 7% 20% 
Median year of  first included publication  1999 2002 2004 2005 2005 2006 2008.5 2011.5 2004 
Earliest first included publication 1985 1997 1993 1983 2002 1999 2001 2003 1983 
Subject Category: PhD/Highest Degree      (% of cluster) (% network)  
Public, Environmental & Occupational Health 19% 45% 36% 19% 43% 20% 0% 64% 30.00% 
Medicine, general & internal 4% 6% 14% 5% 29% 13% 13%  8.80% 
Medicine, research & experimental     14% 13%   1.20% 
Nursing   5%     7% 2.00% 
Dentistry, oral surgery & medicine  3% 1%      0.80% 
Nutrition & dietetics   1%      0.40% 
Psychology 11%  5% 5%  7%   5.20% 
Psychology, clinical   8% 2%     2.80% 
Behavioral sciences   3%      0.80% 
Education & educational research    2%     0.40% 
Statistics & probability 7%  1%  14% 7%  7% 3.20% 
Biochemistry & molecular biology 4%       7% 1.20% 
Ecology 2%      13%  0.80% 
Biology        7% 0.40% 
Genetics & heredity        7% 0.40% 
 
148 
             
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
Health policy & services   3%   13%   1.60% 
Health care sciences & services 2%   5%     1.20% 
Planning & development    2%     0.40% 
Family studies      7%   0.40% 
Demography 4% 3%  2%     1.60% 
Urban studies 2%   2%     0.80% 
Geography 2%  1% 5%   50%  3.20% 
Communication   1%      0.40% 
Business   1%   
   0.40% 
Economics 2% 29% 3%      4.80% 
Social sciences, biomedical 4%  1% 7%   13%  2.80% 
Social sciences, interdisciplinary 2%   2%  7%   1.20% 
Social work 2%  1%      0.80% 
Sociology 26% 6% 9% 17%   13%  12.40% 
Political science 4% 3% 3% 14%     4.40% 
Anthropology      13% 
  0.80% 
Law   1%      0.40% 
History  3%  2%     0.80% 
Literature    2%     0.40% 
Philosophy    2%     0.40% 
Information science & library science    2%     0.40% 
Unknown 7%     
   2.00% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.00% 
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each discipline ) across the network.  
With the exception of Cluster 4, no cluster has the Shannon diversity or 
Integration of the whole network, suggesting a degree of disciplinary sorting 
or concentration within clusters. The following section explores this 
possibility by examining each cluster in turn, in chronological order.   
Cluster 1: Whitehall Investigators & Health Inequalities Pioneers 
(UK/Europe). 
The network's oldest cluster (by median entry to the field) is comprised 
largely of researchers from the UK and Europe who began studying health 
inequalities during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The relatively high diversity scores 
reflect the wide-ranging backgrounds of these early inequality scholars, 
which included many social scientists. This cluster is especially notable for 
its high proportion of sociology PhDs, making up just over a quarter of the 
cluster, while psychology, the social sciences and political science are also 
represented. The upper left part this of cluster includes several sociologists 
from Scandinavia and Germany. Researchers toward the bottom of this 
cluster (overlapping Cluster 7) share a focus on place and health. 
Cluster 2: Economic approaches & measurement of inequity at scale 
(Netherlands, UK, US). 
Cluster 2 is comprised of two distinct regions, each with disciplinary 
features. Work in this cluster emerged in the early 2000’s and addresses 
methodological issues arising from the international scaling-up of studies 
occurring in Cluster 1. Located at the top of the cluster are economists from 
the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, and the US, who have contributed 
advances in the measurement of health equity. Near the centre of the 
network are a group of epidemiologists and social epidemiologists, many of 
whom have medical or sociology backgrounds. Both regions share an 
interest in the measurement of health equity, and the ways in which income 
and prevailing economic conditions affect health, including dental and oral 
health. Cluster 2 is around three-quarters the size of Cluster 3, but 
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demonstrates 35% of that cluster's SNE diversity, reflecting the smaller 
number of disciplines represented.  
Cluster 3: Health Disparities Research (US). Almost all members (96%) of 
the network’s largest cluster are located in the US. One in every two 
researchers from Cluster 3 holds a PhD or other doctoral degree in Public 
health (including epidemiology) or medicine. Nursing, psychology and 
sociology PhDs are well-represented within this cluster, but political science 
and the humanities are absent.  While the majority of authors in Cluster 3 
have written about ethnic and racial disparities in health, researchers in the 
rightmost region of this cluster (near Clusters 5 and 8) share a particular 
focus on racial and ethnic disparities in cancer outcomes. Researchers in 
the leftmost part of the cluster (toward the centre of the network) have a 
more mixed focus, for example, maternal and child health, sexual 
determinants, drug use, mental health, and allergies. The top-left corner of 
this cluster includes several highly-cited researchers from the Harvard 
School of Public Health, and University of California San Francisco. These 
researchers are distinctive within this cluster for their long-standing focus on 
the relationship between socioeconomic status and health, perhaps 
explaining their strong citation links with Clusters 1 and 2. Cluster 3 might 
be viewed as a microcosm of the whole network, with social epidemiology 
on the left hand side, and clinical (especially cancer) epidemiology on the 
right. The emergence of this cluster and its links with other clusters is 
discussed in more detail in Section 6.4. 
 
Cluster 4: Policy-Focused & Critical Health Inequalities Research (UK). 
Cluster 4 is unique within the network for its disciplinary diversity. 52% of 
members are located within the UK, 19% in Australia and 17% in Canada. 
While median entry to the field for authors was 2005, Cluster 4 generally 
developed alongside Cluster 1, throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, as the 
strong citation links in Figure 10 indicate. Researchers in this cluster have 
the network’s most diverse doctoral trainings, with an equivalent 13 equally-
represented disciplines among just 42 members. The Integration of this 
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cluster is higher than the integration of the network as a whole, suggesting 
not only that a large number of disciplines are present, but that these 
disciplines are themselves diverse. The network’s humanities PhDs and 
political science PhDs are concentrated within this cluster and the social 
sciences are also well represented. These trainings are consistent with the 
research focus of the cluster on macro or ‘upstream’ determinants, including 
political and corporate determinants. Many researchers in this cluster 
conduct qualitative research, or have a theoretical emphasis in their work. 
This cluster covers topics such as health policy, lay knowledge, and 
evidence synthesis. Cluster 4 has strong citation links to Clusters 1, 7 and 6, 
but is sparsely linked with Cluster 3.   
Cluster 5: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Cancer: Administrative 
Reporting (US).  
Cluster 5 is the network's smallest cluster and (like Cluster 8) is cancer-
focused and located geographically within the US. Members of this cluster 
have co-authored highly-cited, national administrative cancer statistics 
reports which include cancer incidence and mortality for racial and ethnic 
subgroups (labelled with the keyword “health disparities” since 2002). This 
cluster has the network’s lowest Integration Index, as nearly one third of 
members have medical training, and remaining members have statistical, 
biomedical, or public health backgrounds. Most members are affiliated with 
either the National Cancer Institute, National Cancer Society, Centers for 
Disease Control, or National Institutes of Health (NIH). 
Cluster 6: Socio-Critical accounts of Work-Related and Migrant Health 
(US, Canada, Spain).  Cluster 6 is a mix of researchers from Europe, Latin 
America and the US. Researchers in this cluster are linked via a joint focus 
on employment-related health disparities/inequalities, and migrant health. 
Several researchers are based in Barcelona or completed doctoral study in 
that city. An additional group are located at (or have passed through) the 
Wake Forest Department of Family Medicine. In terms of disciplinary training 
this is the most diverse of the small clusters (Clusters 5–8), containing a mix 
of researchers with medical, biomedical, family studies, health policy, 
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psychology, and statistical backgrounds. The network's anthropology PhDs 
are also concentrated within this cluster. 
Cluster 7: Geographical Approaches: Inequalities in Place & Space 
(UK).This relatively new, chiefly UK-based cluster contains the majority of 
the network’s geography PhDs. Located at the right-hand margin of Cluster 
4, these researchers share a focus on spatial and geographic inequalities, 
environmental justice, and neighbourhoods. These eight researchers entered 
the field of HIDR slightly later than researchers in other clusters, with a 
median first publication year of mid-2008. 
Cluster 8: Breast Cancer Disparities (US). This small cluster is comprised 
chiefly of contributors to a single project, the Breast Cancer Health 
Disparities study (Slattery et al., 2014), many of whom are (or were once) 
based at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, or University of Utah. This 
densely connected set of co-investigators is connected to the main network 
primarily via citations to and from researchers at the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer 
Centre, in Florida. This is the least-diverse cluster in terms of disciplinary 
background according to both indices, with an equivalent 3.4 balanced 
disciplines. This reflects the concentration of researchers holding a PhD in  
Health Behaviour, Health Education and Health Promotion (consolidated 
within the Public Health Subject Category). Other members hold advanced 
degrees in statistics or biomedical science. This is the network’s most 
recently established cluster, with members’ median first publication in the 
field being mid-2011.  
Figure 10 does not lend itself to concise summary, however, the findings 
above can be summarised visually to convey the general features of the 










Figure 11 - Eight clusters of health equity research. 
 
6.4 Exploring and explaining the eight research clusters  
 
In this section, I draw on interview data to better understand how 
clusters have emerged and by what forces they are sustained in citation-
space. As a reminder, I interviewed 43 network members and incorporated 
questions about an early version of Figure 10.  
6.4.1 Landmark studies & advances in measurement 
 
Major research projects have contributed to the form and disciplinary 
topology of Figure 10. An early milestone of health inequalities research was 
the Whitehall cohort, established in 1967 and analysed from 1978 onwards 
to investigate the relationship between cardiovascular (and other) diseases 
and occupational social class within the British civil service (Marmot, Shipley 
& Rose, 1984). The status of the Whitehall studies as paradigmatic examples 
of health equity scholarship is reflected in Figure 10, as Whitehall 
investigators and collaborators make up much of Cluster 1, and occupy a 




Dutch researcher Johan Mackenbach spearheaded efforts to replicate 
Whitehall in Europe, beginning with the Dutch Longitudinal Study on Socio-
Economic Health Differences, containing an explicit reference to Whitehall in 
its abstract (Mackenbach et al., 1994). Authors of similar single-country 
studies make up the top (left) half of Cluster 1. These replications provided 
comparable cohorts in several high-income countries and, therefore, the 
opportunity for cross-country comparison. This work was initiated by a 
group of economists, visible in Cluster 2. Throughout the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s, the scaling-up of the field from single cohort studies to global 
mega-comparisons introduced methodological challenges, and an 
accompanying need for “valid measures and methods” (Manor et al., 1997). 
In response, a literature specific to the measurement of health equity 
emerged, largely authored by the economists in Cluster 2 and others located 
at the intersection of Clusters 1, 2 and 3 (Kakwani et al., 1997; Kawachi and 
Kennedy, 1997; Lynch & Kaplan, 1998). 
In sum, in the UK and Europe, paradigmatic epidemiological studies 
aiming to investigate how social class (measured by employment status) 
impacts health played a key role in the development of Clusters 1 and 2. A 
shared focus on social inequalities in health outcomes facilitated links 
between these two clusters. 
6.4.2 ‘Inequalities’ & ‘disparities’ 
 
The lack of citation links between Cluster 3 and the European/UK 
clusters is a conspicuous feature of figure 10. US researchers in figure 
10 seem to mostly cite other US researchers, whereas researchers in 
Australia, Europe and Canada seem more interconnected. This may be a 
reflection of the specialised streams of research apparent in Figure 10, and 
specialised communities of (for example) geographers, economists, clinical 
epidemiologists or social-scientists, unaware of potentially relevant 
publications from other streams. Alternatively, these different terms may 
signify varied framings of health equity as biomedical or sociological 
phenomena. In interviews, most interviewees were unable to explain this 
feature of Figure 10, and interviewees in both network hemispheres 
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commonly indicated they had little sense of the other, underlining their 
separation: 
I have no idea who anyone is! I've never heard of any of those people! […]. 
How is this all getting done in silos? And Why?? 
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD), Cluster 3  
 
It is a bit hard to make sense of. There are a few names I've never heard of. 
I have to say […] I just can't think who these people are. 
Health Geographer (Geography PhD), Cluster 7 
Some interviewees suggested space between Cluster 3 (US dominated) 
and other clusters is due to a combination of terminological differences and 
contrasting research foci, with UK based researchers generally studying 
‘inequalities’ between social classes, while researchers in the US tend to 
study ‘disparities’ between racial and ethnic groups (Kawachi et al., 2002). 
However, this was only a partial explanation. 
 
The separation between ‘inequalities’ and ‘disparities’ scholars in Figure 
10 appears to reflect the distinct origins and independent development of 
two research traditions. Several inequalities scholars interviewed were keen 
to highlight the historical context of Cluster 1, in the wake of the Black 
Report (Black, Morris et al., 1980), the first systematic effort by any national 
government to understand and explain health inequalities between social 
classes (Smith, 2013). The 1980’s and 1990’s were periods of intense 
activity for British health inequalities scholars, as they attempted to address 
gaps in understanding identified by the Black Report, while documenting the 
health impact of policies put in place by the Thatcher-led Conservative 
government that had rejected the Report's conclusions (e.g. Whitehead, 
1987). Many members of Cluster 1 and 4 pursued research on health 
inequalities throughout this period, despite limited funding, when the idea of 
health inequalities, even the term itself, was politically controversial: 
[It] was called the “health variations research program.” We were told we 
couldn't use “inequalities” because Margaret Thatcher didn't like the term, 
so it was dumped and we were “variations”. 
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Sociologist (Sociology PhD), Cluster 1 
Interview data suggests this struggle contributed to a shared sense of 
identity among these scholars, now passed to some students and 
collaborators in Clusters 1, 4 and 7. There was resistance toward adopting 
any term other than ‘inequalities’ among these UK interviewees, because 
the term had been fought for by researchers perceived as pioneers: 
TC: Would you ever want to apply the term “Health Disparities” in the UK? 
I would rather we stuck with ‘health inequalities’. […] During the Thatcher 
time, you weren't allowed to talk about health ‘inequalities’, I don't like 
dodging away from it. 
Medical Sociologist (Social Science PhD) 
There was also a sense that some UK interviewees considered ‘real’ 
health inequalities research as being concerned exclusively with social 
determinants, and restricted to network Clusters 1, 4 and 7: 
There is that community, and there are factions within that community […] 
But we would all be seen as ‘Health Inequalities’ […] Some [are] more on 
the periphery, like [Researcher from Cluster 7] for example because [s/he's] 
more geography. [S/he] is more on the periphery, but a part of the family. 
And then there are almost like ‘interlopers’ of the mainstream […] they 
probably think that they're health inequalities researchers, but [they don't 
belong to] this group of people who *are* health inequalities, who have 
carried that trajectory within them, and have been shaped [by], and learned 
from, those pioneers. 
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
In contrast, in the US, the importance of social factors in determining 
health outcomes was catalysed by studies in the 1980’s noting differences 
in medical practice across apparently similar patient populations 
(McPherson et al., 1982). Responding to this unexplained variation in 
medical care, the US government commissioned the “Health, United States, 
1983” report, which described, for the first time, significant differences in 
“the burden of death and illness experienced by blacks and other minority 
Americans as compared with the nation's population as a whole” (p.ix). The 
dominance of the term “health disparities” arose from this motivating drive 
to understand the ‘gaps’ in observed health outcomes and health care 
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access between minority and majority ethnic populations (e.g. AMA CEDA, 
1990). 
 
This emphasis continued into the 21st century, with health disparities 
research in the US tending to focus on healthcare (e.g., Fiscella et al., 
2000; Nelson, 2002), while the European concern with inequalities in health 
relating to social class also persisted (Marmot et al., 2012). Several 
interviewees noted the longstanding divide between scholars studying 
health inequalities (in class) and health disparities (in race): 
TC: Race is clearly very important to work on health disparities in the USA, it 
seems to be less of a focus in the UK? 
Yeah I've noticed that […] and I'm not sure why that is. [..] I haven't gone as 
deeply into it as I might, because it is not, to be quite blunt, it doesn't 
interest me that much, in the UK context. 
Health Policy Researcher (Social Science PhD), Cluster 4 
Here [in the US] it is very much on race, we don't talk about class here. […] 
There is so much focus on race here. Some of it makes sense, and some of 
it is really misguided and misses the point. 
Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD), Cluster 8  
 
US-based interviewees across the network, but especially in Clusters 3 
and 6, expressed concern regarding the way race is conceptualized in 
research, particularly within ‘mainstream’ epidemiology. NIH requirements to 
report findings by racial and ethnic subgroupings were positioned as 
contributing to the uncritical treatment of race in quantitative analyses: 
Important now is to talk about race and ethnicity, to talk about race being a 
sociological concept and not a biological reality. […] In the US, because 
many of us are getting federal funds, one has to design research that covers 
human variation, and that is designated as sex, race and now age. […] This 
notion that you have to design it into your study means then that you have 
to be able to assign a value […]. In assigning that value then you have pretty 
much said “this is an entity, these different racial categories really are 
entities.” 




In summary, in Figure 10 we see the lasting impact of the way research 
about health equity was conceptualised and initiated on either side of the 
Atlantic. Interview data reveal the ongoing importance of the way the two 
fields originated in the 1980’s and developed over time, trajectories reflected 
in the structure of Figure 10. Perhaps more importantly, it is clear that 
‘inequalities’ and ‘disparities’ are, in practice, not interchangeable terms for 
the same phenomena. To use one term aligns a project with a particular 
tradition of research, a group of pioneering investigators, and a historical 
conceptualisation of equity. Overlying geographic variation was disciplinary 
variation in use of these terms, discussed in the next section. 
6.4.3 Disciplinary diversity 
 
Doctoral trainings are not uniformly distributed across the network, 
mostly due to the mix of humanities, political-, life- and social-sciences on 
the network's left side (which, as Figure 2 illustrates, tend to study ‘health 
inequalities’), and the dominance of medical, statistical, health promotion 
and epidemiological backgrounds on the right side (where ‘health 
disparities’ dominates as the preferred term). Researchers with economic 
training are similarly concentrated in Cluster 2, as are the majority of 
geographers (Cluster 7). The small, US dominated clusters (5 and 8) contain 
many more cancer epidemiologists and health promotion scholars than the 
wider network. Clusters 7 and 8 have the most recent median first 
publication date, and appear to represent regional communities of 
disciplinary and topical specialists. Clusters 1 and 3 (foundational clusters 
within the UK and US, respectively) have the same SNE diversity, though 
Cluster 1 might be considered more diverse, as it is smaller. 
 
One notable anomaly is Cluster 6 (which includes a mix of ‘health 
inequalities’ and ‘health disparities’ researchers) appearing on the health 
inequalities ‘side’ of Figure 10 but does not include any members from the 
UK. Many members of Cluster 6 have social science backgrounds, and 
interviewees from this cluster explicitly framed the drivers of health inequity 
as socially-situated, which may explain the location of this group in citation 
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space alongside clusters with strong social science membership. 
Nevertheless, interviewees in Clusters 1, 4 and 7 were almost universally 
unaware of the work proceeding in Cluster 6. 
6.4.4. Disease focus 
In addition to varied use of terminology, and different disciplinary 
profiles, the two network hemispheres differ in their disease foci, reflected in 
the algorithmic detection of two cancer-specific, US-dominated citation 
clusters (5 and 8) on the network's right side. This difference may be at least 
partially due to the data availability landscape within the US throughout the 
1990’s. In 2002, six members of Cluster 3 expressed their frustration that 
“few or no socioeconomic data exist in most US public health surveillance 
databases” (Krieger et al., 2002). In the context of this scarcity, the 
Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results registry (SEER) held high-
quality cancer incidence and outcome data alongside demographics dating 
back to 1973 (National Cancer Institute), representing a crucial data source 
for health disparities scholarship. Between 2000 and 2010, several members 
of Clusters 3, 5 and 8 utilised SEER to demonstrate racial disparities in 
cancer screening, incidence, and outcomes (e.g., Singh et al., 2004). 
Analysis of SEER data to investigate disparities in cancer-related outcomes 
was also utilised to demonstrate best-practice methodology (Harper et al., 
2008). Cancer disparities research continues to be well-funded in the US, 
and is supported institutionally via Comprehensive Cancer Centres. Many 
interviewees in the US suggested that the security of cancer-specific 
funding powerfully shapes research about health disparities: 
TC: Many US researchers who have appeared in my bibliometric network 
study cancer. Why do you think that is? 
Because it's sexy. And well-funded. 
Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD), Cluster 8 
For interviewees in Clusters 3 and 8, there was a sense that studying 
cancer is a financial necessity, and that funding streams shape research 
questions. These data are presented (along with other references to 




Partly as a reaction to the dominance of medical and disease-specific 
models in the US (Honjo, 2004), some US-based epidemiologists have 
advanced Social Epidemiology. These researchers, located in Cluster 3, 
helped cement social epidemiology as a mature sub-disciplinary 
specialisation (Galea and Link, 2013). Popular textbooks and key theoretical 
contributions to the field have been authored by members of Cluster 3, and 
the journal Social Science and Medicine (where many such contributions are 
published), is edited by members of Cluster 3. As these social 
epidemiologists are advancing a view of health as socially (rather than 
biomedically) situated, it is unsurprising that these scholars are located in 
the region of Cluster 3 closest to the social-science dominated network 
clusters. 
6.5. Concluding discussion 
Results presented in this chapter provide the first empirical test of the 
common assertion that HIDR is comprised of a broad mix of disciplinary 
trainings. However, this diversity is not distributed evenly across the field. 
Analysis of the network’s 8 clusters reveals the presence of silos within 
HIDR, and a historical review of HIDR in the US and UK brings further 
nuance to the interpretation of the network’s configuration.  
Demographic and interview data suggest that, although disciplinary 
training played a role in the emergence of these clusters, so too have 
historical, geographic, institutional and financial (research funding) forces. 
 
The appearance of social epidemiology as a distinct paradigm within 
mainstream epidemiology appears to be holding the two research 
communities together in citation-space, as this interdisciplinary specialty 
supports the interweaving of diverse perspectives. However, the ‘bridge’ 
researchers in Cluster 3 do not appear to have strong links to the critical, 





The ‘unexplored waters’ (Jasanoff, 2012) of health equity scholarship 
appear to lie in the gulf between (mainly) European scholars of the 
relationship between policy, health and social class and the (mainly) US 
scholars of the intersection between health and race/ethnicity. Despite 
strong links to the epidemiologically-driven Cluster 1, Cluster 3 is poorly 
connected to the social science-dominated Clusters 6, 7 and 4. Linguistic 
differences (‘inequalities’ vs ‘disparities’) do not fully explain this lack of 
connectivity, and rather themselves appear to reflect distinct, mature 
research traditions, each with their own history, disciplinary character, and 
funding landscape. US researchers outside the bibliometric network are 
studying the political economy of health inequity (e.g. Lynch, 2020) 
although, interestingly, some of this work relates to UK and European, not 
North-American policy (Lynch, 2017; Greer 2004).  
 
Although these findings make clear that disciplinary training alone cannot 
explain the clusters comprising health equity research, disciplinary siloing is 
apparent. The paradigm as exemplary-past-achievement is also visible in 
Figure 10, as early framings of health equity in the 1980’s, in both the UK 
and US, have cast long temporal shadows and appear to have impacted the 
field’s structure and membership; in the UK, where health inequalities 
research was politically controversial, sociology and political science are 
well-represented, and now present established, independent traditions of 
health equity scholarship. In the US, where health disparities research began 
with unexplained variation in clinical practice, the clinical disciplines such as 
medicine, nursing, clinical epidemiology and psychology are more dominant, 
and ‘cancer disparities’ has emerged as a free-standing research domain, 
partly in response to independent funding streams. 
 
It is possible that the clusters detected in this bibliometric analysis reflect 
deeper fragmentation in the conceptualisation of health, equity, and health 
equity. The following three chapters explore this possibility, with a focus on 
knowledge (Chapter 7), research methods (Chapter 8) and interpretation of 
statistical results (Chapter 9). 
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Chapter 7: Knowledge, Knowing & Epistemic 
Culture in HIDR  
[Science] is not one enterprise but many, a whole landscape - or market - of 
independent epistemic monopolies producing vastly different products.  
Epistemic Cultures (Karin Knorr-Cetina, 1999:p4) 
If you put a psychologist and an epidemiologist and a medical doctor and a 
sociologist in a room […] They have different models of the world, and how 
inequalities are produced.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
The previous chapter detailed the diversity of disciplinary backgrounds 
within HIDR, and the uneven distribution of those backgrounds across 
citation-space. Boundaries were drawn around eight clusters, and certain 
disciplines found concentrated within those clusters. In this chapter I draw 
on interview data to investigate the extent to which network members hold 
different views regarding the generation and evaluation of knowledge about 
health equity. That is; whether HIDR contains diverse epistemic cultures, 
diverse ‘strategies and policies of knowing’ (Knorr-Cetina, 1999), and the 
extent to which this diversity appears connected to disciplinary training. The 
following analysis suggests there is meaningful diversity in the kind of 
knowledge researchers seek, and also in the criteria used to evaluate 
knowledge. But, what might be summarised as ‘disciplinary tension’ is more 
accurately described as a connected set of tensions relating to various 
elements of the disciplinary matrix: the type of knowledge researchers value, 
the structures via which knowledge is configured, the extent to which a 
discipline is strongly- or weakly-classified, and tolerance for complexity.  
7.1   Knowledge and the ‘Big Picture’  
 
Researchers must choose which parts of the world are studied and 
which ‘signs’ are considered worthy of analysis (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour 
& Woolgar, 1986). Eighteen interviewees mentioned the importance of the 
‘big picture’, ‘whole picture’ or ‘real story’ when making these decisions, 
and this notion of a holistic view seemed to play an important part in 
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deciding and justifying what should be studied, and how. There was 
widespread agreement among interviewees that good research moves 
beyond surface-level observation to connect with a ‘big picture’. However, 
interviewees were not in agreement about what the big picture is or how it 
can be analytically accessed, suggesting meaningful diversity in both what 
and how researchers seek to know. 
 
 Disciplinary training seems to play a part in setting up the view 
considered ‘big’, which in turn seems to shape the choices researchers 
perceive as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ in scientific practice. Illustrative quotations 
are contained in Table 10, including references to the big picture as 
regarding causal processes and analytical approaches. These extracts also 
introduce the diverse research objects considered relevant in the study of 
health equity, and hint at the diverse conceptions of health as a social, 
physiological, behavioural and technical research object, to be explored in 
detail in this chapter.   
 
 Big Picture Illustrative Quotation Interviewee 




My initial training in history really enables me 
to take a big picture [view]. “What's going on 
here? Why? What are the different forces?” […] 
I was initially trained in a discipline that 
encourages, that suggests a focus to look at 






of societal and 
physiological 
causes 
I am really signed up to the view that the whole 
life-course epidemiology, that the conditions in 
which people live, love, whatever, work and 
play, are important, but ultimately there are 
physiological mechanisms. So we have to 







We are very focused on intrapersonal ideas 














The whole picture, kind of looking at various 
things. The size of the effect […] and 
confidence intervals are important [...] it's 





Use of theory 
When I read good theoretical work I think it 
contributes a new way of thinking about 
something [...] helping you understand the 









Regarding health equity, there seem to be diverse pictures which include 
biological processes, behaviour and ‘interpersonal factors’, and dynamics in 
society. In Table 10, one interviewee describes accessing the big picture via 
an appropriately designed quantitative study, while another suggests that, 
for them, a theoretical lens performs a similar function. Together, these data 
suggest variation in the following dimensions:  
 
1. Researchers’ sense of the causal processes relevant to the study 
of health equity,  and  
 
2. Attitudes about the points along these causal chains at which 
research effort should focus (i.e., the perceived location of authoritative 
evidence)  
 
Interviewees were directly asked about (1), usually phrased as:  
“I am interested in understanding the mental models we carry around, as 
researchers. What is your back-of-the-envelope model of the process, or 
set of processes, that determine who is sick and who is well?” 
 I did not refer to ‘health inequalities’ or ‘health disparities’ in my 
questioning, as I wanted researchers to step back from the literature and 
their own work, to consider their most fundamental ideas about why health 
varies. I was also careful to avoid linking this question to interviewees’ 
disciplinary training. Data concerning (2) emerged during discussions of 
what interviewees consider the hallmarks of ‘good empirical work’ (see 
Appendix A for the full interview schedule).   
 
These epistemic commitments are connected, and appear to jointly 
reflect the type of knowledge researchers value, and aim to generate. Four 
distinct types of health-related knowledge emerged from interview data; 
knowledge about society, knowledge about disease, knowledge about 
behaviour, and what Knorr-Cetina (1999) termed ‘negative knowledge’, 
knowledge about how to get knowledge. These knowledges appear to be 
pursued for different purposes, and to be associated with what I term key 
scientific virtues. These knowledges, purposes, and virtues will be 
introduced and explored in this chapter, which concludes with a discussion 
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of whether they suggest the presence of distinct epistemic cultures, and 
how these factors may have shaped the bibliometric network. The exception 
is the key virtue associated with negative knowledge, explored in the next 
chapter.  
 
7.1.1 Knowledge about society  
 
 There was a clear connection between exposure to the social and 
political sciences and a social perspective on health. This social framing 
seemed like common-sense for many social scientists, as this interviewee 
explained:  
[Most important are the] social, political, economic processes which affect 
all sorts of aspects about people’s trajectories in life, including, of course 
their health. […] Geographers […] what we think a lot about is those 
integrative processes that work across different scales, so it’s a very natural 
way to work as a geographer, but I would say the same is almost equally 
true across all social science disciplines.  
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
 
References to what feels ’natural’ will be a recurring theme in every 
results chapter.  Repeatedly, common-sense was invoked by interviewees of 
various disciplines to explain a variety of scientific practices. Barnes (1982) 
and Bloor (2011) note that appeals to common-sense within science very 
often signify culturally-determined standards, and what is presented as 
‘natural’ or ‘proper’ should be treated analytically as that which is rooted in 
place and purpose, communally judged to be natural and proper (see 
Barnes, 1982: p.29).  
 
Indeed, a social framing of health was not ‘natural’ for everybody. Social 
structure was identified as the leading, most important, or ultimate cause of 
ill health by 15 interviewees, and of these, 13 are located in the region of the 
citation network highlighted in Figure 12, below (four of the five researchers 





Figure 12 - Thirteen (out of fifteen) Researchers who specifically mentioned Social 
Structure as the ultimate or most important cause of health inequalities were located in 
network clusters 4, 7 and 6.   
 
The conclusion that social scientists tend to think about health in a 
sociological way is not especially interesting. However, it is not only the case 
that these researchers view health as being socially-situated; for some 
interviewees, the underlying purpose and motivation for studying health is to 
better understand society:  
I see health as being a fascinating vehicle for understanding broader issues 
of social justice.  
Professor of Health Geography, (Geography PhD) 
Health inequalities, [is] an important way of framing what is happening to 
people, a way of understanding what is happening to people.  
Professor of Public Health (Health Services Research PhD) 
Particularly important is that these interviewees presented understanding 
as the goal of their research. While improving population health is a shared 
goal for HIDR scholars, for many interviewees in the highlighted region of 
Figure 12 this improvement is understood to be achievable primarily 
(sometimes only) via an understanding of how society works, and how social 
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structures impact health.  For this reason, good research goes beyond the 
biomedical to encompass the social, because social factors and forces are 
where authoritative evidence about the drivers of health are understood to 
reside. This is not to suggest that other interviewees discounted societal 
factors as unimportant for health, but, in the context of widespread 
agreement that the social determinants of health are important, what 
appears to vary is the extent to which the sociality of health is incorporated 
into research questions, is approached directly via research methods, and is 
presented as an object of dedicated empirical interest. Disciplinary training 
was an obvious driver of this variation. Formal training in or other exposure 
to social science appeared to be a precondition for the recognition of social 
structures and processes as research objects relevant to health.  
 
Some interviewees discussed the clear connection between their training 
and their thinking in response to my question about their ‘mental model’ of 
the process(es) driving inequality in health:  
This reflects my history background. People are really creatures of the 
structures in which they live. So every time, you look at historical 
circumstances. For me, I think the structural interpretation is the one that 
makes most sense.   
Public Health Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Part of it is culture and part of it is structure, because I’m a sociologist and 
an anthropologist [laughing].  
Occupational health researcher (Anthropology PhD) 
My mental model is actually very geographical. […]Essentially, I think it is all 
about geography. Where you are, and where you grow up, and how you are, 
are all inextricably bound together.  
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Historical circumstance, space, culture and structure are recognisable as 
research objects to these interviewees because their disciplinary training has 
familiarised them with a particular set of methods and style of scientific 
questioning.  Not all interviewees had such clear correspondence between 





Key Virtue - Reflecting Lived Experience 
 
Four researchers from clusters four and six specifically mentioned that 
good research connects with or contains data relating to  lived experience:  
Really good empirical work captures what it is like to suffer. It captures the 
pain of everyday life lived with enormous difficulty. That somehow stays with 
the ‘public’ in public health, that the people who are experiencing these 
difficulties, health difficulties that we’re trying to ameliorate, have lives of 
enormous suffering […] it holds the people they’re talking about in huge 
respect […] could almost have been in the lives they’re describing. That to 
me would be fantastic empirical research […] continuing to say “this is what 
peoples’ lives are like”.   
Sociologist (Sociology PhD) 
This view of good science as accurately reflecting lived realities 
consistently emerged in the transcripts of interviewees from Clusters four 
and six, which may explain the co-location of these geographically distant 
clusters in citation-space.  For these researchers (mostly social scientists) 
the ‘real story’ of health inequality is the lived experience of individuals, and 
the impact of policy and social structures on that experience. This emphasis 
on lived experience aligns clearly with what  Lamont (2009) termed the 
constructivist epistemological style.  
 
Interviewees with training in geography were distinctive for their attitudes 
to complexity. Of the five researchers (Geography x2, Anthropology, 
Epidemiology and Social Policy PhDs) who identified research setting out to 
grapple with the complexity of social interrelationships as being especially 
valuable, four had some training in geography. Two extracts below from the 
same interviewee demonstrate a clear correspondence between their 
disciplinary training and attitudes about research quality:  
Social geography, and health geography within that, for a very long time has 
understood and written about the complexity and interconnection of 
everything. 
[Later in the interview]  
TC: What are the hallmarks of really good empirical work?  
P: That’s a good question. That’s a good question […] I think work which is 
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oriented to understanding the complex and interacting nature of society, 
economy, culture and health.  
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Studying complex social relationships feels natural and rewarding for this 
geographer, and this appears to have originated in their training. However, 
the study of complexity is not possible in all disciplinary paradigms, a point I 
explore later in the chapter.  
 
In sum, within the region of the network highlighted in Figure 12, ‘good 
research’ explicitly engages with and describes the lives of individuals, the 
sociality of health and the impact of policy on health. This is a reflection of 
the view of social structures as the cause of health inequity, the recognition 
of these structures as objects amenable to empirical study, and of the 
motivating aim to better understand these structures via the study of health. 
These topics fall outside epidemiology’s problematique, and (as will 
frequently be the case throughout the thesis) understanding epidemiological 
norms and standards is key to understanding interviewees' attitudes, 
challenges and reported priorities, in diverse disciplines. Tensions between 
this view of health and other views are discussed in Section 7.2.1.5. 
7.1.2 Biological Causes & Knowledge about disease  
 
Very few interviewees stated explicitly that their research (or ‘good 
research’) relates to disease or biological outcomes. This probably reflects 
the dominant status of the epidemiological paradigm within HIDR, and the 
ways in which features of that paradigm are taken as given and do not 
require recapitulation or justification. One biostatistician made their 
preference for biomedical evidence explicit:  
The biomedical study and randomised study I would say are important 
[trails off]. How they are designed, I think they bring the best evidence. 
Biostatistician A (Biostatistics PhD) 
Four epidemiologists and medical doctors indicated that studying the 
structural determinants of health does not provide the most desirable kind of 
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evidence about health inequity:  
[I] don't mean to say that the fundamental determinants, like education, 
income, quality of education, family environment, community stuff,  It 
doesn't mean to say that they’re irrelevant, but it's a looooooong causal 
process from those things through to the actual manifestation of 
pathological disease.  
Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD) 
Ultimately, everything becomes expressed, at some level, in biological 
processes. Unless you are willing to deal with that, you're never going to 
really understand what the hell is going on.   
Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
For these interviewees, due to the difficulty elucidating causal links between 
socio-structural and biological processes, it seems natural to focus research 
efforts on the proximal determinants, which are closer (in causal terms) to 
pathophysiology and disease, to where things ‘become expressed’. Left 
unsaid is the status of knowledge about disease and ill-health as 
representing authoritative evidence about health equity, and the aim of 
learning about health equity via obtaining knowledge about disease. 
Although four interviewees made their preference for the study of disease 
explicit, many others discussed their work in ways which implied that the 
underlying aim is to generate knowledge about disease distributions and 
processes. One epidemiologist made that aim explicit:  
I am primarily concerned with preventing major diseases which may affect 
the health of people and cause premature death […] people are healthy, and 
people may become diseased, may get a disease, and the progression from 
healthy to diseased often depends on a number of risk factors for that 
disease, including the generalised risk factors of susceptibility. That is what I 
am interested in.  
Social Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Epidemiology PhD) 
Improved understanding of disease processes was presented as important 
by interviewees in the network region highlighted in Figure 13, below 
(including the zones of overlap between Clusters 7, 4 and 1, and overlap 
between Clusters 1 and 2).  This focus on disease stands in contrast to the 
kind of knowledge most valued by the interviewees highlighted in Figure 12, 
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To generalise, interviewees in the highlighted region of Figure 13 seemed to 
value and seek knowledge regarding processes demonstrably driving 
pathophysiology within human bodies.  These researchers did not discard or 
reject the social determinants of health, but the social determinants tend to 
enter the epistemology as ‘risk factors’ or ‘exposures’ alongside and in the 
same manner as behavioural or biological factors. These risk factors are 
then analysed with the aim of better understanding what causes disease, 
and it is the ‘links’ between exposures and biological outcomes which are 
the objects of principle scholarly focus: 
We are interested in the link between the exposures and the outcomes […] 
We need to know how it functions so that we can find ways to reduce it.  
Biostatistician A (Biostatistics PhD) 
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Apparent in the above extract is the motivation for studying exposures and 
their links with health outcomes: by better understanding disease 
processes, they might be avoided, interrupted, or minimised. This connects 
with the key virtue of this kind of research, generating useful knowledge. 
 
Key Virtue: Useful Knowledge  
 
Strongly-classified disciplines are characterised by a clear distinction 
between work which belongs to the discipline, and work which does not 
(see Section 3.4.2.1) Interviewees with epidemiological training expressed 
quite consistent ideas about good empirical work, across different sub-
specialties of epidemiology, and different continents. These ideas tended to 
be collected under the banner of ‘epidemiological rigour’, described and 
discussed in the next chapter. Nine interviewees from the region highlighted 
in Figure 12 (whose work includes theoretical or conceptual elements from 
outside epidemiology) commented on the difficulty of gaining recognition 
from epidemiologists: 
Despite the fact that people like [Cluster 3 researcher] and [Cluster 1 
researcher], some of the leading social epidemiologists who are shifting 
epidemiology, there is still a big core I think who are sticking to, sort of more 
conventional thinking about epidemiology, and looking for more linear 
relationships rather than looking at the complexity. And not wanting to look 
at the politics of the situation.  
Public Health Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
However, one epidemiologist specifically highlighted this ‘consistency in 
thinking’ in epidemiology as a positive attribute, relative to the social 
sciences:  
[Epidemiology is] a very solid, clear discipline, and I like that.  
TC: Looking at the social sciences, is that less clear? 
Yeah, it is less clear. It doesn't have the same uniformity in statistics, and 
consistency in thinking.   
Social Epidemiologist (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
Given this consistency experienced from within and without, 
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epidemiology seems to be a strongly-classified science. Epidemiology is 
also an applied science. On that basis, drawing on existing analyses of the 
Biglan quadrants (Simpson, 2017; Becher & Trowler, 2001), criteria for 
evaluating knowledge in epidemiology are expected to be purposive or 
functional, or to reflect what Lamont (2009) termed the ‘utilitarian’ style. 
Purposive criteria for knowledge evaluation were apparent in almost all 
interviews with epidemiologists, and twelve interviewees with epidemiology 
training specifically reported being drawn to the subject because they 
wanted to do contribute something  ‘useful’ , or practical:  
I wanted to do something, practical is a bit too much to say, but something 
that could potentially be relevant for making this world a better place. Not 
studying culture for the sake of more knowledge, but for the sake of making 
this world a better place.  
Public Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
[I did study] sociology, I felt I needed something more tangible. I wanted to 
feel that what I am doing has impact in the society, in humans. So it 
[epidemiology] seems to me to be very tangible, it is not abstract like the 
sociology discipline.  
Biostatistician B, (Biostatistics PhD) 
Implied, but not discussed by these interviewees, was the corollary that 
abstract knowledge about culture or society cannot have the same impact, 
or be similarly relevant to making the world a better place. Generally, 
interviewees with epidemiology backgrounds displayed a preference for 
knowledge which can inform action, where ‘action’ was usually defined as 
reducing incidence of a specific disease. In short, in order to be ‘good’, 
epidemiological knowledge must be perceived as useful and as relating to 
solutions. 
 
 The desire to pursue solutions in epidemiology was repeatedly contrasted 
against the social sciences, especially sociology, by interviewees from both 
disciplines: 
 I know I'm being utterly critical here, but sometimes I think “why do people 
get out of bed in the morning, if they’re not going to do something that’s 
going to be useful?” […] if your only goal is to contribute to theory, I 
 
174 
suppose that’s an interesting problem, [that is] half-way to getting to a 
solution.  
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD) 
I think epidemiology has, it comes from the medical field, very clearly. Fixing 
things is the ultimate goal.  Sociology is much more a science which tries to 
understand society, the primary focus is not to fix society.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD) 
The interviewee above who describes themselves as seeking ‘useful’ 
findings expressed a common viewpoint, that theoretical research appears 
to serve the researcher, by enhancing their understanding, and therefore has 
no clear purpose. But, ‘useful’ has different meanings in different research 
traditions. In the social sciences, improved understanding of social 
processes and patterns is useful. In epidemiology, useful typically means 
relating to solutions, and solutions are understood as being identifiable not 
via theoretical models, but via experimental interventions: 
We want the evidence which will tell us what to do. It might not be evidence 
from interventions, but the evidence which would inform interventions.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
‘Doing interventions’ emerged as a key distinction epidemiologists drew 
about their own work, and among themselves. One social epidemiologist 
suggested that their work is not ‘helping’, because it is not intervention-
based: 
It is appealing, that idea that I am helping promote change, but I am not 
doing interventions. Maybe one day I will do interventions but I’m not ready 
for that.  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD), 
Interviewees also expressed a preference for interventions in the 
literature:  
[Descriptively,] there are some areas which are untouched and we don’t 
know what the size of inequalities is. But, of course, the emphasis should 
be on interventions.  
Public Health Researcher (Public Health PhD) 
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And, interventions were presented as the ‘natural’ extension of 
descriptive research programs:  
I can take my research to the point of identifying barriers, understanding 
peoples’ knowledge, but the natural next step would be an intervention.  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
Scholars of the political and corporate determinants of health reported that 
the expectation of providing evidence-based solutions created challenges 
for the funding, evaluation and publication of their research. Generally, 
compared to the social and political sciences, understanding without an 
obvious path to action appears to be less-highly valued in epidemiology, 
where the aim, as one sociologist above expressed, is to ‘fix’, not to 
understand.  
 
 This drive toward solutions also shapes the kinds of questions 
epidemiologists ask and answer. One social epidemiologist described how 
the need to produce actionable knowledge diverted them from questions 
driven by curiosity, or a desire to understand:  
I could easily fall into ‘wouldn’t it be cool to look at’ or ‘what if we…’ but I 
need to really think “what would we do with that? So what?” So, I think I am 
almost forced into that, but I love it. I really like that about being in a medical 
school.  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
While no interviewee from any discipline argued that improving health is 
unimportant, epidemiology’s purposive slant seems to functionally narrow 
the zone of legitimate enquiry to topics which can inform action. Here is a 
paradigm functioning in the way Kuhn (1962) describes: The epidemiological 
paradigm appears to restrict the kinds of questions interviewees considered 
legitimate, and also the form of acceptable problem-solutions. This tension 
between knowledge-for-action and knowledge-for-understanding gets to a 
question of deep epistemological significance: What is the purpose of 
scientific knowledge? I attend to the link between disciplines and research 
methods in the next chapter, but the above data shed light on an important 
aspect of disciplinary difference. While it is the case that interviewees from 
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different disciplines study different research objects (social structure, 
disease risk-factors) this is one element of disciplinary difference, not its 
sum total. Researchers trained differently study different objects for specific 
reasons, entangled with the deepest commitments of their field (to improve 
health / to understand society). In interview data, what was presented by 
interviewees as tension or difference across ‘disciplines’ was, usually, more 
accurately described as a connected set of tensions across knowledges 
(pure and applied), collection codes (cumulative and integrative)  
classification strengths (strong and weak) and tolerance for complexity (high 
and low). Prototypical examples of these tension-sets are presented at the 
end of the chapter, and the impact of these tensions on interdisciplinary 
collaboration is explored in Chapter 10.  
 
7.1.3 Behavioural Causes and Knowledge about Behaviour    
 
No interviewee identified health behaviour (smoking, alcohol 
consumption, diet, physical activity etc) as an authoritative form of evidence 
regarding the causes of health inequity. However, a large amount of research 
output within HIDR relates to behaviour (see Section 1.4), and attitudes 
about health behaviour as a research focus permeated other discussions. 
Interviewees from clusters 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 perceived a lack of balance 
within HIDR, and generally wished there was less research about behaviour, 
pointing variously toward funders, data availability constraints, and vested 






Figure 14 – Interviewees identifying as scholars of health behaviour  
 
Four interviewees identified themselves as scholars of behaviour at the 
beginning of the interview. All four are located in the US, and work within the 
field of cancer prevention. In citation-space, they are similarly co-located, in 
the highlighted region of Figure 14, at the junction of clusters 3 and 8.   
       
Just as social scientists viewed social forces as research objects of 
interest, and epidemiologists tended to focus on links between exposure 
and disease, behavioural scientists discussed aiming to study and improve 
health equity by studying and changing behaviour:  
The kinds of things we might be interested in, in health behaviour [come] 
from the perspective of really identifying the determinants of a particular 
behaviour. […] [and] trying to influence behaviour.  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
I bring in behavioural theories and methods, to develop interventions. Then I 
use the epidemiological principles of study design, etc, to design and test, 
to study the interventions that I develop. […] We've got to do more than just 
tell the public ‘this is not good for you’.  
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
Knowledge about behaviour is therefore valued and sought empirically 
because it can be harnessed in the development of resources and 
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programmes designed to encourage the public to behave in ways which 
minimise disease risk, particularly cancer risk. These interviewees do not 
want to understand behaviour for an academic purpose; the explicit 
motivation for studying behaviour is to change behaviour: 
I want it to be usable, not just ‘here’s what we did in this little study’ […] to 
make it a better world.  
Nursing Researcher (Nursing PhD) 
 
Conceptualising Behaviour: Tension between personal and published 
understandings 
 
All four interviewees expressed a conceptualisation of behaviour as 
being intertwined with other factors, including social and biological factors. 
This holistic view of behaviour was presented as most accurately reflecting 
the world in which people live:  
Behaviour is a function of a person in his or her environment, given what 
they value. […] We’ve seen the iceberg image, where at the top we see the 
health outcome and [below is] what lies beneath. I think […] [that image] 
really can convey the essence of disparities.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD) 
 
But two behavioural scientists reported struggling to achieve 
correspondence between this understanding of behaviour and the views 
contained in or suggested by their own published research. The 
conceptualisation of behaviour as a function of environment was positioned 
as conflicting with the individualist approach common within health 
promotion and cancer prevention. One interviewee specifically located that 
difficulty within their training, which appears to have again shaped what is 
‘natural’:  
One thing we often overlook in our health behaviour world is that we are 
very focused on intrapersonal ideas and concepts. Things that are specific 
to the individual […] there is kind of a disconnect between the interventions 
or ideas that are proposed, [they] don’t account for the ‘real world’ context 




TC: What do you think it is that’s discouraging people from seeing those 
‘real-world’ contexts?  
I think the focus on the individual is a natural place to start, right? If you’re 
thinking about behaviour change, you’re usually thinking about it at an 
individual level.  So a lot of our training […] our theoretical frameworks, 
they’re often limited to intrapersonal factors […] sometimes we don’t think 
about, kind of, the bigger context in which issues take place. […] [our] 
theories tend to drive us toward individual-level factors.  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
The social scientists from the highlighted area of Figure 12 patently do 
not consider it ‘natural’ to conceptualise behaviour as beginning and ending 
with individuals. These interviewees almost universally took a structural view 
of behaviour, and located its drivers within society. However, as the 
interviewee above explains, in the ‘health behaviour world,’ behaviour is 
more likely to be conceptualised as belonging to individuals, and this is 
positioned (in the above quotation) as being driven by the discipline’s 
theoretical frameworks, by the health behaviour paradigm.   
 
In addition to interviewees who identified themselves as scholars of 
behaviour, psychologists and economists described their disciplines as 
having an overt individual and behavioural focus.   
Psychology is basically trying to understand individual behaviour.  […] What 
psychology contributes is more the models for understanding how such 
behaviours arise […] [and] by giving input when it comes to designing 
interventions. Making sure that interventions are geared toward the sub-
groups for which they are meant.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD)  
I would say that economics is becoming more empirical, in some sense it is 
moving closer to biostatistics, while also thinking about and understanding 
people's behaviour, and what things influence peoples’ behaviour. […] We 
are probably less focused on outcomes [than epidemiologists], and are 
more focused on how you get people to do what you want them to do. 
Which doesn't sound very good [laughing].  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
These data suggest that collaboration between health behaviourists, 
psychologists and economists may be more straightforward than for other 
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disciplines (like sociology, or social epidemiology).  
 
 Perhaps surprisingly, some interviewees who took a structural view of 
health equity conducted research about health behaviour, but reported 
doing so against their better judgement, and in deference to financial or 
data-availability constraints:  
We collect data on behaviours, societal factors, also genetic data, so we 
can look at these […] [But] then, you get to the conflict between what you 
would like to do and what's realistic, what the funding allows. That is a 
different question.  
Biostatistician A (Biostatistics PhD) 
It’s almost like there’s this massive white elephant in the room that is the 
real [social] determinants [of health]. […] But it’s like, we just ignore the 90% 
of what causes inequalities and focus on the one bit where we can get 
money and we can have control. I can see how that actually impacts on me 
[…] even though you know, fundamentally, it will only make a tiny bit of 
difference, because that’s where you’ve actually got the potential to do 
something.   
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
I am not the first to suggest that research funding has epistemic 
consequences (Smith, 2010; Spurling, 2012; Lyall, 2019). But, these data 
reveal the specific ways population health researchers may bend (or 
suspend) their own epistemology in pursuit of funded research programs.   
 
It struck me as an unlikely coincidence that all behavioural scholars of 
health equity interviewed were also interested in cancer prevention. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 6, I asked one North American interviewee to help me 
understand this focus, who explained that cancer is ‘sexy, and well-funded’. 
One behavioural scientist framed the topic of cancer as a trap in which they 
have found themselves:  
We’re pushed and funded to examine disparities in single disease 
conditions. And I am very guilty of this, I definitely need to have a funded 
research program […] And now I’m in this middle, like a hamster on this 
wheel. There is a lot of money to study cancer […] my papers and my grants 
are all focused in this area of cancer, but, transportation is an issue for 
getting your blood pressure checked, its an issue for getting your sugar 
checked, getting your glucose monitored. That effects everything. There are 
common underpinnings across a number of health behaviours […] Even 
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though I may always maintain that way of thinking, my products maybe 
don’t reflect that.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD) 
Therefore, certain kinds of knowledge are perceived to be more fundable 
than others, with projects aiming to produce disease-specific knowledges 
appearing more fundable than cross-cutting projects. This may be because 
such projects can more precisely outline their ‘usefulness’, as understood 
within epidemiology. As an interviewee quoted earlier described, for 
researchers employing the biomedical model the ‘loooooong causal process 
from those things through to the actual manifestation of pathological 
disease’ may be viewed as a limitation, as a reason to direct research effort 
elsewhere.   
 
A study with an individual, behavioural focus might therefore represent 
what is perceived could be feasibly funded, or studied, rather than what a 
researcher most wanted to study. Although many interviewees seemed 
aware of this pressure in their own work, this did not seem to dampen 
criticism of others. Research with a behavioural focus was the subject of 
fierce criticism, most especially by interviewees from Clusters 1 and 4, 
discussed alongside other inter-knowledge tensions in Section 2.5.1. 
 
7.1.4 Negative Knowledge: Knowledge about getting knowledge  
 
Six interviewees reported having no back-of-the-envelope causal model 
of health equity to report, and all six were trained in Economics or 
Biostatistics; disciplinary paradigms lacking a theoretical framework 
specifically describing the causes of disease. These interviewees appear to 
seek yet another form of knowledge, where the focus is not social, biological 
or behavioural, but technical. These researchers have chosen to spend their 
careers studying health equity, and so health equity is clearly of interest and  
considered important, but, when asked to discuss their own understandings 
of the processes generating health inequity, they did not do so. Instead, they 
emphasised technical aspects of the research process, especially data 
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collection and study design. One professor of biostatistics repeatedly 
returned to study design when I asked about their mental model, and didn’t 
seem to quite understand my question, or feel their own understanding had 
relevance:  
TC: You mentioned there that [as a statistician] you are a team-player on 
research projects. I am wondering how your personal understandings of 
health are expressed, in the work that you do? 
I think I've got what you are saying, but can you just reiterate your question, 
more specifically? 
TC: You pointed out that being a statistician is a bit different […] you might 
influence the design, but you don't always define the research question. Do 
you have your own mental model of what determines who is sick and who is 
well in the population? Or do you see yourself as implementing and 
investigating models that other people have? 
So, when you are young, it is hard to be determined to get the best study 
design […] I am a team player, and I am a statistician […] [When] the design 
the investigator or scientist proposes, when I find it's not optimal I am 
strongly against it […] It is, to me, morally illegal to have a bad study design. 
[…]  based on the scientific concepts, we need to try to get an optimal 
design.  
Biostatistician B (Biostatistics PhD), Cluster 3) 
This interviewee repeatedly returned to design as the most important 
consideration in research, and discussed the importance of study design 
with conviction.  Biostatisticians are experts in the design of clinical and 
epidemiological studies, and so the impact of this interviewee’s training is 
quite clearly discernible here. Some economists also presented study 
design as a substitute for a global conceptual model:  
I suppose it is such a complex question, I wouldn't know where to start, to 
be honest. In some ways I don't think it matters too much about what 
influences health […] There are observational studies you can do, 
randomised controlled trials, there are all these different things that you can 
test out and try to think about what impacts on health. 
Health Economist (Economics PhD)  
In clear contrast to the models of disease causation previously 
discussed, for the above interviewee the fundamental determinants of health 
are something a researcher ‘tries to think about’ by ‘testing out’ various 
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designs. The implication seems to be that health is not firmly conceptualised 
as socially-situated, or as relating to disease processes, or behaviours. 
Rather, health is reflected in data, and the determinants of health are found 
not in society, or in the body, or in behaviour, but in well-designed empirical 
studies. This perspective was echoed within commitments to ‘evidence’ 
above any particular causal model, expressed by several interviewees in 
Cluster 2.  
I definitely have priors when I am predicting an equation, and I have beliefs 
about reducing disease and how you might reduce inequalities, but that is 
mainly based on external evidence, like the effectiveness of statins, and that 
sort of thing.   
TC: So it comes down to a series of questions about individual risk factors?  
Probably. Generally, yeah. Yes. [Pause]. I would say it is fairly empirical. I 
don’t have a global… [trails off] 
TC: A global conceptual model?  
That’s right.    
Professor of Health Economics B (Economics PhD) 
In some scientific contexts, researchers seek knowledge which relates 
not to specific objects or phenomena, but to a better grasp of errors and 
more precise measurement. This negative knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) 
relates to the struggle of attempting to know, and provides 
 "knowledge of the limits of knowing, of the mistakes we make in trying to 
know, of the things that interfere with our knowing.” (p.64) 
Researchers who have spent their careers trying to optimise the 
measurement or statistical handling of inequality in health do appear to be 
pursuing negative knowledge, with the purpose of improving other 
(‘positive’) knowledges. If health is an atomised collection of empirical 
findings, researchers can set aside debate about structural causes vs 
individual causes, and focus can shift to the technical challenges associated 
with the generation of empirical findings.  Here again is the paradigm 
functioning as Kuhn described; the emergence of a specialised research 
focus (‘quantitative measurement and description of inequality’) liberates 
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scientists from debates about fundamentals, and they can set off to solve 
the set of puzzles early work has presented. For many interviewees in 
Cluster 2 (including epidemiologists, medical doctors and economists) the 
optimisation and improvement of these technical aspects has become a 
dedicated research effort, with its own literature, and lessons. In citation 
space, the upper peninsula of Cluster 2 contains a number of economists 
who have played a part in the development of specific knowledge regarding 
the measurement of inequalities in health: 
We’ve made good progress on developing measures. […] We have learnt in 
the last decade that it [measuring health] is not the same as measuring 
income […]. Health is bounded at the top [by perfect health] and at the 
bottom [by death]. That gives us different characteristics. That is a lesson 
we learned.  
Professor of Health Economics C (Economics PhD) 
This biostatistician seems to have developed specific, negative 
knowledge regarding the challenges and pitfalls of cluster-randomised trials:  
Based on my experience […] you collect your data, which is a tremendous 
challenge, [and] the true effect size is always different from what you 
planned, from what you expected. […] [Study investigators] have some 
imagination or idea about the effect size. “Yes, this group will be two times 
higher than this control arm”. And it never happens! [laughing]  
Biostatistician B (Biostatistics PhD), Cluster 3 
These same interviewees did not describe a global conceptual model of 
the causes of ill-health, perhaps because they do not perceive this as useful 
or relevant to the kind of knowledge they want to produce. This seems to 
support Kuhn’s assertion that scientific tools (methods, conceptual models) 
are adopted only where they are understood to serve a relevant function 
(Kuhn, 1989). The development and uptake of tools within disciplines to 
serve particular functions is explored in detail in the next chapter.  
 
The above extracts provide a glimpse of the way research in disciplines 
governed by cumulative codes can proceed as compartmentalised streams 
of questions. In both health economics and biostatistics, new findings bolt-
on to existing knowledge in an additive manner, advancing the frontier as in 
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a crystalline structure. In contrast, the social sciences are generally 
integrative in their collection codes (Becher & Trowler, 2001), meaning that at 
least some knowledge integrates, agglomerates and forms a mass which 
cannot be easily sub-divided, or decomposed. These disciplines operate at 
somewhat fuzzy ‘frontier’, which may be hard to locate, especially by those 
not trained in the field (Abbott, 2001). Under integrative codes, some 
findings cannot be comprehended (even when summarised) when isolated 
from underlying concepts and theories.  
 
Health-focused research is an applied area of many social sciences, and 
this applied focus may introduce cumulative elements into the epistemology 
(more on this in Chapter 8), however the fundamental difference in the way 
knowledge accumulates in social and biomedical sciences may explain 
some persistent tensions within HIDR, most especially debate about the 
relative merits of ‘decomposed causal associations’ in HIDR, discussed in 
the next chapter.  
 
Analysis so far suggests that interviewees are pursuing diverse kinds of 
knowledge, for varied purposes, and that these knowledges and purposes 
tend to broadly align with disciplinary background. The four knowledges 
presented above are summarised in Table 11, along with their apparent 
purpose, and associated conceptualisation of health. 
 
Form of Knowledge Health is… Purpose of Knowledge 
Knowledge about Society A socially-situated phenomenon Understand  Society  Change Society 
Knowledge about Disease A biomedical phenomenon Understand Disease Incidence Reduce Disease Incidence 
Knowledge about Behaviour  A Behavioural phenomenon  Change behaviour  
Negative Knowledge  Empirical findings & technical challenges Improve Other Knowledges  
Table 11 Forms of knowledge about health  
 
There was correspondence between interviewees’ disciplinary training 
and the kind of knowledge they aim to produce in most, but not all cases. 
The question of how to manage causes at various levels (social, behavioural, 
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biological) within a single study seemed to act as a refractive prism to 
demonstrate the way disciplines map onto the knowledges in Table 11. 
Twenty-two interviewees discussed the challenges of addressing multiple 
levels of causality in a single study. One epidemiologists and one medical 
doctor worried biological processes would be neglected or downplayed, six 
researchers from social epidemiology and the social sciences (especially 
sociology) worried that societal causes would be neglected. 
 
One economist and one health behaviour researcher stated that this 
challenge is minimal, because their aim is to understand individual-level 
causes of ill-health: 
How do we individualise? How do we look at that individual, and not, 
because you know, when you get into public health you’re looking at the 
population. But then [we need] to break it back down to the individual.   
Nursing Researcher (Nursing PhD) 
Three geographers expressed worry about how varied 
conceptualisations of space would impact conclusions:  
Environment is not just the physical environment, for us [geographers] it is 
the social environment and the people you interact with […] Place and 
space for geographers is quite a broad definition […] [Other researchers] 
don’t always think to analyse the individual experience in the wider context.  
Professor of Geography (Geography PhD) 
One biostatistician framed their answer entirely in terms of the challenges 
associated with combining data sources, isolating the ‘signal’ from the 
‘noise’:  
Yes the aggregate data, merging to the individual level is very challenging 
[…] it is too much noise in the data […] that noise, it is at the individual level 
but also within the clusters, there is noise.[…] For me that is a challenge and 
it is hard to do validated and appealing research [with these data].   
Biostatistician B (Biostatistics PhD), Cluster 3 
The above extracts, and Table 11, suggest the possibility of tension 
across knowledges and purposes. In the next section I present data relating 
to tension within and between knowledges.  
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7.2 Tensions & Epistemic Cultures  
 
 The rows and columns of Table 11 may represent academic distinctions, 
interesting to a sociologist of knowledge but of little consequence for 
research conduct. During interviews I took every opportunity to ask 
interviewees for details about tension they experienced across disciplinary 
lines, or to describe the ‘disciplinary dynamic’ of various situations they 
presented.  On close examination, these related more precisely to the kinds 
of knowledge different disciplines tend to favour, to differences in 
disciplinary classification, and tolerance for complexity.  
 
In this section I outline these tensions in detail, and ask whether the 
knowledges presented in the previous section (and tensions between them) 
signify the presence of distinct epistemic cultures, different ‘strategies and 
policies of knowing’ (Knorr-Cetina, 1994:p.4) which shape academic 
practice and underpin the generation of the ‘vastly different products’ 
referred to at the beginning of the chapter. This is the approach employed by 
Knorr-Cetina, using what she terms comparative optics to ‘visibilise’ the 
invisible, harnessing patterns detected in one domain as ‘a sensor for 
identifying and mapping (equivalent, analogue, conflicting) patterns in the 
other’ (ibid, p4). 
 
Pure and Applied Knowledges: The ‘Incomprehensible’ and the ‘Bizarre’ 
 
Work producing a different kind of knowledge to interviewees’ own was 
frequently described as confusing, frustrating, or as being without scientific 
merit. For example, one psychologist trained in epidemiology reported 
confusion and frustration with the work of social theorists, who seem to 
produce un-intelligible research outputs: 
Part of me is quite impatient with some of the theorising that goes ahead. 
Especially in areas like sociology. I don’t find it easy to understand much of 
it, and particularly when it comes to [topic], there are theorists who write 
things that are incomprehensible to anybody. And it’s, kind of, is this 
helping? how is this helping? […] I guess I am more instrumental, I am more 
‘how can I use this?’ ‘how will it work for me, or for other people?’  
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Public Health Researcher (Health Services Research PhD)  
One researcher’s effort to describe or understand social phenomena is 
therefore labelled incomprehensible by another researcher, for whom it feels 
more natural to seek ‘helpful’ findings. This was presented as a disciplinary 
difference, but is a prototypical example of tension across pure and applied 
knowledges. This is also a tension across collection codes. For a researcher 
with experience in cumulative knowledge collection, research which 
proceeds in an integrative fashion may feel ‘incomprehensible’, because key 
foundational concepts are challenging to precisely define, yet tend to be 
central to analysis (Abbott, 2001). Compared to disciplines like epidemiology 
and medicine, findings in the social sciences may not be intended to be 
generalised, or very succinctly summarised (Lamont, 2009). 
 
This tension between knowledge-for-understanding and knowledge-for-
action appears to flow in both directions:  
As far as I can see, inequality research […] it has been a traditionally 
biomedical area. We get more funding than other parts of sociology [which 
creates tension for me]. Health is key to our society, and therefore it is more 
fundable than research on, let’s say, attitudes, which is more core to the 
tradition of sociology.  
Sociologist (Sociology PhD) 
This sociologist wants to study society by studying health. However, this 
creates professional difficulties within their sociology department, which 
prefers a focus on sociology’s traditional concerns (i.e., not health). 
Sociology appears to exhibit local variation in its classification strength, and 
readers with sociology backgrounds may have different experiences within 
their own departments. But, at least some parts of sociology are strongly 
classified when it comes to the question of applied research, and more 
specialised writers than I have argued previously (in the terms used by the 
above interviewee) that knowledge does not flow from the ‘periphery’ to the 
‘core’ of sociology as quickly, or as freely, as in the natural and medical 
sciences (Cole, 1994; Abbott, 2001). Four interviewees with training in 
sociology described difficulty publishing in sociology journals, and framed 
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this as a ‘disciplinary’ tension, however the key issue seemed to be that the 
knowledge they were trying to disseminate was too applied: 
We have put qualitative research papers in journals with a more sociological 
focus, and they’ve always been rejected, I feel for really bizarre reasons […] 
there is also a lack of acceptance of applied health research, and applied 
research within those disciplines. […] [We] write what I think are quite 
sociological papers, but they are not seen as ‘sociological enough’ for some 
mainstream sociology journals.   
Professor of Population Health (Public Health PhD) 
This suggests that applied knowledge is not highly valued within 
mainstream sociology, consistent with its classification as a ‘pure’ discipline 
in Biglan’s (1973) analysis. I do not know what ‘sociological enough’ looks 
like to mainstream journal editors, but a common thread running through 
interviews with sociologists was the importance of a coherent theoretical 
framework, and the desire to understand rather than to influence. This may 
explain the apparently ‘bizarre’ rejection of papers with applied foci.  
 
The perception of these decisions as ‘bizarre’, and the description of 
theoretical knowledge as ‘incomprehensible’ seems to suggest the presence 
of quite different ways of knowing. It is not news that sociologists and 
medical scientists approach certain aspects of scholarship differently. What 
this analysis contributes is empirical confirmation of what Simpson (2017) 
suspected, that the dimensions identified by Biglan almost 50 years ago 
(Pure/Applied, Strongly/Weakly Classified) remain relevant, and capture 
something meaningful about disciplinary diversity. The tension between pure 
knowledges which enhance understanding, and applied knowledges which 
inform practice was clear in my data. Decomposing ‘disciplinary’ difference 
via these specific features may provide clarity in long-standing cross-
disciplinary debates, and assist researchers to more precisely understand 
the difficulties they face in funding, conducting, and publishing inter- and 
trans-disciplinary work. 
 




The previous tension relates to the content of scientific output, but the 
same kind of mirrored tension was apparent on the topic of publication 
structure. Four epidemiologists reported feeling confused by the structure of 
social science papers, and framed this as a disciplinary difference, with 
sociology singled out for special criticism. One epidemiologist (choosing 
their words carefully) located their frustration in a perceived lack of 
efficiency, and lost scientific ‘progress’: 
I must confess that, personally, I feel that epidemiology and medical 
scientists are, in some way, quite efficient scientists. Very productive, and 
have clearly found a way to progress in our knowledge. [Long pause] 
I sometimes become a bit frustrated if I see researchers from the social 
sciences, especially quantitative research. […] There is, the way in which it 
is reported, with much emphasis on theory in the beginning, then brief 
results, no discussion. It is totally different to what we do, a brief discussion, 
a brief introduction, results and extensive evaluation. […] I think these 
sciences are much less able to make progress.  
     Social Epidemiologist (Epidemiology PhD) 
The underlying issue here seems to be the way knowledge is presented 
in strong- and weakly-classified fields: In strongly-classified fields there is 
agreement about which questions are important, which methods are 
appropriate, and the form answers should take. As was discussed in Section 
2.1.2, epidemiology seems strongly classified, and this may explain how it is 
possible (and common) for epidemiologists to publish works with relatively 
brief introductions. In the social sciences there is rarely such consensus, 
and a comparatively lengthier presentation of each project and its rationale 
is necessary. However, the volume of written material in the social sciences 
looks, to the epidemiologist above, like an ‘inefficient’ mode of scholarship, 
and the lengthy exposition in social science papers was described as 
overwhelming by epidemiologists:  
I don’t have the stamina to read those long articles. I never did. I cannot 
train my brain to read a 20 page sociology [paper], I’m like “where are the 
equations??” ten pages of theory!? [Laughing]  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
In epidemiology, economics and the biomedical sciences, published 
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research most frequently takes the form of experimental reports, a genre 
“central to many conceptions of the sciences as empirical enquiry” 
(Bazerman, 1988:p.7). Whereas, in the social sciences, the structure of 
written articles is less uniform, and article lengths more variable. Such 
differences between scientific texts are “not just on the page” (ibid, p.16) but 
reflect the way the writer positions their work (and themselves) with respect 
to the social, textual, and natural worlds. Therefore, the existence of diverse 
academic genres in HIDR may itself be interpreted as signalling the 
presence of substantially different ways of knowing. 
 
Integrative and cumulative collection codes (Bernstein, 1971) also inform 
article structure, and notions of scientific progress. In epidemiology, if new 
work is understood as positioned on the (common) frontier, no further 
rationale or explanation is required, and this manifests in extremely short 
introductions to peer-reviewed papers. In the social sciences, the frontier 
itself may require identification, justification and explanation, and time must 
be spent outlining the precise ways new work builds upon and braids 
together existing lines of enquiry, resulting in much longer introductory 
sections.  
 
In addition, progress has a particular appearance depending on whether 
knowledge accumulates or integrates. As was discussed in Chapter 2, in 
disciplines with cumulative codes, old work is systematically devalued 
(relative to new work) old questions abandoned and replaced. Disciplines 
with integrative codes tend to return regularly to a central set of issues and 
motivating questions. Sociology has been repeatedly characterised in this 
way, and Abbott (2001) asserts that sociological knowledge is not 
progressive, but continually returning to the fundamental questions.  
 
However, things are not as straightforward as the cumulative/integrative 
distinction might suggest. Abbott’s (2001) discussion of fractal distinctions 
in academic culture cautions that, wherever such distinctions exist, there will 
be examples of both sides on both sides (social scientists working 
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cumulatively, and epidemiologists working integratively). It also is not the 
case that ‘progress’ is obvious in epidemiology (where knowledge advances 
along a frontier) and difficult to discern in the social sciences (where 
knowledge integrates with what has come before), because these 
disciplines do not have shared definitions of ‘new’ and ‘old’, and this was 
evident in interviews (discussed shortly).   
 
In classical epidemiology, the concept of external validity relates to 
whether findings can be appropriately generalised to different measures, 
persons, settings, and times (Steckler & McLeroy, 2008). If a finding cannot 
be generalised (usually because the sample is not considered 
representative) then repeating the same study with different participants, in 
a different place, or at a different time is a study answering a new question. 
However, to many interviewees, such work did not have the appearance of 
progress or seem to be tackling ‘new questions’. Rather, this was framed as 
an example of the lack of progress in HIDR: 
There is just so much of the same old, same old. […] There are just a 
shedload of papers that go ‘there are health inequalities’ [or] ‘we’ve still got 
health inequalities’.  
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Quite a lot of work in epidemiology is simply descriptive. Quite a lot of the 
work we publish is simply descriptive […] it’s what’s fundable. It’s beavering 
away at the same old body counts, essentially.  
Health Policy Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
This seemed to be reflecting a tension between HIDR and what some 
interviewees described as ‘mainstream epidemiology’ or ‘the core’ of 
epidemiology. There was a perception (especially, but not limited to social 
epidemiologists and social scientists) that questions about equity have been 
incorporated or absorbed into the wider epistemic machinery of 
epidemiological enquiry, and that this was incentivising the kind of research 
described in the two quotations above. I tentatively posit that this may be 
the case because, in the classical epidemiological epistemology, concern 
about the external validity of evidence can lead to the framing of inequalities 
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in each new disease area, new geographic area, and new measure as a ‘new 
question’. This intersects with the drive (in some settings) to maximise 
publication counts to favour the publication of small empirical advances, 
rather than research tackling bold questions. There was a perception that, in 
epidemiology, all that is required in the introduction to a publication is to 
demonstrate that the project described does not yet exist: 
There is a tendency in epidemiology, and social epidemiology, to be looking 
for the least publishable unit.  And saying, ‘people have looked at this, and 
this, but no one has looked at this’, [saying] ‘no one has made this table 
before’. And then [they] produce that table, without justifying why that table 
is of interest. I think that is a disgrace, I think that is polluting the scientific 
air.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD) Cluster 1 
 
One interviewee described this as the ‘mainstreaming’ of health 
inequalities research, and felt that this limits capacity to engage with the 
structural determinants of health, and normative origins of the field:   
Health inequalities has become a kind of everything and nothing. It has 
become embedded in things. It is a success, in that every grant proposal to 
the public health part of NIHR has to show how it addresses inequalities. 
That is an achievement, in many ways, for the health inequalities [research] 
community. But on the other hand it has de-radicalised what health 
inequalities really means. It becomes something like, “oh yeah, we stratified 
our analysis by socioeconomic status”. Tick. Rather than thinking that, 
actually, there are these big, political, structural drivers [of health]. 
 Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
The format of epidemiological journal articles was discussed by some 
interviewees as actively limiting the kinds of things they can discuss, and the 
impression of dissatisfaction with academic genres cut both ways between 
epidemiologists and social scientists. Four social scientists expressed 
specific frustration with the lack of theoretical exposition in epidemiological 
studies: 
I find that in public health there is not the value placed on an exposition of 
your theoretical foundations, that there might be in anthropology or 
sociology. So I think when I read the results of research, I want it to be clear 
all the way through that, from the theoretical foundation, through the 
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methods, to the results, that they all fit together. That’s sort of cognitively 
pleasing […]  I think sociology does that quite well.  
Epidemiologist (Anthropology PhD) 
Intellectual coherence is presented by Becher (2001) as the defining 
scientific virtue of sociology’s Biglan (pure, soft) quadrant, and theoretical 
coherence was raised as a specific marker of good work only by 
interviewees with sociology training. However, explicating a theoretical 
model is a challenge within the 3000-word limit typical in epidemiology 
journals (2500 words in some medical journals), and this was widely 
positioned as problematic by interviewees who pursue knowledge about 
society, and negative knowledge. Word limits were problematised in ways 
seeming to correspond with the form of knowledge interviewees pursue; this 
researcher with training in sociology wanted more space to set out their 
conceptual framework:  
The conceptualisation of inequalities is very important […] You have seen 
the papers in the medical journals, the introduction is two paragraphs! What 
about the conceptual framework?  How can you understand the 
conceptualisation of the problem if you only have two paragraphs? […] 
TC: It is more difficult to publish work which has that conceptual 
framework?  
In the medical journals, [and] public health journals in general, it is very 
difficult.  
Public Health Researcher & Medical Doctor (Public Health PhD)  
This economist wanted more space to fully present their statistical 
analyses:  
If I was publishing in public health or medicine I would probably try and lead 
with the simple stuff, and the complex stuff comes in an appendix […] If I 
was going in economics, it would be almost the reverse.  […] [Public health] 
people think “you've bamboozled me with some complex model, I don't 
understand what's happening” […] in medicine and public health, you have 
3000 words, people do not want four different sets of results, especially in 
the main text.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
Medical and epidemiology journals have a long tradition of disseminating 
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knowledge which fits within the medical and epidemiological paradigms, 
(which are more strongly classified than the social sciences) facilitating 
shorter article lengths. In addition to disease-focused knowledges being 
perceived as more fundable, disease-focused knowledge was presented as 
being more publishable, because epidemiology’s strong classification 
facilitates dissemination in a format which may prevent other knowledges 
from being comprehensively presented.   
   
Taken together, the above contrasts suggest differences in the ways 
knowledge about equity is pursued, and published. ‘Progress’ has different 
meanings, and takes different forms, reflected in the structure of scientific 
outputs.  
 
Implied within the above quotations is the need interviewees felt to 
publish in epidemiology journals. Many interviewees, from varied 
backgrounds and seeking varied kinds of knowledge, discussed this 
necessity. Top epidemiology journals tend to have higher impact factors 
than journals specific to public health, social science perspectives on health, 
and health economics. If researchers are aiming to publish in epidemiology 
journals (for reasons related to impact-factor targets, and others discussed 
in the following two chapters), then the epistemological style and 
classification strength of their own discipline may be less relevant than what 
is usual within epidemiology. The dominance of epidemiology journals within 
HIDR may amplify the importance of epidemiological standards for research 
conduct, and effectively prevent researchers from asking questions which 
cannot be addressed using paradigmatic epidemiological methods.  
 
One social epidemiologist reflected on why they have not pursued more 
qualitative work, and linked this directly to the possibility of publication in a 
high-impact epidemiological journal:  
It is not so rewarding, scientifically, to do qualitative research. It is much 
more time consuming, and you don't get into the International Journal of 
Epidemiology. The best you can hope is to get into Social Science and 
Medicine. So that is difficult.  
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Social Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Epidemiology PhD) 
To my knowledge, the situation in which these health equity scholars find 
themselves is highly unusual within science. I am not aware of research from 
any other domain describing scholars working within one tradition (e.g., 
economics, social science, geography) being functionally obliged to submit 
their work for evaluation within another discipline (medicine, epidemiology).  
 
The 3000 word manuscript for submission to an epidemiology journal 
appears to have become a key context within which research about health 
must be reported, and a ‘social fact’ to be reckoned with, as Bazerman 
described: 
“Though genre emerges out of contexts, it becomes the context for future 
works […] Now anyone with results to report must somehow address the 
context created by the social fact of this genre”   
(Bazerman, 1988:p.8) 
Analysis suggests that a more comprehensive study of the way article 
formats and journal requirements shape knowledge construction in 
population health would be of value.  In the next chapter I discuss how the  
3000-word research publication also influences methodological choices 
inside and outside epidemiology.  
 
In the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, Knorr-Cetina describes 
epistemic cultures as being ‘independent epistemic monopolies’, however, 
within HIDR (possibly within population health more broadly) they are not 
independent, because epidemiology’s norms and standards exert force on 
the scientific practice of individuals working within a range of disciplinary 
frameworks.  Epidemiology’s strong classification promotes a particular 
picture of progress, a particular view of ‘new questions’, and the 
‘consistency in thinking’ (as one interviewee put it) may narrow the zone of 
legitimate enquiry, creating challenges for researchers approaching the 
study of health equity from other perspectives. 
 
‘The World’ and Tolerance for Complexity  
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Widespread desire within epidemiology to ‘do interventions’ was 
described in Section 7.1.2. This methodological preference reflects a deeper 
preference for simplicity over complexity in research findings, and 
preference for decomposed findings, extricable from other knowledge. 
These preferences varied across individuals, but also across disciplines in a 
predictable way, appearing to reflect what kind of knowledge is sought and 
valued.  
 
Randomised interventions produce a particular kind of knowledge, a 
quantified estimate of the link between one exposure and one outcome, 
decomposed as far as is possible from the effect of other exposures. 
Compare this with one geographer’s stated aim in Section 7.1.1, to explore 
the ‘complexity and interconnection of everything’. Such an aim requires 
significant tolerance for complexity, not achievable within all paradigms. 
Four interviewees with training in geography criticised attempts from other 
fields to study geospatial exposures on this basis, as being too simplistic:  
If I see one more study of people looking at the distance from where people 
live to grocery stores and their shopping habits, their dietary intake, I will 
scream. Because that seems to be so simplistic and useless. […]  the world 
is much more complicated. 
Epidemiologist (Anthropology PhD)  
 The below discussion of studies of neighbourhoods reinforced that, for 
some geographers, the aim is not understand space as an ‘exposure’ (as in 
a classic epidemiological study) but to understand the dynamics of social 
processes:  
If you you're thinking about neighbourhoods […] it's not just a simple 
question […] it is understanding the dynamics of the process that generates 
inequality […] all the things that feed into that, to produce unequal patterns, 
patterns and processes. 
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
 Seven interviewees (six social scientists from the highlighted area of 
Figure 12) criticised the biomedical model on these specific grounds, as 
being poorly suited for the analysis of complex problems, and complex 
 
198 
social processes. In section 7.1.2  interventions were presented as the 
‘natural’ next step for both a research program and a career in epidemiology. 
But, this is not natural in all research domains, or for all determinants of 
health, especially where complexity is perceived and holistic study valued. 
Discussions of obesity were illustrative of the ways some disciplines value 
the decomposition of effects, whereas others prefer a holistic view which 
preserves inherent complexity:  
Obesity is an epidemic in the world, right? […] the balance should be put on 
the main causes […] the main things are related to the ways in which Big 
Food, the big corporations, are generating most of the food we consume. 
That is the thing, and so we should spend a lot of effort there, trying to 
understand that.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
There is no randomised controlled trial of the ways in which corporations 
influence or determine the diets of individuals. The kind of work this 
interviewee wishes to see will generate understanding, not solutions. 
However not all researchers perceive the benefit of ‘trying to understand’, 
and the complexity which accompanies understanding obesity as 
happening in the world (as opposed to in human bodies, or in the behaviour 
of individuals) is not attractive to all researchers. One economist explained:  
What I mostly like a lot about economics is that we think in an abstract way, 
and try to solve a problem in a select way […]  I like that we try to make a 
problem simple, so that we can solve it.  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD)  
Simplicity is therefore a virtue in some epistemic cultures, reflected in the 
kind of knowledge which is sought and valued. In interview data, this 
preference for simplicity was connected to a preference for ‘elegance’ in 
research design among economists and some epidemiologists. When 
interviewees (from outside economics) described econometric studies as 
‘clever’, what they especially seemed to like was the way these studies 
isolated variation in one variable, permitting the researcher to precisely 
estimate the impact of a single factor, treating all other factors as constant. 
The unspoken corollary of this is that engaging with multiple causes, or 
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conveying real world complexity is not clever, or elegant. The balance 
between complexity and simplicity was also connected to methodological 
preference, explored in the next chapter.   
 
Negative Knowledge? No thanks. 
 
Negative knowledge did not escape similar tensions.  Multiple 
interviewees described statisticians as ‘strange’, or ‘different’ and one 
erected a boundary between statisticians and ‘normal people’. Whilst the 
contributions of statistical experts were widely valued, the pursuit of 
negative knowledge as a career choice seemed to be viewed by some 
interviewees as unappealing: 
When people say ‘let’s write a methods paper’ - Ugh. No thanks! I’m not 
interested in that!  
 Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Some of the statistical niceties […] None of that really matters to me. I’m 
sure it matters to some people. […] I’m not in that world, I’m in the world of 
“what can we do to tackle some of these problems?”   
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
This, too, cut in both directions. An economist with expertise in the 
measurement of inequality in health reported frustration with applied 
researchers from epidemiology and public health, specifically wishing they 
would focus more technical matters, and less on application:  
The measures I develop are used by public health researchers, and 
epidemiologists. But, how can I say this in a good way? They are mostly 
interested in applying these measures, and are not that much interested in 
discussing the underlying concepts. […] I try to explain that it is not just a 
cookbook, you should think very carefully about how you apply different 
inequality measures. 
Professor of Health Economics D (Economics PhD) 
Here, again, is the epistemic drive toward (or away from) applied insight 
shaping research practice: one interviewee has little interest in the precise 
workings of a measurement tool, and another expressly desires more 




In interview data, and in the above economist’s experience, interviewees 
with epidemiology training tended to ask ‘how can I use this?’, ‘how will this 
help?’ whereas biostatisticians, economists or epidemiologists with a strong 
interest in research methods (concerned with the pitfalls and challenges of 
knowing) might instead prefer to ask ‘how does it work?’ or ’is it 
appropriate?’ 
 
In all disciplines there is tension between negative and positive 
knowledges, between knowing-about-things and knowing-about-knowing, 
which plays out in research teams and research projects. Knorr-Cetina 
(1999) described the central importance of negative knowledge in High-
Energy Physics, and contrasted this with Molecular Biology, and its overt 
focus on objects. But, in Knorr-Cetina’s study, members of these two fields 
never met, and were not trying to collaborate. In multidisciplinary settings 
like HIDR, what appears to be tension across disciplines might reflect 
tension between the balance of negative and positive knowledges. For 
example, the two public health researchers quoted on the previous page 
view attention to ‘statistical niceties’ as an unnecessary break on the engine 
of knowing ‘what to do’ or ‘how to tackle’ inequalities. For the economist 
quoted on the previous page, concern about validity, bias and statistical 
power means this break is a crucial safeguard against erroneous 
conclusions, viewed by some statisticians and economists as the worst-
case-scenario: 
[My stats people] say “this is what we can do, and this is what we can’t”. I 
go with that, because that is what they worry about, because they are 
statisticians and health economists and that’s what matters to them, being 
methodologically pure. I need to feel confident that when I present the work 
some other stats person isn’t going to [highlight flaws], and that’s what they 
[my stats people] worry most about.    
      Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
 
Tension between negative and positive knowledge does seems to have 
emerged on a grand scale in two long-running debates: first, the question of 
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whether the association between health and income is causal, and second, 
the question of whether randomised trials are necessary in HIDR. Causality 
is discussed in Section 10.5.3, and the status of RCTs is discussed in 
Section 8.3.2.  
 
‘Interlopers’& knowledge about Behaviour  
 
The above tensions were dwarfed in volume and intensity by the criticism 
levelled at knowledge about behaviour, and the researchers who seek it. 
Studying behaviour seems to represent a flashpoint for conflicting epistemic 
commitments in HIDR, and a topic where the moral dimension of inequality 
emerges for discussion and debate. Seeking to follow Latour and Woolgar’s 
(1986) example of avoiding ‘muck-raking’, I present these data as efficiently 
as possible, and try not to dwell on sensational language or personal 
comments. 
  
Five interviewees (from the social sciences and social epidemiology) 
stated that knowledge about behaviour does not usefully explain systematic, 
social differences in health.  Four other interviewees noted that the most 
important questions about behaviour relate to its socio-structural drivers, 
and lamented that health promotion and health behaviour researchers rarely 
seem to ask these questions (perhaps for reasons articulated by one health 
behaviour researcher in Section 7.1.3)  
 
In interviews, research about behaviour was variously described as 
‘useless’, ‘rubbish’, ‘unimportant’ and in one case, as ‘terrorism’ directed at 
materially-deprived communities. Criticism also extended to the researchers 
who study health behaviour, labelled ‘crazy’ by one interviewee.  
 
Collectively, these comments reflect one hallmark of good science which 
was common across all disciplines and clusters: good work answers ‘good’ 
research questions, where ‘good’ means ‘important’ (discussed further in 
Chapter 10). Researchers who ask and answer questions about behaviour 
were viewed by some interviewees as focusing on unimportant questions, or 
 
202 
the wrong questions. This reveals the path by which knowledge about 
behaviour can inflame both scholars of society, and scholars of disease, as 
studies of behaviour were presented as being unfit for both purposes.  
 
If the goal of research is to understand social structure, analysis 
beginning and ending with individuals will not support or enhance that 
understanding, especially if individuals are not studied in a way which bears 
witness to or reflects their lived-experience:  
You are saying “these people are behaving badly”, that is what you end up 
saying. […] [You are not] even considering what purposes the so-called 
‘bad’ health behaviours play in peoples’ lives.  
Professor of Public Health (Social Science PhD) 
Additionally, among interviewees with a biomedical or disease-specific 
focus, some studies of behaviour were described as having no obvious 
application, an unforgivable flaw in an area so strongly motivated to produce 
actionable findings:   
The social behaviour people […] drinking more wine, people are more 
happy? Do we really need to know? And what is the implication? is it to get 
people to drink more wine? There are so many more important crises on the 
Earth. It makes me nuts!  
Biostatistician B, (Biostatistics PhD) 
These things [studies of behaviour, nutrition] are only important if they help 
us understand whether health can be improved or not.  
Public Health Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Research about behaviour was framed as the ‘easy’ option by some 
social scientists and social epidemiologists, and was framed as being driven 
by political and/or corporate interest by two social scientists from Cluster 4. 
This is consistent with the ‘big picture’ common to these interviewees, of 
social structure as driver of health, and of health as socially situated. Two 
interviewees went further, and expressed doubt that researchers who study 
behaviour or behavioural interventions would identify themselves as 
scholars of health equity:  
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[There are] other people who are much more focused on interventions, ways 
of improving health that are less focused on structural or social 
determinants type models […] So, they would be interested in the nature 
and success of their intervention, and probably have something to say 
about health inequalities research, but I would imagine most of them 
wouldn’t identify as thinking about inequalities-related issues.   
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
There are almost like interlopers of the mainstream […] ‘it’s all about 
individual health behaviours’, they probably think that they’re health 
inequalities researchers.   
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Perhaps due to the field’s history and politicisation in the UK (discussed 
in Chapter 6), British scholars of health equity appeared to feel a strong 
sense of what it means to be a ‘Health Inequalities Researcher’. But, health 
behaviour researchers in the US were fiercely passionate about health 
disparities, and talked admiringly of researchers from the UK, who they 
viewed as having immense credibility. Perhaps, if these North American 
behavioural scholars were able to engage the above two interviewees in 
dialogue, an exchange of significant benefit would take place. These 
interviewees may come to might feel as I did during interviews with these 
researchers; a sense of humility and slight embarrassment at having 
dismissed them as ‘interlopers’ in the health equity research space. One UK 
interviewee seemed to have arrived at this conclusion as a result of 
collaborative projects:  
I had a tendency, like quite a lot of people in health inequalities research, to 
dismiss anything that is about health behaviours as ‘too downstream’. 
Whereas I now see work that focuses on unhealthy commodities and 
unhealthy commodity industries as cutting across all of those different 
things. There is downstream work which is about trying to change peoples’ 
behaviours, which I don’t think is ever a route to tackling heath inequalities, 
because of the wide structural conditions […] [But] I do see that it cuts 
across. 
Health Policy Researcher (Geography PhD)  
This echoes a comment from a health behaviour scholar in Cluster 8, 
reproduced below (from Section 7.1.3):  
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[…] There are common underpinnings across a number of health 
behaviours, health conditions, health outcomes.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD) 
 
 It seems that these two interviewees (from opposite sides of the Atlantic, 
and opposite sides of the bibliometric network) are really not in 
disagreement about the drivers of inequity in health. However, these two 
researchers are working within different epistemic cultures. The second 
interviewee felt unable to publish research which reflects their ‘upstream’ 
understandings, because of the norms within the fields of health promotion 
and cancer prevention. The first interviewee, working within a department of 
social science, faces no such restriction, but does need to navigate the 
challenge of publishing or presenting this work in spaces dominated by 
medical and epidemiological perspectives. 
 
 Analysis from this chapter helps to explore this difference (and other 
such differences) with reference to terms more specific than ‘norms’. Health 
promotion and cancer prevention are more strongly classified than the social 
and political sciences, and have lower tolerance for complexity. It is 
therefore unsurprising that, in disease-specific funding proposals or 
publications, the presentation of behaviour as enmeshed in socio-cultural 
and environmental causes is not met with enthusiastic acceptance.  
‘Behaviour’ therefore means something different in these epistemic cultures. 
For social scientists, behaviour reflects social structure, and the complexity 
of lived experience. In medicine and classical epidemiology, behaviour is a 
proximal determinant of disease which enters the epistemology as a risk 
factor or exposure. In health promotion and cancer prevention, behaviour is 
the point in the causal chain at which disease (in particular bodies) can be 
prevented.  
 
It is worth noting that three interviewees actively resisted the opportunity 
to discuss tension or to express criticism of other parts of the field.  The 
perspective of the interviewee below was particularly refreshing: 
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I am prepared to accept that there are different ways of looking at a 
problem. […] you can’t say ‘that is not a valid way to look at the problem’ if 
somebody else thinks it is, and especially if its work which has been 
published and peer reviewed. To say it is “wrong”,  I think I would be 
stepping outside my comfort zone.  
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
Geography has been described elsewhere as being inherently 
interdisciplinary, which may explain this open-mindedness (Skole, 2004). 
But, despite these few exceptions, it was not widely recognised that there 
are diverse accounts of what is ‘valid’ in science, and that these ideas might 
be a function of disciplinary background, exposure to individuals, ideas, and 
literatures across a career. This suggests that what Lamont (2009) termed 
cognitive contextualisation, the ability and willingness to recognise 
evaluative standards from other disciplines, is not the norm. 
 
7.3 Discussion  
 
The preceding analysis suggests different policies and strategies of 
knowing are applied in HIDR, which themselves reflect varied kinds and 
configurations of knowledge and different tolerances for complexity.  These 
differences underlie and underpin observed ‘disciplinary’ differences in 
HIDR, and do appear to suggest different epistemic cultures, which do not 
map onto specific bibliometric clusters but rather regions of HIDR (visualised 
in Figures 12-15). The conclusion that diverse epistemic cultures are present 
in HIDR is reinforced by comments from interviewees that peer review is not 
always ‘peer’, especially for social scientists:  
The problem is that when you apply to [funding] bodies […] most often you 
are not getting peer review. In public health you are still getting reviewed by 
epidemiologists who don't really understand sociology or political science. 
[…] that is still a great frustration […] some leading social epidemiologists 
are shifting epidemiology, [but] there is still a big core I think who are 
sticking to, sort of more conventional thinking about epidemiology, and 
looking for more linear relationships rather than looking at the complexity. 
Public Health Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
This single comment almost captures my preceding analysis. Coming to 
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understand sociology and political science is a multifaceted task, which 
includes coming to grips with an integrative collection code and weakly-
classified science, perceiving value in complexity, and accepting the validity 
of projects which aim to understand rather than intervene. Each of these is 
challenging for researchers who have trained in strongly classified, 
cumulative, intervention-focused traditions, because disciplinary training 
appears to establish the features of scientific practice considered ‘natural’ or 
‘common-sense’. However, the relationship between disciplinary training 
and the dimensions of variation identified in this chapter is not deterministic, 
nor necessarily straightforward.  
 
Complications for a deterministic model of disciplines and knowledges  
 
Kuhn presented scientific training as rather authoritarian and dogmatic, and 
argued that because paradigms demand monopoly of explanation, multiple 
paradigms cannot easily coexist. However, some interviewees expressed 
mental models and preferences for forms of knowledge which appeared in 
tension with their disciplinary background, and drew upon material beyond 
their initial training. In all cases, these instances were explained as being the 
result of exposure to a specific literature, person, institution, or research 
question at a formative career stage. Some illustrative quotations are below, 
in Table 12.   
Influence Interviewee’s PhD Mental Model Other Relevant Extract 
Literature  Epidemiology  
It depends entirely on the 
context, what the process is 
there and then. One could say 
underlying that might be more 
historical, or economic forces. 
For me the anthropological 
model was incredibly valuable 
[...] the different explanations of 
general cause to ones 
[explaining] a particular event's 
cause is something I don’t think 
my discipline epidemiology 
thinks a lot about. 
Individual  Psychology 
 
 
These are the questions; what 
is the nature of society, what 
are its processes, what kind of 
people is it creating, how do 





I received an appointment in the 
school of, it was called the 
Department of [Blank], and 
that's where [Blank] was, and 
[Blank]. They were probably 
the primary influences upon 
me, that's when I went from 




Institution  Biostatistics 
I am very much influenced by 
what I do [and] where I am, I 
believe that really it is society 
and, kind of, the influence, the 
external influences and 
environmental influences which 
affect whether we are more 
healthy or less healthy. […] 
there is probably a very strong 
influence of [my institution], 
the culture here. 
N/A 
Table 12 – Non-Disciplinary influences on interviewees’ mental models 
 
While this thesis aims to elucidate the general properties of disciplinary 
approaches to HIDR, and the salient regularities of disciplinary influence, 
discipline is not destiny. There is not necessarily a straight line between 
researchers’ training and their practice across a multi-decade career. The 
extracts in Table 12 reveal some other factors which can shape fundamental 
understandings, and add empirical detail to Ruscio’s (1987) claim that the 
expression of disciplinary templates or genotypes is mediated by factors in 
a researchers’ environment; ‘a subtle, intricate interaction with many 
nuances’ occurs between an individual researcher, their discipline, and their 
institutional setting. Examining how the factors identified as important in this 
chapter manifest in particular contexts would be a potential extension of this 
PhD.  
   
Tension between personal and disciplinary models of health can cause 
researchers to test or bend the limits of their disciplinary paradigm. While 
some interviewees enjoyed correspondence between their personal 
understanding and the understandings conveyed by their published 
research, very often, achieving this correspondence required researchers to 
reach outside the dominant epidemiological paradigm toward the social 
sciences, which sometimes created professional and interpersonal 
challenges: 
Really, it is living in two worlds; Social science, and medicine.   
TC: Is that difficult? 
Um, no. I find it enriching to do so. It is a bit difficult, only for getting 
understanding and acceptance from colleagues. 
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Social Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
 One extreme example was the interviewee quoted below, who left 
epidemiology mid-career: 
 I felt that I personally, and the field of health inequity, had reached the edge 
of what it can do within the public health frame […] so I moved out of the 
school of population health. I’m [now] in the school of [blank]. The 
discussions I follow now, and engage with, are much more political science, 
international relations, global governance questions, policy processes, 
which are not necessarily about health, but these are the big underpinning 
determinants of health. I find those much more satisfying.  
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
 The felt need to produce research resembling epidemiological normal 
science (or, research publishable in esteemed epidemiology journals) has 
already been discussed. This need was in turn driven by the pursuit of 
research funding, career maintenance and advancement. Funding structures 
shape the work researchers do, and the need to obtain funding can cause 
researchers to align their output more directly with ‘mainstream’ modes of 
knowledge production, overriding their own sense of which determinants of 
health are important.  
 
Five interviewees nearing retirement found themselves looking back at 
their published works with a sense of disappointment, or concern they had 
focused on the wrong questions:  
When I was young I was struggling to get promoted to assistant, associate, 
full professor, and also getting tenure. The annual evaluation always 
counted how many first author papers you've had. Now, luckily I have been 
through all of those things, [but] now I am thinking, does my work truly have 
impact on health? 
Biostatistician B (Biostatistics PhD) 
For other interviewees, moving into the health-specific domain of a 
discipline was a mechanism by which they were able to overcome tension 
between their training and their own views. For example, this anthropologist 
found several aspects of ‘mainstream’ anthropology frustrating and declared 
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themselves a positivist:  
There are anthropologists, and people out there […] who believe that 
science is a “white male chauvinist hegemonic discourse, and that facts are 
fascist.” […]  That's why I don’t do that kind of anthropology. […] I’m a 
positivist. I believe there is truth, and that we can find it. We should be 
testing hypotheses.  
Occupational health researcher (Anthropology PhD)  
This researcher found a more comfortable ‘home’ at the intersection of 
anthropology and epidemiology, where knowledge is evaluated in a more 
purposive manner, and testing hypotheses is the norm. Some economists, 
sociologists and geographers also reported a dissatisfaction with the 
abstract or theoretical parts of their home disciplines. Combining that 
training with epidemiology was a path to applied research, which they 
viewed as having more impact:   
Initially what attracted me [to health economics] was, I studied economics 
but I didn't want to put all my effort into selling soup in a marketing 
department or something. I wanted a more noble goal, to further population 
health.   
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
A small number of interviewees insisted that their disciplinary training 
was not relevant to their current research. However, elsewhere in the 
interview these same interviewees would highlight features of their work 
which clearly originated in their training. One interviewee asserted that they 
didn’t “feel” like a political scientist, as they didn’t publish in political science 
journals, or read political science literature. However, when discussing their 
research interests, this same interviewee described a focus on political 
choices and decisions within political systems, including trade agreements.  
For this interviewee, political decisions are research objects, but this was not 
viewed as connected to or a consequence of their training in political 
science. Researchers are not randomised into disciplines (we all pursue 
subjects which match our interests), but in my interview data, the only 
interviewees who discussed policy processes as research objects were 
trained in political or social sciences. In this way, the influence of disciplinary 
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training can be at once obvious and invisible, highlighting the importance of 
comparative study designs in research about disciplines. The perception of 
value within particular objects and data sources emerges in the next chapter 
as a key mechanism by which disciplinary background influences research 
conduct.  
 
Epistemic Cultures, Knowledge, Disciplines and Paradigms  
 
Knorr-Cetina (1999) explicitly rejected the usefulness of disciplines and 
scientific specialties as helping to "captur[e] the strategies and policies of 
knowing that are not codified in textbooks but do inform expert practice” 
(p.2). However, it does not seem appropriate to frame disciplines (or the 
content of their textbooks) as being unrelated to the aim of understanding 
how researchers in a given field ‘know what they know’ (p.1). By moving 
away from the structural account of knowledge-creation usually implied by 
reference to academic disciplines, Knorr-Cetina highlighted the technical, 
social and symbolic dimensions of two disciplinary cultures. In this chapter, 
four kinds of knowledge were identified and discussed, each with different 
purposes, priorities and epistemic virtues. These corresponded with 
disciplinary identity in a fairly predictable but imperfect way, revealing the 
important influence of mentors and literatures on scholarly practice across a 
career. In Chapter 2 the disciplinary matrix was conceptualised as a set of 
dimensions along which disciplines may be expected to vary. Disciplinary 
classification, collection code, form of knowledge, and tolerance for 
complexity emerged as important differences in this chapter.  
 
But, what of disciplinary paradigms, and their influence? Since almost no 
interviewee discussed the importance of the fallen ‘giants’ on whose 
shoulders they stand, is Kuhn’s model a relic of a bygone era?  Kuhn took as 
his main subject the strongly-classified discipline of physics, and it is in the 
strongly-classified disciplines (classical epidemiology, and economics) that 
the power of paradigmatic norms were most evident. Beliefs about what 
epidemiological journals will (or won't) publish contributed to a narrowing of 
the kinds of questions researchers felt they could ask and answer. Because 
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researchers from multiple disciplines seek to publish in epidemiological 
journals, epidemiology’s paradigmatic commitments to useful knowledge, 
and to a focus on the links between exposures and outcomes, can act as 
intellectual grind-stones, sheering away the theoretical, the complex, the 
structural, and other kinds of knowledge which don’t sit easily within a 
cumulative structure. However, clear trends and preferences also emerged 
among interviewees with social science training; a desire to preserve and 
engage with complexity, interconnectivity and contextual detail, and the 
value of lived experience as a data-source.  
 
Kuhn’s second interpretation of the paradigm as exemplary past 
achievement comes into its own when we ask the obvious question: Why? 
Why are some disciplines strongly classified, and others weakly-classified? 
Why does knowledge accumulate in some sciences and integrate in others? 
Why do some disciplines seek to eliminate complexity, while others focus on 
trying to preserve, capture and understand complexity? In Knorr-Cetina’s 
parlance, if epistemic cultures are the machineries of knowledge 
construction, by what process are these machines assembled, and by what 
criteria is their performance evaluated? It is in answering this question that 
Kuhn’s late writings are of primary relevance, and the epistemic power of the 
paradigm as exemplary past achievement is demonstrated. This is the topic 
















Chapter 8: Work Worth Doing, Method & Theory 
in HIDR  
 
The previous chapter explored the kinds of knowledge interviewees 
appear to be seeking as they study health equity, revealing disciplinary 
differences in the kinds of knowledge researchers value, and the way this 
knowledge is structured. Epidemiology emerged as a dominant discipline, 
positioning the epidemiological paradigm as a force in the agonistic field, 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1986) within which knowledge claims about health equity 
are evaluated. In this chapter, I explore how interviewees obtain the 
knowledge they value; namely, how members of the different epistemic 
communities outlined in the previous chapter select and apply scientific 
tools. Beyond this descriptive appraisal, I analyse discussions of method 
through the lens of a metaphor suggested by Thomas Kuhn in his essay 
“Possible Worlds in the History of Science” (Kuhn, 2000a), to explore why 
disciplines gravitate toward certain methods, and theories.  
 
In the previous chapter, interviewees expressed strong feelings about 
efforts to obtain knowledge they did not personally value. Approaches not 
aligning with interviewees’ goals were sometimes dismissed as ‘useless’, or 
‘rubbish’. The general sense of what researchers feel is worth doing 
emerged as a strong driver of both methodological and topical preference. 
Ideas about what is worth doing also varied across disciplinary groups, 
suggesting that disciplinary training shapes these ideas in important ways. 
Like the knowledge-types explored in the previous chapter, ‘work worth 
doing’ is not the manifestation of a single idea, or single preference, but 
reflects a connected set of concepts and preferences, many of which are 
encountered during disciplinary training. For example, an interviewee who 
viewed health as socially-situated explains what they feel is worth doing:  
Any time you are looking at societal structures and processes, that is 
particularly worth doing. If you can identify aspects of living and working 
conditions that are associated, and lead to adverse health outcomes.  
 
Health Policy Researcher (Psychology PhD) 
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The influence of epidemiological norms and standards apparent in the 
previous chapter will be revisited in this chapter (and the next chapter). For 
interviewees working outside the norms of the epidemiological paradigm, 
researchers’ own sense of what is worth doing was frequently presented as 
being less important than what they could convince others was worth doing, 
and ‘others’ usually meant clinical or epidemiological colleagues. Just as 
certain knowledges appeared less fundable than others in the previous 
chapter, this extended to the methods via which such knowledge is 
acquired. One interviewee reflected on the challenges of funding qualitative 
work:  
If you're clinically trained, or you're kind of quantitatively trained, I think it is 
harder for you to see utility of it [qualitative research]. […] funding panels are 
a diverse bunch of people from a range of different disciplines […] you 
always have to be able to convince people that, actually, something is worth 
doing. […] it's kind of quite difficult to get some of that stuff through funders 
sometimes. You always have to make a case for it.   
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
 As was discussed in the previous chapter, certain knowledges tend to 
accompany certain disciplinary classifications, certain collection codes, 
certain preferences for pure and applied knowledge, and certain tolerances 
for complexity. These characteristics are not randomly distributed across 
disciplines, but are connected to, are even reflections of, disciplines’ 
intellectual content.  
 
Not all methods produce all knowledges, and not all knowledges are 
accessible via all methods. For this reason the separation of methods from 
knowledges is not straightforward. But, while the value of a certain type of 
knowledge is tacit and frequently left unsaid within scientific communities 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) methodological choices are 
highly visible, and require explicit justification in grant applications and 
within publications. Most PhD theses (including this one) have “Methods” 
chapters, but no thesis or paper I have read has a “Knowledge” section, 
wherein the author argues why generating knowledge about society (or 




 If scientists were required to build up each study from such bare 
foundations, progress would be impracticable, and so, within certain 
scientific cultures the value of particular kinds of knowledge is taken as 
given, left unsaid. This is one application of the term “paradigm”, as 
meaning that which can be taken for granted (Kuhn, 1970: esp. p.37).  
Becher and Trowler (2001) discuss taken-for-granted values, behaviour and 
attitudes within the scientific settings they observed, and refer to this as 
‘disciplinary culture’. But this approach leaves the content of science 
unexamined. Scientific values and attitudes might have their origins in 
research, Bloor (2011, p.368) noted that the turning point in the development 
and professional consolidation of aerodynamics, an emerging discipline, 
came when  
"experimenters were learning what they could take for granted. […]. What 
was once strange was becoming familiar and part of predictable, daily 
experience.” 
Similarly, by the end of the events detailed in Laboratory Life (Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986), the mass spectrometer, the product of colossal scholarly 
effort, became a piece of furniture, an unremarkable presence. Similarly, the 
hormone TRH transitioned from an entity whose existence was actively 
contested (and demonstrable only via large-scale experiments) to an 
unremarkable white powder, shipped between labs in postage satchels for 
investigation of other phenomena. Latour & Woolgar added important 
empirical detail to Kuhn’s view of scientific progress as leaning heavily on 
“deeply entrenched expectations” (Kuhn, 1970), and revealed what this 
means for the role of technology in knowledge construction. These 
assumptions and expectations have functional consequence, especially for 
the use of scientific tools, because: 
The decision to employ a particular piece of apparatus and to use it in a 
particular way carries an assumption that only certain sorts of 
circumstances will arise (Kuhn, 1970:p.65) 
In other words, the paradigm is the (unremarkable) background throwing 
scientific anomaly into relief. In multi-disciplinary fields such as HIDR, that 
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which is bright, and highlighted by one backdrop may be dull and hard to 
discern against another. For example, epidemiology is the study of 
populations, but individuals within populations are not typically 
conceptualised as being part of any social structure, as one epidemiologist 
explained:  
"Most of us don’t even pay attention to individuals, just thinking of 
proportions of variables in datasets, which are faceless and abstract 
quantities, divorced from their humanity."  
Social Epidemiologist C (Epidemiology PhD)  
 Likewise, epidemiological training does not (usually) equip researchers 
with a vocabulary for describing policy-development or policy change, as 
one epidemiologist who subsequently left the field pointed out:  
TC: Are there any kinds of research about health inequalities that frustrate 
you?  
All the epidemiology [laughing] 
TC: [laughing] Is there anything you’d like to add, at the level of individual 
publications?  
Yeah, so you’ve got all the epidemiology, it is marvellous work, I am not 
discrediting the epidemiology,  but you get to the end of the papers and 
here are all these ‘policy recommendations’ without any understanding of 
policy whatsoever! Again, it is the arrogance of the field, saying that having 
done this kind of study you can answer these ‘policy questions’, but you’ve 
not asked the ‘policy question’ to begin with. 
 Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
This was reinforced by comments from researchers with epidemiological 
training, who felt ill-equipped in this regard:   
What I think I need to understand much better […] is about the process by 
which research turns into evidence, turns into ideas, then turns into social 
change. […] I work as part of a [blank] specialist team, we have very weak 
understandings of how to affect social change. We just do things [studies] 
because it is the way that people do them.  
Public Health Researcher (Health Services Research PhD)  
Epidemiological normal science (doing things ‘the way people do them’) 
therefore comes up short in describing political and social change. Criticism 
 
216 
of disciplines on the basis of what a paradigm does not contain was 
common in interviews. For example, psychology was criticised for its 
individualist focus by four interviewees: 
Psychology is a very individual science, they look at individuals and 
individual traits, individual behaviours, not only are the methodologies 
different but the whole outlook, psychologists have often great problems in 
understanding populations […] psychologists have great difficulties in even 
understanding what social structure is all about.    
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
Psychology is not a discipline organised around the understanding of 
social structures. That discipline is sociology, in which the interviewee 
quoted above trained. Economics was criticised by 8 interviewees, for 
(among other things) not ‘understanding disease’ and for focusing on the 
mechanics of the market economy: 
A proper health economics would be about […] what a fiscal sector should 
be doing if it wants to be healthy [improve population health]. For me that 
would be health economics […], should be what health economists do, but 
it is not what they do.  
Public Health Researcher (Demography PhD) 
Health economics is not a discipline which developed around questions 
about disease, and the question ‘how could a differently-structured fiscal 
sector maximise health’ is not at the heart of the economic tradition, or 
compatible with the individualist ontology of mainstream economics (Mäki, 
2001). 
 
The above critiques add to those discussed in the previous chapter (e.g., 
whereby geographers generally wanted more attention to place and space). 
In these critiques, we see the way that, in Kuhnian terms, researchers’ own 
disciplinary backdrops colour perceptions of and engagement with work 
proceeding in other disciplines.  These critiques present an opportunity to 
explore more deeply how and why scientific training shapes a researchers 
view of what is ‘natural’ or ‘worth doing’. In order to move beyond 
generalities, in this chapter I focus on the selection and use of research 
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methods and use of theory.   
8.1 Special Tools & Special Functions 
 
 In “Possible Worlds in the History of Science”,  Kuhn (2000a) presents 
the development of specialised scientific methods and isolated, inward-
looking scientific specialities as sources of interpersonal difficulty, but as 
essential for the acquisition of new knowledge and progress of science. Just 
as speciation gives rise to creatures “more and more closely adapted to a 
narrower and narrower biological niche[s]” (ibid., p.102), so too scientific 
specialisation gives rise to scientists adapted to narrower and narrower 
intellectual niches. Some animals have limbs particularly well-adapted for 
climbing trees, but this same feature can produce an awkward, bent-legged 
gait when walking upright. The consequences of speciation in science are 
likely similar, Kuhn argues. Epidemiology is very well adapted to its defining 
niche (the quantitative description of trends in disease incidence and 
prevalence) but may be poorly suited to the description of phenomena 
outside that niche, such as why policies change or don’t change. When 
viewed from the vantage of a paradigm adapted for the niche into which 
epidemiology is straying, epidemiological approaches (such as the ’policy 
recommendations’ mentioned above) are perceived as out-of-place, and 
inappropriate.  
 
Pushing further in this ecological direction: in the physical world, animals 
acquire tools (beaks, claws, tails, feathers) for exquisitely particular functions 
relevant to survival within a habitat. Removed from the habitat, at a distance 
from that intended purpose, these same features are exotic, and useless. 
The same might be true in science; When divorced from their function, from 
the raw materials upon which they operate, scientific tools can appear 
ridiculous, pointless or counter-productive. Kuhn summarised this idea 
succinctly: in science, what we have are “special tools for special functions” 
(Kuhn, 2000a p.98).  
 
This connection between form and function repays deep consideration in 
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multi- and inter-disciplinary settings. On the one hand, the generation of a 
certain kind of knowledge necessitates a certain kind of analytical approach 
- special functions require special tools. This is the conventional view of 
research methods as ‘surrounding’ or ‘supporting’ an epistemology, and 
some interviewees described methods this way, as tools to be taken up or 
left aside on a study-by-study basis, as research questions require: 
 In-depth interview, focus groups, surveys, logistic regression, they’re all 
tools. They’re just tools. One starts off with a question: What is your 
research question? Given this question, and given what we already know, 
what is the best approach? Hmm.  
Occupational health researcher (Anthropology PhD) 
In this model, one begins with a research question and selects a tool for 
the task. But, like much already explored in this thesis, analysis suggests 
that the connection flows in both directions. The questions researchers ask 
are frequently restricted by the methods with which they are familiar (and/or, 
researchers may pursue particular questions because they provide an 
opportunity to apply methods with which they are familiar, and confident). 
Methodologies are epistemologies operationalised, not peripheral, 
interchangeable accessories.  
 
Returning to Kuhn’s ecological metaphor, biological specimens imply a 
biological niche within which they can flourish. When touring a museum, 
even the most musty, glass-encased insect is understood to have once 
crawled about, to have flourished in some environment (however remote). 
Similarly, each tool in a hardware store implies a task to be made simpler, 
implies a task worth doing. In the same way, the existence of special 
methods in science implies a special epistemological function to be 
performed, and an intellectual context within which that function is valued. 
Just as scientists can become a “symbol and carrier” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999: 
p.220) for the kind of science they do, research methods might be symbols 





This connection between research tools and the problems they render 
manageable is little discussed, but key to understanding multi- and 
interdisciplinary research fields, because, as Kuhn implied, and others have 
reinforced (Barnes, 1982; Bloor, 2011; MacKenzie, 1981) the researcher’s 
standpoint matters. The backdrop to ones’ own thinking, the questions, 
answers, and generalisations pre-supposed or taken for granted shape 
perceptions of unfamiliar methods, and methodological decisions. In 
addition, different views of the ‘special functions’ central to good research 
may explain why methodological tension and controversy are perceived 
differently across paradigmatic divides. 
 
The most obvious example of this in interviews surrounded discussions 
of how to evaluate causation, which could itself have been the focus of a 
dedicated thesis chapter. Fourteen interviewees (mostly social scientists and 
social epidemiologists) lamented the extension (even dominance) of 
methods initially designed to evaluate the effectiveness of clinical treatments 
to the study of health equity, and highlighted what they perceive as the 
inappropriateness of such methods for studying social interventions or 
phenomena: 
That challenge is a central challenge. The whole issue of establishing 
causation. Some people think you can only establish causation with 
randomised controlled trials. Well, that’s not establishing causation. 
Randomised controlled trials are very important in saying if ‘Treatment A’ 
works, if a vaccine is effective. Randomised controlled trials are very 
important. But that doesn’t establish causation of saying ‘Education is 
important for health’. Establishing that causation is very difficult, you’re not 
going to do it by randomising people to get more or less education and 
following them for fifty years and seeing how their health goes. Obviously 
not.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD)  
However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, within the classical 
epidemiological paradigm, interventions are positioned as part of a natural 
progression within an epidemiological career. Funding opportunities were 
described as also favouring RCTs in public health:  
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I think there has been a big shove in public health to try to generate 
evidence through, preferably, randomised trials […] The funding landscape 
is set up to strongly favour that kind of evidence, which is why we 
continually fund interventions that fail to tackle inequalities.  
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD)  
Only two interviewees, one economist and one clinician-epidemiologist, 
expressed the view that randomised (or, more realistically, very carefully 
designed quasi-experimental) studies are necessary to prove that the 
relationship between income and health is causal. The below quotation was 
illustrative of this position:  
We still cannot answer the question “So, what needs doing if you want to 
reduce health inequalities?” In order to be able to do that you need causal 
evidence. It is easy to show that there are lots of associations recurring 
everywhere, it is very much more difficult to break the linkage. For that, you 
need quasi-experimental evidence where you use natural experiments like 
policies that have been implemented or abolished, to see what effects they 
have had on the health of various strata in the population.  
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
What can explain the same method being described as indispensable by 
one researcher, and ‘obviously’ inappropriate by another? In the next section 
I begin to sketch an answer, by exploring the fundamentals of scientific 
tools.  
8.1.1 Recognition of tools as tools  
 
The process via which scientific tools are recognised as valuable, and 
their selection and application considered ‘worth doing’ emerges as a topic 
of interest. Continuing my metaphor from the previous section, wandering 
around the hardware store, one assumes that the things displayed there are 
tools. On safari, one may not understand the use to which bright plumes 
and elongated necks are put, but (trusting that evolution eliminates useless 
or disadvantageous physiological quirks) we assume some hidden 
advantage. These assumptions of utility are acts of intellectual generosity, 
and interview data suggested that such generosity is rare in HIDR (perhaps, 
in research contexts broadly). The recognition of tools as tools seems itself 
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to be mediated by disciplinary training (by the kind of knowledge 
researchers seek, the organisation of that knowledge, and for tolerance to 
diversity and complexity.) 
 
In the absence of widespread willingness to assume a priori that a thing 
is a tool, the recognition of tools as tools is a precondition for their 
acceptance and use. Such recognition requires familiarity with a tool’s mode 
of operation, but also with the task it has been designed to simplify.  A rock 
is a ‘tool’ if one knows about coconuts, knows they contain nutrients, and 
knows that rocks, suitably employed, can smash them. Without this 
knowledge a rock is just a rock; useless, inedible, uninteresting. A regression 
equation is a tool if one knows about beta coefficients, values the kind of 
insight they represent, and knows that estimating the coefficient is possible 
given sufficient data. Without this auxiliary knowledge, the equation is a 
meaningless, uninteresting scribble; regression is ‘useless’, ‘rubbish’, and 
not worth doing.  
8.1.2 Preconditions for Adoption of Research Methods  
 
One widely-recognised outcome of disciplinary training is the provision 
of graduates with a ‘toolbox’ of methods, and within HIDR the expansion of 
the communal toolkit has been specifically presented as an important 
marker of collaborative progress (Garthwaite et al., 2016:p.467). However, a 
well-equipped toolshed is of no use without knowledge relating to how, 
where and why tools might be employed. Access to diverse scientific tools 
is useless without companion sense of the phenomena to which they may 
be applied, familiarity with the insights arising from the study of such 
phenomena, and belief that such insights are valuable. I summarise this 
triple-stranded precondition for the adoption of a research method in Figure 








Figure 15: Preconditions for the adoption of a research method 
 
 
Acquisition of a toolbox meets only one condition in Figure 15, exposure 
to method. In scientific settings, the presentation of a method purely in 
terms of its mechanics inevitably draws one question: Why? “Why would 
you do that?” The second and third strands of Figure 15 pose the answer; 
one uses a method to study phenomena pre-supposed to be interesting, to 
generate insight pre-supposed to be valuable. As was just discussed, 
however, this underlying justification is rarely made explicit. In interview 
data, the three strands of Figure 15 appear to collectively support a sense 
that a method is worth applying, that something is worth doing. What one 
interviewee described as ‘making the case’ for qualitative methods might be 
more specifically understood as elaborating the triple-stranded helix in 
Figure 15. Should one strand prove missing, the use of the method may be 
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insupportable. This was most obvious in interviewees’ discussion of 
qualitative research, and so I begin analysis there.   
8.2 Qualitative Research  
 
Twenty-two interviewees discussed qualitative methods in a positive or 
neutral light. Attitudes to qualitative work varied across disciplines, with 
researchers holding PhDs in sociology, social epidemiology, psychology and 
social policy being most likely to express positive views. Economists and 
classical epidemiologists expressed some scepticism or qualification, and 
two interviewees from these disciplines were overtly dismissive of qualitative 
approaches. Attitudes also varied across network clusters. In Clusters 4 and 
6 (where health was generally framed as socially situated), qualitative 
research was presented as standing on its own merits as a research 
method. In other clusters, qualitative methods were more typically described 
and appraised as an addition or accessory to quantitative research. 
 
It is important to note that the data in this section were generated in part 
because qualitative research requires justification in many public health 
research spaces. When one anthropologist began their discussion of 
qualitative research by saying:  
I am an expert in qualitative analysis, but I still see that as empirical science. 
 
Occupational health researcher (Anthropology PhD)  
It occurred to me that an equivalent statement positioning quantitative 
research as “empirical science” is unnecessary (and was not expressed by 
any interviewee). Some interviewees reported that qualitative research faces 
an up-hill battle against charges of being ‘unscientific’, and that these 
charges sometimes extended to interviewees themselves:  
“Have you heard of [Blank]? Of course, the great guru of the RCT. He and I 
used to clash […] He would accuse me of being an ‘unscientific qualitative 
researcher’ […] we had a real battle over methodologies.”  




There are no comparable data describing the struggles of quantitative 
researchers to be taken seriously or considered ‘scientific’. The value of 
quantitative research appears self-evident. It is not the aim of this analysis to 
recapitulate commentary on the ‘qualitative-quantitative divide’. But, as is 
reflected in Figure 15, my data suggest that one explanation for why 
qualitative methods are not always recognised as valid, free-standing 
scientific tools because not all researchers are familiar with these methods, 
and with empirical treatment of the phenomena they are designed to study. 
Additionally, not all researchers believe (or have previous experience 
suggesting) resulting insights are valuable. But first, how do researchers with 
this experience view qualitative methods?   
 
8.2.1 Researchers who conduct qualitative research 
 
Interviewees with first-hand experience employing qualitative methods 
were the most enthusiastic about their value. These were the social 
scientists in Clusters 4 and 6, and health promotion/ health behaviour 
researchers in Cluster 8. It was noted in the previous chapter that these 
groups focus on different research objects and have different research 
objectives. This was further reflected in attitudes to qualitative methods. In 
Cluster 4, qualitative methods represent an analytical window into 
phenomena of interest within the social sciences (e.g., policy processes and 
the lived experience of individuals). The six interviewees who identified 
qualitative methods as a hallmark of high-quality empirical work were all 
located in Cluster 4 and 6, and this seemed directly connected to the type of 
knowledge these methods access:  
TC: What are the hallmarks of really good empirical work? 
[…] To me that is qualitative in nature, so, really good quality qualitative 
evidence that demonstrates that messy ‘policy stuff’. 




Here is Figure 15 in action. Qualitative methods are valued by the above 
interviewee because they grant access to important phenomena, to valuable 
insight. The three criteria for the adoption of a research method are 
apparently met; being familiar with the method, familiar with the phenomena 
it is designed to illuminate, and the belief that insight about those 
phenomena is of value. But, what are the specific phenomena which 
qualitative methods illuminate, and what is the value of the insights derived 
from qualitative analysis? In Kuhnian parlance, what are the ‘special 
functions’ which the special tools known as qualitative methods perform? 
Some clues are located within the five strengths of qualitative methods 
identified by interviewees who either conduct qualitative studies themselves, 
or closely collaborate with others who do: 
 
I) Providing understanding of lived experience 
An understanding of the world from the perspective of people themselves. 
[…] that is missing if you would rely purely on quantitative studies, because 
we do not have the perspective and the understanding of people 
themselves.  
Social Epidemiologist (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
II) Leading to research centred around and driven by research 
participants  
 
[Quantitative research] is driven by you. It is not driven by the people in 
those communities. […] [In qualitative research] there is some shaping, but 
within that, it is actually fairly broad what can happen.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD)  
 
In the first extract above, ‘perspectives’ are understood to exist, as 
objects which can be studied, and they are presented as a valuable data 
source: the starting point for valuable insight about health equity. Qualitative 
methods therefore perform the special function of accessing these insights.   
 




“A qualitative study would be a rich and novel kind of way of thinking about 
how people make sense of [blank]  […] as far as I know, there has not been 
any work in that area and it would really enrich the picture.”  
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
Similarly, for this geographer, understanding how people make sense of 
something is a worthwhile thing to do, and is considered relevant to 
research about health. Understandings exist, they can be studied, and are a 
valid and valuable component of the scientific picture. Qualitative methods 
are worth doing because they represent a strategy for accessing and 
learning about understandings.  
 
IV) Qualitative work embraces and preserves complexity  
 
[I like when researchers] are using qualitative data for what I feel it really can 
offer, which is when I feel it’s really exciting, to help show the complexity 
which draws together various different theoretical insights […] it adds this 
depth and complexity.  
Health Policy Researcher (Geography PhD) 
 
This researcher values complexity in research findings. Representing 
complexity is positioned as a useful thing to do, as an activity relevant to the 
study of health equity. Qualitative methods perform the special function of 
accessing and demonstrating complexity. 
 
V) Brings research closer to the ‘real world’  
“How do we know in [region], [that] the salience of the measurement tools 
we were using was really missing the boat, until we talk to them and give 
them a chance to explain? It helps make our studies look more realistic and 
real-world, in their understanding and application.”  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD)  
Here, qualitative methods represent an opportunity to improve the 
precision of measurement tools, to improve the applicability of research 
findings. Being ‘realistic’ entails better measurement, and qualitative 
methods perform the special function of providing an opportunity to check 
the suitability of selected measurement tools.  
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In short, qualitative methods perform the special function of generating 
detailed understandings of what life is like in certain places, at certain times, 
for certain people. The picture is made up of social objects, and the 
representation of these may be complex. Three researchers noted that some 
research questions are impossible to answer via quantitative methods, and 
that qualitative methods are a necessity in these cases. These questions 
related to policy and politics, and so qualitative methods also perform the 
special function of generating insight about these.  
 
8.2.2 Quantifying Qualitative Data 
 
The defence of qualitative research as being a part of ‘empirical science’ 
at the beginning of this section may have been a push against what some 
researchers described as qualitative purism; the belief that qualitative 
methods cannot and should not be combined with quantitative methods. 
The split between qualitative purists and non-purists was most evident in 
the discussion of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the distillation of 
qualitative data into a series of cases represented by numeric variables. 
Once represented using numbers, logical inference is applied to determine 
the descriptive inferences supported by data. Some researchers found this 
innovation valuable:  
“We have been starting to explore QCA […] I think that has great promise 
when you want to bring some of that power that the numbers have. You end 
up with this richness of contextual understanding that you can start to look 
at in a quantitative sense. I think that is brilliant.”   
 
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
QCA offers a way of blending that more quantitative approach, to most 
effectively categorise and utilise the stories and information that were 
shared.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD)  
 
But two others (both social scientists, located in Cluster 4) viewed QCA 
as a troubling signal of a wider trend, the attempt to transform qualitative 
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research into formats resembling quantitative research. Of particular 
concern to both interviewees was a sense that quantifying qualitative data 
destroyed what was perceived as most valuable about the method, 
destroying its special function:   
Qualitative researchers, some leading ones […] deformed the 
methodologies to conform to a mind-map that looks like ‘quantitative 
research only different’ in ways that ultimately undermine their legitimacy. 
[…] Cutting up peoples’ life experiences into snippets of a few words that 
can be coded, what does that have to do with peoples’ lives?  
Health Policy Researcher (Social Science PhD)  
For this researcher, knowledge about peoples’ lives and lived experience 
is of significant scholarly value. Attempts to summarise or simplify this 
authoritative evidence-source are viewed as distortion (or worse), a 
perspective common in network Clusters 4 and 6. The above extract makes 
explicit a key question which seemed to underpin individual epistemologies 
from all network clusters:  
 
‘How comfortable am I with what I have discarded in the creation of my 
analytical product?’  
In Chapter 7, attitudes to abstraction varied across disciplines, and this 
corresponded with integrative collection codes (supporting and 
accommodating complexity) and cumulative collection codes (requiring at 
least some degree of simplification or abstraction). When discussing 
research methods, some epidemiologists and economists presented 
abstraction as a mechanism by which valuable insight is generated, and 
‘elegant design’ seemed to act as shorthand for work which abstracts and 
simplifies.  
 
Therefore, for some researchers, simplifying a problem is the first step in 
an analytical journey, not for frivolous or arbitrary reasons, but because it is 
a pre-requisite for the application of paradigmatic methods, for accessing 
insight communally-judged and pre-supposed to be of scientific value. In 
contrast, for researchers who believe good research captures the depth and 
complexity of social reality, very little detail can be comfortably discarded 
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en-route to analytical insight, because complex reality is the analytical 
insight. For these researchers, simplification represents a barrier to the 
application of paradigmatic methods. All researchers who described good 
empirical work as capturing the reality of lived experience also mentioned 
qualitative methods as a hallmark of good research, and reported 
involvement in qualitative studies. This very strong correspondence between 
ideas about what research is for and how research should be conducted 
reveals the subterranean underpinnings of methodological preference, and 
represents another way in which the conceptualisation of methods as tools 
to be picked up and put down may be inadequate. Researchers’ 
methodological preferences are connected to the kind of knowledge they 
consider valuable, which in turn is connected to wider purpose of research. 
My data bring contemporary support to the claim that researchers like the 
methods they like because they facilitate a kind of scientific enquiry 
perceived as important, ethical and useful (i.e. worth doing).  
 
However this finding has (at least) one other interpretation.  Rather than 
being motivated by a kind of knowledge and/or a particular sense of the 
goal of research, the causal arrow may run in the opposite direction (or in 
both directions).  Aptitude in certain methods may shape the kind of 
knowledge researchers value. MacKenzie’s (1981a) study of the controversy 
surrounding mendelian genetics presented the way researchers tended to 
value theories which allowed them to put their skills to good use. Similarly, in 
Bloor’s (2011)  study of aerodynamics, participants tended to dislike theories 
suggesting their skills are redundant, and tended to value the kind of 
knowledge produced by methods they are skilled in.  
 
This PhD study cannot shed light on which interpretation applies more 
broadly in HIDR, or whether both apply. But, in either case, methods are not 
mere tools. In multi-disciplinary spaces, critique or dismissal of a research 
method may be experienced as critique or dismissal of the phenomena the 




8.2.3 Researchers who don’t conduct qualitative research 
 
Eight researchers not directly involved in the conduct of qualitative 
studies discussed their attitudes to qualitative research during interview 
(during the activity described in Section 5.3, not in response to my question 
about the hallmarks of good empirical work). Among these researchers, 
qualitative methods were primarily valued for the ways in which they are 
understood to support or augment quantitative methods. Specifically, that 
they help researchers understand the mechanisms underlying statistical 
associations.  
I think it [qualitative research] is very useful, if you do a quasi-experiment, to 
then understand perhaps better what is lying behind it. I think it can be 
useful.  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD) 
Here, qualitative methods are a means of improving or explaining results 
suggested by statistical causal inference procedures. Therefore, qualitative 
methods perform the special function of enhancing and improving insights 
arrived at via quantitative methods. Qualitative methods were also 
positioned as supporting the evaluation and development of experimental 
interventions: 
I think they have a place, both prior to and after things, to work out how you 
might improve things […] are there different ways we could have done 
things? To make things better? [I like] lots of process evaluation  […] 
understanding these things can lead to better designs, even in health 
economics […] 
TC: Is that appreciation widespread in economics? 
No (Laughing)  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
How do you know what intervention you should use? And what you should 
put in your intervention? Unless you do some qualitative work first, to 
understand?  
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD), Cluster 3  
Qualitative insights have value in the two extracts above because they 
perform the function of generating insight about quantitative projects, 
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facilitating improvements to the design and roll-out of subsequent projects 
(although acknowledgement of this value is reportedly limited in health 
economics). Unstated is the belief that the truly valuable insights are 
generated by an appropriately executed quantitative analysis. Such 
lukewarm support for qualitative methods was almost always tempered by 
an indication that qualitative research is not felt to be on the same level, 
scientifically, as quantitative research. No interviewee explicitly stated this 
view, however the implication or assumption frequently seemed to be that 
qualitative research conducted independently of quantitative research is of 
limited value, with no obvious ‘purpose’: 
It shouldn't replace the quasi-experiment. You need to do the quasi-
experiment and then the qualitative research might help in trying to 
understand it better.  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD) 
I think, it has to be not done in isolation. If you do the qualitative for a 
purpose, to develop the intervention, then I think it tends to be more 
valued.   
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
This seemed to confirm the view expressed by qualitative researchers 
that their methods are undervalued within population health, and within 
some parts of HIDR. One UK-based sociologist described this as a 
consequence of the development of health inequalities research around 
quantitative findings: 
The field of inequalities was constructed around quantitative data […] The 
paradigms that dominate are epidemiological, and by definition they are 
statistical. […] The qualitative ‘enriched’ understanding of the quantitative, 
but the scientific status was accorded to the quantitative and not the 
qualitative. It was illustrative, it was decorative, it was secondary. It certainly 
wasn’t central and on its own wouldn’t constitute ‘proof’ of any kind.  
But, I think what has happened subsequent to that is, I wouldn’t say they 
are of equal status but I think the power of qualitative and the necessity of 
qualitative research has been much more strongly recognised […] But, I still 
think for an awful lot of people who are ‘the leaders’ in public health 
research, the king-pin is still quantitative.  




It therefore seems to be the case that some researchers view qualitative 
methods as indispensable, independent, and as generating the best sort of 
evidence. Others view these methods as being accessory to or evaluation of 
other methods. Overwhelmingly, the former are trained in a social or political 
science and the latter are trained in epidemiology, economics, or health 
promotion. But, as I outlined in the previous chapter, disciplinary tension is a 
connected set of tensions, and what appears to be a ‘disciplinary difference’ 
is more likely to be a connected set of differences.  
 
As suggested by the three strands in Figure 15, interviewees with training 
in humanities, social sciences, policy studies and health geography were 
equipped with the terminology and theoretical frameworks to perceive and 
discuss the value of qualitative data. But, more than this, qualitative data 
sources represent the arena within which paradigmatic theories and 
concepts can be encountered. One sociologist described liking qualitative 
research because it illuminates “what structure and agency mean as 
dynamic and interlocking processes” and because it provides  
 
a kind of feeling for what structure-and-agency means. Not as abstract 
books, or conceptual framings, but what it means for the day-to-day lives of 
the people who are in the poorest circumstances, and the poorest health.   
Sociologist (Sociology PhD) 
 
For this researcher, qualitative data provides a direct connection to 
concepts and theories fundamental to the discipline - qualitative data 
sources are the raw materials from which key insights are wrought. But 
‘Structure’ and ‘Agency’ are not concepts which exist within the classical 
economic or epidemiological paradigms, and the description of them as an 
‘interlocking process’ has no meaning within these research traditions. 
Qualitative data do not represent a way for researchers with epidemiological 
or economic training to encounter and explore their disciplines’ central 
concepts or foundational theories. Qualitative data do not provide these 
researchers with examples of ‘the familiar in the unfamiliar’ (Barnes, 1982), 
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they are simply unfamiliar.  This is perhaps why researchers with 
epidemiological and economic backgrounds tended to perceive and 
evaluate qualitative research in terms of what it can do for quantitative 
research, because quantitative analysis is the setting within which the core 
concepts of these disciplines are encountered. This was reflected in the 
view expressed by some researchers that qualitative research does not 
provide ‘answers’: 
I probably instinctively prefer quant, because I like to have an answer, so 
that's an epistemological statement in itself.   
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Whereas others clearly felt qualitative studies do provide ‘answers’:   
That's where having a plurality of methods is really useful. I don't think you 
can necessarily answer some questions using quantitative data, but actually 
talking to people is the way to answer those questions.   
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
 
Of course, the capacity for a research method to deliver ‘answers’ 
depends on the question a researcher is asking. The role of research 
questioning will be explored in Chapter 10, but, for now, the qualitative-
quantitative divide seems reflective of much more than simple 
methodological preference. It is a reflection of ideas about what it means to 
be empirical, what it means to get answers, and what it means to be 
scientific.  
8.3 Quantitative Research Methods: Meaning, 
Artefact and Truth  
 
In Chapter 7, knowledge about society was linked to the key virtue of 
reflecting lived experience, which also appears to drive methodological 
preference. Knowledge about disease was linked to the key virtue of ‘being 
useful’, and this epistemic force within epidemiology shaped diverse 
aspects of scientific practice, even for members outside the discipline. In 
this section, the key virtue associated with negative knowledge (knowledge-
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about-knowledge) is presented.  
 
Broadly, concerns expressed by researchers with a technical focus 
signalled a preoccupation with bias, spurious results, and statistical artefact. 
Biostatistics is very closely connected to epidemiology (and might even be 
described as a subspecialty of epidemiology concerned with negative 
knowledge). It is therefore unsurprising that the focus on bias and artefact 
was widespread in epidemiology also.  
 
Generally, for researchers with a technical focus, ‘good’ methods were 
described as those which most completely reduce the risk of artefacts, or 
guard most appropriately against likely sources of bias. “Avoiding bias” is a 
special function which quantitative methods are expected to perform, and 
the following analysis illustrates the importance of this function within 
epidemiology’s natural (intellectual) habitat. However, underneath the 
discussion of artefact and bias is a feature of quantitative research which 
emerged from interview data and, to my knowledge, has not been 
highlighted elsewhere. 
 
 Clearly apparent was a sense that only some statistical results have 
meaning.  In the absence of complete numerical data, distinguishing 
between statistical results which do and don’t have meaning is the central 
challenge of quantitative research, and the possibility that results are 
meaningless can very rarely be definitively escaped. This constant threat of 
meaninglessness appears to shape the way economists, epidemiologists 
and biostatisticians select and evaluate all research methods. In other 
words, in these disciplines, safeguarding against meaninglessness is a 
special function which all scientific all tools are expected to perform12.  
 
Generally, though with exceptions, researchers with epidemiological 
training sought to escape meaninglessness via research involving precise 
 
12 A more comprehensive discussion of the ways interviewees pursue and verify meaning in 
statistical results can be found in Chapter 9 
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measurement and large sample sizes: 
We have to do work that is epidemiologically sound. We have to do work 
that includes a large enough sample size that we can address or examine 
the fact that we are looking at. We can't make generalisations, either with 
the results of the study or in the populations we are studying, unless the 
study is soundly designed and has a good sample size. So those 
epidemiology principles are drilled into my head.   
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
Frequently collected under the banner of ‘epidemiological rigour’ or 
‘sound epidemiological design’, these attributes were explicitly positioned 
as methodological safeguards against error and bias:  
TC: What are the hallmarks of really good empirical work? 
[…] I am a stickler for getting rid of sources of error. So I always look to see 
whether the confounding is taken care of, the measurement error is taken 
care of, and the selection bias is taken care of. For me, from where I sit, that 
is the hallmark of good research […] studies which look for causal estimates 
by getting rid of the three key systematic sources of error.   
Professor of Epidemiology (Epidemiology PhD)  
Good empirical work for me is a rigour in the methodology and the 
approach, so it’s all the things we’re taught in our research methods class, 
thinking about things like our study sample, how we’re sampling, are we 
using the best techniques when it comes to measuring our variables?  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
While the focus on randomisation, quasi-experimental designs and 
intervention studies was more common among epidemiologists specialising 
in cancer research (located in the US, in network clusters 3 and 8), concern 
about bias and small sample sizes was expressed by epidemiologists and 
biostatisticians across the network, including in Clusters 4, 6 and 7.  
TC: What are the hallmarks of good empirical research, for you? 
P:  […]  you quite often see small studies which really cannot answer the 
questions. So being a pedantic methodologist, I like people to think about 
sample size, whether the study is powered enough, which I think many 
people don't do. Biostatistician A (Biostatistics PhD) 
Here, good research presents findings which emerge from an analytical 
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process designed to minimise bias and systematic error. It is the design (the 
sample size, the precision of measurement, the ways in which error is 
accounted for) which confers legitimacy, relevance and meaning. This 
process is not compatible with all kinds of data, and cannot produce all 
kinds of insights, because such knowledge relates not to specific individuals 
but to populations, the defining epidemiological research object.  Social 
structure and policy processes are not accessible via this epistemology, and 
were not presented as research objects or data sources by interviewees who 
pursue knowledge-about-knowledge.  
 
As already discussed in Section 7.1.1, lived-experience was positioned 
as an authoritative source of evidence by several social scientists. For 
researchers pursuing knowledge-about-knowledge, authoritative evidence 
was obtainable via sufficiently large, well-designed studies. In an interesting 
echo of the interviewee who described accessing “depth” via qualitative 
methods, quantitative studies were described as moving beyond surface-
level trends and revealing what is ‘really’ happening:  
From epidemiology […] the critical gaze, the kind of continual worry about 
confounding, that what we think is going on is not actually going on, and is 
driven by something else. Because I think that can be very useful, and I 
think there is an awful lot in social science and general social and political 
thinking […] there’s not a lot of really asking yourself what’s really going on 
here?   
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Here we catch a glimpse of the epidemiologist’s natural (intellectual) 
habitat. This ‘continual worry’ about confounding did not appear in 
epidemiology by chance, and is not sustained by accident or coincidence. 
Rather, it is a legacy of the crucible within which the discipline matured: the 
debate around smoking and lung cancer. Epidemiological results very rarely 
have a single interpretation (explored further in Chapter 9) and the 
discipline’s history is riddled with false alarms due to failures to sample 
appropriately, or failure to adjust statistical results for a relevant factor. 
Systemic bias is the death-knell of an epidemiological study, and is 
potentially lurking in any component of a study’s design; sampling, 
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recruitment, measurement, and data analysis. As a result, designing an 
epidemiological study feels rather like moving tentatively across a thin sheet 
of ice; a single misstep can undermine an entire project, presenting a need 
for tools with quite particular functions. ‘Continual worry’ seems appropriate, 
large studies feel safer than small ones, and accurate measurement is 
imperative. Randomisation is understood as the best way to eliminate 
confounders and systematic biases, and it is for this reason that randomised 
studies sit near the top of epidemiology’s “Evidence Pyramid” (Petticrew & 
Roberts, 2003). But, these epistemological safeguards are adopted for their 
function within a specific intellectual context, and when moved outside that 
context, such focus on generalisability and bias becomes a source of 
difficulty and frustration for collaborators (see Chapter 10).  
 
Three, specialised approaches to quantitative bias were apparent in 
interview data, belonging to economists, social epidemiologists, and 
epidemiologists embedded within community settings. To better understand 
these approaches, I explore the particular ‘special functions’ of quantitative 




To provide some context for the data presented below, at the time of 
interview, all interviewees with economic training were located in either 
continental Europe, the US or Australia, and were therefore working outside 
the UK research context. There are several health economists studying 
health inequalities in the UK, however it is the group in Cluster 2 (not based 
in the UK) who appeared in the bibliometric network, likely due to their 
highly-cited early research in the specific area of inequality measurement. A 
comparison of views among economists in different research contexts 
would be an interesting extension of this project, but is not my aim. All 
interviewees with economic training were based within departments of 
economics or health economics, not departments of epidemiology or public 
health, perhaps reflecting the insular, strongly-classified character of this 
discipline, and confirming existing descriptions of economics as ’insular’ 
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(Fourcade, 2015) and ‘hierarchical’. In particular, economics is dominated by 
a small number of top departments and journals to an extent not observed 
in other disciplines (Han, 2003). 
 
Economists interviewed were distinctive for their unified account of their 
own discipline. Despite being spread across three countries and a range of 
research foci, economists tended to express similar criteria for evaluating 
methods, similar frustrations with the literature, and similar hopes for the 
impact of their work. This does not mean interviewees applied economic 
theory and methods uncritically, or without creativity. However, there can be 
little doubt that normal science within economics is inflexible compared to 
other disciplines in HIDR, and this rigidity was reflected in attitudes about 
quantitative methods.  Economists interviewed placed very high value on 
quantitative methodology, and three (out of five interviewed) were critical of 
what they perceived as lower standards in other disciplines. Several 
interviewees from other disciplines described communicating with 
economists as very challenging (see Chapter 10), but, rather than simply 
noting this challenge, it may be instructive to ask: Within what intellectual 
habitat is the economic approach useful? What special functions do 
economists value in quantitative methods?  
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, it is theorised that strongly classified 
disciplines tend to empower academics, and this did seem to be reflected in 
economists’ ideas about what makes a study ‘good’. Interviewees with 
economic training didn’t tend to list the attributes of an ‘economically 
sound’ study in the way epidemiologists did. Rather, sound methodology 
begins not with features of the study, but with the researcher. Common 
threads were the importance of precision in language, displaying ‘care’ in 
the conduct of analyses, and caution in drawing conclusions from data:  
TC: What are the hallmarks of good empirical work?  
[…] The first thing is to be clear about what you are doing […] In causal 
analysis, the hallmark there is to be very clear on what it is you are trying to 
identify. What is your outcome? What is your treatment? What is the 
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variable which we think is changing because of the effect? Defining those 
two, the outcome and the treatment very specifically, so we know exactly 
what is the effect that we are trying to identify? Then being super clear on 
how you are going to identify this effect. An empirical strategy which says “I 
am going to use this variation in my treatment.”  
Health Economist A (Economics PhD) 
Here is the abstract, atomised and cumulative nature of economic 
knowledge. The default position is not a connected set of factors, jointly 
influencing outcomes in context-dependent ways. To study causal 
connections in health economics is to carefully isolate one outcome, one 
treatment, and exploit variation in that treatment to quantify its causal 
impact. The grand aim is to decompose observed variation in health into 
constituent parts, neatly attributed to risk factors, exposures, or treatments:  
TC: What are the characteristics of good descriptive work?  
I think, certainly over the last thirty or forty years we have made great 
strides in developing better measures, we understand much better how we 
can measure and decompose, sometimes we call them “sources” but I have 
to be careful because I'm using causal language there, it is certainly 
decomposing the association between socioeconomic status [and health] in 
some form. Economists prefer to keep income and education separate, and 
not as a construct which people call “socioeconomic position”.  
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
The combination of income and education under the common label of 
“socioeconomic position” is undesirable for this economist. It seems that, 
among the health economists I spoke with, the special function valued most 
highly was decomposition of observed variation in health.   
 
The value placed on this kind of analysis was also evident in discussions 
of where ‘care’ in causal analysis ought to be directed. Being ‘careful’ 
seemed to relate overwhelmingly to one aspect of study design known 
within economics as identification, briefly touched on in the extract above. 
Despite similarities between health economics and biostatistics, the term 
identification has no formal meaning in the latter, but is a point of emphasis 




We call them the ‘identification police’, the [journal] reviewers who will 
scrutinize every sentence to say, this you can call a causal effect. […]  
[Later] 
In that causal work, we admire people who have clever ideas for what we 
call the ‘identification strategy’ […] finding some sort of exogenous 
variation, ideally in one of these social economic indicators (income, 
education, occupation), and if that [variation] is sufficiently exogenous you 
can look for its effect on health. Or vice versa, the effect of health on one of 
those. But, very often, they are difficult to find.  
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
Causal analysis in health economics is therefore preconditioned on a 
successful search for exogenous variation, a ‘shock’ originating outside the 
study in no way feasibly connected to variables under study. Only if a study 
is well-identified can causal claims be permitted, and this was described as 
being annoyingly restrictive by all economists interviewed, and as giving rise 
to studies of strange or extreme phenomena, tangentially-connected to 
health. Emphasis on identification was reportedly reinforced by editors of 
top economics journals, understood to value the careful identification of 
causal effects over the importance or implication of research findings:  
Only if you go to the lower quality economics journals would you be able to 
publish without this very, very clear explanation of how you’ve identified the 
effect you’re claiming is causal […] the problem in economics for now is that 
it becomes so preoccupied with causality that they publish anything which 
they think is probably causal, irrespective of how important the effect is. 
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
The ‘identification police’ are perhaps a reflection of how important 
internal validity is in mainstream economics. If the necessary assumptions 
for a method’s use are not met, an economist may prefer to abandon 
analysis altogether, regardless of the potential usefulness of the outcome. 
This can create tension across disciplinary lines: 
“What methods are appropriate? […] the standards are different.  The 
Economist would say, to some questions “I cannot provide an answer”, a 
public health researcher would say “That is stupid, because we need that 
answer!” (Laughing) 
Health Economist D (Economics PhD)  
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Is it better to have no evidence than evidence generated without the 
appropriate care and caution? From the economic standpoint, there is at 
least the possibility that it is better to have no evidence. One specific study 
of lottery winners (Cesarini et al., 2016) was divisive. On one hand, the study 
was described as elegant, and prototypically well-identified (lottery winnings 
representing a random income shock): 
The best new piece of evidence [about health inequalities] that was added 
recently was a study in the QJE, the top journal in economics, by a Swedish 
American group who used the Lotteries of the last 30 years.  
Professor of Health Economics C (Economics PhD)  
However, this same study was presented as an example of the negative 
impact the ‘identification police’ are having: 
It is very difficult to study the impact, during adult life, of income on health. 
Because, the way economists typically do this is to develop an experiment, 
or a quasi-experiment, it is very difficult to come up with a real, very strong 
income shock in a quasi-experiment. People have used something like the 
lottery, but that is not what we are thinking of, we are thinking of living in a 
poorer area in Glasgow versus a rich area in Glasgow, which is a city 
famous for its health inequalities. How can you develop an experiment, an 
empirical design that allows you to really measure the impact of that kind of 
income difference? I think it is fair to say that these studies just don't exist.  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD)  
The income difference to which the above interviewee refers is 
endogenous (inside the model, not an external shock), and by definition is 
not well-identified. For this reason, for economists, studying this kind of 
income difference feels ‘very difficult’. Representatives from other disciplines 
would almost certainly disagree, and propose ways to study these income 
differences, but those disciplines are not so rigidly organised around the 
decomposition of well-identified causal effects. If empirical work in 
epidemiology feels like treading on ice, research in economics feels like 
peering down a microscope: Only when the dials and lenses are lined up 
just-so can anything be reliably discerned, and such intense magnification 
has the effect of restricting the world to narrow slivers of things, rather than 
wholes.  With scope to analyse only very particular kinds of variation in the 
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drivers of health equity, the study of disadvantage across a lifetime may 
appear impossible via the economic paradigm.  
 
So far in the thesis I have repeatedly reported that social scientists value 
depth and complexity in empirical work, and this contrasted against others’ 
preference for simplification and abstraction, reflecting different (disciplinary) 
tolerances for what can be discarded and disregarded en route to analytical 
insight. Economists tended to have a higher tolerance for dispatching local 
detail to obtain an elegant answer, but this liking for simplicity and 
abstraction is not a matter of taste, or preference: for economists, 
quantification and abstraction are necessary steps toward answering the 
kinds of questions at the core of the discipline, toward accessing 
authoritative evidence.  The economic epistemology (like all epistemologies) 
tackles a certain kind of problem, by generating a certain kind of knowledge, 
from certain kinds of data. This manifests as a strong preference for 
particular methods.  
 
Therefore, while sociologists and economists are making vastly different 
methodological choices, my analysis suggests these choices are made for 
similar reasons: Researchers seek, value, and use methods which support 
access to the core concepts of their disciplines, the methods understood to 
reliably generate the kind of evidence considered authoritative. As ideas 
about authoritative evidence seem to vary across disciplinary communities, 
so too does methodological preference. Returning to the introduction of this 
chapter, the perception of economists within the wider HIDR network is an 
excellent example of a tool operating at a distance from the material for 
which it was developed (a methodological polar bear roaming the tropics). 
Economic methods were developed as problem-solving mechanisms within 
economics, a strongly classified field with little tolerance for diversity in 
method, but what seems rigorous to economists did not seem rigorous to 
other interviewees: The geographer who highlighted the ‘inseparability of 
things’ in Chapter 7 went on immediately to say that the apparent rigour of 
elegant econometric approaches was ‘built on sand’. A social 
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epidemiologist from a different country, and a different network cluster, 
expressed a similar sentiment: 
Economists, especially some types of economists, use mathematics all the 
time, it looks so sophisticated, so important, so elegant. But behind that, 
very often, nothing. It is a desert.  
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Health Policy PhD) 
 
The ‘desert’ is perhaps the space left by things discarded en route to 
abstract analytical products: Context, complexity and lived-experience. 
From one perspective, these are the necessary casualties of pursuing the 
‘real story’, fully-decomposed causal effects. From another perspective, 
context, complexity and lived experience are the real story.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, economists interviewed reported feeling 
misunderstood:  
There might be preconceptions […] people might say yeah, ok, [I’m an] 
Economist, I'm just interested in money. I know the price of everything and 
the value of nothing, blah, blah.  
Health Economist A (Economics PhD) 
The only groups to consistently report that other scientists made 
assumptions about them because of their training were social scientists 
(who reported that their work was perceived as “Unscientific” or “soft” in 
some settings) and economists (who reported being accused of being 
“cold”  or “heartless”). These criticisms reflect the location of these 
disciplinary groups at epistemological extremes: discarding everything 
except well-identified, causal threads on one hand, and preserving and 
maintaining the ‘messy’ stuff (as one interviewee said) on the other. Here, 
again, disciplinary tension is more accurately described as a connected set 
of tensions: The special functions scientific tools are expected to perform 
within these traditions are markedly different, and this reflects the 
phenomena considered relevant, and the different kind of insights 
considered valuable.   
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TC: Do people make assumptions about you because you have economic 
training?  
Oh, clearly […] [the] typical prejudice about economists, “they want 
markets”, “they want competition”, “they want rationality”. We don't want 
anything, we just have our own ways of trying to disentangle causal 
evidence. 
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
Difficulties predictably arise when economists enter scientific spaces 
within which ‘disentangling causal evidence’ is a lesser priority. Taken 
together, these analyses of qualitative and quantitative methods 
demonstrate that when scientific practice reflects ‘special functions’ at the 
extreme, researchers can appear to one another as glass-encased 
specimens from some other planet, wielding tools with no obvious purpose.  
 
 
3.4.2 Epidemiology & Biostatistics in community settings 
 
 In the USA, five interviewees working within an epidemiological setting 
were co-located with and/or directly involved in community-based 
healthcare. As was discussed in Chapter 7, these scholars were described 
as ‘interlopers’ by some British scholars of the Health Inequalities research 
tradition. As interview data suggests assumptions are made about the way 
these scholars approach their work, and the things these scholars value, I 
take this opportunity to present their perspective and preferred approach to 
research. 
  
 These researchers seemed connected to their local communities in 
ways which British, Australian and Continental European interviewees were 
not, including regular contact with community members:   
I’m a nurse. So, that’s probably the biggest… I still try to keep in touch with 
the population, so I practice what I preach.  
TC: How do you keep in touch with the population?  
Every Thursday afternoon I do a food pantry. It’s in a very poor part of our 
town and I have my bag full of blood pressure cuffs. I know some of the 
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disparities that are happening within our community regarding overuse of 
the emergency room, for fevers. So I hand out thermometers, and talk about 
how you can bring down a fever without going to the emergency room. 
When people come in sick, to get food, we talk about what would be the 
best plan.  
Nursing Researcher (Nursing PhD) 
This connection to community was evident in the way interviewees 
viewed research. Three interviewees explicitly characterised their academic 
career as a service to community (no other interviewees explicitly framed 
their research in this way): 
Some of the greatest lessons I’ve learned as a scholar came from my 
community partners […]. I might understand aetiology, I might understand 
the statistics, yet they understand the implications of that and they know 
what they see, what’s behind those numbers. […] I call them my most 
influential teachers […] [my work] has to involve and has to engage the 
broader community I seek to serve.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD)  
Researchers with certain ideas or priorities may self-select into these 
environments, these environments might actively shape understandings of 
good research as involving the community, or both. In any case, these five 
researchers had quite particular ideas about what good quantitative 
research looks like, and some of these ideas stretched or cut against the 
norms of classical epidemiology. 
 
 They valued multi-level analyses: 
I love a good multi-level study. I love it when there’s this recognition that the 
individual alone isn’t the sole indicator of success or failure of an 
intervention, multi-level interventions specifically. […] does the bus route 
come near here? Is this walkable? Is there a pharmacy in the area? […] the 
culture and the system […] I like that kind of stuff. Helping to understanding 
what the conditions look like which can positively and favourably promote 
decisions which are conducive to health is important.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD)  
And also expressed a preference for adaptive or dynamic study design:  
If you want to change individual behaviour you really need to be thinking in 
this more pragmatic way of doing things. The idea of randomising people to 
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get something, especially after informing them, in my mind is borderline 
cruel and methodologically not all that sound. […] [We need] to meet the 
exigencies of life, and the changes in circumstance.  
Professor of Health Sciences (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
Accommodating the ‘exigencies of life’ is not a usual consideration in the 
design of epidemiological intervention studies. This group of researchers 
(frequently in contact with the reality of disease within a single, materially 
deprived community) appeared to value methods which perform the special 
function of accommodating, or somehow recognising those lived realities.  
 
Does this attention to context suggest a lesser role for disciplinary 
training? A comparison of these researchers with the social scientists 
conducting qualitative work suggests not.  As was discussed in Chapter 7, 
the general aim within health promotion is to intervene (to ‘change individual 
behaviour’ as the interviewee above expressed). Similarly, the North 
American researchers embedded in community-care framed their research 
specifically as aiming to modify individual behaviours, and did not advocate 
for research methods which studied social structures or policy processes. 
Despite clear insight into the structural determinants of health in their 
communities, these researchers did not discuss ‘structure’, ‘agency’, or 
‘society’ as objects for study. Rather, good research accommodates life-
within-community via adaptive trial designs, and health disparities are 
combatted at food pantries with bags full of blood-pressure cuffs, one 
individual at a time. The goal of research in these setting seemed to be less 
focused on understanding the social structures which create or sustain 
inequality, but rather understanding how to change behaviour within that 
social context, by identifying the optimum configuration of interventions 
which support individuals to improve their own health. These researchers 
advocated for a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, which 
perform the special function of confirming the acceptability and suitability of 
interventions within community settings:  
When you draft up an intervention, you ask, what is the best way to deliver 
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it? Is it in print, is it via phone, video, classroom, from the doctor, what 
works the best? Once we have marked things up, we show it and say, 
“Does this look ok? What colours do you prefer?” We really do everything. 
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD), Cluster 3 
Therefore, qualitative methods perform a different function for these 
researchers, compared to the social scientists in Clusters 4 and 6 
(discussed in section 8.2.1). The contrast between community-oriented 
researchers and social scientists interviewed was also evident in discussions 
regarding where the ‘answer’ to health inequality and disparity is understood 
to be located. Researchers embedded within communities tended to look to 
community for solutions: 
 If the problems are in the community, so are the solutions. I firmly believe 
that, and embody that, and live that in my work.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD)  
 
The researchers in Clusters 4, 6 and 7 who expressly valued research 
about society and policy did not locate the solution in the community, and 
some explicitly rejected this approach:  
 I’m on the more structural side of the structure-agency debate […] the 
[research] focus right now is very much on the individual health behaviours, 
and then a bit of community, because, why not put poor people and poor 
communities under pressure to deal with their own health problems?  
 Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
This brief analysis of one specialised research context adds some further 
complexity to the qualitative/quantitative divide. We see that the fervent 
pursuit of bias-free quantitative estimates takes a back-seat in some 
settings, and methods are required to perform an additional special function, 
accommodating and reflecting the needs of the community. Additionally, 
qualitative methods can be moulded to different purposes, and perform 
different functions across disciplines, and in different geographical contexts. 
 
8.4.3 Social Epidemiology  
 
Social epidemiologists tend occupy a position in the centre of the 
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citation network (Figure 10), between the biomedical-dominated right hand 
side and the social-science dominated left hand side. This reflects the 
central aim of social epidemiology, to integrate ideas about health from the 
social and biomedical sciences. Social epidemiologists were the only 
epidemiologists to foreground theory as a hallmark of good empirical 
research, or to discuss qualitative approaches and/or mixing methods. 
Social epidemiologists also stressed the importance of placing quantitative 
results within social contexts: 
TC: What are the hallmarks of good empirical work?  
Difficult to say. I like ones that recognise that whatever the findings are, they 
need to be placed in context. They need to be contextualised […] I’m not 
looking for a general, universal theory of everything […] why does 
something work in a particular setting? And what are the factors there which 
influence it? That sort of thing.  
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD) 
When I say quality I mean many things. Many things need to be taken into 
account, including the conceptualisation. […] sometimes we need a mixed 
methods approach, a systemic approach, [or] an historical approach.  
Public Health researcher (Health Policy PhD) 
Despite this attention to context and tolerance for varied approaches, 
social epidemiologists shared the mainstream epidemiological concern 
about error and bias: 
[Good work includes] a real accounting for what the biases are that threaten 
the validity of A) the construct, B) any empirical measures ostensibly 
reflecting that construct, and C) the limitations of the inferences themselves 
based on the kinds of data that are available.   
Social Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
As research methods tend to signify and symbolise particular intellectual 
domains, it is not surprising that augmenting the epidemiological 
epistemology with elements from the social sciences was described as 
personally rewarding, but professionally very challenging (in Chapter 7, one 
social epidemiologist highlighted the difficulty of ‘getting understanding and 





Some social epidemiologists did not feel their approach is understood or 
valued within wider epidemiological circles:  
[In epidemiology], the problems and some of the limitations have partially, 
only partially, in the last few years have been developed. Like geographical 
epidemiology, or political epidemiology, other things. But, still, this is not the 
mainstream, this remains a minority view in this science.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD)  
And focus on the technicality of research design was frustrating for some 
social epidemiologists who felt this occurred at the expense of theory:  
In my view the good social epidemiologists have become marginalised and 
epidemiology has become more and more self-consumed […] [the] more 
technical issues have become more forefront, I think.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
Therefore, social epidemiologists are aiming to strike a very challenging 
balance: demonstrating the hallmarks of good research from more than one 
epistemic culture. The role of theory within social epidemiology is central to 
understanding the kind of insight valued by members of this sub-specialty. 
In the next section I consider theory in detail, a scientific tool unexamined so 
far in the thesis.  
8.4 Theory  
 
 My interview data highlight a lack of agreement across disciplinary 
groups regarding what scientific theory is, how it should be used, and what 
function it serves. However, this is not an open scientific debate or 
controversy, as no interviewee described active contestation about what 
theory is and/or what it does. Notions of theory seem to be located within 
the heart of disciplines, as a resource for the discipline, not to be advanced 
or extended toward others. Even economists (described as ‘colonial’ by 
some interviewees, in their perceived efforts to sweep across intellectual 




Epidemiologists […] I never can talk with them about my theoretical stuff, 
that is something I only do with other Economists  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD) 
 
Apparent in the data was a spectrum of theory-related terminology which 
seemed to reflect an underlying continuum of ideas about both what theory 
is, and what it does. This continuum, depicted in Figure 16, traverses the 





Figure 16, terms employed in discussion of theory in HIDR 
 
Here is a recapitulation of findings from Chapter 7. Just as knowledge 
about society was frequently pitted against knowledge about disease, 
theory about society (social theory) appeared in opposition to theory about 
disease (causal theory). These terms map onto material covered in Chapter 
7 in two further ways: First, within disciplines, ‘theory’ acts to reflect the 
objects of principle scholarly focus. In epidemiology, these are the links 
between exposures and outcomes (see Section 7.1.2). In the social 
sciences, this is social structures and phenomena (see Section 7.1.1). These 
are not an unexpected findings, but, as I elaborate below, comparing the 
use of theory in these disciplines demonstrates the way theory blossoms out 
of a discipline’s motivating focus, rather than being a detachable 
epistemological accessory.  
 
Second, the form theory takes seemed to correspond broadly with 
disciplinary preferences for pure and applied knowledge. At one end is 
‘pure’ theory about society, denoted in interview data by references to 
“Social Theory” and theories “belonging” to Sociology. At the other end are 
concrete theories about the causes of disease, denoted by references to 
“medicine”, “hypotheses” and “causal frameworks” as theory. In the centre, 
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somewhat awkwardly, sits the “conceptual framework”. Discussion of this 
term and rhetorical function it appears to perform close out this chapter 
section.   
 
8.4.1 Theory as Hypothesis & Causal Pathway 
 
Interviewees trained in public health and epidemiology frequently 
employed the term theory as a synonym for hypothesis, sometimes as a 
comment on the discipline:   
In public health, theory is often a hypothesis, essentially. ‘Thing X works in 
this way on thing Y’.   
 
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
Just as qualitative methods tended to be evaluated in terms of what they 
could add to quantitative research, this technical view of theory-as-causal-
pathway was presented in terms of its capacity to improve statistical 
analyses:  
You have a theory about what would be a confounder, what would be a 
mediator, and why. And you start your causal diagrams and build your 
statistical model on the basis of your theory. And let that theory guide what 
variables you actually put in your model.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD)  
You need to put structure on it [a statistical model], so you need to bring 
your theory to bear. 
Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor, (Medicine PhD) 
The discipline of medicine was referred to as theory in a similar way, both 
by medical doctors and their collaborators:  
Biological plausibility comes from theory.  
Public Health researcher (Medicine PhD)  
People with medical training, they are much, they feel much stronger on the 
theory, this conceptual understanding of a why a certain [medical] condition 
could be varying.  
Health Economist A (Economics PhD)  
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The special function performed by this kind of theory is improved model 
development, and guidance for selecting variables in quantitative analysis. 
In addition to guiding what goes into statistical models, theory about the 
causal pathways driving disease prevalence was described as guiding the 
interpretation of what comes out: 
 If I put a variable in my model and I see that these two [variables] are 
adjusting the main association I'm interested in, I could interpret it as either 
being due to confounding, or I could interpret it as being due to mediation. 
What it is depends on my theory. It is not the statistic that tell me this.   
Professor of Epidemiology and [Blank] (Epidemiology PhD) 
These references to ‘theory’ do not refer to social theory as a social 
scientist would understand it (see below), but, to ideas about how variables 
represented in a statistical model are understood to relate to one another. 
These ideas appear to be personal. The interview extracts above make clear 
that statistical interpretation and variable selection depend on your theory, 
your causal framework, your conception of the factors which collectively and 
separately determine health and disease.  
 
The application of this kind of theory was also described as being time-
sensitive. Interviewees described a window within which causal theory can 
be usefully exercised, which closes once a statistical model is run:  
[I] believe more in getting theory before you start building your model.  In 
social epidemiology […] you need to have the theory before you start 
building your regression model.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD)  
I see it in studies from epidemiology […] you notice that they haven't 
thought about any conceptual framework, the causal framework […] There 
is a lack of causal thinking before the analysis is made.  
Social Epidemiologist (Epidemiology PhD)  
This time-sensitive application illustrates the perceived fragility of this 
kind of theory, relative to quantitative findings. In the epidemiological 
epistemology, once a model is run, ‘causal theory’ survives on the basis of 
statistical confirmation. However, things are not quite as simple as was just 
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suggested. If causal theory (‘causal thinking’, as one interviewee just put it) 
informs both the input and interpretation of statistical models, there must be 
an epistemological mechanism by which causal theory can survive a 
disagreeable finding. This mechanism is outlined and discussed in Chapter 
9.  
 
8.4.2 Classical Sociology & Social Theory 
 
The view of theory-as-causal-pathway was contrasted against the view 
and use of theory within the social sciences by several social scientists, and 
social epidemiologists:  
Usually epidemiologists don’t have a theory. Quite often actually they have a 
hypothesis derived from coffee table discussions, or whatever. They have an 
idea, is there a positive relationship, or not?   
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD) 
Theory is not “I’ve got an idea.” It is much more complicated than that.  
Public Health Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
It [epidemiology] has theories, but it has mainly pathways and mechanisms 
and explanations. That is not theory.   
Sociologist (Sociology PhD) 
To me, the big difference between social science in public health and true 
discipline-specific social science is about the use of theory. […] If you are a 
true social scientist or a true sociologist, theory is something 
epistemological, kind of a meta-thing that comes before the question and 
frames the entire way of thinking.  
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD) 
 
 No interviewee stated definitively what theory is in the social sciences, 
consistent with the integrative collection code and relatively less-strong 
classification of these disciplines (compared with epidemiology) discussed 
in Chapter 7. But, use of the term “social theory” (rather than “causal 
theory”) was consistent among social scientists and social epidemiologists. 
We’re [Epidemiologists] not based in the social theory that I think would be 
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really helpful for some of these questions. […] I think it [epidemiology] is 
lacking in its basis of social theory.   
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
 One interviewee did outline the all-encompassing nature of social theory 
in terms more precise than a “meta-thing”:  
The topic you choose, the way you choose it, the topic, the problem, the 
objective, the methods, the way you interact with the methods, the analysis, 
the data, everything is involved with a theoretical view or vision of what you 
are trying to understand.   
Public Health researcher (Health Policy PhD) 
Clearly, this is not the same scientific tool as was described in the 
previous section. Social scientists described theory as acting in many more 
ways, and on many more parts of the research process than other 
disciplines. There is no time-limited window, no restriction of theory to 
causal pathways (to links between concrete variables) and no emphasis on 
statistical confirmation. Additionally, social theory is very rarely ‘yours’ in the 
way causal theory appeared to be. Quite the reverse, as social theories are 
frequently named for their originators, and names (like Bourdieu, Foucault 
and Latour) can act as shorthand for sets of theories13.  
 
The special functions of social theory were visible in interview data, 
despite their flexible and amorphous nature. One key function was to grant 
analytical access to the principle objects of scholarly interest in the social 
sciences: social structures, policy processes, and processes of social 
change. Interviewees in network clusters 4 and 6 (the most social-science-
rich region of the network) described theory as having two more specific 
functions: directly supporting analytical insight, and transforming 
researchers’ thinking:   
Critical [blank] theory […] that’s the kind of thing you don’t get elsewhere, 
where you can have real lightbulb moments and it flips your thinking about 
 
13 It is interesting to note that in epidemiology and biostatistics, with the exception of the Hill criteria 
for causation (after Bradford Hill), names typically act as shorthand for statistical tests, frequently 




Public Health Researcher (Health Services Research PhD)  
It is a spotlight on something, on some findings, that just adds this much 
clearer explanation of what’s going on. […] when I read good theoretical 
work, I think it contributes a new way of thinking about something.  
Health Policy Researcher (Geography PhD) 
Social theory appears to provide this support by rendering visible what 
was previously invisible:  
“Oh yes I didn’t see that!” It was before your eyes, [but] you were not able to 
understand it.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
However, theories were not viewed as equal in this regard, and, like all 
scientific tools, the application of theory in the literature was subject to 
critique. Social scientists described encountering work which uses theory to 
varying degrees of sophistication and success:  
You get a lot of work that engages with a particular theoretical approach in 
quite a shallow way. That is definitely the case in policy studies where 
people seem to gravitate towards [blank]’s model and reproduce it in a fairly 
unengaged way. Sometimes it’s not clear that they’ve read the original work, 
and even if they did, it’s a fairly simple way of thinking about things.  
Health Policy Researcher (Geography PhD) 
Here again is the presentation of simplicity as a weakness within the 
social sciences (specifically, simplicity in thinking). Perhaps this is another 
special function of ‘good’ social theory, that it supports the researcher to 
preserve and manage the complexity of social phenomena, established in 
Chapter 7 as a key virtue within social science disciplines.  
 
Just as epidemiologists varied in their preferred application of statistical 
methods, social scientists expressed diverse views about and preferred use 
of theory. Generally, sociologists tended to be dissatisfied with the 
application of theory in HIDR, desiring more depth, and rigour: 
What has been commonly used is Pierre Bourdieu, with his capital, that is 
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one area. But it shouldn’t just be applied and you have a half-page 
introduction, it should be thoroughly discussed and argued.  
Sociologist (Sociology PhD)  
For similar reasons, some sociologists viewed HIDR as being weak in 
theory, and viewed this as a consequence of its disciplinary makeup:  
It is a really theory-weak field. Of course, one of the reasons is it has been 
dominated by medical researchers for too long, which is also why it is very 
statistically oriented.   
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
Recalling Section 8.2.3, the focus on measurement within epidemiology 
is a central pillar of that discipline, unlikely to shift. But this focus was 
perceived by some social scientists as creating an atomised evidence-base:  
TC: Do you feel there is sufficient theoretical underpinning for work about 
health inequalities? 
No. Much of it in fact seems devoid of theoretical underpinnings, or of the 
need for them. “Here is something we can measure, great, let’s do it!” Fine, 
but what is the connection to anything else?  
Health Policy Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Of course, it is only from the vantage of an integrative discipline that 
cumulative knowledge structures appear unsatisfactory. The special function 
‘connect findings to everything else’ is not high on everyone’s priority list. 
However, this view of theory as demonstrating the connection of empirical 
findings to broader ideas was a point on which even economists and 
sociologists appeared to agree. In all disciplines, in both qualitative and 
quantitative settings, theory was described as helping to discern the 
meaning and implication of empirical findings:  
 
Even a well-designed RCT cannot give you all the answers, you still need 
theory, to develop ideas about how things work.  
Health Economist C (Economics PhD)  
In this way, theory appears to perform the special function of 
safeguarding against superficiality and meaninglessness, a ‘special’ function 
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indeed. This may explain why members of scientific disciplines take such 
fierce pride in their theories, and experience criticism or dismissal so deeply.  
Latour & Woolgar (1986) described the crushing persistence of chaos within 
scientific inquiry, and noted that much of what researchers do appears to be 
aimed at carving out local “pockets” of order, within which certain ideas can 
be tested. Theory appeared to help interviewees to create order (in their 
thinking, and in the world) and this function cut across epistemic cultures. 
However, as my previous analysis has demonstrated, ‘depth’ takes different 
forms in different disciplines, and so it should not be surprising that the term 
‘theory’ does have consistent meaning in varied disciplinary contexts. 
Rather, theory takes different forms, enters the epistemology at different 
times, with different fragilities, and for different analytical purposes.   
 
8.4.3 The Rhetorical Import of “Frameworks” 
 
Based on the preceding analysis, social epidemiologists, working at the 
intersection of the social sciences and epidemiology, might be expected to 
experience some difficulty in coherently combining the two approaches.  
However, for social epidemiologists the ‘conceptual framework’ appeared to 
act as an important rhetorical resource:  
[Some]thing that I’ve found is that some clinical epidemiologists are more 
open to a “framework” (laughing) and you can then use a “framework,” and 
test a “framework”.   
Epidemioligst C (Epidemiology PhD) 
Several social epidemiologists described needing to temper their use 
and discussion of social theory in clinical (or epidemiological) settings. In 
these settings, social theory performs no recognised special function, 
because it does not provide access to a phenomena with which clinical 
researchers are familiar, and may not connect obviously with insights of 
value. However, this is got over via the rebranding of theory as ‘conceptual 
framework’.  
 
The extract below, a response to my question about whether this 
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interviewee (trained in anthropology) feels social epidemiology is sufficiently 
theoretical, reveals the way in which the conceptual framework functions as 
a sort of epistemological halfway-house between social theory and causal 
theory:  
Many social epidemiologists do have a framework, or a conceptual 
framework, at least in their head, of how social factors impact health 
outcomes. And the chain of causation which underlies that. […] Social 
scientists are more theory-driven than epidemiologists are. But I think most 
have a conceptual framework in their head.  
To what extent that there are deep underlying theories behind those 
conceptual frameworks? I don’t know. I suppose it also depends on how 
detailed or deep a theory needs to be to be called a ‘theory’. But, people 
definitely have conceptual frameworks.  
Public Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
What interviewees meant by ‘conceptual framework’ seemed therefore to 
represent the maximum theoretical content tolerated by clinical 
epidemiologists, but perhaps the minimum viewed as acceptable by 
sociologists (a negotiation which makes sense in light of clinical 
epidemiology’s relatively stronger classification, and the power wielded by 
some epidemiologists in their role as journal editors). This was the reason 
that some sociologists did not view social epidemiology as productive 
blending of sociology and epidemiology. Rather, social epidemiology was 
presented as a watering-down of sociology for presentation and publication 
in epidemiology journals, a kind of ‘sociology-lite’ :  
In the last 10 years I have been much more inclined again to see myself as a 
sociologist [rather than social epidemiologist], because there are inherently 
sociological issues in how people act, and behave, and interact. I have 
come to think that social epidemiology has less to offer, if you want to have 
more theoretical understanding of the processes at work.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD) 
 The challenge of social epidemiology is now a recurring theme in this 
chapter, and within the thesis. In Chapter 5, social epidemiologists were 
located at the centre of the bibliometric network, linking diverse scholarly 
communities across citation-space. Chapter 7 demonstrated that 
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knowledge about disease and knowledge about society take different forms, 
and are organised via different structures. In this chapter, the challenges of 
combining social and biomedical approaches became clearer, as methods 
are inextricably linked to the insights they support, and to phenomena on 
which they shed light. At risk of simplifying to an unhelpful degree, there is 
meaningful tension between a sociologist’s desire to understand, the 
economists’ desire to decompose, and an epidemiologist desire to measure 
and intervene, and this tension appears to touch all areas of scientific 
practice. 
8.5 Conclusion  
 
In this analysis, the connection between paradigmatic concepts and 
researchers’ sense of what is worth doing was explored in detail. 
Disciplinary concepts and concerns may drive methodological preference, 
or researchers may focus on concepts to which they can confidently gain 
access, via methods with which they are familiar. In either case, methods are 
not simple tools to be pick up and put down. The decision to employ a 
method seems to have three precursors; being familiar with the method, 
familiar with the phenomena the method is suited to investigate, and belief 
that resulting insights will have value.  
 
 Similarly, preference for abstraction versus complexity appeared to be 
related to whether complexity is understood to hinder or constitute valuable 
analytical insight, with what researchers ‘value’ being at least weakly 
influenced by disciplinary training. Also different across disciplines (and 
connected to particular forms of knowledge) were views of theory, which, 
like research methods, perform the function of supporting researchers to 
access the kind of knowledge they value, and to carve out pockets of order 
in their thinking, and in the world.  
 
Therefore, analysis suggests that whilst researchers make different 
methodological choices, these choices are made for similar reasons. 
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Researchers seek, value, and use methods which support access to the 
core concepts of their disciplines, and prefer methods understood to reliably 
generate the kind of evidence they consider authoritative.  
 
The next chapter focuses on statistical methods, the concept of 
‘statistical significance’ in different disciplines and the extent to which 
interviewees from different disciplines view two particular statistics as 
representing straightforward ‘truth’. The empirical part of the thesis then 
concludes in the following chapter, with an investigation of how these 
tensions may complicate attempts to collaborate across disciplinary 





















Chapter 9. The Eye of the Beholder: Meaning 
and Statistical Inference in Quantitative 
Health Equity Research 
Scientists themselves constantly raise questions as to whether a particular 
statement “actually” relates to something “out there,” or whether it is a mere 
figment of the imagination, or an artefact of the procedures employed. It is 
therefore unrealistic to portray scientists busily occupying themselves with 
scientific activity, while leaving debates between realism and relativism to 
the philosophers. 
 
Latour & Woolgar (1986), Laboratory Life,  p.152  
9.1 Introduction  
The results presented thus far connect with the existing, overlapping 
literatures of STS, SSK, Higher Education Studies, English for Academic 
Purposes and the Sociology of Professions. To various extents, interest in 
academic disciplines peaked in these areas between 1980 and 2000, and 
has subsided more recently. Statistical practice has, however, never been a 
fashionable focus within these fields14.  
Mackenzie (1981) provided a thorough account of the ways social 
experience shaped statistical practice in the UK between 1865 and 1930; for 
example, Francis Galton’s views on intelligence, heritability and eugenics 
demonstrably ‘conditioned the content’ of his statistical practice 
(Mackenzie, 1981:p.66). To date, very little empirical research has 
investigated what conditions the content of 21st century statistical practice, 
even as this practice becomes increasingly important within public health 
and medical research. To my knowledge, no empirical account of factors 
influencing individuals’ statistical practice in public health is available.15  
Several studies evaluate statistical knowledge among particular groups  
 
14 This chapter was presented at the July 2020 meeting of the Australian Statistical 
Association, Victorian branch, recording available at https://vimeo.com/ssavic/2020721-
collyer 
 
15 Currently underway, but not part of this PhD, is a scoping review of literature surrounding 
statistical practice. The references included here are representative of the 47 studies 
included at the abstract screening stage. 
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(Ercan et al., 2013; Badenes-Ribera et al., 2016) or summarise what is 
reported in particular journals over time (Goldin et al., 1996; Armstrong & 
Henson, 2005). Many such papers begin with the aim of illuminating errors, 
misunderstandings or ‘bad practice’ (Bland & Altman, 2003), and the 
overwhelming majority focus on research published in psychology and 
medical journals, rather than population health.   
Searching Scopus and Web of Science16 for the phrase “sociology of 
statistics” returns just 9 results (Bardet, 2008; Camargo, 2009, 2015; 
Desrosières, 2007; Otero, 2018; Prévost, 2009 ; Sabri, 2013; Senra, 2008; 
Thévenot, 2011) Of these, none relate to health, but to a diverse set of 
topics including student evaluation, home care, policy evaluation, fascist 
Italy, French Philosophy, and a review of the historical study of statistics. 
Camargo (2009) identifies the sociology of statistics as a potential new field 
of study, describes the study of statistics at a macro level, as a political 
technology, and at the meso level within ‘statistical institutions’. While this 
focus will doubtlessly yield interesting insights, the framing of statistics as 
belonging to institutions or groups leaves little room for the human analyst, 
and risks treating individuals within institutions as homogeneous. 
Additionally, the scientific research context has unique organisational 
characteristics (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) suggesting that insights from non-
academic institutions may not transfer to research. This paucity of work 
stands in contrast to the currently consolidating (though loosely connected) 
subfield known as the sociology of quantification (Berman & Hirschman, 
2018). Four thematic areas have been identified, extracted below from 
Berman and Hirschman (2018, p.258)  
 
• The technopolitical decision-making that guides methodological 
choices […] showing how social, technical, and political factors 
interact to make stable numbers. 
• Which kinds of numbers matter and when? 
• How do we govern quantification?  
 
16 Searched 03/10/2020 
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• How should scholars study quantification? 
The focus of the work reviewed by Berman and Hirschman is very much 
on statistics in society, politics, big-data and the quantified self. My focus on 
statistical practice in health-related research settings and the role of that 
practice on the construction of scientific knowledge is therefore not an easy 
fit, but does perhaps contribute to the first two themes, as limited to 
research contexts.  
In Chapter 6, the network visualisation demonstrated the way geographic, 
historical, institutional and disciplinary factors intersect to jointly influence 
citation patterns in HIDR. It is possible that a similar set of forces shapes 
statistical practice. In this chapter I take a micro view of statistical practice, 
focused on the way individuals understand and interpret statistics in 
research settings, and ask: What account do researchers studying health 
equity provide of their own approach to statistical work? What variation is 
present regarding the kind of information understood to be contained in 
statistical output? Returning to the parlance of Chapter 8, what special 
function do researchers understand statistical analyses perform, and does 
this vary by discipline? A whole thesis could have been completed (and may 
yet be) on the topic of how researchers within public health understand the 
statistical methods they use. In this chapter I answer these two questions as 
best I can from my data, and outline directions for future research. 
To narrow the scope of enquiry I focus on two specific statistical 
tasks: The interpretation of regression coefficients and the interpretation of 
p-values. These were selected for the near ubiquity of regression methods in 
quantitative health-related research (Hidalgo & Goodman, 2012), and the 
heated, long-running debate surrounding p-values and their appropriate use 
(Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016; Matthews, Wasserstein, & Spiegelhalter, 2017). 
In addition, my experience in biostatistics leads me to suspect that there is 
variation in the way these statistics are understood. 
While there is not a mature sociology of statistics on which to draw, three 
concepts from the SSK and STS literatures help to more precisely 
investigate statistical practice; These are Duhem’s Paradox (Duhem, 1954) , 
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the Agonistic Field (Latour & Woolgar, 1986) , and Mechanical Objectivity 
(Daston & Gallison, 1992).  Before presenting interview data I introduce 
these concepts, below.  
9.2 Duhem’s Paradox & the Agonistic Field 
Variation in interpretation of statistical results may arise due to what is 
known as Duhem’s (1954) paradox. The ‘paradox’ is that no scientific result 
can be unambiguously interpreted without reference to an existing set of 
theoretical propositions. For example, an experiment designed to detect 
gravity may fail to do so, a finding with two interpretations: either the 
experiment was incorrectly conducted, or gravity is absent. By referring only 
to the content of the experiment researchers cannot know (definitively) 
which interpretation is correct. Within HIDR, faced with unexpected results, 
researchers may find themselves unable to judge whether results support a 
revised understanding, or suggest the study was flawed. If researchers rely 
on existing theoretical propositions to interpret ambiguous results, it seems 
plausible that these are acquired during disciplinary training, and may vary 
across disciplinary groups. 
In quantitative research about health, the interpretation of a beta coefficient 
(a component of a regression model) is an arena within which Duhem’s 
paradox is encountered. When a researcher executes their syntax and 
regression results appear on-screen, they see something like Figure 17 
below (coefficients are bolded): 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      acs_k3 |  -2.681508   1.393991    -1.92   0.055    -5.424424    .0614073 
       meals |  -3.702419   .1540256   -24.04   0.000    -4.005491   -3.399348 
        full |   .1086104    .090719     1.20   0.232    -.0698947    .2871154 
       _cons |   906.7392   28.26505    32.08   0.000     851.1228    962.3555 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Figure 17 – A generic regression output with coefficients bolded 
The bolded coefficients represent how some numeric outcome (Y) tends to 
change over different levels of an explanatory variable (X). It is on the basis 
of a table like the above that researchers argue, for example, that a 
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treatment works, that inequality is present, or that a particular population is 
at increased risk of disease. But, in order to be interpreted, this numeric 
output must be parsed, and translated into statements about health. One 
interviewee described the appearance of the coefficients on-screen as 
‘beautiful’: 
It’s fun! The numbers come up […] All of a sudden, it’s beautiful. 
TC: When the coefficients appear? What is it that’s so wonderful for you, 
about that moment? 
Well, isn’t that wonderful for everyone?? It’s exciting! You get the answers. 
It’s the end. Crossing the finish line. It’s the cake coming out of the oven. 
Health Equity Researcher (Nursing PhD) 
However, the analysis which follows suggests that the status of a regression 
coefficient as an ‘answer’ is a point of contestation, and that appearance of 
results on-screen is not the finish line. Frequently, it is the beginning of what 
Latour and Woolgar term an agonistic process (Latour & Woolgar, 1986), the 
shepherding of a new statement through an agonistic field: 
“Members of the laboratory are unable to tell whether statements are true or 
false, objective or subjective, highly likely or quite probable. While the 
agonistic process is raging, modalities are constantly added, dropped, 
inverted and modified.” (p.150) 
Generally, few statements survive the agonistic process. In Latour and 
Woolgar’s own observations, negotiations among researchers as to what 
counts as proof, or what might be undermine a particular experiment’s 
integrity, were disorderly, and frequently circular. Key stages in the journey 
from speculation to fact were characterised by the addition and subtraction 
of modalities, which served to tie new scientific claims to the local 
circumstances of their observation, limiting their generalizability: “it is the 
deletion of modalities which facilitates the promotion of speculative claim to 
fact-status” (ibid, p.69) 
In the study of health, something like an agonistic process would be 
expected to be detectible surrounding regression coefficients, as they 
represent numeric proto-statements regarding relationships between 
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exposures and disease risk. 
Latour and Woolgar characterise facts as the set of statements which 
survive the agonistic process (and are therefore modality-free). Such 
statements are understood as being true by all ‘concerned parties’ (the 
members of the relevant specialty). This aperspectival objectivity (Daston & 
Galison, 1992) merits specific consideration in a discussion of statistical 
methods, as, perhaps more than any scientific domain, statistics have the air 
of being simply true, and of being beyond the influence of social forces 
(MacKenzie, 1981). 
9.2.2 Mechanical Objectivity 
As Victorian scientists sought increasingly to move away from reliance on 
the human observer, mechanical, automated images replaced artistic 
renderings as the preferred representation of scientific objects. Daston and 
Galison (1992) frame the search for objective renderings of nature during the 
17th and 18th centuries as “a moral, as much as a technical quest” (p.117). 
Where human investigators proved lazy, inconsistent and unreliable, 
mechanical instruments entered the laboratory, and worked there, “patient, 
indefatigable, ever alert, probing beyond the limits of the human 
senses”(p.120). Mechanical objectivity emerged as a scientific ideal, and 
human judgement was re-framed as a source of scientific error, to be 
corrected, rather than a skill to be valued. Automated imaging technologies 
such as photography and the x-ray represented 
“attempts - never wholly successful - to extirpate human intervention 
between object and representation. Interpretation, selectivity, artistry, and 
judgement itself all came to appear as subjective temptations requiring 
mechanical or procedural safeguards” (p.98) 
The search for objective imagery in science is therefore “inextricably tied to 
a relentless search to replace individual volition and discretion in depiction 
by the invariable routines of mechanical reproduction.” (p.98) But, the X-ray 
wasn’t a perfect truth-teller. Movement of the equipment or subject could 
result in certain contours disappearing (or appearing) in X-ray images. Thus, 
even mechanically generated representations required expertise in 
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interpretation and “the acquisition of the ‘seeing eye’” (p.109). 
Despite these weaknesses, mechanistic imaging devices retained an “aura 
of superhuman power”,  a privileged epistemic status. The automation of 
image generation “excludes the scientists’ will from the field of discourse” 
(p.117) along with scientists’ fallibility and human weaknesses. 
A similar transition seems have occurred in statistical inference (see Box 1) 
during the 20th century, as the statistical procedure known as Null 
Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) has come to dominate the 
quantitative analyses of health-related data. NHST is a mechanistic 
procedure, designed to remove expert judgement from the task of statistical 
inference (Gigerenzer, 2018). One of the biggest debates in all science 
currently surrounds the continued use of the hypothesis testing framework 
(Amrhein et al., 2019), with attempts to remove and replace it generally 
being regarded as unsuccessful (Matthews et al., 2017). It may be that 
mechanised, automated statistical inference procedures possesses the 
same ‘aura’ of mechanised images, and that the same forces which 
rendered the latter appealing are at work maintaining the dominance of the 
former, perhaps to varying extents in different disciplines. 
In the following analysis I ask whether interviewees appear to be 
encountering Duhem’s paradox in their interpretation of statistical results, 
whether such results are reported as being shepherded through something 
like an agonistic field, and whether mechanised inferential procedures are 
received as the straightforward ‘words of nature’ (Daston & Galison, 1992), 
or whether they are interpreted through the critical lens of subject-matter 
expertise.  
9.3 Interview Data  
To support this analysis, I  separated interviewees into four groups on the 
basis of their account of their own statistical practice: 
• Researchers who mostly do their own quantitative analysis (n=18) 




• Statisticians who conduct analyses for others (n=3) 
• Qualitative researchers who do not conduct (or delegate) quantitative 
analyses (n=2) 
These groups developed as I coded interview transcripts, and interviewees 
were allocated on the basis of data arising at all parts of the interview, most 
commonly in discussion of research methods, and statistics. I did not have 
sufficient data to classify one interviewee, and so they are missing from the 
summary above.  
A general discussion of interviewees’ sense of their own statistical literacy, 
and the forces in academia which appear to promote or hinder the 
development of statistical capabilities is not within the scope of this chapter, 
but is included in Appendix I. To summarise that material, interviewees had 
varying confidence in their statistical skills, which in many cases seemed 
inconsistent with my impression of their experience, and expertise. The 
status of ‘statistical expert’ emerged as being relative, a feature of expertise 
established by other STS scholars (Grundman, 2017; Jasanoff, 2003).  For 
some interviewees (and, it was reported, within their teams), statistical 
proficiency seems to be surrounded by intense emotions (e.g., fear) and low 
statistical literacy was repeatedly connected to feelings of illegitimacy, 
inferiority and inadequacy. Despite this variation, the value and importance 
of statistical literacy was acknowledged by almost all interviewees, but most 
especially interviewees in the US working in cancer-related research, who 
presented statistical capability as being key for maximising research output, 
obtaining grant funding, and maximising individual employability. Despite 
being a valued skill, several senior academics across disciplines and 
geographic settings reported declining statistical literacy across their 
careers. Eight interviewees specifically mentioned that while early in their 
careers they conducted analyses themselves, they no longer do so. 
However, no interviewee in Cluster 2 (where negative knowledge was 
discussed as being highly valued) described themselves as being 
‘dependent’ on statisticians in a similar way. Doing one’s own statistical 
analysis was presented in tension with ‘efficient’ research output by 
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interviewees in the UK, Australia, and the US. Despite a widespread 
perception that quantitative skills are highly valuable (even essential) in 
research settings, for some interviewees these are not as valuable as the 
efficient generation of grant applications and peer-reviewed publications. 
Box 1: Statistical Inference 
In applied research settings such as epidemiology and public health, 
probability theory is applied to study data via a process known as statistical 
inference. Inferential statistics support researchers to make claims (or, ‘draw 
inference’) about entire populations based on statistics calculated from a 
sample. The basis of inferential statistics in probability necessitates uncertain 
conclusions. Where in mathematics answers can be concrete and definite, in 
statistics answers are almost always couched in terms of chance 
(percentages, odds). In the face of this uncertainty, a process known as 
hypothesis testing is the dominant quantitative framework for generating 
inductive insight from sample data. Very generally, patterns observed in 
study data are compared with what might be expected, assuming a 
particular state of affairs known as the ‘null hypothesis’. Where the observed 
data differs markedly from what would be predicted under the null 
hypothesis, that hypothesis is rejected in favour of some other explanation. 
In theory, under the null hypothesis significance testing framework, the 
researcher draws a bright line between results which have meaning (and 
merit the rejection of the null hypothesis), and results which do not. 
9.3.1 Once more, with meaning 
As was briefly mentioned in Chapter 7, interviewees presented the central 
conundrum of statistical inference as determining whether or not observed 
results have meaning. Also noted was the way interviewees trained in 
epidemiology and health economics placed high value on empirical 
strategies felt to safeguard against bias (‘confounding’ in epidemiology, 
‘poor identification’ in economics), positioned as distorting results, or 
rendering them meaningless. 
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Some interviewees who lacked confidence with statistics indicated that this 
extended to their ability to determine which results have meaning, compared 
with statistical experts (whatever ‘expert’ meant within their context). 
Experts were perceived not only to have more, or broader understanding, 
but a qualitatively different understanding. It was in discussion of regression 
methods where five interviewees discussed the substance of this difference: 
The people who do stats that I really respect the most […] they really, really 
understand what regression is and what it’s doing. I think they understand it 
from a qualitative sense […] there are a lot of people who can run 
unbelievably wizzy models but don’t really have a scooby about what it 
actually means. They understand what the results are telling them but they 
don’t understand, in a qualitative sense, what the model is doing. 
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Understanding what a method ‘is’ and what it ‘is doing’ may not seem like 
expert-level knowledge. But, in my biostatistical consulting experience, few 
researchers can explain in detail how regression models work. Where 
interest in the modelling process is apparently limited, interest in results is 
widespread, and is typically focused on just one part of the regression 
equation, the ‘effect size’ or beta coefficient. Strictly speaking, removing a 
coefficient from its parent equation is not appropriate because the 
coefficient is only one part of the equation, and can only be accurately 
interpreted in context. Only interviewees in Cluster 2 noted this point ( beta 
coefficient = ‘odds ratio’): 
In medicine and epidemiology, often odds ratios will be presented as the 
way of showing an effect, which is not done so much in economics […] 
[also] there is the lack of appreciation that an odds ratio really can only be 
interpreted in the context of the particular model. Any odds ratio will be 
dependent upon the other variables you have in your model. So comparing 
odds ratios across studies, that doesn’t make much sense.  
Health Economist A (Economics PhD) 
In the discussion section of epidemiological and public health papers, the 
practice of contrasting odds ratios between studies is quite common, 
despite the technical issue outlined above. Whatever is gained by the 
comparison must surmount these technical objections, echoing the finding 
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from Chapter 7 that the purposive slant of the epidemiological epistemology 
is a powerful driver of scientific practice: If useful knowledge can be 
gleaned, technical details may take a back seat. Recall that in chapter 
Chapter 7 some economists expressed the reverse position, and 
emphasised the cardinal importance of demonstrating that technical 
assumptions have been satisfied. Additionally, this economist’s refusal to 
compare results across studies might hint at the origin and basis of the 
atomistic conceptualisation of health-related research common among 
biostatisticians and economists in Chapter 7. If results cannot be compared 
between studies, then health is, as some economists and statisticians in 
Chapter 7 described, a set of (disconnected) empirically-derived statements. 
Multiple interviewees with economic training expressed the perception that 
epidemiological, medical and public-health publications often lack sufficient 
detail for a reader to independently assess (or even identify) the model 
which has been fit: 
It is hard to unpack, especially in public health and medical journals, what 
exactly has been controlled for, how they controlled for it, and what 
implications that might have. 
TC: Is that because only the final model is presented, and you have no idea 
what went on? 
Even when the final model is presented, only the coefficients of interest are 
presented, sometimes, you haven’t got all of the other variables.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
It is notable that for economists and some epidemiologists, this statistical 
detail appeared essential to the evaluation of claims made within a 
publication. Here we catch another glimpse of the role negative knowledge 
plays in these epistemologies. For quantitative studies of health equity, 
statistical analysis is one part of the research process where negative 
knowledge (knowledge about getting knowledge) and positive knowledge 
(knowledge about health) are in direct contact, and might mutually influence 
each other. However, disciplinary training appeared to shape the balance 
researchers wished to strike in this regard. 
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The only interviewees to comment on specific technical limitations of 
regression methods were economists or epidemiologists from network 
Cluster 2, or were biostatisticians, reflecting the importance of knowledge 
about the challenges of knowing, or limits to what can be known, in these 
disciplines and network cluster17. For some other interviewees, statistical 
detail was framed as a hindrance, obstructing the key message of a paper, 
obstructing the positive knowledge. For example, the following interviewee 
explained that sparse reporting is necessary, because the full regression 
model is incomprehensible to some readers, and extracting the central 
finding allows work to be more widely disseminated: 
I would say […] [to my statistician] “How the hell do we convey all of that?” 
My role is to turn it into something you can publish in a social science 
journal, rather than [*gushing sound*]. Nobody wants equations.   
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
Despite this interviewee’s own view, clearly, some researchers do want 
equations. These researchers tended to be very confident in their statistical 
literacy, and/or to be located in network Cluster 2. Here is evidence of the 
Clusters detected in Chapter 6 representing epistemic silos, as something 
indispensable to one researcher is presented by another as being a 
communicative hindrance. 
 
9.3.2 The epistemological status of the beta coefficient 
Given that the results of an entire analysis might boil down to a single 
number in epidemiology and public health, the meaning and interpretation of 
beta coefficients emerges as a key point of potential divergence in statistical 
practice. Even to the most accomplished and experienced analyst, the 
coefficient cannot explain itself. Scientific objects are not accompanied by a 
‘halo’ conveying their meaning (Barnes, 1982); rather, their interpretation is 
something scientists learn, in a particular scientific context, within a 
 
17 In noting this trend, I do not claim that the limits of knowing are unimportant in the social 
sciences. However, when asked what sets good work apart from poor work, epidemiologists, 
economists and biostatisticians overwhelmingly referred to aspects of negative knowledge.  
 
273 
particular scientific culture (Jasanoff, 2003). 
Acknowledging diversity in interpretation does not imply that all 
interpretations are ‘true’, as there are mathematically correct and incorrect 
interpretations, which either are or are not consistent with the form of the 
model within which the coefficient sits. But, not all interpretation depends on 
mathematical definitions. Two researchers who agree on the formal 
definition of the beta coefficient may disagree regarding what has been 
learned about health at the end of a given project, once the coefficient is 
known. In the next section I explore how interviewees understand these 
coefficients; what sort of information they contain, and whether researchers 
view coefficients as reflecting an entity which exists, or are a part of a 
symbolic mathematical sketch. 
9.3.3 Regression as Knowledge Discovery and/or Construction 
To try and understand what researchers believe a set of regression 
coefficients can convey about health, I asked interviewees familiar with 
regression methods (n=28) to discuss their conceptual approach to the 
application of these methods. Two pilot interviewees complained my 
question was ‘abstract’ and extremely difficult to answer. In subsequent 
interviews I invited researchers to position themselves along a spectrum: 
between viewing regression modelling as a process of knowledge discovery, 
knowledge construction, or something in between. Interviewees might 
consider the coefficient as something which is discovered by eliminating all 
bias and revealing the ‘truth’, or as something constructed by a researcher, 
a best effort, subject to major caveats. Nine interviewees articulated a clear 
position, three opted not to answer, and the remaining 16 responded with a 
general discussion about how they feel regression models correspond to 
‘reality’ and ‘truth’. 
An unexpected question 
Even with this specific line of questioning, several interviewees struggled to 
arrive at an answer. Four interviewees from a diverse set of disciplinary 
backgrounds and network clusters began by noting that they had never 
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thought about this issue before: 
Interesting! That is interesting.  
[Long pause]. 
I don’t know. I don’t know. […] I definitely 
understand both sides but I’m not sure 
I’ve ever thought about it in that way. 
Health Education & Behaviour 
researcher (Health Promotion PhD) 
Hmmm. I’m not sure I have a 
preconceived response to that question. 
Health Equity Researcher  
(Sociology PhD) 
 [Long pause]. I haven’t been asked that 
question before. 
Health Economst B  
(Economics PhD) 
 [Pause]. I haven’t thought about that. […] 
It’s something to think about. 
Social Epidemiologist A  
(Epidemiology PhD) 
 
That researchers from such varied disciplinary backgrounds (and in such 
varied geographic locations) reported never having deeply considered the 
epistemic status of a statistic central to quantitative work about health is 
itself interesting. Although only four interviewees were open about never 
having considered the question, it was clear that the majority of interviewees 
did not have a prepared response. This is consistent with Kuhn’s description 
of the paradigm as forming the unremarkable backdrop to routine scientific 
work, with Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) description of inscription devices as 
representing black boxes opened only in the event of suspected 
malfunction, and also with Rudwick’s (1985) conclusion, based on study of 
19th century geologists, that the theory-laden character of empirical scientific 
work is only rarely contemplated by working scientists. 
Three interviewees who commissioned analyses from statisticians but did 
not perform analyses did not directly answer the question, and seemed to 
view the issue as being outside their scholarly domain: 
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Well, I’ve never really thought about… [trails off] 
TC: [laughing] Yes, it is a slightly weird question. 
Yeah. The regression. [Pause]. I just let my statisticians do all of the 
analyses. It keeps me honest. So, I don’t have a view. 
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
Such responses suggest that some researchers who delegate statistical 
analyses view this as inclusive of the conceptual approach to quantitative 
work. For at least some researchers, the epistemological status of the 
analysis appears to be viewed as belonging to the analysis and not to the 
scientific project of which the analysis forms a part. Future studies might 
investigate this further. 
Other responses to this question are handled in the next two sections, 
dealing with those who positioned regression as a process of discovery, or a 
process of construction.  
9.3.3.1 Regression Methods as Discovery 
Interview data contained contrasting perspectives regarding whether 
regression models can facilitate ‘discovery’. Although no interviewee 
mentioned Duhem by name, his paradox seems ever-present in the 
interpretation of regression coefficients. Interviewees leaning toward the idea 
that models do facilitate discovery tended to reminisce about a particular 
result which surprised them: 
With our stuff on [blank] and inequalities, the model was the discovery. We 
ran a model and were not expecting to see a smaller inequality among 
populations that had greater access to [blank]. I wasn’t expecting that, […] it 
was a bit like an archeological process, sweeping away the soil and 
suddenly, there’s excalibur. 
Public Health Researcher (Geography PhD) 
For this researcher, the beta coefficient suggested a revised interpretation of 
a commonly understood relationship, and this revised understanding was 
accepted as corresponding with the real world, rather than as reflecting a 
quirk in the study’s design. But, the interpretation of unexpected results was 
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not so clear for all interviewees: 
I am always a bit cautious. If you get something that looks weird, check it 
and see, and maybe test it using a split sample, or another dataset, or 
something. It should make sense. But I’m not ruling out the possibility that 
you find something that is completely left field. […] They may or may not be 
[correct], but at this stage you don’t know what they are. 
Public Health Researcher (Medicine PhD) 
This interviewee has articulated Duhem’s paradox quite neatly, emphasising 
their inability to know what strange results mean at the time they arise. 
Faced with this uncertainty, knowledge from outside the model (from other 
datasets) is necessary to inform interpretation. Consistent across 
interviewees was the sense that such confirmatory references do not 
provide an interpretation, they inform the researchers’ interpretation. From 
the above extract, it is “you” who doesn’t know, and “you” who needs to 
evaluate the merits of the result and come to a decision. It is the researcher 
who decides whether a result has meaning (and represents ‘excalibur’, new 
knowledge) or is an artefact, to be dismissed or re-estimated. For the above 
interviewee, despite its mechanistic origin, a regression model does not 
speak the words of nature (Daston & Galison, 1992), the coefficient is a 
somewhat garbled statement to be treated with caution, to be checked and 
cross-checked against other sources. 
But not all coefficients are treated with equal scepticism. The interpretation 
of coefficients seemed to depend on whether they agreed with researchers’ 
prior expectations. Comments like the above, that coefficients “should make 
sense” were widespread, seeming to suggest that results fitting with 
researchers’ existing understandings are somehow different to results which 
do not: 
My radar would be up more if it [the estimated effect] is an unexpected 
direction, or it was significant when I thought it wasn’t going to be. You 
know, so I guess once that happened, I don’t just take it at face value that 
“Yep, that’s it”. But I don’t tend to do that for results that are sort of more 
expected.  
             Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
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If the interpretation of the coefficient varies depending on whether it makes 
sense to the researcher, regression coefficients are not mechanically 
objective, but require a ‘seeing eye’ and expert judgement (Daston & 
Galison, 1992). The interviewee quoted above expressed this as follows: 
I think you have to take those [unexpected] results, but view them from a 
lens of common-sense  
One strategy for navigating Duhem’s paradox is therefore the application of 
‘common-sense’. As common-sense might rely upon things the researcher 
already knows, it seems that the paradox is embraced via this approach, 
rather than evaded. In the biostatistics literature, common-sense has been 
presented in tension with the Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
framework for over 20 years. For example, Lane (1999) lamented common-
sense as having been ‘sacrificed on the altar of statistics’ in medical 
research, meaning that expert, clinical judgement is systematically devalued. 
Later in the chapter, the specifics of what researchers mean by common-
sense will be investigated more closely. 
On the question of whether regression results represent discoveries, some 
interviewees, especially epidemiologists and economists, went around in 
circles. These interviewees seemed reluctant to rule out the potential for 
discovery, as memories of previous analyses or the certainty of seminal 
findings seemed to draw interviewees toward the conclusion that 
coefficients do represent ‘real’ relationships. But, as was discussed in 
Chapter 7, the persistent, nagging awareness of bias and measurement 
error seemed to prevent interviewees with epidemiological and economic 
backgrounds from settling on this as a definite answer. Three illustrative 
extracts are provided below: 
TC: [Do models provide discoveries, or represent a construction?] 
I am more on the ‘trying to find what’s real’ side […][But] it’s hard [for the 
coefficient] to ever be truth when we have so many caveats with 
measurement, and whatever. I hope I’m at least getting closer to the truth, 
as I’m building. But then, […] I guess I am ‘building’ […] Those estimates 
inform interventions, so let’s hope there is some truth to it. […] I’m hedging, 
I’m in between. Because, of course, it’s not perfectly true. 
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Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
For this interviewee, technical caveats get in the way of regression results 
representing simple truths. This interviewee finds themselves ‘in between’ 
awareness of the limitations of the model, and the sense that, over time and 
in the long-run, these methods do provide reliable representations. 
We know from regression, if you’ve left something out of your model, you 
are not going to get perfect identification of what’s in the model. So, 
yeah, I suppose I don’t generally view… [pause] Or do I?  […] I’ve definitely 
changed my view about the world [following a regression analysis], my 
priors have changed. So in that way I would be in the first camp [model is 
discovery], but, in general, I am in the second camp [model is 
construction].  
Health Economist B (Economics PhD)  
For this interviewee, technical limitations mean that results aren’t perfect, 
but, sometimes, regression coefficients do alter a researcher’s 
understanding of the world. This economist’s simultaneous identification 
with both ‘camps’ is yet another manifestation of Duhem’s paradox. Notice 
that ‘generally’, models do not facilitate discovery. Only in specific instances 
where the researcher’s prior understanding is updated (perhaps due to the 
absence of negative modalities) are regression models understood to have 
this capacity.  
Seminal findings were frequently held up as evidence that regression models 
detect facts:  
Smoking does cause lung cancer. You’d really have to be philosophically 
nimble to say that that is somehow not a generalisable fact. You would 
bloody well hope that your case control study, or cohort study picks it up, 
and your model is therefore measuring something that is true. But it will 
have error, due to statistical imprecision, as well as the three sources of 
error: confounding, selection bias and measurement error. 
Professor of Epidemiology (Medical Doctor)  
For this interviewee, Duhem’s paradox is seemingly evaded via 
acknowledgement that regression models access true relationships, but 
reflect them imperfectly. References to smoking and lung cancer were 
pervasive throughout discussions of regression methods, but interviewees 
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employing this example seemed to ignore the heated debate which 
surrounded the original claim, and the range of perspectives and methods 
which contributed to resolution of the debate. In the above extract, it is 
known that smoking causes lung cancer before the model is run. It does 
seem straightforward that a model is ‘measuring something that is true’ 
when that truth is established in advance. Similarly, Latour & Woolgar (1986, 
p.153) noted in their study of molecular biologists that “the distinction 
between reality and local circumstances exists only after the statement has 
stabilised as a fact”. The splitting of truth and statement-about-truth can 
occur only after a scientific controversy settles, after a statement like 
“smoking causes lung cancer” stabilises within the agonistic field. Thus, 
Duhem’s paradox persists, as unless ‘truth’ is established at the outset, the 
presence of bias cannot be assessed by the researcher. 
These data seem to suggest an agonistic process occurs around the 
interpretation of regression coefficients. Regressions produce ‘generalisable 
facts’ only in specific, particular instances, where bias, measurement error 
or other problematic features (modalities) are demonstrably absent.  
One interviewee trained in psychology had a contrasting perspective, and 
argued forcefully that the special function of regression methods is to 
confirm pre-existing understandings, and that regression cannot discover (if 
‘discovery’ means a finding not anticipated in a pre-specified analysis plan): 
You are testing the model. I mean, ((exasperated)) you don’t discover stuff, 
you verify it. When I’m doing quantitative [work] I am really into hypothesis 
testing. […] I have never found anything from statistical analysis that I didn’t 
expect to see […] the model doesn’t work that way. You’re not supposed to 
look at the correlation matrix and say “I have found a significant relationship 
I didn’t expect”, that’s not the way the model and the theory is supposed to 
work. I discover new stuff when I do qualitative stuff […] I don’t think you do 
[statistical] analyses to discover stuff, I think you verify and confirm.    
Health Policy Researcher (Psychology PhD) 
This interviewee is adhering very tightly to the technical stipulations of rule-
based null hypothesis significance testing, which mandate either that the 
researchers’ primary hypothesis is confirmed, or the null-hypothesis is not 
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rejected and the analysis provides a ‘null’ finding (Pernet, 2016). Under this 
view, strictly speaking, when performing hypothesis tests, surprising or 
unexpected results should be discarded, and investigated in a dedicated 
study. However, in practice, where time and money have been spent on 
study design and data collection, and where researchers demonstrate their 
value by generating high-impact published outputs, surprising findings are 
routinely published. This practice has been positioned as problematic when 
researchers present unexpected findings as though the study was originally 
designed to detect them (Rubin, 2017; Kerr, 1998) If authors are deliberately 
opaque regarding the status of an analysis as either post-hoc or a priori then 
this is clearly questionable. However, the general validity of post-hoc 
analyses is debated in medical and biological science (Head et al., 2015) 
and there is no widely-accepted, formal process for reporting post-hoc 
analyses. 
The above interviewee clearly views regression analyses as confirmatory, 
suggesting that regression coefficients are chiefly a mechanism for verifying 
what a researcher already suspects. In this way, despite taking a more 
extreme position on the limits of statistical inference, this researcher’s view 
is not inconsistent with the other interviewees who implied, in various ways, 
that the interpretation of the coefficient depends on the researcher’s existing 
understanding of the relationship under consideration.  
9.3.3.2 Regression methods as knowledge construction 
Several interviewees outlined a position indicating that regression models 
are a picture or sketch of reality, rather than representing reality directly. 
However, the reasons interviewees put forward as to why regression 
methods fail to capture the ‘truth’ varied quite neatly across two disciplinary 
groups. Social scientists tended to be reflexive and emphasise the role of 
their own values and priorities: 
It is a representation that, you know, as a researcher, you are constructing. 
Your own principles and kind of epistemological position, of course, are vital 
for how you’ve gone about that process. […] it is not like there is some sort 
of definitive truth out there, it is about thinking about defining a question 
and your own values, and the decision making that you implement 
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throughout the research process.      
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
Interviewees with epidemiology and economic backgrounds tended to 
locate the lack of correspondence with reality within the technical limits of 
the method, rather than the role of the researcher: 
It’s an imperfect representation of reality, because there is always 
confounding.  Also the variables and instruments themselves are imperfect, 
there are no perfect ways of measuring things, are there?  
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
Nine interviewees specifically discounted the likelihood of a single 
regression analysis providing a durable answer: 
That would be problematic, if people imagine they’re going to plunge into a 
dataset and ‘prove’ conclusively, forever, that this is the ‘right’ answer.  
Geographer (Geography PhD)  
Regression models can be useful as a starting point, however, I can’t 
imagine that regression models based on a few variables offer accurate 
representations of reality.  
 
Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD)  
A similar sentiment was that the coefficients ‘help’ researchers arrive to at 
their conclusions: 
They represent help. I think they represent help to answer my questions. So, 
they represent possible effects of exposures on the outcomes. […] 
TC: So, they help you to answer the question, they are not themselves the 
answer to the question? 
The coefficients themselves? No. 
 
Biostatistician A (Biostatistics PhD) 
This view of coefficients as being ‘helpful’ represents another route to the 
conclusion that it is researchers who answer questions and assign meaning, 
not models. The view of regression coefficients as contributing to an answer 
(rather than themselves being answers) implies that regression models do 
not fully capture or accurately reflect reality. Ten interviewees expressed this 
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view, suggesting variously that regression coefficients approximate true 
relationships:  
I view it as an approximation to lots of these different relationships  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
Reflect some part or component of true relationships:  
I think that it’s one piece of reality.  
Professor of Health Outcomes (Epidemiology PhD) 
It’s always going to be a partial representation of truth 
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
That regression coefficients approach true relationships from a certain 
direction (implying that there are other directions):  
I think they are a depiction of some view of reality 
Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD)  
Or are inherently limited in the completeness of the picture they provide:  
They will never fully describe reality  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
Therefore, for both interviewees who view regression as discovery, and 
those who view it as construction, results are not necessarily definitive or 
conclusive. An obvious next question relates to how interviewees navigate 
this uncertainty and draw conclusions from research data; but first, a related 
discussion surrounds the extent to which data can ‘speak for itself’. 
Several interviewees used language implying that data can communicate. 
The metaphor of data ‘talking’ or ‘saying’ was employed by interviewees 
from a range of disciplines and network clusters, and one interviewee 
framed their entire approach to statistical inference explicitly in these terms: 
It’s just like interviewing someone. You ask them a question and they give 
you an answer, and sometimes you need to understand how history and 
personality and situation is going to condition the answer they give you. […] 
my approach to it [statistics] is to see it as a bit like interviewing the data. 
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
The presentation of researchers and data as being in a dialogic exchange 
merits close analysis, as on the subject of data ‘talking’, some tension was 
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evident. On one hand, being attentive and ‘listening’ to data was presented 
as a virtue: 
When you confront data, it can tell you things you didn’t expect. Are you 
listening? 
Social Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
The conclusion, whatever you want to call it, has to be based on what the 
data says. 
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
But, some interviewees identified risks associated with listening uncritically 
to data: 
Most of the time you can’t let the data just speak, you need to put structure 
on it. […] what you get out of the model depends on how you set it up. I 
think for most things, that is true. 
Professor of Epidemiology (Medical Doctor)  
This extract points to the central issue with the dialogic metaphor of 
statistical analysis. Data only ’speak’ in ways facilitated by researchers; 
models do not build themselves, tables do not populate themselves, graphs 
do not design themselves (Barnes, 1982). Just as the image-makers of the 
18th and 19th century were disappointed to discover that X-ray depends on 
expert operation and interpretation (Daston & Galison, 1992), regression 
models ultimately depend on researchers for their design, execution and 
interpretation. However, in the context of negative commentary surrounding 
the intrusion of the researcher into the inferential procedure, the appeal of 
data-as-talker may be that it frames the researcher in a passive manner, as a 
mechanical recorder of what data says rather than as an active mediator of 
what data can say.  
A contrasting metaphor, employed while discussing the use of regression 
methods, framed the researcher in a more active light. Eight interviewees 
described their actions in intrepid terms, “exploring” relationships, data, and 
ideas: 
Most of us want to extrapolate to the human race. And when we do that, 
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that is a matter of construction, constructing something empirically 
grounded […] But when you’re in your data, and you’re trying to establish, 
it is more exploring what is there.  
 
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
This view of data-as-terrain presents the researcher as being active, 
determining both what is explored and to what extent. This view of data was 
more commonly expressed by statisticians, or interviewees with experience 
and confidence conducting analysis, perhaps suggesting that experience 
applying statistical methods shapes understanding of how data enters the 
epistemology. The tension between these views of data might be explored in 
detail, in a future research project. 
9.3.3.3 ’It depends’ 
For most interviewees, unless studying relationships already understood to 
be ‘real’, regression coefficients do not appear to be viewed as a final, 
complete and authoritative source of knowledge. Researchers must 
therefore look elsewhere for a basis on which to promote statements 
suggested by regression models to generalisable facts. Interviewees 
reported looking in a variety of places for confirmation that a particular 
statistical result has meaning (or does not have meaning), and these are 
presented in Table 13 
 
It depends on… [n]  
How the model is setup [4] 
We make decisions in model building, we make decisions 
further upstream in what we ask, the tools we use, how we 
manage data, how we code data, there are choices that 
are subjective.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher  
(Health Promotion PhD) 
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Study Design [3] 
It depends on the research design. If I participated in a 
randomised control trial I would feel differently about this 
than when I do a quasi-experiment, compared to doing a 
descriptive paper.  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD)  
Research Question [5] 
It partly depends on the model, and perhaps the questions 
you’re trying to ask with it.  
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Data Quality & Availability [5] 
If you do use statistical models […] the underlying data 
need to be good.   
Public Health researcher (Public Health PhD)  
Table 13: Places interviewees looked for confirmation that a statistical result has meaning 
The contents of Table 13 represent source material for both positive and 
negative modalities which may be attached to individual regression 
coefficients. If a study’s design is perceived as good, the data as being of 
high quality, and research question as appropriate for investigation via 
regression, interviewees described themselves as being more likely to trust 
the coefficient. However, any single item in Table 13 failing to meet 
expectations could lead to a result being dismissed. This perhaps explains 
why interviewees generally assumed there is some reason why a regression 
coefficient does not perfectly reflect reality, as most interviewees stressed it 
was only in rare, special cases that the full range of factors in Table 13 were 
satisfied. 
9.3.3.4 The Eye of the Beholder 
From the data presented, it appears that, despite the mechanistic, 
algorithmic origins of regression coefficients, interviewees do not generally 
understand them as being uncomplicated representations of reality, as being 
the ‘words of nature’. Repeatedly, and in various ways, interviewees 
foregrounded the role of the human analyst; the interpretation of the 
coefficient might depend on what the researcher expects to find, might be 
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understood as helping the researcher arrive at their own answer, or might 
depend on myriad other factors under the researchers’ control. In addition, 
the coefficients themselves are influenced by the researcher’s judgement 
during the model building process. It appears that the meaning of an 
individual regression coefficient lies in the eye of the beholder, it is the 
researcher, and their readers, who decide its meaning. 
9.4 Significance, Meaning and Thinking 
 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Null Hypothesis 
Significance Testing (NHST) framework represents a mechanistic approach 
to statistical inference. It represents an attempt to evade Duhem’s paradox, 
by providing formal, rule-based guidance for deciding whether a particular 
statistical result has achieved ‘Statistical Significance’ (which, in some 
contexts, is synonymous with ‘meaning’). The test involves checking 
whether the value of a particular statistic, the p-value, exceeds a threshold 
set by the researcher before the analysis is conducted. 
9.4.1 P-Values 
Broadly, the p-value represents the probability of the observed result, 
assuming there is no underlying difference in the data18. Therefore, a low p-
value is desirable for demonstrating difference, suggesting the observed 
result is unlikely in the absence of underlying difference. 
In some scientific spaces, the use of p-values reduces statistical inference 
to a yes/no question: if the p-value exceeds 0.05, the result is ‘statistically 
significant’, if not, the result is ‘not statistically significant’ (and, depending 
on the research area, may be unpublishable, see Head et al., 2015). This 
rule-based approach nominally removes subject area expertise and 
statistical expertise from statistical inference, limiting the role of the 
researcher and their judgement in the interpretation of results. The use of p-
values to determine statistical significance appears to represent a 
 
18 Said another way, if a study is aiming to detect a difference in a health outcome between 
two income groups, the p-value reflects the likelihood of observing the study result, 
assuming there is no difference (in health) between the groups. 
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mechanical or procedural safeguard against the ills of expert judgement and 
interpretation of the type Daston & Galison (1992) described from historical 
sources. The moral dimension of this privileging of mechanical objectivity 
above expert knowledge in statistical inference has also been the subject of 
comment for several decades in medical research: 
“What used to be called judgment is now called prejudice, and what used to 
be called prejudice is now called a null hypothesis.” (Edwards, 1972: p180) 
The continued use of the p-value as the only criterion upon which results are 
judged remains the subject of continued outcry (Amrhein et al., 2019), 
however, to date, most commentary has come from statistical associations 
(e.g., Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016) and prominent statisticians (e.g. Gelman, 
2016). This PhD project provided an opportunity to hear from researchers 
who may not be engaging in the conversation. 32 interviewees (out of 43)  
mentioned or were asked to comment on the use of p-values within HIDR (I 
did not ask interviewees with limited time available for the interview, or 
interviewees who responded to my initial enquiry about their use of 
statistical methods in a way which indicated this was not a comfortable 
topic). Going into my interviews, I believed that all quantitative researchers 
who study health were actively wrestling with this issue. However, I quickly 
realised that while some interviewees leapt at the chance to express views 
on the topic, and had clearly followed debates closely, others were less 
aware. The following two extracts are illustrative of this contrast: 
It is a disaster, p-values, an absolute disaster. […] It is the greatest problem 
in our science. 
Social Epidemiologist (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
TC: There’s a bit of noise around, about P-values. 
Is there? I am not surprised.  
Geographer (Geography PhD)  
I got the sense that for many interviewees the debate surrounding the use of 
p-values is occurring somewhere in the intellectual distance. Few 
interviewees discussed the issue in relation to their own research, or 
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positioned themselves as stakeholders in the debate. Many had the sense 
that others would resolve the question: 
There are people debating it much more actively than me […] I respect the 
debate. I’m aware of the debate and I think they have some good points but 
as long as they’re sorting it out I’m happy to let them do it. 
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD) 
Four interviewees commented on how long the issue has been the topic of 
debate and discussion within public health and epidemiology: 
It has been about forty years […] I think it is mind-boggling that this debate 
is still going on. 
Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD)  
This seemed to contribute to a sense that entering the debate actively was 
of little likely benefit. Nevertheless, discussing p-values proved to be a 
window into more general attitudes regarding statistical inference. As with 
regression models, the judgement of the analyst and the importance of 
‘common-sense’ emerged as  central, and the role of the researcher, their 
expectations and their choices was repeatedly emphasised. 
9.4.2 Thinking and “Stupidity”  
Calculating Without Thinking 
Nine interviewees said they felt that the use of p-values as binary decision-
making tools discourages ‘thinking’ (nuanced interpretation of results). As 
discussed in Appendix I, developing and maintaining the kind of statistical 
literacy necessary for engaging quantitative data is challenging for some 
researchers. In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the p-value 
emerges as an attractive alternative, as it can be quickly computed and 
interpreted without reference to statistical theory, or subject-area expertise. 
Put another way, the p-value has the appearance of being mechanically 
objective. This aspect was presented in opposition to researchers’ own 
thinking: 
To me, the worst thing is to transform something that needs to be thought 
and discussed into something which systematically is used as the solution, 
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the ‘objective’ solution. […] It’s like a recipe, people use it ,maybe 
unconsciously, as a recipe. […] People need to think!  
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Social Science PhD) 
I think it is a great loss of detailed thinking, it simplifies the thinking, 
hypothesis testing, young students are learning to reduce their thinking to a 
yes/no, and not looking at the data in detail. 
Social Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Epidemiology PhD)  
This perceived lack of thinking was positioned as giving rise to blind 
application of the rule that only results achieving p<0.05 have meaning. In 
the next section I present the alternatives presented by interviewees to this 
rule-based approach. 
Integrative approaches to statistical inference 
Ideas about the appropriate interpretation of results failing to attain 
statistical significance (where p>0.05) were varied, and suggested two 
distinct approaches to statistical inference. Two interviewees (trained in 
psychology and clinical epidemiology) appeared to adopt the rule-based, 
binary interpretation of p-values wholesale: 
If it’s more than [p=]0.10, you don’t even look at it.  
Health Policy Researcher (Psychology PhD) 
One of my pet peeves is where the odds ratio is greater than one […] the p-
value is not significant, but people will say “That’s an association” and I’m 
like, “No, it’s not!” That happens, I’m sure you’ve seen that. 
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
However, six interviewees (three from Cluster 2) advocated a different 
approach, and argued that meaningful, important findings may fail to 
achieve p<0.05: 
The significance thing, that gets to me. Not understanding, suggestions that 
it [the study] has failed because it isn’t significant. It’s not that nuanced, 
the understanding of what that means. […] someone who doesn’t 
understand those issues reads [p>0.05] as “it has no effect”.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
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You need to think. […] This, deciding a p-value of 5% or 1%, 0.1% and 
then saying ‘all on one side is true and everything on the other side is 
untrue’ - That is, of course, stupidity. 
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
If what seems like common-sense to one researcher seems like unthinking 
stupidity to another then this is an interesting state of affairs. It appears that 
at least some researchers using the same statistical framework are 
interpreting their results in different ways, corresponding to two, specific, 
frequentist19 approaches to inference: a rule-based approach which refers 
only to statistical information from within the statistical test, and an 
integrative approach, drawing on sources of evidence and knowledge from 
outside. Some researchers appear to pursue (and believe they can obtain) 
mechanically objective statistical accounts of meaning, whereas others pass 
mechanical estimates through the prism of their own judgement. 
9.4.3 “Significance” 
The concept of statistical significance was quite widely criticised, but 
criticism was not uniform. Repeatedly, statistical significance was positioned 
as being arbitrary, or without meaning: 
P-values are dependent, enormously, on sample size. So you can have a 
low p-value for a microscopic difference in a humungous sample. Is it 
meaningful? 
Social Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
Statistical significance is kind of arbitrary, and not very meaningful. 
Epidemioligst C (Epidemiology PhD) 
Almost all interviewees reported wanting to demonstrate something beyond 
statistical significance, but precisely what needs to be demonstrated 
seemed to vary across disciplinary backgrounds. Ten interviewees specified 
the particular ‘significance’ they seek in preference to statistical significance,  
presented below.  
 
19 As distinct from Bayesian approaches 
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Social & Sociological significance 
The desire to demonstrate social significance was expressed by three 
interviewees with social science training, located in network Clusters 1 and 
4.  
My standard approach is […] it doesn’t matter so much whether it is 
statistically significant, it needs to be sociologically significant. 
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
[Name] told me once that there is a difference between statistically 
significant and clinically significant. And by clinically, [s/he] means socially 
significant, for public health.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD)  
Human Significance 
One social scientists and one behavioural scientist referred to human 
significance:   
We have played around with the term ‘humanly important’. We’re not in 
clinical epidemiology any more. We haven’t really found a better term for 
clinically important. But, [what we mean is] meaningful for population health.  
Epidemioligst C (Epidemiology PhD) 
‘Clinical Significance’ 
Three interviewees expressed a preference for clinical significance: 
It might be statistically significant but is it clinically meaningful? Does 
anybody give a toss about [it], is this going to change someone’s life? 
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
 ‘Biological Significance’ 
Two interviewees, both with medical training, mentioned biological 
significance:  
Both p-values and confidence intervals can be useful. They should be 
provided together. Both need to be interpreted considering their strengths, 
limitations, and likely biological significance. 




Only one interviewee mentioned ‘practical significance’, but this seemed to 
connect with a widespread desire that researchers focus on important 
questions (explored in the next chapter):  
The question comes down to statistical significance and practical 
significance. […] If you come out and find that low-income people have a 
statistically significantly lower likelihood of eating lettuce […] and you can’t 
do anything about it anyway, why bother?  
 
Health Policy Researcher (Psychology PhD) 
Clearly, there is not a single term which describes the kind of ‘significance’ 
all researchers seek. These various significances map quite neatly onto the 
different types of knowledge researchers aim to produce (discussed in 
Chaper 7). Efforts to move away from statistical significance are generally 
understood to have been unsuccessful (Amrhein et al., 2019; Matthews et 
al., 2017), possibly because an important, yet under-recognised 
characteristic of statistical significance is that it serves as a standard which 
cuts across multiple disciplinary boundaries. 
9.5 Conclusion 
It is a well-accepted finding within SSK and STS that the interpretation of 
experimental results is significantly more complicated than eureka-style 
discoveries, or scientists ‘reasoning through’ their findings. This 
investigation of statistical practice within HIDR suggests that, despite their 
mechanistic origins, the interpretation of regression coefficients depends 
heavily on the analyst; their expectations, their suspicions, their own ‘lens of 
common-sense’. Negative modalities seem to attach to statistics, and 
function to limit the extent to which they are understood to correspond with 
reality. Findings from this chapter also echoed and reinforced key findings 
from Chapter 7, providing a more detailed sense of the way the various 
knowledges within HIDR (including negative knowledge) are pursued and 
generated. The ideal of mechanical objectivity was rejected by almost all 
interviewees, suggesting that the challenge of statistical inference cuts 
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across disciplinary boundaries, and also that this challenge unites 
researchers from disparate backgrounds. This quality may explain why the 
field has (and many other fields have) been unable to arrive at a satisfactory 
replacement for the much-maligned ‘Statistical Significance’. Together, 
these results strengthen my view that widespread changes in statistical 
practice will not be achieved without a picture of the social forces sustaining 
current practice. A mature sociology of biostatistical practice could generate 
such a picture, and would also contribute usefully to understanding both 

























Chapter 10: Questioning & Collaborating:  The 
intersecting challenges of interdisciplinary 
research 
10.1  Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters I outlined substantive differences in the way 
researchers of different disciplinary backgrounds approach and evaluate 
research about health equity, and sketched the epistemological drivers of 
such difference. In this final empirical chapter, I examine how these findings 
play out in interdisciplinary settings via analysis of interviewees’ accounts of 
multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and other collaborative experiences.  
 
10.2 Interdisciplinary Research: Balancing Questions 
& Methods 
 
Research projects are interdisciplinary (or cross/mono/trans-disciplinary) 
due to the perspectives brought to bear on a question, or set of questions. A 
surface-level analysis could show that researchers from different disciplines 
tend to ask different research questions, but, the preceding results chapters 
shed light on why they ask different questions, and suggest specific 
challenges which may arise when researchers work across disciplinary 
boundaries. Question-asking has a prominent place in the linguistics and 
science-education literatures (Bromberger, 1992; Ram, 1991), but is rarely 
the special focus of analysis in health-related research (Thagard, 2018). For 
this reason, before discussing interviewees’ interdisciplinary experiences, I 
present some data illustrating the central role of questioning in HIDR. 
 
10.2.1 The importance of the question  
 
Questions emerged as entities of major epistemological importance in 
interviews, across disciplines. The interplay between questions and methods 
(or rather, the desire to elevate questions above methods) was a point 
heavily laboured by interviewees from a variety of backgrounds, in a range 
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of geographic and institutional contexts. In total, twenty researchers 
specifically mentioned the importance of ‘the question’. Of these, nine 
mentioned that good empirical research asks a good question, or an 
important question: 
TC: What are the hallmarks of good empirical work?  
I think it all starts with a very good question. That is more important than the 
methods. I think there should be more emphasis on what exactly are we 
studying? Why is this interesting?  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD) 
 
It seems unremarkable that good research arises from good questions.  
However, two key issues are apparent even from the short quotation above. 
First, commentary on the value of ‘good’ questions implies the existence, 
perhaps even dominance, of ‘bad’ questions. Second, many interviewees 
did as the interviewee above, and stressed the relative importance and 
superiority of research questions over research methods, suggesting some 
tension between these elements of research.  
10.2.2 Tension Between Methods & Questions  
 
Commentary on question-asking frequently took the form of statements 
about interviewees’ own practice. These statements had four general forms, 
outlined in Table 14. 
 
Statement Form N  Example  
My research starts with the 
question, I don’t start with the 
method  
7  
What drives me in my research is that it is the 
question that matters, and what is, sort of, the right 
toolkit to interrogate and answer that question? 
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
I’m flexible about methods if 
they are right for my question 7  
I don’t really care. I’m not a purist. Some people say 
“it’s only qual” or “it’s only quant” [but] I am much 
more relaxed.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD)  
My research topic/question 
shapes my identity as an 
academic, not the methods I 
use  
6  
I have quantitative, qualitative work, all focused on 
one particular set of questions around [blank] and 
health inequalities  
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
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My role as a senior researcher is 
to shape the research question, 
my team brings expertise about 
methods 
3  
The point for me is teams with complimentary 
expertise in order to be able to answer the 
questions, which may be motivated by the lead 
investigator […], but they have the [methodological] 
expertise. Social Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology 
PhD) 
Table 14: Commentary on question-asking 
 
The apparent tension between questions and methods seemed to 
originate from the impossibility of pursuing of a research program motivated 
purely by research questions. Considerations of what was logistically 
feasible, fundable, and publishable contributed to this difficulty, but the 
professional space and time to ponder questions of interest was also 
positioned as a luxury to which most interviewees aspired, but few enjoyed. 
As Barnes (1982) noted, the ’ship of reason’ does not “power its own way 
through a silent sea of social contingencies” (p.117). Conditions are choppy, 
and both tactical and strategic factors must be weighed and prioritised for a 
project to make landfall. While idealised, linear models of science present all 
research as beginning with a question, in practice the research question is 
one consideration among many. Interview data suggested that, within HIDR, 
research questions are actively constrained by disciplinary norms and 
traditions, at least in some disciplines.  
 
 Each disciplinary community strikes a particular balance between 
valuing knowledge, valuing theory and valuing methods (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) 
and this appeared to inform disciplinary ideas about research quality, which 
in turn shapes what questions are considered fundable and publishable. For 
example, when methodology is highly valued, it can become the starting 
point and motivation for research, rather than being subservient to a 
question:  
Sometimes people have a method and they go looking for something to 
research with that method. […] That happens quite a lot.  
TC: Are you talking about any particular disciplines? 
Epidemiology, epidemiology and risk factors.  




As was discussed in Chapter 7, the status of epidemiology journals within 
public health amplifies the importance of epidemiological standards for 
research conduct, and was reported as preventing some researchers from 
pursuing questions which cannot be addressed via epidemiological 
methods. Also discussed was the way the focus on interventions within 
medicine and epidemiology shaped some interviewees’ research priorities, 
both in the US and UK. If the dominant epistemology prioritises 
methodological rigour (and particular methods) above other features of 
research, studies failing to meet those standards may be discarded, or suffer 
in interdisciplinary contexts - even where they ask ‘good’ questions.  
 
 As was illustrated in Chapter 7, epidemiology and economics place high 
value on methodological rigour, and ‘rigour’ has a rather narrow definition 
within these strongly-classified disciplines. This was positioned as 
potentially incentivising against studies which ask good questions by 
researchers whose work leaned towards the social sciences:  
I do think that unlike any other discipline, epidemiology for example is 
focused mainly on method. […] Having the best methods, the best technical 
solutions, is the gold, it’s high status […] Whereas I think that in the social 
sciences, having good theory is the higher status thing. 
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
As was mentioned briefly in Chapter 7, the Kuhnian model does not 
anticipate the long-term coexistence of multiple disciplines within a single 
research domain. Also not anticipated by Kuhn is the manner in which 
research questions are constrained by meso- and macro-level forces 
shaping the professional academic landscape (such as funding and higher 
education policy), or by publishing requirements in different disciplines. 
Interviewees from diverse backgrounds reported that top journals in 
epidemiology and economics value work which is novel, and that this 
intense focus on novelty is squeezing out research using established 
methods to address interesting questions:  
In economics you get more reward for doing clever things, elegant design or 
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a new design, a new method, rather than applying existing methods to an 
interesting question.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD)  
However, perhaps confusingly, it was also widely reported that many 
published papers do not contribute in any novel way:  
TC: Are there papers that are not contributing much that is new?  
Absolutely. Almost nothing, I would say. […] [I see] big pieces of research 
that are limited, very limited, or sometimes completely useless.     
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Social Science PhD)  
 
There seemed to be a disconnect between what journal editors or 
funders considered ‘novel’ and what interviewees, specialists in the study of 
health equity, viewed as representing an important advance: 
I was in a meeting with [blank] who are funding [blank] a couple of months 
ago, and I was just fuming at the end of it, because every other word they 
said was “new” or “novel”, “new and novel”. They didn’t seem to care what 
it was, they just wanted something they hadn’t seen before. […] I’m not 
interested in novelty for the sake of it, I’m interested in something that takes 
us somewhere, moves things forward.  
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
In light of the previous chapters it is not surprising that there are diverse 
views about what ‘moves things forward’. Very generally, researchers 
working with a critical or socio-cultural lens were roundly dissatisfied with 
studies that seemed to be asking ‘old’ questions applied to a new dataset, a 
bigger dataset, or via a new method.  
What definitely isn’t an improvement is looking at the same boring 
association with more and more sophisticated ways of trying to say are they 
causal. I have no time for that whatsoever, I find it anaesthetising. Now we 
have birth weight and blood pressure, or something like that, we've been 
doing something on birth weight and blood pressure for 30 years! Now 
we're doing it with a structural something model. Jesus Christ.  
Medical Sociologist (Social Science PhD) 
Another interviewee framed this frustration in Kuhnian terms:  
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It frustrates me to see people reinventing the wheel and doing the same 
studies over and over again. And I guess, if you take a sort of scientific 
revolution approach to this, we are in the period of normal science and it 
gets kind of boring.   
Epidemiologist (Anthropology PhD) 
There was a sense among some interviewees that the focus of funders and 
journals on methodological novelty has successfully driven innovation in 
methods, but that this occurred at the expense of innovation in questioning: 
This lack of new big ideas [in health equity research] is the result of the fact 
that we spend too little time sitting down thinking “What is really the 
interesting question here, what is really the thing we need to put our minds 
to?” Instead there is fashion and trends, very often driven by new, or 
pseudo-new, statistical techniques.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
Surprisingly, this was a point upon which most economics and sociologists 
were in agreement:  
I think there should be more emphasis on what exactly are we studying? 
Why is this interesting? If you have a very cool identification strategy that 
might really help to get your paper published, well, I can see there might be 
benefits to that, but sometimes we forget what the interesting questions are. 
Health Economist D (Economics PhD) 
However, this thesis highlights the ways in which the kind of insight viewed 
as ‘interesting’ varies across disciplinary groups. 
In epidemiology and economics, incentives for researchers to 
improve the methodological sophistication of research were described as 
being stronger than incentives for tackling research questions broadly 
considered important, and interviewees reported following these trends 
themselves: 
We have fairly weak mechanisms for determining what the important 
questions are, and getting academic communities in collaboration with 
others to align what they’re doing to address those questions. I think we 
have persistent trouble with that.  
TC: Right, is it ‘I’ve got this hammer and I’m going to whack all the nails 
within my reach’? Is it that kind of thinking?  
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Yeah. [Pause]. You know, I think I’m the same (laughing). It’s not a criticism 
that wouldn’t apply to me.   
Public Health Researcher (Health Services Research PhD)  
 With a clearer sense of the importance of good questions, and the 
challenges researchers face in pursuing good questions, I turn to 
interviewees’ discussions of collaborative and interdisciplinary research in 
the next section.  
 
10.3 Collaborative & Interdisciplinary Research in 
HIDR 
10.3.1 Perceived Benefits of Interdisciplinary Research  
 
With the exception of two interviewees,20 it was unanimously felt that 
diverse disciplinary perspectives generate a productive tension, beneficial 
for individual scholars and for HIDR generally.  
The more perspectives you get in, even the more perspectives that would 
disagree with you, the better. You need to feel the resistance in order to feel 
certain about what you do. […] The more people disagree, the larger the 
potential for learning something new. Staying in one group where we all 
agree with each other is not very healthy.  
Sociologist (Sociology PhD) 
 
All interviewees reported inter/multi-disciplinary collaboration of some 
kind, ranging from “Everything I do” (n=3) to “not much” (n=2) with most  
somewhere in between. For some (mostly senior) interviewees, 
interdisciplinary work meant synthesising multiple literatures by themselves, 
or serving as the “glue” which holds various disciplines in a multi-
disciplinary project together (discussed further in Section 10.5). Interviewees 
discussed a range of benefits and motivations for engaging in 
interdisciplinary or collaborative work, falling into two broad categories; 
personal benefits and motivations, and scholarly or scientific benefits.   
 
20 One interviewee expressed skepticism about the benefits of multiple perspectives, and 





Interviewees tended to use the term 'interdisciplinary' to refer to any 
collaborative cross/inter/trans-disciplinary effort, and I use the term in the 
same way in these sections.  
 
Personal value of collaborating with other disciplines 
 
  Many interviewees reported that they enjoyed being exposed to 
new perspectives, and found understanding and integrating new 
perspectives into their work a rewarding, exciting and a productive 
challenge.  
 
Interdisciplinary projects presented an opportunity for some interviewees 
to collaborate with scholars whom they like, and respect:  
Through years of trial and error, I have worked with people, and I now have 
a good group of collaborators who I enjoy working with, and it's easy to 
work with, and fruitful, and intellectually stimulating. I continue to work with 
those people […] I am not particularly precious about a group or discipline 
or anything like that, but there are good people who are good to work with. 
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
Six interviewees mentioned that disciplinary background was less 
important than the character or reliability of collaborators. As the above 
interviewee captured succinctly, it is ‘good’ to work with ‘good people’. 
However, these interviewees also stressed that it takes many years to 
develop such strong (interdisciplinary) interpersonal links, and the definition 
of ‘good’ did vary somewhat across disciplinary groups. For example, only 
economists linked statistical literacy to status as a ‘good’ collaborator: 
Most of the time the best collaborators have good across the board 
knowledge of stats.   
Health Economist E (Economics PhD)  
Two social scientists mentioned valuing particular collaborators for 
specific theoretical or conceptual viewpoints. One epidemiologist with 
sociology training commented:  
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For example, [Blank], he has been working at [institution in the US], he has 
been very important for our group because he is so good conceptualising 
health and politics, politics and health [...] he has been very important for us.  
Public Health Researcher & Medical Doctor (Public Health PhD)  
10.3.2 Scholarly Value  
 
 The perceived scientific or scholarly benefits of interdisciplinary work 
were primarily linked with research questions, but also intersected with 
career stage, and the type of knowledge valued within an interviewee’s own 
discipline. Seven interviewees mentioned that they are unable to answer 
their research questions from within one discipline:  
Given the type of research I do, I need a team. I am not a toxicologist, I am 
not an epidemiologist, I am not a physician, I am not a statistician. I am a 
social scientist, and I can do social science really well. But if, in my social 
science, I am going to look at the effects of social structure and culture on 
the prevalence of [a particular condition], I better have someone who can 
measure [clinical biomarkers], and I can’t do that.   
Occupational Health Researcher (Anthropology PhD)  
These interviewees tended to be in later career stages, as marshalling a 
team of investigators is not an opportunity possible for most early-career 
researchers.  
 
Seeking Methods, Questions, Efficiency & Power  
 
Interviewees described engaging in interdisciplinary research for a variety 
of scientific or intellectual reasons. Four interviewees described the aim of 
their interdisciplinary efforts as bringing new methods into their discipline, to 
answer their research questions;  
I know that colleagues from the economics department are trying [a new 
method]. So I am keeping my eye open for how they do that, and how we 
could benefit from that, with our study.  
Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
Six other interviewees valued interdisciplinarity for exposure to questions 
from other disciplines, which could be answered via their usual methods. 
This latter type of interdisciplinarity is the classic Kuhnian expansion of 
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normal science, discovering the ‘familiar in the unfamiliar’. Very generally, 
whether interviewees were seeking to import questions or import methods 
seemed to reflect the balance between negative and positive knowledges. 
Interviewees from disciplines with a strong and clear picture of ‘rigour’ 
seemed less likely to view interdisciplinary work as a strategy for 
encountering new methods. In particular, economists were more likely to 
view interdisciplinary work as a strategy for discovering new questions 
appropriate for their own methods: 
For me, it is perhaps different for others, but for me that is the most difficult 
part [of research], what is a good question? We [economists] are in this Ivory 
Tower. If I am an obstetrician then I see the problems I face, on a daily basis. 
It might be very practical, [a] very precise [question]. Economics is much 
broader than obstetrics, I think that is why it is difficult for economists to 
come up with good questions. 
TC: It seems like interdisciplinary collaborations might be a way for you to 
access interesting questions? 
Yes, yes.  
Health Economist D (Economics PhD)      
 
Similarly, discussed in Chapter 8 was the importance of hypothesis 
testing within epidemiology (and the way ‘theory’ tended to mean 
‘hypothesis’ within that paradigm). It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that 
some clinical epidemiologists framed the value of interdisciplinary 
collaborations for perceived improvements in their hypotheses:  
The perspectives of people from a wide variety of research and practice 
backgrounds form a gestalt, for developing more reasonable hypotheses.  
Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD)  
In previous chapters, social epidemiologists emerged as distinctive for 
the manner in which their work blends epistemologies. Four social 
epidemiologists positioned interdisciplinary work as a faster way of 
achieving the co-creation of knowledge:  
If you’re separate, in your own field and your own journals, you learn less 
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from each other and the co-creation of knowledge is less quick than you 
would perhaps otherwise see.  
Public Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
The extracts presented thus far illustrate that while researchers bring 
specialised knowledge and methods to collaborative projects, 
accompanying this knowledge and methods are the specialised goals and 
epistemic priorities of the intellectual niche from which researchers come. If 
the overriding aim of social epidemiology is to bridge epistemologies, 
interdisciplinary research may feel ‘efficient’. However, a researcher from a 
different background may have a different goal, and a different view of the 
same project.  
 
Not all benefits related specifically to the creation of knowledge. One 
interviewee from a non-Anglo-Saxon country mentioned that 
interdisciplinary collaboration was a strategy for accessing the power of 
established research groups located in the US and UK: 
Some of these groups, they are much more powerful than we are. They 
have more resources, more people. For us to advance ourselves it is 
important to be working with them.   
Public Health Researcher & Medical Doctor (Public Health PhD)  
 
For this interviewee and others, ‘advancing’ meant opportunities to 
publish more, or in better journals. Peer-review and publishing appear in 
every section of this chapter, because the perceived need to publish in high-
impact journals was more evident in discussion of interdisciplinary projects 
than in any other part of interviews. 
 
As well as accessing power from different continents, interviewees 
discussed enrolling the power of other disciplines. Economists were 
described as having credibility and influence in policy spaces, and 
collaborating with an economist could help researchers’ findings advance 
into such spaces:  
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Working with them is really rewarding because they bring all that 
quantitative prowess to the question, and have traction in the economic 
circles that other social scientists don’t, they just don’t. They [economists] 
can speak the economic language, in terms of impact and engagement. So 
that has been brilliant.  
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
This is the first reference to the value of speaking a disciplinary ‘language’, 
explored further in Section 10.5 
10.3.3 Perceived Pre-requisites for interdisciplinary work  
 
The benefits discussed in the previous section are only attained if 
collaboration is successful (if, as many interviewees put it, the project 
‘delivers’). Interviewees tended to discuss interdisciplinary work in terms of 
what they felt ‘you need’ in order to make it workable:  
In order to make transdisciplinary research you need a number of things. 
You need the view, you need the knowledge, you need the language, you 
need the resources, you need the time. Unless you have these kinds of 
things, you have it in your mind but there is no room for discussion.  
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Social Science PhD) 
This included personal requirements, and team requirements. 
 
10.3.3.1 Personal requirements & appropriate career stage 
 
Discussions of character or personality traits required for interdisciplinary 
work connect with existing studies highlighting the attitudes, orientations 
and temperament of successful interdisciplinary researchers (e.g., Fam et 
al., 2017). The particular attributes interviewees felt were important or 
necessary seem to reflect a complex web of professional, academic and 
disciplinary forces which collectively constitute the challenge of 
interdisciplinary research.  
 
Three interviewees discussed the importance of dedicating time and 
energy toward understanding other disciplinary perspectives, connected to 
a need for epistemic humility:  
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The minute you work with somebody from a different discipline you realise 
that you’re the learner, you’re the beginner. […] [Interdisciplinary work 
means] embracing and trying to understand as much as you can of the 
paradigms they work within.  
Sociologist (Sociology PhD) 
Failure to do this resulted in projects which involved different 
perspectives but did not integrate perspectives, discussed in Section 10.5.4. 
 
Four interviewees described confidence as a prerequisite, and this meant 
confidence in oneself (to ask questions, and possibly appear ignorant in 
meetings) and confidence in ones’ discipline, which may be questioned or 
minimised as a part of the collaborative process:  
Having the experience to know you’re going to be a bit challenged. People 
are going to say things that make you shudder with revulsion, and of course 
you will say things to them which make them shudder. Also having a bit of 
confidence that your disciplinary perspective has something valuable.  
But, also the confidence to understand that other peoples’ disciplinary 
perspectives have value, too. It’s alright for people to do things differently to 
you, and possibly better.  
Public Health Researcher (Geography PhD) 
This confidence was broadly understood to be obtained via experience. 
Two interviewees specifically stressed experience as a pre-requisite for 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and three others described interdisciplinary 
projects as especially hard or risky for early career researchers (ECRs), and 
that they should not ‘rush in’ to interdisciplinary work. This was because an 
established research profile within a single discipline was widely perceived 
as important (even essential) for securing a stable academic career. Perhaps 
predictably, given results of previous chapters, interviewees from the 
strongly-classified fields of epidemiology and economics expressed this 
point most forcefully:  
We have to work in a more interdisciplinary way, but […] we must not 
mistakenly do non-disciplinary work. Because that is sometimes what 
happens […] students don't know anymore, is this economics? What is 
this? […] it is difficult to learn from, and this is not a very nice way of putting 
it, from ‘non-disciplinary’ people.[…] Because, in the end, the field is very 
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often very specialised, even within health economics […] you have your 
niche. That is the only way of getting good publications out, by being an 
ultra-specialist on something.   
Health Economist C (Economics PhD)  
The sense of a pervasive drive toward specialisation, and specialisation 
in turn being the path toward a secure career, was not limited to 
epidemiology and economics. The same point was made in various ways by 
interviewees from diverse disciplines and contexts, from Scandinavia to 
Australia: 
For me personally it has always been a pleasure to learn more and get a 
broader picture on the world […] But very often the logic in research 
councils is that you need, to be at the research frontier, to be the ‘real’ 
expert on a very tiny little thing. […] If you are evaluated against those 
standards you fall short, of course, you cannot have width and depth at the 
same time.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
 One interviewee offered this account of their own interdisciplinary 
experiences, rising up the ranks:  
TC: Is there a career stage element there? I'm imagining once you reach a 
particular career stage maybe you have more control and you can say no [to 
interdisciplinary projects]? 
Yeah, definitely. Early on it is almost like, the higher go, you reject the hard 
projects. […] You are more selective, you think “this one is difficult” and you 
pick easy things that are publishable, and potentially will have a big impact. 
The other things you leave. […]  
Early on it is harder […] people are thinking “Who are you? why are you 
asking this? Just do it, go away.” But if you get more power then they listen 
to you more, and are more willing to engage in some of your creative ideas.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD)  
This last point relates to another attribute viewed as important for 
interdisciplinary success. Credibility was positioned by interviewees as an 
important pre-requisite for a good experience collaborating with other 
disciplines. Latour and Woolgar (1986) conclude that scientists, as well as 
producing knowledge, are engaged primarily in the production of personal 
credibility. As cycles of credit progress, researchers convert funding and 
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materials (data, equipment), into claims, publications and more credibility 
(which facilitates access to further inputs, and the next cycle begins). This 
concept is quite widely applied, including one analysis of HIDR (Smith, 2014) 
however, the concept is most typically used to explain the behaviour of 
scientists, and to illustrate the self-amplifying nature of scientific success. 
However, as originally framed by Latour & Woolgar, the scientific cycle of 
credit is a statement about knowledge construction which connects some of 
the findings of this thesis.  
 
Latour & Woolgar ultimately conclude that 'truth' in science is the set of 
statements viewed as too costly to contest. Triumph in the agonistic field, 
(the socio-cognitive arena within which new claims stand, fall, or fade away), 
is connected to this view of credibility, because the 'cost' of contesting a 
claim is directly proportional to the credibility of the claim-maker. This 
seemed to be what the interviewee above was suggesting; if a researcher is 
perceived as lacking credibility, the price of conflict in the agonistic field 
may be perceived to be very low by collaborators, and that researcher’s 
ideas may be dismissed.  
 
This is not to suggest that credibility is something researchers simply 
possess, or lack. Credibility takes different forms in different contexts, career 
stages, and disciplines, however, researchers with medical training reported 
to have (and were discussed by others as having) access to cross-cutting 
credibility in both research and policy settings. One medical doctor reflected 
on their success in such settings: 
I guess I’ve got a degree of credibility. I’m old, I’m male, I’m white. I’ve got a 
medical degree, lots of honours and all these things. It sounds awful, god, 
but certainly […] I have that credibility which other people might not have. 
When I say something, they’re not going to dismiss me out of hand.  
Public Health researcher (Medicine PhD) 
Discussions of credibility and confidence seem to be connected, in that 
they relate to an individuals’ capacity to evade or endure what Lamont 
(2009) termed Disciplinary Prejudice, which might be conceptualised as 
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partly determining the terrain of the agonistic field within which claims are 
contested. Chapter 7 contained some examples of interviewees actively 
dismissing work from other fields (work which pursued a different kind of 
knowledge, or knowledge for a different purpose) and so this is perhaps 
unsurprising. In Lamont’s study, such prejudice was overcome only within 
environments engendering respect and trust, cultivated by a skilled panel 
chair. The view of interdisciplinary spaces as potentially demoralising (or 
damaging) to researchers without the resources to endure open epistemic 
conflict seems to suggest that such respectful and trusting conditions are 
hard to come by in HIDR (explored further in Section 10.5.2). However, this 
is only a partial explanation for interviewees’ reported belief that 
interdisciplinary work is especially difficult for ECRs. The above extracts 
caution ECRs to be wary of engaging in interdisciplinarity too soon, not only 
because their confidence or credibility may be dashed, but because the 
viability of an entire career might be jeopardised by an early interdisciplinary 
misadventure, or by becoming a ‘non-disciplinary’ person. 
 
Viewed one way, this is the paradigm exerting its force in the classic 
Kuhnian sense: research is governed by paradigms, with strict ideas about 
the form good research should take. In deviating from disciplinary norms, 
ECRs put themselves in a vulnerable position. However, this does not align 
with the findings of Chapter 7 regarding the high value placed on 
instrumental knowledge, and also seems to undermine the status of ‘the 
question’ as being held above all other considerations, for some 
interviewees. When accounting for their own mental model and 
methodological preferences, many interviewees (especially, though not only, 
epidemiologists) explained that their grand aim was to produce useful 
knowledge, and this was a key criterion when evaluating the quality of 
research publications. However, when discussing what is safe or advisable 
for ECRs, or for securing success in the modern academy, this instrumental 
focus seemed to disappear from the ideal strategy; which was to specialise, 
and publish, at all costs. Therefore, concern with what is publishable may 
override what researchers’ own intuition (and/or training) suggests is 
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important, or interesting. No interviewee described their own thinking in this 
way, but some did comment in a more general way:  
People are most worried about writing a paper which is published in some 
first-quartile journal than they may be […] [in] the originality, or the quality of 
the work.  
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Social Science PhD) 
Interview data has supplied two explanations for this concern with what 
is publishable. First, not all kinds of research are valued equally by journal 
editors (e.g., the perception that qualitative research cannot be published in 
the International Journal of Epidemiology), second, researchers do not have 
the time to engage in ‘risky’ projects, as one economist stated in the 
previous section.  
 
These findings may help to explain the question-vs-methods tension 
introduced earlier in the chapter, as researchers face multiple competing 
priorities in attempting to generate publishable output.  
 
10.3.3.2  Team Requirements  
 
 Good interdisciplinary teams were described as being united around a 
common objective or mission. However, producing such alignment depends 
on having a common language with which to discuss the objective, a major 
and widespread challenge (discussed in Section 10.5).  Interviewees valued 
and enjoyed involvement with interdisciplinary teams whose members 
respected each other, and each others’ perspectives. One interviewee 
described this collaborative ‘sweet spot’:  
When you get the sweet spot of interdisciplinary working there is nothing 
better, professionally.  
TC: What is the sweet spot?  
You know, when it’s not about my disciplinary approach as the dominant 
one, or ‘it really has to be this way and not that way’- in terms of different 
disciplinary perspectives. When there is collective ownership of the research 
question, and everyone is in it to answer the question. They’re not in it to 
have their disciplinary answer to the question. When you get that it is 
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amazing, but it’s very hard.  
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
Here, again, is the central importance of the research question. Here also 
is concern about disciplinary preference threatening to obscure or dominate 
the question. This concern was widespread, and manifested in comments 
about collaborators asserting the superiority of their own disciplinary 
approach, or failing to ‘check their egos’: 
What you can't be dealing with are people who play the superiority and 
inferiority game. I've been either lucky or selective […] I have never got into 
that bullying competition, obviously if that's a thing that's going to take 
place you're not going to be doing productive work, and not enough of it.  
Public Health researcher (Social Science PhD) 
 
Discussions of interdisciplinary spaces as potential sites of conflict 
helped to draw out interviewees’ perceptions of mono-disciplinary projects 
as (relatively) more comfortable, or safe. This perception cut across 
disciplines and geographic contexts.  
[There is a] safety that you feel once you’re established in a field. Once you 
step out of it you become slightly uncomfortable.  
Sociologist (Sociology PhD)  
Working with people in your discipline there is a bit less of having to justify 
your existence, so to speak.  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
This sense of comfort associated with working within (rather than across) 
paradigms seemed to be rooted in what could be assumed, or taken for 
granted in mono-disciplinary contexts:  
Working within one discipline there would have been more things we could 
take as read. In those [interdisciplinary] projects we had to spend a little bit 
of extra time planning what we were doing, [and] exchanging with each 
other about why we were doing it.   




The additional effort and time required to undertake interdisciplinary work 
was presented by many interviewees as a barrier to such work, especially in 
the context of scarce research time, and an academy focused on the volume 
of published output.   
10.4 Energy, Outputs & Language: The intersecting 
challenges of interdisciplinary research in HIDR 
10.4.1  Science, fast and slow: Disciplinary Pace & Publication Culture  
 
References to Disciplinary ‘speed’ or ‘pace’ appeared to act as 
shorthand for multiple findings in this thesis.  
It is sometimes frustrating because we work at different paces, we speak 
different languages, and you really have to allow time for people to interact.  
Epidemiologist (Anthropology PhD) 
By these terms it was not meant that researchers work harder in certain 
disciplines and less-hard in others. Rather, the pursuit of certain kinds of 
knowledge, via certain methods, tends to take a certain amount of time. This 
amount of time (whatever it may be) feels natural or usual for members of a 
given discipline, and, when met with a different approach, the relative speed 
or slowness can itself feel jarring, or unscientific. Diverse disciplinary speeds 
manifest publicly in authors’ publication counts, and this highly-visible 
disciplinary difference resulted in judgement, both from and toward scholars 
who publish a lot, or a little:   
The single-author monograph is the gold standard publication in sociology, 
or geography, or whatever it might be, and the expectation is that you 
publish one or two papers every two or three years, but they have to be 
substantial. Whereas the model in public health is, you know, 50 papers a 
year for some big group that publishes loads. So, somehow they [both] see 
it as weak scholarship […] I think we are stuck, both ways.  
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
Underneath perceptions that the speed of research varies were feelings 
that researchers from other fields are ‘precious’ or ‘picky’ about particular 
features of research such as the form and use of theory, or measurement. In 
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addition, statistical differences between disciplines were noted, however, 
even collectively, discussion of these issues was dwarfed by discussion of 
the challenges associated with research output or publication, and 
language, which also intersected with institutional criteria for academic 
advancement.  
 
Across disciplines, and countries, interviewees described academic 
institutions as being supportive of interdisciplinary efforts in a nominal or 
surface-level way, but generally felt that academic institutions functioned to 
limit interdisciplinary collaboration. One clinician in the US described their 
institution as ‘seeming more interested in turf protection than building 
bridges’. One economist felt that there was no force in HIDR generally, or 
within their institution specifically, bringing researchers of diverse 
backgrounds together. Just as publication was central to the perceived risk 
of interdisciplinary work for ECRs (discussed in Section 10.4.2),  the use of 
publication counts as criteria for evaluation and promotion within academic 
institutions seemed to act as a disincentive for interdisciplinary work for 
interviewees at later career stages, due to concern that interdisciplinary 
work is difficult to publish.  
In the long run I think it [interdisciplinary work] is a real strength, but […] our 
institutional structures I think make it more complicated.  
TC: What is it about the structure? 
The basis of assessment, the opportunities for publication I would say […] it 
can be a bit complicated to get that [interdisciplinary research] published in 
a way which can help you build your career. 
Geographer (Geography PhD)  
Publishing work ‘in a way which can help you build a career’ meant 
adhering to disciplinary publication norms, or what some interviewees 
termed their ‘publication culture’. This included the expected frequency of 
publication, but also the expected venue of publication, and expected 




In principle it [interdisciplinary work] is something very good, but in practice 
it is something very difficult […] [due to] differences in publication culture. 
Even though I want to collaborate with this doctor, if I ask him for an opinion 
he thinks he should be a co-author because that is normal in his field. 
Which is perfectly fine with me, but then I get penalised for that because my 
university tells me ‘we don't multiple authors’.   
Health Economist D (Economics PhD)  
Interviewees described uncertainty regarding whether an interdisciplinary 
project would generate output, but also (if outputs did materialise) whether 
they would be perceived as valuable within their home institution, or 
discipline.  
When it gets to the publication stage, it is very often that it doesn't matter 
so much when whether you have published in The Lancet if you hoped for a 
promotion here [in the economics department]. And in the medical centre, 
there they don't take you seriously if you don't have 20 publications per 
year.  
There is a different publication culture. They have many more, shorter 
articles. In economics it takes 5 years to get a paper published and [for 
promotion] they only look at your 5 or 10 most important papers, not all the 
rest. It is a different publication and promotion culture.  
Health Economist C (Economics PhD) 
 These concerns were most intense (and most clearly illustrated via 
examples) by economists. This is unsurprising, as that discipline is so 
strongly classified with a relatively stable (and rigid) picture of scholarly 
excellence. However, concern regarding publication culture and the difficulty 
judging the quality of interdisciplinary work was not limited to economists, 
and the status of interdisciplinary research a being hard to evaluate and 
publish has been established in single-country studies of interdisciplinarity  
(Mansilla et al., 2006; Feller, 2006).  
 
Publishing frequently in high-impact journals is not a trend which has 
spontaneously arisen within HIDR. Interviewees are responding to macro- 
and meso- forces in academia, which is increasingly quantified and 
increasingly lacking space for reflection, and deep-work (Smith, 2010). For 
this reason, I do not interpret widespread concern with publication and 
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output as careerism, but rather a reflection of what is necessary to build and 
sustain an academic career in a health-related research field.  
 
When submitting work to journals, interviewees from diverse disciplines 
described the value of work which reads as ‘belonging’ to a particular 
discipline, and papers which sat uneasily within a discipline were described 
as being difficult to publish:  
If you're trying to publish in the mainstream journals it's really difficult.  
TC: So the issue wasn't with the collaboration itself, it was with publishing 
the product of that collaboration? 
Exactly yeah, because it's not seen as one thing or another. 
Population Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
This quotation echoes an extract earlier in the chapter, wherein ECRs 
were cautioned against becoming ‘non-disciplinary people’. This seems to 
suggest that researchers and papers with ambiguous disciplinary identities 
should perhaps anticipate challenges in academia, as being an 
interdisciplinary entity might be functionally the same as being a non-
disciplinary entity, and a disadvantage. In the context of an academy striving 
for efficiency (Archer, 2008), anything which adds time and complexity to the 
research process might be avoided rather than confronted, despite 
widespread sense that interdisciplinary work is important, and addresses 
good questions.  
 
Some interviewees explained that they did not attempt to produce 
interdisciplinary outputs from interdisciplinary projects, due to journal word 
limits:  
 We’re also somewhat limited by what you can include in a paper, right? In 
the grant application you’re including all of the different [parts of a project], 
you’re giving a blueprint. But when you publish, you get one room: “Here’s 
what I found in this room, I can’t tell you what I found in the rest of the 
house because I don’t have enough words, I don’t have enough space, but 
in this room this is what we found”.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD) 
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It is telling that this interviewee did not discuss the possibility of 
submitting longer papers to alternative journals, but rather elects to present 
interdisciplinary projects as multiple, smaller pieces.  In this way, work which 
is pitched and funded as an inter- or multi- disciplinary project may not 
produce any multi- or interdisciplinary outputs. This is described by 
Nowotny (2003, p.184) as the ‘clumsy disaggregation’ of interdisciplinary 
research in academia. The difficulty publishing interdisciplinary research has 
been reported in other studies, but - as interviewees themselves mentioned 
- the expected number of publications per year in health-related fields is 
unusually high, and the focus on peer-reviewed journal articles (rather than 
book chapters or conference papers) unusually narrow. This puts journal 
editors (gate-keepers to publication) in a powerful position to shape health-
related research, including interdisciplinary research. As many journals are 
overtly disciplinary institutions, this is an important way that disciplinary 
paradigms actively shape the design and conduct of research in HIDR. 
 
In the previous section, interviewees reported navigating difficulties 
arising due to variation in goals, norms, and traditions of knowledge 
production by finding ‘good people’ and/or by synthesising diverse 
literatures on their own. However, difficulties related to publishing 
interdisciplinary work cannot be resolved via similar strategies, and these 
difficulties were reported to dis-incentivise interdisciplinary research, 
especially for researchers working outside the epidemiological paradigm. In 
general, academic careers were discussed as being built on peer-reviewed 
papers, which were the main way interviewees demonstrate to their 
employers that they are allocating their time effectively:  
Academia is a business, the currency of which is grants and papers. You 
need to be publishing to show you’re doing something. We do need to do 
that work. But, it is a bit frustrating when you see the work. […] I think we 
probably are asking the questions we need to ask, but we’re not prepared 
to put down the things that aren’t working. […] It’s much easier to do a 
small intervention which shows some slight change in a process, or 
outcome. It is much harder to [stop, and] say ‘what can we realistically do 




Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
Interviewees from all disciplines and all network clusters discussed this 
last point, that doing work which cuts across disciplines and dramatically 
advances understanding is hard, and especially difficult in the face of an 
evaluative culture which signals quantity and methodological novelty as 
being important.  If job-security depends on publishing regularly, it is less-
risky to produce mono-disciplinary, descriptive work which recycles 
questions (or methods) than to produce interdisciplinary work wrestling with 
the fundamental drivers of inequity in a ground-breaking way. 
10.4.2 Disciplinary dynamics: Core & Periphery  
 
Overlaying challenges with finding collaborators to get along with, and 
challenges publishing the output of interdisciplinary research was the sense 
that some disciplines (especially social and behavioural sciences) were not 
highly-valued in multi and inter-disciplinary contexts. This was not attributed 
to personal disagreement, or ego, but rather to the hierarchy of disciplines 
apparent within population health research, and interviewees’ sense that 
epidemiology and medicine were at the top of this hierarchy. One 
interviewee (very well-known within their discipline) described feeling as 
though collaborative projects tended to involve a ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, and 
that sociology was always relegated to the periphery:  
Basically there is a core discipline and then there is a periphery. And you 
can bet your bottom dollar you are not the core discipline.  
TC: Why? Why aren’t you the core discipline? 
Because the core discipline will be something with statistical clout, and will 
have this strong individualistic focus. So if you come in with things that add 
complexity, and talk about much more of an experientially-based 
understanding - rather than something you can work deductively through 
statistical analysis - it is very difficult to position yourself at the core, or be 
recognised at the core.   
Sociologist (Sociology PhD)  
This seem to directly connect to the findings presented in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8, to the kind of knowledge researchers value, and to researchers’ 
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epistemological styles. The above interviewee describes feeling as though 
approaches which witness lived experience, or preserve and explore 
complexity are not easily integrated into the positivist/utilitarian style, which 
is dominant. A different interviewee, on a different continent, with different 
training, made a similar comment:  
Within that public health community, the biomedical paradigm is the 
dominant paradigm. So, in terms of the hierarchy of knowledge within all of 
that, the hierarchy of disciplinary knowledge, the default is a biomedical 
explanation for health. […] In the field, those interests with most power I 
think are the medics, medical voices, so that is privileged compared to 
some of the other voices […] it comes down to what mental model gets 
privileged.  
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
  This core/periphery dynamic was also evident in descriptions of 
what interviewees termed interdisciplinary ‘box ticking’; the involvement of 
scholars from diverse backgrounds on a project without intending to 
collaborate meaningfully.  This phenomenon was described by interviewees 
in diverse geographic and institutional contexts, including economists, 
social scientists, and behavioural scientists who described feeling devalued 
in some interdisciplinary settings:  
Sometimes you don’t click with other collaborators. [… ] At the end of the 
day they’re trying to check some box saying “I needed this other discipline 
on my team” but not really valuing your contribution. I think that’s part of the 
learning process, you find those collaborators who can really appreciate 
what you bring to the table  
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
A power imbalance is implicit in these metaphors. The ‘boxes’ do not 
belong to a team, they belong to collaborators at the ‘core’, and others are 
enrolled in order to provide a veneer of interdisciplinarity, for the benefit of 
those core investigators. The flexible definition of 'interdisciplinary research' 
(as encompassing cross- and multi-disciplinary projects which do not 
integrate disciplinary approaches) seemed to be behind this trend, creating 
a situation where a project presented on a grant application as 
"interdisciplinary" could proceed in a fragmented, disciplined manner:  
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 The researchers have said on paper [on the grant application] that they will 
collaborate with researchers from other disciplines, but in practice they are 
[each] doing a tiny thing that belongs to their discipline, and they pass that 
to someone else, and the project rolls on, without much intermingling.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
This is the rhetorical function of 'interdisciplinary' suggested by 
Frodeman (2017), that the vague nature of the term “allow[s] academics to 
gesture toward conducting research that's more relevant than ‘normal’ 
disciplinary knowledge, while avoiding the painful task of actually working 
with people outside the academy" (p.4). 
 
Without exception, in examples provided by interviewees, box-tickers 
were clinicians or epidemiologists. The superiority of epidemiology or 
position of epidemiology at the core of collaborative work was also asserted 
in the minimising or scaling-down of other (disciplinary) contributions to 
projects:  
 There are some people who, they will be told that they need a health 
economist [on their project]. They will come to you and say “I need a health 
economist”, [but] actually, they don't care.  They don't acknowledge what 
your discipline can bring. It means they want to scale your part down if they 
don't value it, or ignore it.  
Health Economist E (Economics PhD) 
  This experience of epidemiological or clinical collaborators scaling-
down parts of projects was also described by two geographers:   
What I thought was the more interesting bit, the bit that I was really 
interested in, didn’t really happen because compromises were made.  […] I 
was really interested in trying to bring a geography perspective. There was a 
lot of resistance to that, when it actually came to the doing of the work, it 
wasn’t seen as being a priority, and so it got a little bit side-lined.  
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
Other interviewees felt themselves peripheral based on the timing of their 
invitation to participate in a project. Behavioural scientists described being 
brought onto projects at the conclusion of analysis, to assist with the 
communication of findings, but wished that they had the opportunity to 
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inform research at the outset. 
 
I do not view these data as reflecting a sinister intent among 
epidemiologists or clinicians, and interviewees also stressed this point:  
It’s not necessarily done as a power play, to assert the supremacy of one 
discipline over another. 
TC: It’s not a hegemony?  
 (Laughing) No […] but in my experience, those are relatively few and far 
between, those genuinely interdisciplinary pieces.    
Sociologist (Sociology PhD)  
So many similar experiences suggest there is something about health-
related research (including HIDR) which results in non-biomedical 
approaches being systematically devalued or minimised. This finding 
connects with existing studies, wherein social scientists reported not feeling 
as though they are in the ‘driving seat’ when collaboration is led by natural 
scientists (Lyall, 2019) . Recalling Abbott’s (2001) fractal distinction model of 
scientific culture, it perhaps should not be surprising that HIDR contains a 
natural/social science distinction, and that this distinction functions to 
minimise the social sciences, given that this distinction is a part of broader 
scientific culture.  
 
My study cannot shed light on the mechanism by which this dynamic 
arises, manifests and operates in individual projects. However, discussion of 
the field in terms of core and periphery does suggest a new interpretation of 
the bibliometric network, wherein other disciplines exist at the edges of an 
epidemiological ‘core’. The yellow zones highlighted in Figure 18, below, 
correspond with the groups of interviewees who felt as though they had 
been involved in a ‘box-ticking’ project. No interviewee in the blue area 
reported such an experience, and this region of the network does contain a 
high proportion of researchers with epidemiological and medical training 





Figure 18: The HIDR bibliometric network in terms of disciplinary ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ as 
discussed by interviewees.   
 
Given the challenges discussed so far, it is unsurprising that interviewees 
ultimately tend to collaborate with scholars they personally like. But, in 
practice, ‘liking’ or ‘clicking with’ collaborators seemed to mean agreeing on 
important points: 
The behavioural vs structural [determinants] […] most of the researchers I 
collaborate with would agree with me. I suppose that is why I collaborate 
with them (laughing).  
Public Health Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
And to mean collaborators with whom interviewees can communicate: 
The other disciplines [I collaborate with] would mostly be people I can easily 
talk to. So epidemiologists, mostly. 
Health Economist D (Economics PhD) 
Language, the most widely discussed challenge, is the subject of the 
next section.  
10.5 Language, Possible Worlds & the True/False Game  
 
Scientific knowledge is disseminated via technical vocabularies  (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999) posing a difficulty in interdisciplinary settings where members 
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may not share such vocabularies. As was mentioned in the literature review, 
Kuhn (1970) argued that ‘complete’ communication isn’t possible across 
paradigms. In his later writings, Kuhn positions incommensurability as being 
a consequence of the ‘untranslatability’ of scientific concepts across 
paradigms (Kuhn, 2000a) and focuses analysis on the acquisition and 
deployment of scientific lexica:  
"To possess a lexicon, a structured vocabulary, is to have access to the 
varied set of worlds which that lexicon can be used to describe. Different 
lexicons - those of different cultures or different historical periods, for 
example - give access to different sets of possible worlds, largely but never 
entirely overlapping" (Kuhn, 2000a: p61) 
This view of scientific language rests on a more general view of meaning 
as being rooted in a term’s use, rather than within the term itself. Under this 
view, technical definitions are of limited value, because “knowing what a 
word means is knowing how to use it for communication with other 
members of the language community within which it is current" (Kuhn, 
2000a: p.62 emphasis added) The assumption that unrestricted scientific 
communication across paradigms is possible rests on the assumption that 
anything can be said in any language. Kuhn rejects this assumption, 
because a paradigmatic lexicon constrains the way the world can be 
described.  
 
This feature of disciplinary epistemologies has been demonstrated in this 
thesis. For example, epidemiologists and economists tend to place high 
value upon abstracted, generalisable findings, and one consequence of this 
focus is that these disciplinary lexica do not contain terms and concepts 
permitting the discussion of complexity and context as they relate to 
(classical) epidemiological and economic research (recall one economists’ 
comment that studies of life-time relative disadvantage “do not exist”). 
 
Kuhn describes the process of ‘enriching’ a lexicon by co-opting terms 
from another as being possible, with effort. Galison (1999) also describes 
such half-way languages, which evolve within what he terms the ‘trading 
zone’ of collaboration.   
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"Two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly 
different significance to the objects being exchanged; they may even 
disagree on the meaning of the exchange process itself. Nonetheless, the 
trading partners can hammer out a local coordination, despite vast global 
differences” (p.138) 
Galison presents the 'pidgin', a simplified, restricted form of communication 
containing elements of two languages. Over time, pidgins may be extended 
to serve a wider range of purposes, perhaps ultimately expanding into a 
'creole'.  
 The originating example of the trading zone described by Galison is the 
development of radar technology; a long-term, urgent and high-pressured 
collaboration between branches of physics. Even in this instance of 
neighbouring paradigms, participants needed to ‘hammer out’ a basis on 
which to coordinate, linguistically. Coordination between more distant 
paradigms such as medicine, economics and sociology might be expected 
to require yet more time and effort. To my knowledge, no creole has been 
documented within research about population health (they have been 
documented within biological art, and health-related commerce, see Leeper 
et al., 2010; Shin et al., 2018), however Galison’s case-study provides an 
important example of a mechanism by which linguistic coordination across 
paradigms is possible.  
 
However, the late-Kuhnian view of language sounds a note of caution, 
and anticipates a problem widely experienced by interviewees: Members of 
different paradigms may arrive at a half-way language to facilitate local 
coordination, however ”the price of combining them [lexica] is incoherence 
in the description of phenomena to which either one might alone have been 
applied." (Kuhn, 1989: p.74).  For this reason, the results of such a 
collaboration cannot be easily framed in mono-disciplinary terms, and 
results may not be recognised or understood by other members of the 
participating paradigms. This poses a problem if results are to be published 
in disciplinary journals.  
 
Kuhn’s position on language also helps to explain the sense some 
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interviewees had that they were ‘talking past’ each other in debate. Kuhn’s 
view of debate between paradigms as futile stems from his position on 
disciplinary lexica, because “evaluation of a statement's truth value […] can 
be conducted only with a lexicon already in place, and it's outcome 
depends upon that lexicon” (ibid, p.77) Therefore, the prospect of ‘full’ 
communication is dim. If different lexica describe different worlds, there is 
no (semantically) neutral language into which all scientific terms, ideas and 
theories can be translated, and no neutral ground from which to choose 
between paradigmatic approaches. Therefore, there are no universal rules 
for what Kuhn terms (after Wittgenstein) the “true/false game” (ibid, p.100).  
 
To take a recent example from health equity research, JP Mackenbach 
(Bibliometric network Cluster 1) recently published a commentary containing 
the following statement:  
There is surprisingly little robust evidence that the correlation between 
socioeconomic inequalities and health inequalities is causal, in the sense 
that socioeconomic (dis)advantage produces health (dis)advantage.   
(Mackenbach, 2020; p.615) 
The ‘truth’ of this statement cannot be evaluated in a multi-disciplinary 
domain where there is no common understanding of the terms ‘robust 
evidence’ and ‘causal’. Results presented in Chapters 7 and 8 suggest 
these terms do not have a shared meaning across the field. Indeed, 
responding commentary from sociologist Olle Lundberg (2020) has focused 
on the meaning of these specific terms. It was with reference to such 
debates that one interviewee made the following comment about HIDR:  
I tend to think of the field less as a terrain of debate and more as a situation 
in which people talk past one another, which happens to a considerable 
degree. […] I don’t know whether there are debates, there are tensions.  
Health Policy Researcher (Social Science PhD) 
The Kuhnian view of disciplinary language anticipates this absence of 
productive debate. In multi-disciplinary domains, certain statements may not 
even be candidates for being true or false in all disciplines, as this, too is 
lexicon-dependent. Chapter 8 included a quotation from a sociologist 
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describing the ways in which ‘structure and agency [are] dynamic and 
interlocking processes’. This is an example of a statement which cannot be 
translated into all disciplinary lexica, and is not a candidate for being true or 
false in all disciplines involved in health equity scholarship. This reasoning 
leads Kuhn to conclude that, when it comes to cross-paradigm 
communication, “there is no such thing as being merely right or wrong” 
because most scientific statements are “located within an elaborate lexical 
and theoretical system" (p.83).  It is for this reason, Kuhn argues, that 
disciplinary cross-talk tends to be circular, and may never resolve.  
 
However, Kuhn concludes that understanding across paradigms is 
possible, occurring via the actions of bilingual individuals, not in the form of 
translations. He argues also that the lexical isolation of disciplines is not 
problematic, but is an essential precondition for development of knowledge, 
because “the process of specialisation, with its consequent limitation on 
communication and community, is inescapable." However, this is little 
comfort to interviewees, who described immense difficulty in 
communication when trying to execute interdisciplinary science. In this final 
section I review these data, with the Kuhnian lens just described.  
 
10.5.1 Hard work & Magic Words; Diverse terms, diverse meanings  
 
Twenty-five interviewees specifically mentioned that communicating 
across disciplinary lines is difficult, and/or impedes research progress. A 
dedicated chapter could have been written about the role of language and 
disciplinary lexica in collaborative HIDR, however an extended, detailed 
analysis is outside the scope of this general discussion. In this section, I 
focus on the most commonly-described challenges regarding use of 
language in interdisciplinary work, and draw out the links with the Kuhnian 
view of disciplinary lexica, with previous sections of this chapter, and 
previous chapters.  
 
Overwhelmingly, interviewees described language and terminology as 
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the site or subject of effort and hard work in interdisciplinary collaborations:  
There are differences across disciplines, people have to work hard to 
understand that.  
TC:  What kind of differences have been important?  
Terminology.   
Cancer Researcher (Epidemiology PhD) 
Interviewees located the source of this difficulty chiefly within the way 
meaning varies across disciplines. As one interviewee described, language 
has ‘baggage’:  
If you do work across lots of disciplines you become sensitised to the fact 
that when you hear somebody using a particular word it actually has 
baggage that comes with it, and usually is an indicator they have a 
particular paradigm. […]  If you’re familiar enough you can decode things.   
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Medicine PhD) 
Getting familiar enough to decode things emerged as a (perhaps the) 
central task of interdisciplinary scholarship. Almost all interviewees 
described expending time and effort in pursuit of a common language with 
their collaborators, understood to be key to success: 
We have to find some common words which we can agree on to describe 
the problem and describe the opportunities. […] The common language 
exists to some extent, but people use those words differently.  
Health Education & Behaviour researcher (Health Promotion PhD)  
However, no interviewee reported having arrived at a common language 
which was stable, and enduring. The reasons why a common language 
remains elusive fell into three categories, visualised below in the panels of 
Figure 19:21 A) The challenge of disciplinary terms having diverse, existing 
meanings; B) the challenge of similar or identical concepts having diverse, 
existing terms or labels; and C) the challenge of concepts not existing in 
other disciplines, or instances of total communication breakdown.  
 
21 This figure would perhaps work more effectively with examples from within HIDR, 
however, much depends on the lexica available to the reader (which is the very point 





Figure 19: Three challenges with translating terms across disciplinary lexica. A: The 
same concept (book) may have diverse names in other lexica. B: The same term may have 
different meanings in different lexica (‘gift’ in German means ‘poison’). C: A term may have 
no meaning in another lexica, and be untranslatable. (For example, the Dutch language has 




The first challenge (same term, different meanings) was best illustrated 
by the experience of geographers, for whom the terms ‘space’ and ‘place’ 
have particular meanings not shared by other disciplines. Communicating 
the precise meaning of these terms therefore required additional effort:  
If I’m talking about ‘space, place and environments’ that can be received in 
different ways than what I mean […] there is always a journey to go on 
there.  
Health Geographer (Geography PhD) 
Geographers were well-practiced at presenting these core concepts in 
terms which were likely to be understood by others, a finding which aligns 
with previous studies describing geography as itself interdisciplinary (Skole, 
2004). However, this was a necessity for all interviewees in the ‘peripheral’ 
(yellow) regions of Figure 18.  
 
  Therefore, in addition to being a learner (as one interviewee described 
in Section 10.3.2), interdisciplinary spaces may require researchers to be 
teachers. These data lead me to question whether and how the balance 
between teaching and learning roles in interdisciplinary spaces may shape 
research projects, intersect with career-stage dynamics, and/or shapes the 
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power dynamics discussed by interviewees in Section 10.4.2.  Mismatched 
assumptions about who enters collaboration to teach and who to learn may 
result in unsuccessful or unsatisfactory collaboration, or be a part of the 
mechanism via which certain disciplinary voices are privileged, or amplified. 
Fruitful educational exchanges between teachers and learners takes time, 
which many interviewees described as being in short supply. The ‘sweet 
spot’ one interviewee discussed might therefore refer to situations where 
every participant is both willing and able to teach, and to learn.  
 
More common than the same term having diverse meanings was the 
same meaning having diverse terms (Panel B, Figure 19):  
Sometimes you find your ideas are similar but we use completely different 
names, different labels for the same things.   
Biostatistician A (Biostatistics PhD) 
This is perhaps unsurprising, as so many disciplines present within HIDR 
are tackling quite similar questions. However, even when underlying 
concepts are similar this was described as creating work in collaboration, 
and being a source of interpersonal difficulty:  
I once had a debate in an interview with an economist who used different 
language for the same concepts we have in epidemiology. And I translated it 
back into the concepts we use in epidemiology, but he said “no, no” and 
went back to his language. You can have misunderstandings, if someone is 
not willing to step outside their own comfort zone and listen to different 
concepts for describing the same thing.  
Public Health Researcher (Public Health PhD)  
Here is another example of an interviewee stressing the importance of 
leaving ones’ comfort zone to engage with other disciplines, but further 
specifying that this includes being willing to employ terminology from other 
fields. The late-Kuhnian view of language comes into view, also: In the 
above reference to an unsuccessful attempt at translation, the interviewee 
reported that the other participant did not understand their translation as 
corresponding with their understanding of the ‘same concept’. Seven other 
interviewees indicated that, where similar concepts have diverse names, 
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attempts to translate between lexica did not seem to work in a 
straightforward way:  
Our language is sometimes different, really we’re talking about the same 
thing and we don’t sometimes know. […] I’m thinking of confounders vs 
endogenous/exogenous [in economics], we don’t say that in epidemiology. I 
think that if I translate it we’re talking about some of the same things, but 
[trails off]  […] It gets confusing.  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
This confusion in turn generates work, as time, energy and effort are 
required to ‘hammer out’ (in Galison’s parlance) a locally-stable coordination 
with respect to these terms. Results presented in Chapter 7 suggest 
interviewees have subtly different understandings of health (as a research 
object). The confusion described by the interviewee above was reported to 
extend to concepts as fundamental as ‘health’:  
If, by health, we understand different things, it is very difficult to come to 
generalising statements regarding inequalities in health. Because everyone 
else has a different concept.  
Social Epidemiologist & Medical Doctor (Epidemiology PhD)  
 
 In the social sciences, such disagreements sometimes centred around 
collaborators’ willingness (or unwillingness) to call a theory by an alternate 
name:  
I am always rolling my eyes, there is a jargon that sits in sociology, a jargon 
within political science, you’re talking about the same things but its 
someone else’s theory. So that’s frustrating […] I notice that within the social 
sciences. […] I don’t care what it’s called. [It’s] so trying, to get through with 
a common language.  
Health Equity Researcher (Epidemiology PhD)  
Viewed in the light of the results of this thesis (demonstrating the 
connection between methods, theory and epistemology) it is perhaps 
unsurprising that researchers cling tightly to their preferred terms, and the 
terms of their own discipline, in interdisciplinary spaces. In previous results 
chapters, interviewees were particularly strident in defence of or advocation 
for analytical strategies leading to encounters with core, paradigmatic 
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phenomena and concepts. This seems to extend into interdisciplinary 
encounters. 
 
The interviewee quoted above referred to ‘jargon’ and this term merits 
further analysis. As a label, jargon might refer descriptively to terminology 
understandable by a particular group, as a part of what Bernstein (1971) 
termed a ‘restricted code’ (see literature review Section 4.2).  Labelling a 
term as jargon may also have normative overtones, suggesting a term is 
unnecessary or does not convey important, specific meaning. Five 
interviewees mentioned jargon in the context of interdisciplinary work, and, 
exclusively, this referred to terminology from another discipline (or a different 
disciplinary specialisation) felt to convey no important meaning. One 
interviewee reflected on what they perceived as a proliferation of 
terminology throughout the span of their career:  
Qualitative stuff, people are getting too serious about it so they have come 
up with all this jargon. Are you doing this type of analysis or that type of 
analysis? Are you using this conceptual framework?  
When I read these things, [if] you cut all that crap out they’re all doing the 
same thing! […] But if you don’t use the magic words right now you get 
dinged for it. All of us have our ‘magic words’. Anthropologists, statisticians 
have their magic words.  
Occupational Health researcher (Anthropology PhD)  
This reference to certain terms as being magic (mandatory for 
recognition and acceptance) connects with broader views of language as 
performative within academia. Since ‘questions of authenticity and 
legitimacy are central to the formation of social relations within the academy’ 
(Archer, 2008 : p.389), the use of particular terms in research can signal 
familiarity with (and position new work in relation to) previous work, and/or 
demonstrate authors’ normative values. However, these signals do not 
appear to translate across the boundaries of disciplines and specialties, 
appearing to others as ‘jargon’ and unwillingness to abandon them is 




Rarer than these challenge of mismatch between terms and meanings 
was the situation in panel C of Figure 19, whereby terms or ideas simply 
cannot be translated across disciplinary boundaries.  Three social scientists 
discussed situations where their efforts to communicate with members of 
other disciplines had broken down completely, because the other 
participant(s) did not appear to be able to engage with their approach:  
I’ve had early career experiences where I’ve been presenting stuff and the 
understanding is, the way they’re viewing things is so different, that it’s not 
there has been negative feedback. It just feels like you’re talking past each 
other.   
TC: So, there’s just no feedback? 
P: Yeah, no feedback. Or people are really perplexed, which doesn’t then 
feel like a productive space.  
Professor of Public Health Policy (Geography PhD)  
 
Such experiences may be relatively infrequently reported in my data 
because interviewees strategically avoid situations where they are unlikely to 
be understood. If productive academic exchange depends on researchers 
being able to communicate, it seems sensible that researchers avoid 
projects or environments where ideas or concepts central to their research 
are unfamiliar. But, even when concepts are shared, this analysis illustrates 
the way in which specialised terms for common concepts, or diverse 
meanings for common terms may make communication difficult, and 
overcoming these difficulties takes time, and effort:  
Extra time needs to be invested in developing the project as it goes along 
[…] there are extra resources required to make the connections work.   
Geographer (Geography PhD)  
In the context of an academy increasingly squeezed for time (Smith, 
2010) and, in some contexts, driven to maximise output (Archer, 2008), this 
extra work may cause some researchers to avoid such projects altogether, 
or to collaborate only with near-neighbours, who speak similar languages:  
I haven’t worked with that many sociologists, now that I think about it. It is 
 
332 
mostly social psychologists and health psychologists. I feel like we’re often 
speaking a similar language. I have not collaborated with economists, but 
when I hear them talk about things I am very confused, so I don’t end up 
working with them as much.  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
    
While many researchers spoke of desiring a common language, no one 
claimed to have arrived at one. Perhaps because of this, many interviewees 
highlighted ’needing to speak their language’ in collaboration, or the 
importance of efforts to understand other disciplinary languages, which 
some researchers had learned to do: 
It’s important to be able to reach across the aisle to the basic scientists, and 
talk a bit in their language. I feel the same way about my statistician 
colleagues. I am going to do the best I can to make things easy for them. 
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
The problem is, of course, it is like different tribes. You need to be able to 
communicate with the other people, in their own language. You need to be 
able to understand what they are saying.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
However, such widespread enduring difficulty with communication 
suggests the ability to speak multiple disciplinary languages not typical. If a 
common language is a mirage, or too time-consuming to hammer out in 
modern academic contexts, this opens up opportunities for researchers who 
are able to function as the glue holding a project together, linguistically. Six 
interviewees described themselves in these terms (‘you’re the glue that 
connects them all’), as synthesisers of diverse disciplinary approaches in 
service of their scientific questions. These researchers were all at 
professorial level, had all published more than 30 articles meeting the criteria 
for inclusion in my bibliometric analysis, and two of the six are among the 
top 5% of network members, in terms of in-network citations. Five of these 
six specifically mentioned the importance of ‘doing your homework’ prior to 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and stressed the value of their sustained 
efforts to read outside their discipline.  
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I get to grapple with a lot of questions which enable me and require me, in 
my way, to read in history, biology, philosophy of science, science studies, 
and all kinds of social sciences.  
Social Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
Although, not all of these interviewees practiced a collaborative form of 
interdisciplinarity:  
The ‘reaching out’ I do is primarily reading […] The interdisciplinary stuff 
comes from me reading other stuff, and being able to make sense of it. […] I 
wouldn't get in touch with them and say “do you want to collaborate on 
something?” I don't work that way.  
Health Policy Researcher (Psychology PhD) 
This contrasted with the strategies of two interviewees, earlier in their 
careers, who confessed (somewhat sheepishly) that they struggled to read 
actively even within their own discipline, as the pressures of grant writing 
and publication targets felt all-consuming:  
I honestly, I am probably not reading as much work as I should.  […] To fully 
confess, I focus on my discipline in terms of what I read. I try and read 
outside…. Well… I don’t really try to read outside (laughing). I have a hard 
time keeping up.  
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
The prospect of investing time in reading and understanding a new 
literature did not seem possible for this interviewee. However, they had 
cultivated a reputation in their department as a valuable interdisciplinary 
collaborator, in a revealing demonstration of how interdisciplinary research 
can play out in varied ways for researchers at different career stages, and 
how interdisciplinary box-ticking might benefit researchers at the ‘periphery’, 
depending upon institutional context:  
Here in the medical school it is interesting, because for them I am the social 
scientist. So everyone is like “I need you on this grant” […] I am a social 
epidemiologist but it counts, here it counts [as social science]. […] For a lot 
of people I am what makes their work interdisciplinary, even though I know 
it’s not quite true.  
TC: You don’t think of yourself as a ‘real’ social scientist?   
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Not really, no. Just because of my training [in social epidemiology] I think I 
have an understanding. I don’t know what a sociologist would call me, I 
guess they would consider me an epidemiologist. I would be interested to 
hear what others, who I think are ‘real’ social scientists,  would think of me. 
But I feel like I am not the same [as them]. […]  
It works because I can convince the clinical people. I am in a situation 
where I need to write a lot of grants, so for me that works, if people 
consider me that [as a social scientist]. I probably need to do better at 
collaborating with people who are social scientists. But, it works well 
enough for the grantsmanship side. So I think, ok, I will play along, and be 
the ‘social scientist’. 
TC: How do those collaborations work out?  
They work out well, I speak that language pretty well. 
Social Epidemiologist B (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
The above extract reveals how the benefits and challenges discussed in 
this chapter might intersect, in practice. I will mention and briefly discuss 
three features: First, this researcher does not view themselves as a social 
scientist, but for clinical collaborators looking for a team member who can 
tick the social-science ‘box’, they fit the bill. In precisely the way Abbott 
(2001) describes, what appears to matter is not an individual’s position in the 
grand (cultural) social science / natural science distinction, but the local 
distinction, the extent to which a researcher is “social” relative to what is 
usual in a particular research context.  
 
Second, the pressure on this researcher to win competitive grant funding 
is clearly shaping their willingness to ‘play along’ and ‘play the social 
scientist’ on such projects. As was mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter, very few interviewees described feeling able to pursue a purely 
question-driven research agenda. 
 
Third, this interviewee attributes their success to an ability to command a 
non-epidemiological disciplinary lexicon, not to an ability to stabilise an 
enriched, interdisciplinary creole within a collaborative setting. Most 
interviewees discussing interdisciplinary work expressed a desire for a 
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common language with which to communicate. But, in discussing and 
describing interdisciplinary successes, interviewees overwhelmingly 
discussed (or described themselves as) bilingual individuals, as Kuhn (1989) 
suggested was necessary for meaningful communication across paradigms.  
    
However, when evaluated against mono-disciplinary experts in their 
‘home’ disciplines, these bilingual researchers (seemingly key to the success 
of interdisciplinary science) may find that their skill in speaking two 
disciplinary languages is not formally valued:  
Sometimes it takes a lot of time and then nothing comes out of it. It 
becomes more of “well, we learnt to know each other”  […] But when you 
hand in applications to research councils, you’re not really getting credit for 
that kind of effort. […] It may be said in different documents that cross 
disciplinary research is important and blah, blah, but often you are [then] 
evaluated against people who are more [mono-disciplinary] experts.  
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD) 
This may perhaps help to explain interviewees’ sense that ‘true’ 
interdisciplinarity (which fully integrates disciplinary perspectives) is rare. In 
the context of the challenges discussed in this chapter, a picture emerges of 
the kind of project most likely to ‘deliver’: a collaboration between closely-
related disciplines sharing similar or overlapping lexica, with project-
elements which are easy to decompose into mono-disciplinary outputs likely 
to be successfully published in high-impact journals. Nine interviewees 
described interdisciplinary projects with which they had been involved as 
‘fragmented’:  
People love talking about multidisciplinary teams and multidisciplinary 
centres, but my experience is that they tend to be very fragmented, along 
disciplinary lines.  
Health Economist B (Economics PhD)  
This sense of interdisciplinarity as tending to be narrow, or local, reflects 
findings from bibliometric studies of interdisciplinarity over several decades. 
Porter & Chubin (1985) reviewed citation patterns in 383 articles drawn from 
19 diverse journals. Distant citations (from or to engineering, life sciences, 
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physical sciences, and social sciences) were extremely infrequent and the 
median number of such citations within papers was zero. In a later study 
encompassing 30 years of data, Porter and Rafols (2009) concluded that the 
distribution of citations has remained mainly within neighbouring disciplines. 
When compared with citation patterns from the 1970’s and 1980’s, 21st 
century science is becoming more interdisciplinary, but only by degrees, 
drawing primarily from neighbouring fields and only modestly increasing 
connectivity between distant areas. Interviewees noticed that collaboration 
seemed most common between ‘neighbouring’ disciplines.  
I think when people think about interdisciplinary work they might be thinking 
“we will get an epidemiologist together with a microbiologist” and they’re all 
actually closely connected to clinical medicine. Which is great, they do 
fantastic work. But […] I think that sometimes the definition of 
interdisciplinary [work] is actually quite narrow. […] They are finding it a bit 
more difficult to step over the line towards the social sciences or arts and 
humanities.   
Geographer (Geography PhD)  
This analysis has shown specific reasons why scholars might be 
reluctant to ‘step over the line’.  
10.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the balance between research questions and 
research methods, and presented the benefits and challenges of 
interdisciplinary HIDR.  
 
The vast majority of interviewees reported that they value and enjoy 
interdisciplinary collaboration. Personal benefits included being exposed to 
new perspectives, and the rewarding, productive challenge of understanding 
and integrating those perspectives. Scientific or intellectual benefits 
included accessing new questions, new methods, the co-production of 
knowledge and access to the power of other research groups.   
   
These widely-perceived benefits were tempered by the significant, 
practical challenges of working across disciplines. Difficulty publishing the 
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output of interdisciplinary projects intersects with career-stage dynamics 
and a wider sense that, in general, hyper-specialisation represents the surest 
route to a secure academic career.  
 
Interviewees discussed ’confidence’ and ‘credibility’ as pre-requisites for 
venturing across disciplinary divides, however close analysis of these 
comments suggested an underlying view of interdisciplinary spaces as 
potentially damaging or demoralising for those lacking the wherewithal to 
endure disciplinary prejudice (Lamont, 2009). Such risks can be got around 
in teams which respect each other, and are focused squarely on the 
research question, however this seemed to be achievable only in rare cases, 
after long time-periods of ‘trial and error’ searching for the right 
collaborators.   
 
In practice, getting along or ‘clicking’ with collaborators seemed to 
reflect alignment in a number of areas. Researchers may not get along with 
a collaborator who minimises or disregards their discipline (expressed in a 
sense that some disciplines are relegated to the ‘periphery’, and are not at 
the ‘core’ of collaborative effort). Researchers also cannot get along with a 
collaborator with whom they cannot communicate, and language emerged 
as the biggest challenge of interdisciplinarity, and a source of hard work, 
requiring researchers to both learn and teach. The same terms can have 
different meanings, the same meanings can have different terms, or 
communication may fail entirely. Relating to language, ‘getting along’ 
involved a flexibility with regard to terminology, and a willingness to employ 
the terms of other disciplines - difficult when disciplines each have their own 
‘magic words’.  
 
The Kuhnian theoretical lens helped to tease out the ways comparison 
and evaluation of scientific statements depends upon scientific lexica, and 
Kuhn’s assertion that true interdisciplinarity requires bilingual scholars 
(rather than ‘enriched lexica’) was supported by interview data. Some 
interviewees had built careers on their ability to familiarise themselves with 
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and integrate multiple disciplinary languages, however, the time required to 
develop this capability did not appear to be available to all interviewees, 
and, even where communication succeeded, this was not necessarily 
viewed (itself) as success within institutional evaluations, or competitive 
grant panels: 
It is a huge investment that each individual researcher has to make, but it is 
also an investment that the whole research society has to make. If you want 
cross-disciplinary research, you need to put a value on people knowing 
more languages than one. […] if the only thing that is valued by the system 
is that you dig deeper in your own discipline, there is going to be very little 
cross-disciplinary research, in the end. 
Health Equity Researcher (Sociology PhD)  
In light of so many intersecting challenges it may be surprising that the 
majority of interviewees continue to attempt collaborative research. This 
persistence is partially explained by strategic manoeuvres (e.g., the social 
epidemiologist ‘playing along’ with clinical collaborators). But, in the majority 
of cases, continued commitment to collaboration seemed to be sustained 
by a powerful commitment to question-driven science, and a sense that the 
central questions of health equity cannot be satisfactorily answered via 
approaches from a single discipline.  
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Chapter 11: Concluding Discussion  
 
11.1  Introduction 
The aims of this thesis were threefold, to: 
1: Identify the blend of formal disciplinary training present among health 
equity researchers, enabling analysis of the distribution of disciplines across 
the research area. 
2: Explore diversity in epistemological approaches to health equity research, 
including considering how such diversity corresponds with disciplinary 
background, manifests in the design and evaluation of research studies, and 
intersects with other factors. 
3: Assess the impact of disciplinary differences on interdisciplinary and 
collaborative research efforts within HIDR.  
The first aim was approached via bibliometric analysis, reported in Chapter 
6. The second and third aims were approached via qualitative methods, 
reported in Chapters 7-9 and 10, respectively.  
 
This concluding chapter begins with a summary and discussion of the 
key findings. The practical implications of my findings for HIDR (and 
members of the disciplines discussed in the thesis) are discussed in Section 
11.3. The thesis then concludes with a discussion of the thesis’s 
contribution to theoretical and conceptual treatments of academic 
disciplines, in general and in health-related research.  
11.2  Summarising results  
This PhD thesis has been an in-depth investigation of the ways academic 
disciplines shape scientific practice in health equity research. Whilst 
covering many contexts and aspects of research practice, the thesis has 
focused on the way disciplinary training shapes knowledge construction, 
and the tension this produces in multi-disciplinary research domains. 
11.2.1 An Atlas of Health Inequalities and Disparities Research  
 
In Chapter 6, a bibliometric network was presented which included the 
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250 most-connected health equity researchers. Health equity scholars 
represent a large number of disciplinary backgrounds, but this diversity is 
not distributed evenly across the field. Detailed analysis of the network’s 
eight clusters revealed the presence of disciplinary silos, and a historical 
review of HIDR in the US and UK brought further context and nuance to the 
interpretation of the network’s configuration. Although disciplinary training 
appeared to play a role in the emergence of the research clusters, so too did 
historical, geographic, institutional and financial (research funding) forces. 
This visual representation of the field helped unpack divergent views 
expressed by interviewees in later chapters, and, in turn, interview data 
helped to elaborate new interpretations of the network (e.g., interviewees’ 
discussions of the field in terms of 'periphery' and 'core' presented in 
Section 10.4.2).  
11.2.2  Ways of Knowing  
 
In Chapters 7 and 8, I drew upon interview data to demonstrate that 
there is no unified epistemology connecting HIDR. Disciplinary training 
seems to powerfully and enduringly shapes the choices which feel ‘natural’ 
or ‘normal’ for scientists, with multiple kinds of ‘normal’ coexisting within the 
multidisciplinary domain of health equity research.  Strategies for knowing 
and kinds of knowledge mapped predictably (though, imperfectly) onto 
interviewees’ disciplinary training, and onto regions of the bibliometric 
network. These differences illustrated variation between disciplines in 
tolerance for complexity, strong and weak disciplinary classification, and 
integrative versus cumulative codes, and also signalled the presence of 
Lamont’s (2009) four epistemological styles within HIDR (comprehensive, 
constructivist, positivist, & utilitarian), explored in the paragraphs below.  
 
Some researchers appeared to conceptualise health equity as a 
phenomenon located within society (especially interviewees from network 
Clusters 7, 4 and 6).  For these researchers, social structures enter the 
epistemology as research objects in their own right, worthy of empirical 
study. Formal training in (or other exposure to) social science appeared to 
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be a precondition for recognition of social structures and processes as 
research objects. Social scientists tended to value holistic approaches and 
attention to context (Lamont’s comprehensive style) as well as approaches 
which witness or give voice to lived experience (the constructivist style).  The 
extent to which disciplinary paradigms can accommodate a comprehensive 
epistemological style, or require the decomposition of phenomena into parts 
emerged as particularly important (e.g., a clear difference was apparent 
between interviewees who value ‘messy policy stuff’ and those valuing 
analytical ’elegance’).    
 
Other interviewees approached health equity with a stronger focus on 
distribution of disease and pathophysiology. These interviewees were more 
likely to be located in network clusters 1, 3 and 8. Some of these 
interviewees viewed the study of social forces as generating a less-
authoritative kind of evidence due to perceived distance from disease along 
temporal/causal pathways. These interviewees did not discard or reject the 
social determinants, but these tended to enter the epistemology as 
‘exposures’ alongside, and in the same manner as behavioural or biological 
factors (to answer questions about disease distribution, rather than 
questions about society). These researchers were likely to have 
epidemiological or medical training, and to value concrete knowledge 
relating to solutions, which, in some contexts, meant randomised or 
pseudo-randomised studies of policy interventions. This blend of the 
positivist and utilitarian styles was represented by a small minority of 
Lamont's participants, drawn from the humanities and social sciences. 
Among the population health researchers interviewed in this study, the 
instrumental focus was blended with all other styles (i.e., interviewees of 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds expressed a preference for ‘useful’ 
knowledge). However, while a strong desire to obtain useful knowledge cut 
across disciplines, this was not a unifying epistemological feature as ideas 
about what is 'useful' demonstrably varied across disciplinary groups.   
 
Complicating the above distinction are social epidemiologists (located 
 
342 
mostly at the intersection of clusters 1, 2 and 3), working actively to bring 
the comprehensive and constructivist styles into epidemiological research. 
The manner and extent of epistemological integration seemed to vary 
among social epidemiologists interviewed. For example, some social 
epidemiologists engage deeply with sociological theory and/or utilise 
qualitative research methods, and others use multi-level modelling to add an 
extra (quantitative) layer to epidemiological studies. Social epidemiologists 
generally valued attention to contextual, contingent factors (a key virtue in 
the social sciences), but also identified rigorous design and avoidance of 
bias (key virtues in epidemiology) as hallmarks of good empirical research. 
This group are discussed further in Section 11.3. 
 
A fourth set of interviewees based in the US (small in number but the subject 
of frequent, forceful critique) were behavioural scientists, who discussed 
aiming to improve health equity by studying and changing individual 
behaviour. These interviewees were located at the intersection of clusters 3 
and 8. Knowledge about behaviour was valued and sought empirically 
because it can be harnessed in the development of resources and 
programmes designed to encourage the public to behave in ways which 
minimise disease risk. In Chapters 7 and 8, similarities emerged between 
this group and social scientists based in the UK and Europe, although the 
behavioural science paradigm reportedly constrained the way in which (and 
the extent to which) ideas about behaviour originating from constructivist or 
comprehensive epistemological styles could be expressed.  
 
 A final group, primarily located in Cluster 2, appeared to seek another 
form of knowledge: not social, biological or behavioural, but technical. Some 
economists, epidemiologists and biostatisticians study health primarily via 
pursuit of negative knowledge, knowledge about how to obtain knowledge 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999). I am not aware of any previous study presenting the 
balance of negative and positive knowledges as a potentially important 
component of disciplinary difference, nor any study highlighting this 
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distinction as important in research about population health.22 Future 
research might explore this finding, by focusing on the ways negative and 
positive knowledges are blended, within institutions, within teams, and in 
individual research practice.  
 
I have identified fewer groups than there are clusters in the bibliometric 
analysis, suggesting that it is useful to discuss epistemological “regions” of 
HIDR, rather than singling out particular clusters. One cluster (Cluster 5) was 
not represented among my interviewees, and so I can make no statement 
about the dominant epistemology of that cluster. Cluster 3 (the large, US-
dominated cluster) did not seem to represent a distinct epistemology but 
rather a microcosm of the wider network, containing clinical, social, and 
behavioural scientists, distributed in a manner echoing the network’s wider 
structure (a core of epidemiologists, social being toward the left, clinical 
toward the right, and other disciplines at the periphery). The geography-
dominated Cluster 7 may represent a distinct approach, but as I discuss 
further in Section 11.3.1, I have not been able to include detailed analyses of 
individual social-sciences (beyond sociology) in the thesis.  
 
These diverse knowledges connect with previous studies of HIDR 
introduced in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5). Garthwaite and colleagues (2016) 
identified three 'ideal-types' of health inequalities researcher. This PhD 
project has identified more than three 'types', perhaps unsurprising as this 
study was much broader in methodological, disciplinary and geographic 
terms. Smith & Eltanani (2014) reported reasonable consensus among their 
sample that upstream interventions are likely to have the most significant 
impact on health inequalities, but, when participants were asked to rank 
interventions on the strength of the available evidence, responses were less 
cohesive. Findings in this thesis provide multiple potential explanations for 
this finding. First, the preference for instrumental knowledge in epidemiology 
 
22 A search of PubMed (13/11/20) for the term "negative knowledge" returned 18 results, 
none of which refer to this theoretical concept, mostly presenting examples of sentences 




(coupled with the inherent challenges of randomising participants into social 
circumstances) complicates the generation of evidence broadly recognised 
as 'strong'. This (perceived) barrier to studying the structural determinants 
intersects with the generative power of epidemiology within HIDR, and the 
importance of demonstrating 'epidemiological rigour' (which in turn seemed 
to shape views regarding what is fundable, and publishable), potentially 
incentivising small trials of interventions over large observational studies of 
structural determinants.  
 
 In Chapter 8, interviewees’ sense of what is ‘worth doing’ revealed the 
way paradigmatic concepts and concerns can shape methodological 
preference. In their study of UK-based health equity researchers, Garthwaite 
et al (2016:p.466) described ‘Obvious methodological tension within the 
multi-disciplinary field of health inequalities’. This thesis has unpacked the 
foundation of such tensions, demonstrated that they cross geographic 
contexts, and provided clarity regarding why certain epistemologies may not 
be compatible with particular methods.  
 
 Findings in Chapter 8 also caution against the assumption that research 
methods are simple, interchangeable, tools. Rather, methods, knowledge, 
and the purpose of research are intimately connected, and the sets of 
methods favoured within a discipline can be expected to represent favoured 
strategies for encountering paradigmatic concepts. The decision to employ 
a method often appears to have three precursors: being familiar with the 
method, familiar with the phenomena the method is suited to interrogate, 
and having the belief that insight regarding that phenomena is of value. In 
Chapter 9 the status of regression coefficients as reflecting reality in a 
straightforward way was questioned by almost all interviewees. Similarly, the 
concept of ‘statistical significance’ was broadly viewed as lacking meaning, 
but no consensus was evident regarding what should replace it 
(‘social’/‘clinical’/‘practical’ significance). In Chapter 10, tension was 
apparent between research methods and research questions, which in some 
cases seemed to reflect a restrictive focus on method within the strongly-
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classified epidemiological and economic paradigms.   
 
In addition to these epistemological differences, Chapters 7-10 
documented concrete differences in research practice across disciplines, 
connected to and reflecting more abstract, epistemological differences. In 
Chapter 9, health economists discussed reporting multiple iterations of 
statistical models, and fully declaring the form of such models (in contrast to 
more sparse presentation in epidemiology and public health), reflecting the 
cardinal importance of statistical methodology and internal validity in health 
economics. Researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds employed 
qualitative methods for different reasons: social scientists tended to view 
this as a stand-alone method whereas epidemiologists and economists 
reported conducting qualitative research for the purpose of improving or 
optimising quantitative research. In multiple chapters, the form and length of 
publications were described as varying across disciplines, with implications 
for the kinds of knowledge which can be communicated and disseminated. 
The existence of diverse genres is itself a signal that diverse forms of 
knowledge are in play (Bazerman, 1988), and this study could be fruitfully 
extended via dedicated analysis of written texts from network regions, or 
clusters. In Chapter 10, research was described as proceeding at different 
paces in different disciplines, with clearly different norms surrounding 
publication co-authorship acting as barriers to interdisciplinary research.  
11.3. Practical implications 
Conditions facilitating ‘cognitive contextualisation’ (the evaluation of 
research products via standards belonging to the discipline in which they are 
produced; Lamont, 2009) appeared to be the exception, and not the rule in 
HIDR. This suggests that rather than being permitted to shine under the light 
of the discipline from which it originates, research tends to be examined and 
evaluated through the lens of each researcher’s own training and 
epistemological priorities.  In this section, I explore the practical implications 
for researchers in the areas of focus in this thesis.   
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11.3.1 Social Scientists 
 
The status of social science within HIDR appears slightly paradoxical: on the 
one hand, contextualist, constructivist approaches were very widely valued, 
and calls for increased attention to ‘upstream’ determinants has been a 
feature of the literature for many decades. However, the dominant 
(epidemiological, positivist) epistemology was presented by some social 
scientists as being a restrictive conduit for the kind of insight generated (and 
valued) within the social sciences. This manifested in various areas, 
including research funding, publication opportunities, and power-dynamics 
in collaboration. Variation among social scientists has been under-analysed 
in this thesis, primarily because such variation was overwhelmed by the 
differences between social scientists and other groups of interviewees. 
However, this variation is important to explore, in future studies.  
11.3.2 Health Economics  
 
Bartley (1992) positioned health economists as the “natural competitor” of 
the epidemiologist and biostatistician (p.176) in terms of policy influence. 
This dynamic was not evident in this research-focused study. Rather, health 
economists interviewed had their own clear picture of what ‘accuracy’ and 
‘objectivity’ entail, were generally located in different academic departments 
(not co-located with epidemiologists and biostatisticians) with different 
evaluative cultures, and publishing in different journals. Most interviewees 
from other disciplines tended to view health economists as operating in a 
separate space, and to regard their activities with (at least) mild confusion. A 
minority had struck productive working relationships with economic 
collaborators, and found their technical capacity and command of the 
‘economic language’ to be extremely valuable.  
 
 However, as Bartley’s analysis (and other studies of economists, reviewed 
in Mäki, 2001) anticipates, health economists interviewed were more likely 
than other groups to favour individualist explanations and interventions for 
health inequity, and to question the causal connection between income and 
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health, creating predictable tension with social scientists and social 
epidemiologists. In addition, the balance between negative and positive 
knowledge in health economics appeared distinctive. This preference for 
individual-level analysis and very strong technical focus echoes the 
technical tone of exchange between WHO economists and social 
epidemiologists referred to at the beginning of the thesis, suggesting that 
the underlying difference in approach which catalysed that debate in has 
persisted during the intervening decades.  
 
11.3.3 EPIDEMIOLOGY 
In setting out, I sought to identify and describe differences between 
disciplines. However, emergent in interview data was the importance of 
tension within epidemiology in shaping research. While epidemiologists were 
remarkably consistent in their views about ‘good empirical work’, and I 
concluded that the discipline is strongly classified on that basis, the stark 
differences between social and clinical epidemiologists interviewed merit 
consideration.  
 
Pearce (1996) argued that there are in fact two epidemiological 
paradigms. 'Traditional' epidemiology places disease in a cultural and 
historical context, takes a structural view of causation (thereby favouring 
'upstream' interventions), and incorporates elements from demography and 
the social sciences. ‘Traditional’ epidemiology as defined by Pearce 
therefore favours the comprehensive thought-style (Lamont, 2009). 'Modern' 
epidemiology, on the other hand, favours the positivist style,  is focused on 
pathophysiology, aims to divorce disease from context, is centred on the 
clinical paradigm, and focused on individual-level interventions. Pearce 
noted that:  
Traditional epidemiology has become unfashionable and is treated 
somewhat disparagingly in modem epidemiology texts [...] there has been a 
strong focus on statistical issues [...] and an ignorance of the other modes 
of thought. (p.679)  
Since 1996, what Pearce termed 'traditional' has emerged as a mature 
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sub-specialisation: 'social' epidemiology (Honjo, 2004). The emergence of a 
structurally-focused specialism might be viewed as a triumph on one hand, 
a reflection of the importance of the social determinants of health. However, 
it is also possible (and suggested by my results) that this reflects what 
Pearce contended: the comprehensive thought-style is no longer a part of 
epidemiology’s 'core', but is peripheral to modern epidemiology, for 
specialised scholars with particular interests.  
 
In this thesis, social epidemiologists discussed struggling to gain 
recognition in ‘mainstream’ epidemiology, needing to 'make the case' for 
their approach and their methods, the difficulty of fitting their analyses into 
3000-word journal articles, and involvement in 'box-ticking' interdisciplinary 
projects. Together, these findings hint at an uneasy balance between these 
epidemiologies (in population health), and suggest social epidemiology is 
not embraced in all settings, even if it is prominent within HIDR.  
 
11.3.4 Cross-Cutting Factors: Publication, Funding & Promotion  
 
Cutting across disciplines was the epistemic force of research funding. In 
Chapter 7, funding was presented as directly shaping research questions, 
with projects generating knowledge about specific diseases perceived as 
more fundable than knowledge about societal or commercial determinants.  
In Chapter 8, funding streams were described as influencing methodological 
choices, with certain methods being perceived as more or less fundable 
than others. In particular, qualitative researchers described needing to 
advocate for and explain their methods. The status of epidemiological 
journals as high-impact also served to shape the kinds of studies viewed as 
publishable, connecting with Walsham’s (1995) view of scientific journals as 
disciplinary instruments, and description of peer review as a disciplinary 
examination.  A connective thread emerges in these findings: generally 
speaking, that which adheres to the modern epidemiological approach is 
fundable, and publishable, whereas research focused on social or upstream 




Smith (2013) concluded that "micro-political, career interests are crucial to 
understanding the interplay between public health research and policy" 
(p.10), as these help to explain how and why research claims about health 
inequalities are constructed as they are. This thesis has provided additional 
empirical detail on this point, and my findings align with Smith’s 
conclusions:  pursuit of secure funding streams appears to nudge 
researchers toward disease focused, individual-level, 'downstream' 
research. While not all interviewees reported their work being shaped in 
such ways, there is at least some evidence that in order to sustain the cycle 
of credit (Latour & Woolgar, 1986) some researchers are actively minimising 
the presence of comprehensive or constructivist thought-styles in their 
research proposals, and published works.   
 
11.4 A recent interdisciplinary meeting  
 
In May 2018, an international meeting of HIDR scholars was held in 
Amsterdam, hosted by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science 
(Mackenbach & De Jong, 2018). This meeting provides a real-world test of 
some claims made in this concluding chapter, and an opportunity to test 
some key findings of the thesis.  
The meeting focused on the connection between income and health, 
seeking to resolve: 
"uncertainty and controversy about the extent to which the relationship 
[between income and health] reflects causation (socioeconomic position 
influences health), reverse causation (health influences socioeconomic 
position) or confounding (by factors that affect both socioeconomic position 
and health)" (ibid., p.2, emphasis added) 
Whilst I was aware of the meeting in 2018, I did not access the formal report 
until October 2020, as I wished to use this document as a way of checking 
whether key differences emerging from my analysis were apparent in a real-
world interdisciplinary discussion.  
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Three interviewees briefly mentioned the meeting in their interviews. 
Social epidemiologists and social scientists in attendance (reflected in 
interview data, and the meeting's formal report) found the framing of the 
symposium's question, and the project discussion paper "a rather simplistic 
view" (ibid., p12) of the relationship between income and health. This aligns 
with my results suggesting that social scientists tend to value complexity 
and attention to contextual detail in analysis. The value of decomposing 
causal effects (e.g. isolating the impact of education on health from the 
impact of income on health) was specifically and actively contested, with 
social scientists and social epidemiologists on one hand questioning this 
decomposition, and economists and some epidemiologists advocating for 
the value of such decomposition. Discussion was summarised in the official 
report as reflecting the absence of "consensus on the relative importance of 
causation and reverse causation […] no consensus on the relative 
importance of confounding factors, nor on how confounding should be 
conceptualised” (p.5).  
In addition, discussion revealed a lack of consensus regarding both 
whether participants viewed the question 'does low socioeconomic position 
cause ill health?' as answerable (p.18), and whether any answer could be 
understood as having meaning. Attendees viewed achieving resolution of 
these points as "highly relevant to policy development" (p.19). However, this 
thesis anticipates such conflict, and suggests that resolution of these points 
is quite unlikely. Desire to obtain atomised, decomposed causal effects is 
not simple preference, but a reflection of an interconnected set of 
epistemological commitments, originating within the motivating puzzles of 
clinical epidemiology and mainstream economics. Similarly, commitment to 
the 'interconnectedness of things' appears to be grounded within the 
epistemic fabric of the social sciences, not something to be discarded on 
the way to well-identified causal estimates. 
 
A lack of consensus after lengthy debate and discussion (including 
debate about whether a question is ‘answerable’, or whether an answer has 
any ‘meaning’) calls forward the Kuhnian view of disciplinary cross-talk, 
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presented in Chapter 10. It does seem to be the case that, as Kuhn 
asserted, there is no such thing as being simply right or wrong in such 
discussions, as there are multiple ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ available, and no 
neutral territory from which to choose between them. Kuhn’s originating 
contribution to STS (presented in Chapter 2) was his view of scientific theory 
as shaping both what is observed, and how observations are interpreted. 
Kuhn’s position – that even the most apparently straightforward scientific 
statements are embedded in theoretical systems – appears to remain 
relevant, and to help explain why some debates do not resolve within HIDR 
(and population health), even over multiple decades.  
 
In the next section I explore the theoretical and conceptual contribution 
of the thesis more fully.  
 
11.5 Theoretical & Conceptual Contributions  
 
As was outlined in the literature review, various independent strands of 
research about disciplines are available, with much re-inventing of the 
(conceptual) wheel among them. In presenting a coherent analytical strategy 
for addressing disciplines, and highlighting particular concepts as 
analytically fruitful, this thesis lays the groundwork for future studies of 
academic disciplines in health-related fields, and beyond. Whilst I have 
dodged the difficult question ‘what is a discipline?’, I have taken a step 
toward answering what I view as the more important question: ‘what matters 
about disciplines, in research about population health, and how does 
disciplinary difference tend to manifest?’ This section reviews the 
conceptual contributions I feel are most important to carry forward into 
future studies.  
11.4.1 Classification  
 
Disciplinary classification, the relative strength or weakness of 
disciplinary boundaries, categories and identities, has independently 
emerged by various names in diverse literatures (Biglan, 1973; Kolb, 1981; 
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Becher & Trowler, 2001; Abbott, 2001; Lamont, 2009). This concept featured 
in this thesis as a particularly important dimension of disciplinary difference, 
and appears to represent a key, enduring feature of academic disciplines. 
Becher & Trowler (2001) conclude that academics are most likely to be 
empowered (professionally) within strongly-classified, cumulative disciplines, 
suggesting members of certain disciplines may enter interdisciplinary 
spaces on an unequal footing. This was indeed reported in Chapter 10, with 
medical and epidemiological collaborators reportedly enjoying shortcuts to 
credibility and capacity to enrol members of other disciplines in projects 
without the intention of epistemological compromise (described as 'box-
ticking'). However, economists also reported being enrolled in ‘box-ticking’ 
projects, perhaps reflecting the special status and epistemic force of 
medicine and epidemiology within public and population health. Viewed 
another way, this finding may reflect the (relative) flexibility of the social 
sciences: a lack of epistemic rigidity may enable researchers with social 
science training to more easily work with others, and within interdisciplinary 
teams.     
 
Readers with social science backgrounds may reject my conclusion that 
epidemiology is strongly classified and the social sciences are (or, tend to 
be) weakly classified. However, ‘classification’ is relative  (Abbott, 2001), and 
interview data do support the conclusion that epidemiology has a more 
consistent set of questions and methods, reflected in relatively short article 
lengths. Local distinctions (e.g., within the social sciences of a single 
academic School) may be more important in the working lives of researchers 
than the global distinctions drawn in this thesis (e.g., between epidemiology 
and sociology). Disciplines certainly exhibit local and regional variation 
(Ruscio, 1987); however, the capacity for editors of epidemiology journals to 
powerfully shape the field across disciplinary and geographic boundaries 
presents one example where, perhaps, such global distinctions are 
important, and impactful.  
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11.4.2 Cognitive Contextualisation  
 
The interdependent disciplinary differences presented in this thesis signal 
the presence of distinct epistemic cultures, clearest in interviewees’ 
discussions of what felt 'usual', 'normal' or ‘common-sense’, and in 
discussions of the hallmarks of ‘good’ research. Collectively, these findings 
lend empirical support and detail to general claims such as Neumann & 
Becher’s (2002: p.410) that disciplines differ in their “main cognitive 
purposes”, or Sa's (2008: p.549) reference to the "deep roots of traditional 
academic structures". Similarly, Lamont (2009) concluded that disciplinary 
variability in criteria for academic excellence was rooted in the way 
disciplines’ “objects and concerns differ so dramatically” (2009:p.9). In this 
thesis, I have connected such observed difference to specific ‘objects and 
concerns’, where data permitted (chiefly within epidemiology, economics 
and sociology).  
 
Evidence of cognitive contextualisation was limited, though not entirely 
absent (see Chapter 7 Section 2.1.5).  Data presented in Chapter 8 (p.219) 
demonstrated a tendency for the critique of disciplines on the basis of what 
they neglect or do not contain, sometimes with little accommodation or 
regard for the aims and priorities of those disciplines. It seems that, without 
the intervention of a skilled panel chair (as was available in the grant review 
panels studied by Lamont), researchers struggle to overcome their 
‘disciplinary prejudice’, and to allow work from other traditions to shine 
under its own lights.   
11.4.3 The Kuhnian Lens  
 
Throughout the thesis, theory from STS and SSK (and adherence to the 
causal tenet of Strong Programme SSK) helped to go beyond describing 
apparent differences between disciplines, and opened inquiry to 
consideration surrounding underlying epistemological styles and cultures.  In 
turn, exploring the epistemological drivers of disciplinary difference has 
enabled some tentative observations about the nature of disciplines in 
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health-related research.   
In particular, the application of Kuhnian theory helped to move beyond 
description, toward explanation, and to draw out the kinds of 
epistemological commitments embodied in scientific practice. Very 
generally, Kuhn’s description of disciplinary paradigms as patterns of 
investigative practice which endure throughout a career was apparent in 
results.  Disciplinary training clearly informed the ‘mental model’ of many 
interviewees, the kinds of questions they considered interesting, and the 
forms answers to those questions are expected to take.  
 
Three specific Kuhnian insights were particularly important in this thesis:  
 
1. Understanding the paradigm as the 'backdrop' which throws 
certain practices into relief, and obscures others as ‘natural’, 
‘normal’ or ‘common-sense.’  
 
2. Understanding research methods as special tools which serve 
special functions, and the difficulty of discussing or evaluating 
methods in isolation from the insight they generate. 
 
3. Understanding disciplinary lexica as potentially inhibiting 
interdisciplinary communication and collaboration, highlighting the 
importance of researchers who speak multiple disciplinary 
languages.    
 
In Chapter 2, I noted that disciplines are knowledge-communities first 
and foremost, but are also the site of varied social functions (writing, 
publishing, teaching, learning). This plurality complicates the study of 
disciplines. The above set of Kuhnian concepts is reflective of this plural 
character, and the disciplinary matrix is a theoretical frame especially well-
suited to addressing disciplines in all their varied manifestations – as a set of 
separate-but-connected activities conceptualised as the set of elements 
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within a matrix.  
 
My empirical material leads me to think there is a strong case for a 
rehabilitation of the Kuhnian view of disciplines. Kuhn’s writings and sense 
of disciplinary paradigms has been key to recognising and describing the 
mechanism of disciplinary influence in this thesis, and might be applied 
fruitfully in other multidisciplinary research domains.  
11.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has synthesised the findings explored throughout the 
thesis, and offered a reflection on the central theoretical insights about 
disciplines to emerge from results. The thesis concludes here with a 
consideration of strengths, limitations, and opportunities for future research.  
 
First, a key strength is the inclusion of participants from a range of 
countries and institutions, reinforcing the value of a comparative & 
international sociology of science. This study has been able to go beyond 
previous single-country studies, to highlight the parts of disciplinary culture 
which might be expected to cut across geographic and institutional settings, 
and the way these aspects of disciplines shape research in population 
health. However, this breadth is also a weakness: My analysis has leaned 
toward the macro (continents/clusters) and the micro (interviewees), with 
much work still left to do in the meso, at the level of academic institutions, 
departments, and research teams.  
 
Additionally, due to the size of this study and the limits of a PhD 
timeframe I was only able to consider epidemiologists, economists and 
sociology/'social scientists' in detail. Careful analysis of other disciplines 
(such as geography, anthropology, medicine and political science) would 
doubtlessly yield interesting and important insights. Further analysis of 
epidemiology, economics and sociology is also warranted, as close analysis 
of any discipline should be anticipated to reveal significant heterogeneity, 




In addition to the micro-political interests discussed in Section 11.3, 
Smith’s (2008; 2013) data suggested that political ideology was an important 
driver of research conduct, including successful interdisciplinary 
collaboration. As was reported in Chapter 6, the study of health inequalities 
was politicised at an early stage in the UK (where Smith’s studies were 
conducted) and this may help to explain the importance of political views 
and ideology for researchers in the UK. However, beyond very general 
statements about academics tending to lean to the political left, no 
interviewee mentioned politics as an important factor in shaping research 
practice in this study. It may be that my strong focus on disciplines has 
caused other factors, such as politics and values, to be neglected in the 
thesis (and in interviews). The intersection of disciplinary difference with 
these factors will be important to clarify in future research.  
 
Despite these limitations, a sustained focus on disciplines has yielded 
findings with significant implications for the practice and progress of 
research about health equity. Therefore, whilst I cannot yet conclude firmly 
that researchers under different paradigms have different “ways of seeing 
the world and practicing science in it” (Kuhn, 1970: p.4), I do conclude that 
health inequalities and disparities research is a scholarly community with 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds, working within different epistemic 
cultures, exploring diverse ‘big-pictures’, seeking diverse knowledges, via 
diverse methods. Despite critiques describing the notion of paradigms as 
being outdated, or monolithic (Biagioli, 1999; Galison, 2016; Brew & 
Manathunga, 2012), my data show that as well as being social entities, 
disciplines are cognitive enterprises which shape research in varied, 
important ways. 
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Interview Schedule  
0 INTRODUCE PROJECT  CONSENT / WITHDRAWAL / ANONYMISATION  
  BACKGROUND   
1A 
Overview of Academic 
Training How do you describe yourself in disciplinary terms?  
    Multiple identities- how do they manage this? 
    No disciplinary ID - How has training impacted their work?  
1B Own Discipline Any concept from wish others understood better? 
  CAUSATION    
Spiel   
I'd like to … your own personal mental-model of health and illness… According to 
your own outlook, health and disease are distributed.  
2A Mental Model  
Generally, what do you feel is the major process... (or set) determining whether a 
person becomes sick or is will?  
      
2B Tension between levels    
    How do you view the interaction of individual and social causes of illness? 
    How should these different causes be integrated in research? 
  ENGAGEMENT    
3A    Do you regularly engage w researchers from other disc? 
      
3B   What have attempts to collaborate been like?  
      
3C   Are there any kinds of research which frustrate you?  
  METHODOLOGY    
4A  Funding Activity  Pick exposure & Rank study designs 
4B  Sense of Good Research  What … hallmarks of good empirical research? 
(4C) Sense of bad research Red flags… suggests lacking or inferior?  
  REGRESSION  Not a test or attempt to gauge proficiency, interested in your own understanding  
XA   If a colleague asked, what do regression models do?  
XB   Do these models represent reality? (If not, what?) 
XC   What are the coefficients? Discovery? Construction?  
XD   P values & NHST if time 
  CLOSING OUT    
5A Additional comments Anything important we've not touched on? 
5B   Anything you'd like to add to what you've said already? 
5C Giving Feedback Would you like to make any comments on how this interview has been conducted? 
5E Getting Feedback 
Would you like to receive feedback about the outcome of the research?  
CHECK HOW  
 











Author Cluster Total link strength^ Documents* Citations^ 
acevedo-garcia d. 1 151 17 608 
adler n. 1 258 44 3724 
arber s. 2 182 14 812 
arcury t.a. 5 303 52 1195 
artazcoz l. 5 212 21 463 
asada y. 4 187 19 268 
bambra c. 3 1101 57 2028 
barros a.j.d. 4 68 22 582 
barros f.c. 4 108 11 1004 
bartley m. 2 440 27 1066 
bauld l. 3 121 11 745 
baum f. 3 376 63 1027 
baumgartner k.b. 6 362 22 261 
beckfield j. 4 204 10 239 
bell c.n. 1 189 11 159 
bell r. 4 99 20 1701 
benach j. 5 854 53 1376 
blackman t. 3 111 10 194 
blakely t. 7 262 38 1295 
blane d. 2 127 16 567 
bleich s.n. 1 131 7 260 
borrell c. 3 839 72 1438 
borrell l.n. 1 98 17 487 
bowie j.v. 1 250 17 141 
boyce w.t. 2 255 13 2441 
brandt h.m. 6 43 15 269 
braveman p. 1 566 31 3379 
breen n. 4 170 11 1157 
browne a.j. 1 48 19 343 
bruce m.a. 1 127 11 243 
brunner e.j. 2 405 19 2955 
burström b. 3 162 21 330 
chandola t. 2 209 18 633 
chen e. 1 99 16 707 
chen h. 5 158 18 320 
chen j. 1 583 27 2720 
chin m.h. 1 229 37 1229 
chung h. 5 462 27 353 
clarke p.m. 4 252 17 719 
coburn d. 3 165 7 563 
collins c. 1 134 12 709 
cooper h. 1 85 18 575 
cooper l.a. 1 85 26 1122 
croft j.b. 1 59 9 834 
cummins s. 2 101 13 907 
currie c. 2 249 14 1267 
curtis s. 2 148 17 1139 
dahl e. 2 420 21 665 
dean h.d. 1 75 16 298 
diderichsen f. 2 181 24 647 
díez e. 3 160 9 85 
dorling d. 7 243 20 526 
dovidio j.f. 1 68 11 700 
dunn j.r. 2 157 24 903 
duran b. 1 59 8 1123 
edwards b.k. 8 103 5 1031 
egan m. 3 207 8 422 
egerter s. 1 156 7 1012 
eikemo t.a. 2 416 18 617 
elgar f.j. 2 143 14 206 
elstad j.i. 2 257 17 536 
emerson e. 3 163 29 814 
emmons k.m. 1 115 17 452 
erreygers g. 4 134 6 322 
espelt a. 5 256 10 253 
espey d.k. 8 116 9 634 
ezzati m. 4 108 12 1220 
firth d. 2 141 6 296 
fiscella k. 1 100 22 878 
fisher m. 3 119 16 175 
fitzpatrick r. 2 153 7 315 
frenk j. 4 98 10 784 
friel s. 3 173 42 791 
fritzell j. 2 272 14 371 
frohlich k.l. 2 164 17 1042 
fukuda y. 2 142 14 269 
gary-webb t.l. 1 131 9 1265 
gaskin d.j. 1 336 16 560 
gee g.c. 1 144 14 998 
gerdtham u.-g. 4 238 22 532 
geronimus a.t. 1 107 17 764 
gibson m. 3 115 5 304 
giuliano a.r. 6 195 17 197 
graham h. 3 361 19 1266 
griffith d.m. 1 264 26 374 
grundy e. 2 126 12 610 
gruskin s. 1 129 7 732 
grzywacz j.g. 5 235 27 568 
gwede c.k. 6 72 18 185 
halfon n. 1 38 15 998 
harper s. 4 481 40 1304 
harris r. 8 88 11 380 
hatton c. 3 117 15 458 
hatzenbuehler 
m.l. 1 89 22 1581 
hébert j.r. 6 65 12 61 
hicken m.t. 1 170 10 185 
hines l. 6 426 25 311 
hiscock r. 7 155 9 732 
hoffmann r. 3 193 13 114 
hosseinpoor a.r. 4 80 16 330 
house j.s. 1 221 9 1162 
houweling t.a.j. 4 119 11 462 
huang e.s. 1 175 17 894 
huisman m. 4 166 5 291 
hunter d.j. 3 175 19 362 
hurrelmann k. 2 252 13 86 
islam n. 1 119 20 247 
israel b.a. 1 128 18 992 
jackson j.s. 1 343 23 955 
james s.a. 1 92 10 416 
jemal a. 8 138 24 22863 
jim m.a. 8 123 9 662 
john e.m. 6 433 27 287 
joyce k.e. 3 181 8 394 
judge k. 3 202 13 612 
kaplan g.a. 2 344 11 2516 
kaufman j.s. 4 138 30 590 
kawachi i. 1 457 74 2536 
kershaw k.n. 1 151 13 319 
khang y.-h. 2 155 14 450 
king n. 4 175 12 220 
krieger n. 1 1166 60 5483 
kristjansson e. 3 140 11 272 
kumanyika s.k. 1 82 26 847 
kunst a.e. 4 826 54 1979 
kwon s.c. 1 108 22 252 
labonté r. 3 191 62 1091 
lahelma e. 2 740 39 1454 
lampert t. 2 153 35 396 
landrine h. 1 127 6 244 
lang t. 2 70 27 451 
laveist t.a. 1 774 46 1561 
lawless a. 3 100 13 103 
lee h. 1 143 23 354 
levine r.s. 1 69 15 188 
link b.g. 1 185 27 1471 
lundberg o. 2 361 19 882 
lundgreen a. 6 326 14 222 
lynch j.w. 4 800 43 4648 
macdougall c. 3 122 11 288 
macintyre s. 2 90 8 953 
mackenbach j.p. 2 919 77 2980 
malmusi d. 3 250 23 457 
manor o. 2 233 13 793 
marmot m. 2 1268 106 10694 
martikainen p. 2 530 39 954 
matthews s. 2 218 6 867 
mays v.m. 1 41 13 698 
mckee m. 4 97 36 873 
meade c.d. 6 87 24 233 
mensah g.a. 1 66 22 1062 
mielck a. 2 150 48 615 
miller b. 8 148 12 1557 
mitchell r.j. 7 295 26 1127 
mohammed s.a. 1 241 9 1600 
mokdad a.h. 1 48 6 1058 
morello-frosch r. 1 127 12 892 
morrison j. 3 190 17 368 
muntaner c. 5 1058 80 1322 
murray c.j.l. 4 157 17 2681 
nazroo j.y. 2 213 31 1329 
newman l. 3 123 11 117 
ng e. 5 348 14 220 
norman p. 2 84 13 187 
o'campo p. 5 313 32 402 
osypuk t.l. 1 125 15 473 
paskett e.d. 1 32 32 493 
payne-sturges d.c. 1 104 10 443 
pearce j.r. 7 469 41 1279 
peek m.e. 1 126 20 770 
petrie d. 4 127 11 101 
petticrew m. 3 749 45 2134 
pförtner t.-k. 2 126 12 112 
phelan j.c. 1 138 12 1183 
pikhart h. 3 182 12 155 
platt s. 3 121 11 381 
pons-vigués m. 3 147 5 58 
popay j. 3 136 22 805 
popham f. 2 242 22 878 
popkin b.m. 1 68 12 1859 
potvin l. 2 126 18 974 
powe n.r. 1 32 6 1063 
power c. 2 292 17 1336 
quandt s.a. 5 281 48 1165 
rahkonen o. 2 428 30 830 
raphael d. 3 136 36 623 
rathmann k. 2 265 14 90 
regidor e. 4 252 32 445 
rehkopf d.h. 1 349 23 1676 
richardson e.a. 7 142 12 244 
richter m. 2 536 43 1006 
rodriguez-sanz m. 5 291 19 319 
roux a.v.d. 1 171 26 1391 
rust g. 1 79 25 421 
sacker a. 2 364 24 1073 
schaefer c.t. 1 89 10 339 
schrecker t. 3 158 37 594 
schulz a.j. 1 264 33 1444 
sekine m. 2 193 9 200 
shaw m. 7 193 9 821 
sheiham a. 4 250 29 966 
shipley m.j. 2 313 12 1268 
shortt n.k. 7 135 11 228 
siddiqi a. 1 209 22 294 
siegrist j. 2 99 18 578 
singh-manoux a. 2 110 5 706 
slattery m.l. 6 441 28 340 
smith g.d. 2 689 35 4974 
smith k.e. 3 302 30 525 
solar o. 5 227 22 390 
soobader m.-j. 1 213 5 1436 
stansfeld s.a. 2 323 16 3311 
stern m.c. 6 276 15 170 
stringhini s. 2 112 8 702 
stronks k. 2 165 29 564 
subramanian s.v. 1 707 64 4030 
swan j. 8 88 5 1186 
szanton s.l. 1 104 16 347 
thomas s. 3 205 31 884 
thorpe r.j. 1 665 57 885 
torres-mejia g. 6 301 14 251 
torsheim t. 2 138 8 729 
trinh-shevrin c. 1 120 26 299 
tsakos g. 4 199 18 350 
tugwell p. 3 415 33 913 
turrell g. 2 117 33 1622 
ueffing e. 3 128 14 286 
vadaparampil s.t. 6 138 18 243 
van ourti t. 4 160 13 208 
van oyen h. 4 122 13 286 
vandoorslaer e. 4 356 27 2169 
vanroelen c. 5 291 16 379 
victora c.g. 4 129 20 1525 
viswanath k. 1 111 36 981 
vives a. 5 190 10 320 
wagstaff a. 4 205 12 1102 
waterman p.d. 1 543 24 2506 
waters e. 3 199 20 1046 
watt r.g. 4 222 26 854 
welch v. 3 371 28 689 
west p. 2 235 13 1021 
whitehead m. 3 533 46 1854 
williams d. 1 871 57 4941 
williams g. 3 109 18 458 
wolff r.k. 6 441 27 323 
wolfson m. 2 88 6 660 
woolf s.h. 1 92 8 518 
wright k. 3 92 9 404 
wright r.j. 1 109 23 769 
wyatt s.b. 1 96 11 535 
^ Within network                       *containing keyworks within the specified search string  
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Consent form for interviews relating to the research project entitled: 
‘Disciplinary Training and Epistemological Tension in Health Inequalities and 
Disparities Research’ 
 
I (Taya Collyer) am currently undertaking a PhD research project at the 
University of Edinburgh. The project is exploring the impact of disciplinary 
training on the conduct of research about health inequalities and disparities. One 
element of this research involves undertaking interviews with academics who 
conduct research about health inequalities/disparities.  In these interviews, I am 
asking people to share their experiences of working with researchers from other 
academic disciplines, their perceptions of research conducted outside their own 
discipline, and reflections on the impact of their own training.   
 
In line with the University of Edinburgh School of Social and Political Science’s 
ethical guidance, I need to ensure that all participants in this study have decided to 
participate, and are aware that they do so voluntarily and are not required to 
participate.  If you are willing to participate in this study, please sign this form 
(over-page) to confirm that you have freely agreed to be interviewed. 
 
If you do agree to be interviewed, this does not mean you need to answer any or 
all of the questions. You may cancel or stop the interview at any time, simply by 
letting me know that you wish to do so. 
 
If you agree, the interview will be digitally-recorded and subsequently transcribed 
by me. Personal details will be anonymised (unless you elect to remain identified, 
see options over page), and I will not intentionally reveal your identity to anyone 
without your written consent. If you request to do so, you will be given a chance 
to review and amend the transcript for accuracy and/or anonymity in due course 
(see options over page).  
 
Once anonymised, the contents of the interviews – including yours – will be 
analysed and written up during the course of the research. The findings may be 
used in published works, such as academic journal articles or scholarly texts. This 
written work may include quotations from some of the interviews, including yours. 
If you wish to remain anonymous, neither your own name, nor that of your 
organisation, or any of your other personal details that might identify you will ever 
be associated with these quotations. Alternatively, if you expressly wish your name 
to accompany your comments in published findings, please indicate this below.  
 
I would be grateful if you could confirm, by signing the form below, that you are 
happy for me to use the recorded interview or extracts from it in this way. 
 




I confirm I have freely agreed to be interviewed for this project and that the 
recorded interview or extracts from it may be used as described above. 
 
PLEASE STRIKE THROUGH PART OF THE STATEMENTS BELOW 
ACCORDING TO YOUR PREFERENCE:  
 
I would like / would not like to be sent the interview transcript in order to allow 
me to check it for accuracy and anonymity prior to any sections of the transcript 
being used in publications.  
 
I would like / would not like to be identified by name, should any sections of the 
interview transcript be included in publications.  
 
 

















[1] "Health, what is" "Why interested in health" 
[3] "Journeys, pragmatic" "Health, Mental Models" 
[5] "Geography" "Social Science, Strength" 
[7] "Biomedical Model" "Integrating different levels" 
[9] "Policy" "Politics" 
[11] "HIDR - ideas abt \"HI researchers\"" "Economists" 
[13] "Extent of interdisc. collab" "Interdisc work - communicating/terminology" 
[15] "Interdisc work - positive exp" "Interdisc work - challenges" 
[17] "Determinants of interdisc. success" "Interdisc. work - negative exp" 
[19] "Interdisc work - compromises" "Interventions, research abt" 
[21] "Good empirical work" "Seeing the big picture" 
[23] "Activity Ranking" "Sample Size" 
[25] "Qual work, positive" "Feedback on Interview" 
[27] "Statistics - Own use of" "Models - Discovery or Construction" 
[29] "Truth / Reality" "Statistics - Self deprecating remarks" 
[31] "HIDR - tips for ECRs" "Descriptive Work - Limits of" 
[33] "Causality -Debate" "USA cf UK" 
[35] "Disciplinary Identity" "USA - Terminology" 
[37] "My job..." "Journeys, seeking impact" 
[39] "Journeys, close to patients" "ECRs" 
[41] "Study Design" "Science, what is" 
[43] "Statistics - Underpowered studies" "Statistical Literacy" 
[45] "HIDR - Challenges" "Epidemiologists" 
[47] "Journals" "Interdisc work - its the individual" 
[49] "Frustrating research - Unimportant Questions" "Values and science" 
[51] "Journeys, other" "Model Building" 
[53] "Frustrating research" "Public health is..." 
[55] "Epi Paradigm / Ev Pyramid" "Getting into the body" 
[57] "Qual work, negative / mixed" "Data Access" 
[59] "Causality" "Phacking/Fishing" 
[61] "P-Values" "Models, what do" 
[63] "Direction for future" "Statistics - trends over time" 
[65] "Statistics - Linear regression" "Academic training" 
[67] "Theory, role of" "Medical Sociology" 
[69] "Social Epidemiology" "Journeys, challenges" 
[71] "Feelings about home discipline" "Focus is the questions" 
[73] "Disciplinary differences on same concept" "Shadow of the paradigm" 
[75] "Two Worlds" "HIDR - Important Questions / Debates" 
[77] "Inscription device" "Epidemiology" 
[79] "Genetics" "IQ and Health" 
[81] "RCTs" "Interdisc work - do you?" 
[83] "Publishing" "Interdisc work - how to succeed" 
[85] "Disciplines" "Epidemiology - Subfields" 
[87] "MDs" "Mendelian Randomisation" 
[89] "Isolation from home disc" "Sociology" 
[91] "Biologists" "Model, ultimate" 
[93] "Sociologists" "Statisticians" 
[95] "HIDR - Other" "Literature Appearing" 
[97] "Population, idea of" "Economics" 
[99] "Disciplinary differences on same method" "Advocacy/Activism" 
[101] "Descriptive work - Strengths of" "Public Health People/Types" 
[103] "For Revisit" "Statistics - Other" 
[105] "Contrast" "Interdisc Work - Good collaborators" 
[107] "Statistics - Good Statistical collaborator" "Funding" 
[109] "Social Sciences" "Mechanism" 
[111] "Models - problematic that there are several?" "Data" 
[113] "Interesting" "Measurement" 
[115] "Methods belong to disc" "Interdisc work - incentives and motivations" 
[117] "Countries" "Unexpected results" 
[119] "Simplification vs complexity" "Assumptions about me" 
[121] "Creativity" "Psychology" 
[123] "Literature - (purposive knowledge)" "Intersections" 
[125] "Similarities & Common Ground" "UK cf Europe" 
[127] "Evidence" "Critique of HIDR frameworks" 
[129] "Interdisc work - is one interdisc person" "References or quotations" 
[131] "Health Behaviours" "Disciplinary Hierarchy" 
[133] "Natural Experiments" "One Idea" 
[135] "Context" "Key Questions" 
[137] "Disease in Individuals" "Neoliberalism" 
[139] "CPBR type stuff" "Race" 
[141] "Scientist, what is" "Academia" 
[143] "Interesting Language" "Agent Based Models" 
[145] "Mixing Methods" "Anthropology" 
[147] "generalisability" "Being Unsure what others think" 
[149] "Evidence Based something" "Risk" 
[151] "Specialisation" "HIDR - Network comments" 
[153] "Good work is hard" "Statistics - Across a career" 
[155] "Surgery" "Disease focus" 
[157] "Literature - Classification" "Literature - Ontology" 
[159] "Regression equation language" "Literature - Words of Nature" 
[161] "Literature - Epistemology" "Literature - Small Lifeworlds" 
[163] "Language" "Political Science" 
[165] "critical perspective" "Time/Temporal issues" 
[167] "Balancing theory and method"  
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A B S T R A C T   
Research on health inequalities and health disparities has grown exponentially since the 1960s, but this 
expansion has not been matched by an associated sense of progress. Criticisms include claims that too much 
research addresses well-trodden questions and that the field has failed to gain public and policy traction. 
Qualitative studies have found researchers partly attribute these challenges to fragmentation resulting from 
disciplinary and methodological differences. Yet, empirical investigation (‘research on research’) is limited. This 
study addresses this gap, employing mixed-methods to examine, at scale, how and why this field is defined by 
insular research clusters. First, bibliometric analysis identifies and visualizes the 250 most-connected authors. 
Next, an algorithm was used to identify clustering via citation links between authors. We used researcher 
profiling to ascertain authors’ geographical and institutional locations and disciplinary training, examining how 
this mapped onto clusters. Finally, causes of siloing were investigated via semi-structured interviews with 45 
researchers. The resulting ‘atlas’ of health inequalities and health disparities research identifies eight clusters of 
authors with varying degrees of connectedness. No single factor neatly describes observed fragmentation, health 
equity scholars exhibit a diverse disciplinary backgrounds, and geographical, institutional, and historical factors 
appear to intersect to explain siloed citation patterns. While the configuration of research activity within clusters 
potentially helps render questions scientifically manageable, it affirms perceptions of the field as fragmented. We 
draw on Thomas Kuhn and Sheila Jasanoff to position results within theoretical pictures of scientific progress. 
Newcomers to the field can use our findings to orient themselves within the many streams of health equity 
scholarship, and existing health equity scholars can use the atlas to move beyond existing geo-disciplinary 
networks. However, although stronger cross-cluster engagement would be likely to improve insights, the com-
plex nexus of factors underlying the field’s structure will likely make this challenging in practice.   
1. Introduction 
Health inequalities research and health disparities research (hereafter 
‘health equity research’) aims to understand, explain and reduce the un-
equal distribution of health across groups defined by social demographic 
factors, such as education, income and ethnicity. Previous studies chart 
the exponential accumulation of articles on this topic from 1966 onwards, 
demonstrating wide geographical interest, though a dominance of US and 
UK contributions (Bouchard et al., 2015; Cash-Gibson et al., 2018). 
However, growth in research has not been matched by improvement in 
health equity. Many countries have charted persistent health gaps be-
tween their most and least marginalized groups (Pool et al., 2017; Smith 
et al., 2015). Although slightly more positive accounts have recently 
emerged from some Western European countries (Mackenbach et al., 
2018), researchers have nonetheless been critical of the field’s lack of 
success. While some of these critiques emphasize the failure of political 
and policy actors to respond to available evidence (McCartney et al., 
2013; Qureshi, 2013), there have been at least three sets of charges levied 
at researchers. 
The first relates to failure to adequately translate research into policy 
and practice (often directed jointly at researchers and policymakers). 
Here, for example, Lynch argued scholars and policymakers employ 
health inequalities as a medicalized frame for discussing social in-
equalities and, in so doing, made the issue politically more appealing but 
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‘technically quite difficult to solve’ (Lynch, 2017). Multiple authors 
highlight the lack of coalitions connecting health equity scholars to 
those with advocacy, media and policy expertise (Smith et al., 2015; 
Bambra et al., 2011). Other critiques focus on researchers’ perceived 
failure to engage with the public, noting that perceived public prefer-
ences often inform what is deemed politically feasible (Garthwaite et al., 
2016; Smith, 2013). 
The second set of criticisms relate to research content. Here, charges 
include a tendency to investigate well-trodden questions (e.g. describing 
patterns and causal pathways), while neglecting the impacts of policies 
and interventions (Bambra et al., 2011; Smith, 2013; Garthwaite et al., 
2016). For example, Bambra and colleagues criticize researchers and 
policymakers for failing to collaborate in ways that enable the effects of 
policy changes on health inequalities to be adequately assessed (Bambra 
et al., 2011). While a survey of health inequalities researchers working in 
the UK suggests researchers themselves feel the field has been preoccu-
pied with downstream risk-factors, such as smoking, whilst producing 
insufficient research on upstream, structural and social determinants 
(Smith and Eltanani, 2014). This imbalance has, in turn, been linked to 
researchers’ perceptions of what is likely to be funded (Smith, 2010), 
suggesting research funders also shape the field. 
The third set of issues relate to perceived lack of connectivity. Di-
vision is evident even in the characterization of fundamental terms and 
concepts. As Bouchard et al.’s (2015) bibliometric analysis demon-
strates, the terms ‘health inequities’, ‘health inequalities’ and ‘health 
disparities’ are used inconsistently (sometimes interchangeably), sug-
gesting the presence of distinct scientific - perhaps epistemic - commu-
nities. The boundaries separating these communities have, in turn, been 
linked to geographical norms (Graham, 2004), disciplinary preferences 
(Bouchard et al., 2015) and ‘issue framing’ (Gamble and Stone, 2006). 
The latter dimension appears particularly confused; while there is some 
consensus that the term ‘health disparities’ is descriptive, some claim 
‘health inequalities’ better signals health differences as unfair and unjust 
(Gamble and Stone, 2006), while others claim that only ‘health in-
equities’ is imbued with this moral dimension (Ward et al., 2013; 
Braveman, 2006). 
Beyond differences in terminology, qualitative research suggests 
disciplinary divisions are particularly important. Bartley’s analysis of 
research on unemployment and health in the UK highlighted the impor-
tance of differences between economics, statistics and sociology, noting 
that these cut across the boundary between research and policy (Bartley, 
1992). More recently, Wade and Stone’s (2010) reflections on teaching 
health disparities note that sociology and economics tend to approach this 
issue with entirely different questions and assumptions. Garthwaite and 
colleagues’ (2016) study exploring how researchers feel the field should 
progress identified three epistemological clusters, each supporting distinct 
ways forward. 
These three sets of critique are interrelated, with the first two being 
at least partially connected to the third. For example, fragmentation 
arising from geographical and disciplinary differences has been con-
nected to claims that the field lacks clear advocacy-coalitions (Smith, 
2013). While methodological preferences of dominant disciplines 
(especially epidemiology), and the lack of interdisciplinary collabora-
tion, have been charged with contributing to the field’s ongoing pro-
duction of ‘partial investigations’ (Garthwaite et al., 2016). In other 
words, a belief that health equity research is fragmented is viewed as 
problematic for the field in multiple ways. 
Understanding how and why health equity research is siloed there-
fore seems important. Yet there has been little empirical examination of 
the field (sometimes referred to as ‘research on research’) and even less 
examining disciplinary diversity. This study helps address this gap, 
employing mixed methods to examine, at scale, how the field is organ-
ised within citation-space and to ascertain the roles of disciplinary, 
geographical and institutional factors in the establishment and mainte-
nance of this observed structure. By employing a bibliometric approach, 
we provide a much broader view of divisions within the field than 
qualitative studies published to date. We also move beyond existing 
bibliometric analyses by analyzing the connectivity of authors, not pa-
pers. Our analysis provides fresh empirical support for claims that the 
field is fragmented and, for the first time, identifies notable clusters of 
authors within the field and their relationship to one another in citation- 
space. Researcher profiling and qualitative interviews with researchers 
featuring in the bibliometric analysis are then used to shed light on these 
findings, demonstrating that disciplines, institutions and geographies 
have intersected to contribute to the emergence of distinct clusters (or 
‘silos’). These findings can help newcomers to the field orient themselves 
within the literature, and also have important implications for those 
seeking to promote interdisciplinary collaboration within health equity 
research. 
2. Methods 
To avoid reliance on low-quality institutional affiliation data (Rafols 
and Meyer, 2007) or a focus on highly-cited researchers, bibliometric 
analysis was employed to identify the 250 most-connected authors within 
health equity research. This number was felt to be visually manageable, 
while including a range of career stages and locations. 
We selected Scopus, the largest academic database (Mongeon and 
Paul-Hus, 2016) as the source database and article titles, abstracts and 
keywords were searched using the search string below, to extract re-
cords dated between 1976 and 2016. No geographical or language re-
strictions were applied. However, the use of English search-terms 
restricted results to those with an English title, abstract and/or 
keywords. 
((“health inequ*“) OR (“health equal*“) OR (“health equit*“) OR 
(“health disparit*“) OR (“social determin* of health”)) 
As bibliometric analysis at the author level requires a high standard 
of data-hygiene (Wagstaff and Culyer, 2012), records were read into an 
SQL database for cleaning (correcting misspellings, merging authors 
appearing under multiple names, and distinguishing authors sharing 
names). 
The bibliometric analysis aimed to visualise health equity research 
and to uncover patterns in citation flows that enhance understanding of 
the extent to which members of the field are integrated or segregated 
within disciplinary, geographic or institutional silos. Authors with five 
or more publications meeting search criteria were eligible for inclusion, 
and distances between author pairs calculated via direct citation (how 
many times Author A cites Author B). This method was selected over 
analysis of co-authorship as, when contrasted with article authorship, 
citations more completely reflect the material on which scholars draw 
and the literatures to which they feel their work connects. 
A clustering algorithm was then employed to highlight regions of the 
network where a high proportion of citations are local. Waltman & Van 
Eck’s Smart Local Moving algorithm (2013), was used, which initialises 
by assigning each author to a cluster of which they are the only member (i. 
e. 250 clusters where n = 1), and moves authors between clusters until the 
proportion of citations within groupings is maximised. Therefore, an 
author may cite authors from any cluster, but they tend to be cited (and/or 
to cite) authors from their own cluster. 
Next, we used what we term ‘researcher profiling’ to ascertain the 
institutional and geographical location of authors, as well as their disci-
plinary training. To gather this information we undertook online searches 
and, where necessary, contacted researchers directly via email. Since 
observed diversity in disciplinary training could arise due to variation in 
course titles between countries, institutions, or over time, we classified 
researchers’ highest degree (e.g. PhD) into Subject Categories, using 
Porter and Rafols’ (2009) mapping. Following Jost (2007), the Shannon 
Number Equivalent (SNE) index is presented as a measure of disciplinary 
diversity within clusters. This can be interpreted as the number of 
equally-represented disciplines required to achieve the observed diversity 
of each cluster. Bibliometric analyses were conducted using VOSviewer 
(Van Eck and Waltman, 2017) and diversity measures calculated using 
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Stata (Statacorp). 
In addition, the first author undertook semi-structured interviews 
with 45 researchers appearing in the network, to better understand their 
disciplinary backgrounds, career development and views about health 
inequalities/disparities research. Interviewees were shown an early 
version of Fig. 1, enabling them to reflect on clustering. Interviews were 
conducted using a themed interview schedule, via in-person meetings (n 
= 15), phone-calls (n = 3) and video-calls (n = 28). 113 researchers 
were invited to participate, and, with the exception of Cluster 5 (from 
which no interviews resulted), at least 3 representatives from all clusters 
were interviewed. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
by the first author and thematically coded using the R Package RQDA 
(Huang, 2016) to aid analysis. This research project, including in-
terviews, received ethical approval from the University of Edinburgh 
School of Social and Political Science. 
This study does not present the entire, global health equity research 
network, but the 250 most densely-connected set of authors, meaning 
that satellite communities not citing any author in Fig. 1 are excluded. 
Our long time-scale may introduce bias toward late-career, established 
researchers. However, as over 80% of individual papers analysed were 
published after 2008, this impact seems likely to be minimal. Finally, as 
researchers’ PhD discipline may not accurately reflect the discipline of 
their current research output, some disciplinary communities may 
remain undetected. 
3. Results 
We begin by providing an overarching summary of the visual network 
produced via the bibliometric analysis, before exploring geographical and 
disciplinary dimensions of the network. Together with the researcher 
profiling, 45 interviews and our analysis of the cited papers, this informs 
the subsequent brief descriptive account of the eight clusters within the 
network. The final section of the results then draws directly on the 
interview data in attempt to understand this clustering in more depth. 
3.1. Network overview 
29,212 papers containing relevant keywords were extracted, repre-
senting over 8500 authors. Citation flows between pairs of authors were 
analysed, the 250 most-connected authors identified, and arranged such 
that authors with strong citation links are located close together, pro-
ducing Fig. 1. Hence, Fig. 1 depicts the 250 most-connected authors 
publishing research in English about health equity between 1976 and 
2016 (hereafter, “researchers” or “authors”). Despite spanning 40 years, 
25,165 of papers (86%) were published after 2008, reflecting the expo-
nential increase noted by existing reviews (Cash-Gibson et al., 2018; 
Bouchard et al., 2015). 
Fig. 2 is a simplified version of Fig. 1, highlighting the eight clusters. 
The left and right halves of Figs. 1 and 2 have different spatial ar-
rangements and citation structures; the left is made up of five densely- 
connected, partly-overlapping clusters (labelled 1, 2, 6, 7 and 4 in 
Figs. 1 and 2); while the right comprises three non-overlapping clusters 
with relatively sparse interconnectivity (labelled 5, 8 and 3). Generally 
(though with exceptions), researchers from the US appear on the right 
hand side of Fig. 1 and researchers from the UK, Europe, Australia, 
Canada and Europe appear on the left. In the following sections we 
investigate authors’ geographic distribution, and other author attributes 
which seem to overlay and intersect with geography to produce the 
structure of Fig. 1. 
3.2. Network geography 
The geographic location of network members is summarised in Table 1. 
Reflecting the findings of studies focused on the geographical spread of the 
field (Bouchard et al., 2015; Cash-Gibson et al., 2018), two-thirds of re-
searchers are based in the US or UK, and an additional 13% in Canada and 
Australia. The remainder of the network comprises researchers from 
Europe, Scandinavia, Latin America and South-East Asia. 
Fig. 1. The 250 most-connected health equity researchers. Nodes represent authors who have published at least 5 papers with relevant keywords. The size of the 
node/circle represents the number of papers each author has published. Width of lines indicates the number of citations between authors. The colour of the nodes 
represent different clusters (numbered 1–8) of authors detected via algorithm. 
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3.3. Network disciplines 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of first degree and highest degree by 
subject category, providing the first detailed picture of the disciplinary 
backgrounds underpinning the health equity research field. A wide range 
of disciplines are represented in network members’ first degrees. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, there is less variation in researchers’ PhD or other highest 
degree (Juris Doctor, DPhil, etc), with the most common category being 
‘Public, Environmental & occupational health’ (which includes epidemi-
ology, health promotion, health behaviour and health education). This is 
followed by sociology, medicine, psychology, economics/health eco-
nomics, and political science. Almost one in five network members have a 
medical qualification. 
Such varied undergraduate training suggests the field potentially 
incorporates diverse ideas about health, and health equity. However, the 
most common ideas are likely to be shaped by the dominant disciplines 
which are, in order, public health, sociology, medicine, psychology, 
economics, and political science. 
In the following section we explore the clusters in Figs. 1 and 2, 
including via examination of disciplinary diversity. 
3.4. Network clusters 
Fig. 1 contains the set of 250 most-connected health equity scholars, 
in terms of citation links. A large volume of citations flow across cluster 
boundaries, however the eight clusters visualised represent network 
regions where a high proportion of citations are local (i.e., within- 
cluster). Combining demographic data with the citation network al-
lows investigation of the extent to which disciplinary diversity is uni-
form across Fig. 1, or maps onto the clusters (suggesting disciplinary 
silos). Fig. 2 is a simplified version of Fig. 1, highlighting the arrange-
ment and general character of the eight clusters. The labels in Fig. 2 
reflect analysis presented in this section, which considers what research 
profiling and interviews revealed about the intersecting influence of 
disciplines, geography, history, and research focus on cluster formation. 
Table 3 contains key details regarding each cluster, including size, 
proportion in the US/UK, proportion with a medical qualification, and 
members’ highest degree by subject category. The US/UK breakdown is 
presented as while these countries account for over 50% of the network, 
they are not equally represented within any cluster, and some clusters 
are dominated by either the US or UK. 
Table 3 also reports the SNE index, reflecting both the number of 
disciplines and evenness of their representation within clusters. The 
entire network of 250 authors has SNE of 14.15, equivalent to approx-
imately 14 equally-represented disciplines (or, 250/14–18 examples of 
each discipline). Only Cluster 4 is as diverse as the wider network, 
suggesting a degree of disciplinary sorting or concentration. This pos-
sibility is explored below, as we examine each cluster in turn, in order of 
increasing median year of first publication. 
Cluster 1: Whitehall Investigators & Health Inequalities Pioneers (UK/ 
Europe). 
The network’s oldest cluster (by median entry to the field) is 
comprised largely of researchers from the UK and Europe who began 
studying health inequalities during the 1980s and 1990s. The relatively 
high diversity score reflects the wide-ranging backgrounds of these early 
inequality scholars, which included many social scientists. This cluster is 
especially notable for its high proportion of Sociology PhDs, making up 
Fig. 2. Eight clusters of health equity research.  
Table 1 
Network members’ geographical location.  
Country Count % 
US 108 43% 
UK 59 24% 
Canada 19 8% 
Australia 12 5% 
Netherlands 8 3% 
Germany 7 3% 
Spain 7 3% 
Sweden 5 2% 
Brazil 3 1% 
Finland 3 1% 
Norway 3 1% 
Belgium 2 1% 
Chile 2 1% 
Japan 2 1% 
South Korea 2 1% 
New Zealand 2 1% 
Switzerland 2 1% 
Other 4 2% 
Grand Total 250 100%  
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just over a quarter of the cluster, while psychology, the social sciences 
and political science are also represented. The upper left part this of 
cluster includes several sociologists from Scandinavia and Germany. 
Researchers toward the bottom of this cluster (overlapping Cluster 7) 
share a focus on place and health. 
Cluster 2: Economic approaches & Measurement of income inequity at 
scale (Netherlands, UK, US). 
Cluster 2 is comprised of two distinct regions, each with disciplinary 
features. Work in this cluster emerged in the early 2000s and addresses 
methodological issues arising from the international scaling-up of 
studies like those occurring in Cluster 1 (discussed in Section 3.4). 
Located at the top are economists from the Netherlands, Australia, 
Sweden, and the US, who have contributed advances in the measure-
ment of health equity. Near the centre of the network are a group of 
epidemiologists and social epidemiologists, many of whom have medi-
cal or sociology backgrounds. Both regions share an interest in the 
measurement of health equity, and the ways in which money, income and 
prevailing economic conditions affect health, including dental and oral 
health. Cluster 2 is around three-quarters the size of Cluster 3, but 
demonstrates 35% of that cluster’s diversity, reflecting the smaller 
number of disciplines represented. 
Cluster 3: Health Disparities Research (US). Almost all (96%) of the 
network’s largest cluster is located within the US, and half hold a PhD or 
other doctoral degree in Public health (including epidemiology) or 
medicine. Nursing, psychology and sociology PhDs are also represented, 
but political science and the humanities are absent. While the majority 
of authors in Cluster 3 have written about ethnic and racial disparities in 
health, researchers in the rightmost region of this cluster (near clusters 5 
and 8) share a focus on racial and ethnic disparities in cancer outcomes. 
Researchers in the leftmost part of the cluster have a more mixed focus, 
including, for example, maternal and child health, drug use, mental 
health, and allergies. The top-left corner includes several researchers 
from the Harvard School of Public Health, and University of California 
San Francisco. These researchers have focused on the relationship be-
tween socioeconomic status and health, perhaps explaining their strong 
citation links with Clusters 1 and 2. The emergence of Cluster 3, and its 
links with Clusters 5 and 8, are discussed in Section 3.4. 
Cluster 4: Policy-Focused & Critical Health Inequalities Research (UK). 
Cluster 4 is unique within the network for its disciplinary diversity. 
The US is absent from this cluster, with 52% of members located within 
the UK, 19% in Australia and 17% in Canada. While the median entry to 
the field for authors was 2005, Cluster 4 generally developed alongside 
Cluster 1, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as the strong citation links in 
Fig. 1 indicate. Members of this cluster have the network’s most-diverse 
doctoral training, with an equivalent 13 equally-represented disciplines 
among just 42 members. The network’s humanities PhDs and political 
science PhDs are concentrated here, and the social sciences are also well- 
represented. These trainings are consistent with the cluster’s focus on 
macro or ‘upstream’ determinants, including political and corporate de-
terminants. Many researchers in this cluster conduct qualitative research 
and have a theoretical emphasis in their work. The cluster covers topics 
such as health policy, lay knowledge and evidence synthesis. Together, 
these features reflect the conceptualisation of health within Cluster 4 as 
socially-situated. This cluster has strong citation links to Clusters 1, 7 and 
6, but is sparsely linked with Cluster 3. 
Cluster 5: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Cancer: Administrative 
Reporting (US). 
Cluster 5 is the network’s smallest cluster and (like Cluster 8) is 
cancer-focused and located geographically within the US. Members of 
this cluster have co-authored highly-cited, national administrative 
cancer statistics reports which include cancer incidence and mortality 
for racial and ethnic subgroups (labelled with the keyword “health 
disparities” since 2002). Nearly one third of members have medical 
training, and remaining members have statistical, biomedical, or public 
health backgrounds, reflecting the output of this cluster. Most members 
are affiliated with either the National Cancer Institute, National Cancer 
Society, Centers for Disease Control, or National Institutes of Health 
(NIH). 
Cluster 6: Socio-Critical accounts of Work-Related and Migrant Health 
(US, Canada, Spain). 
Cluster 6 is a mix of researchers from Europe, Latin America and the 
US. Researchers in this cluster are linked via a joint focus on 
employment-related health disparities/inequalities, and migrant health. 
Several researchers are based in Barcelona or completed doctoral study 
in that city. An additional group are located at (or have passed through) 
the Wake Forest Department of Family Medicine, in the US. In terms of 
disciplinary training this is the most diverse of the small clusters 
(Clusters 5–8), containing a mix of researchers with medical, biomed-
ical, family studies, health policy, psychology, and statistical back-
grounds. The network’s anthropology PhDs are also concentrated within 
this cluster, and this similar disciplinary profile perhaps explains the 
position in citation-space alongside Clusters 1 and 4, within which 
Table 2 
First Degree and PhD/Highest Degree by Subject Category Data obtained from 
CVs, online profiles, and (where necessary) from researchers directly via email.  
Subject Category First 
Degree 
PhD (Or Highest 
Degree) 
Public, environmental & occupational 
health 
6 74 
Sociology 27 32 
Medicine, general & internal 44 22 
Psychology 26 13 
Economics 11 12 
Political Science 8 11 
Geography 12 8 
Social sciences, biomedical 3 8 
Statistics & probability 3 8 
Psychology, clinical  7 
Nursing 8 5 
Demography  4 
Health policy & services  4 
Biochemistry & molecular biology 2 3 
Health care sciences & services 8 3 
Medicine, research & experimental 2 3 
Social sciences, interdisciplinary 7 3 
Anthropology 2 2 
Behavioral sciences  2 
Dentistry, oral surgery & medicine 3 2 
Ecology 1 2 
History 7 2 
Social work 2 2 
Urban Studies  2 
Biology 15 1 
Business  1 
Communication  1 
Education & educational research  1 
English/Literature 7 1 
Family studies  1 
Genetics & heredity 1 1 
Information science & library science 1 1 
Law  1 
Nutrition & dietetics  1 
Philosophy  1 
Planning & development  1 
Chemistry 6  
Design 1  
Engineering 2  
Management 1  
Mathematics 5  
Microbiology 2  
Multidisciplinary sciences 3  
Neurosciences 1  
Pharmacology & pharmacy 2  
Public administration 3  
Religious Studies 2  
Veterinary sciences 1  
Zoology 2  
Unknown 13 4 
Total 250 250  
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health is characterised as a socio-structural phenomenon. 
Cluster 7: Geographical Approaches: Inequalities in Place & Space (UK). 
This relatively new, chiefly UK-based cluster contains the majority of 
the network’s geography PhDs. Located at the right-hand margin of 
Cluster 4, these researchers share a focus on spatial and geographic in-
equalities, environmental justice, and neighbourhoods. These eight re-
searchers entered the field slightly later than researchers in other 
clusters, with a median first publication year of mid-2008. 
Cluster 8: Breast Cancer Disparities (US). 
This small cluster is comprised chiefly of contributors to a single 
project, the Breast Cancer Health Disparities study (Slattery et al., 2014), 
many of whom are (or were once) based at the University of Louisville, 
Kentucky, or University of Utah. This is the least-diverse cluster in terms 
of disciplinary background, with a concentration of researchers holding 
a PhD in Health Behaviour, Health Education or Health Promotion 
(consolidated within the Public Health Subject Category). Other mem-
bers hold advanced degrees in statistics or biomedical science. This is the 
network’s most recently established cluster, with members’ median first 
publication in the field being mid-2011. 
3.5. Exploring and explaining the eight research clusters 
In this section, we draw on interview data to better understand how 
clusters have emerged and by what forces they are sustained in citation- 
space. As a reminder, we interviewed 45 network members and incor-
porated questions about an early version of Fig. 1. Although we use 
extracts illustrate specific points, we also draw on data collectively to 
draw out common explanatory narratives that appear to explain the 
evolution of the field and the clustering identified above. 
3.5.1. Landmark studies & advances in measurement 
Major research projects have contributed to the form and disciplinary 
topology of Fig. 1. An early milestone of health inequalities research was 
the Whitehall cohort, established in 1967 and analysed from 1978 on-
wards to investigate the relationship between cardiovascular (and other) 
diseases and occupational social class within the British civil service (e.g. 
Rose and Marmot, 1981). The status of the Whitehall studies as paradig-
matic examples of health equity scholarship is reflected in Fig. 1, as 
Whitehall investigators and collaborators make up much of Cluster 1, and 
occupy a central position in the network. 
Dutch researcher Johan Mackenbach spearheaded efforts to replicate 
Whitehall in Europe, beginning with the Dutch Longitudinal Study on 
Table 3 
Network Cluster characteristics.  
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
(n) 57 31 76 42 7 15 8 14 250 
Number Equivalent Shannon Index 9.68 4.53 9.68 13.07 3.6 8.33 4.01 3.42 14.15 
% US 7% 19% 96% 0% 86% 26% 0% 93% 43% 
% UK 40% 19% 1% 52% 0% 0% 88% 0% 24% 
% Any Medical Degree 18% 32% 20% 12% 29% 40% 13% 7% 20% 
Median year of authors’ first included publication 1999 2002 2004 2005 2005 2006 2008.5 2011.5 2004 
Earliest first included publication 1985 1997 1993 1983 2002 1999 2001 2003 1983 
Subject Category: PhD/Highest Degree   (% of cluster) (% network) 
Public, Environmental & Occupational Health 19% 45% 36% 19% 43% 20% 0% 64% 30.00% 
Medicine, general & internal 4% 6% 14% 5% 29% 13% 13%  8.80% 
Medicine, research & experimental     14% 13%   1.20% 
Nursing   5%     7% 2.00% 
Dentistry, oral surgery & medicine  3% 1%      0.80% 
Nutrition & dietetics   1%      0.40% 
Psychology 11%  5% 5%  7%   5.20% 
Psychology, clinical   8% 2%     2.80% 
Behavioral sciences   3%      0.80% 
Education & educational research    2%     0.40% 
Statistics & probability 7%  1%  14% 7%  7% 3.20% 
Biochemistry & molecular biology 4%       7% 1.20% 
Ecology 2%      13%  0.80% 
Biology        7% 0.40% 
Genetics & heredity        7% 0.40% 
Health policy & services   3%   13%   1.60% 
Health care sciences & services 2%   5%     1.20% 
Planning & development    2%     0.40% 
Family studies      7%   0.40% 
Demography 4% 3%  2%     1.60% 
Urban studies 2%   2%     0.80% 
Geography 2%  1% 5%   50%  3.20% 
Communication   1%      0.40% 
Business   1%      0.40% 
Economics 2% 29% 3%      4.80%          
Social sciences, biomedical 4%  1% 7%   13%  2.80% 
Social sciences, interdisciplinary 2%   2%  7%   1.20% 
Social work 2%  1%      0.80% 
Sociology 26% 6% 9% 17%   13%  12.40% 
Political science 4% 3% 3% 14%     4.40% 
Anthropology      13%   0.80% 
Law   1%      0.40% 
History  3%  2%     0.80% 
Literature    2%     0.40% 
Philosophy    2%     0.40% 
Information science & library science    2%     0.40% 
Unknown 7%        2.00% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.00%  
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Socio-Economic Health Differences, containing an explicit reference to 
Whitehall in its abstract (Mackenbach et al., 1994). Authors of similar 
single-country studies make up the top (left) half of Cluster 1. These 
replications provided comparable cohorts in several high-income 
countries and, therefore, the opportunity for cross-country compari-
son. This work was initiated by a group of economists, visible in Cluster 
2. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the scaling-up of the field 
from single cohort studies to global mega-comparisons introduced 
methodological challenges, and an accompanying need for “valid mea-
sures and methods” (Manor et al., 1997). In response, a literature spe-
cific to the measurement of health equity emerged, largely authored by 
the economists in Cluster 2 and others located at the intersection of 
Clusters 1, 2 and 3 (Kakwani et al., 1997; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997). 
In sum, in the UK and Europe, paradigmatic epidemiological studies 
aiming to investigate how social class (measured by employment status) 
impacts health played a key role in the development of Clusters 1 and 2. 
A shared focus on social inequalities in health outcomes facilitated links 
between these two clusters. 
3.5.2. ‘Inequalities’ & ‘disparities’ 
The lack of citation links between Cluster 3 and the European/UK 
clusters is a conspicuous feature of Fig. 1. US researchers in Fig. 1 seem to 
mostly cite other US researchers, whereas researchers in Australia, Europe 
and Canada seem more interconnected. This may be a reflection of the 
specialized streams of research apparent in Fig. 1, and specialized com-
munities of (for example) geographers, economists, clinical epidemiolo-
gists or social-scientists, unaware of potentially relevant publications from 
other streams. Alternatively, these different terms may signify varied 
framings of health equity as biomedical or sociological phenomena. In 
interviews, most interviewees were unable to explain this feature of Fig. 1, 
and interviewees in both network hemispheres commonly indicated they 
had little sense of the other, underlining their separation: 
I have no idea who anyone is! I’ve never heard of any of those 
people! […]. How is this all getting done in silos? And Why?? 
Social Epidemiologist, USA, Network Cluster 3. 
It is a bit hard to make sense of. There are a few names I’ve never 
heard of. I have to say […] I just can’t think who these people are. 
Geographer, UK, Network Cluster 7. 
Some interviewees suggested space between Cluster 3 (US domi-
nated) and other clusters is due to a combination of terminological 
differences and contrasting research foci, with UK based researchers 
generally studying ‘inequalities’ between social classes, while re-
searchers in the US tend to study ‘disparities’ between racial and ethnic 
groups (Kawachi et al., 2002). However, as we go on to elaborate, this 
was only a partial explanation. 
The separation between ‘inequalities’ and ‘disparities’ scholars in 
Fig. 1 appears to reflect the distinct origins and independent develop-
ment of two research traditions. Several inequalities scholars inter-
viewed were keen to highlight the historical context of Cluster 1, in the 
wake of the Black Report (Black, Morris et al., 1980), the first systematic 
effort by any national government to understand and explain health 
inequalities between social classes (Smith, 2013). The 1980s, 1990s 
were periods of intense activity for British health inequalities scholars, 
as they attempted to address gaps in understanding identified by the 
Black Report, while documenting the health impact of policies put in 
place by the Thatcher-led Conservative government that had rejected 
the Report’s conclusions (e.g. Whitehead, 1987). Many members of 
Cluster 1 and 4 pursued research on health inequalities throughout this 
period, despite limited funding, when the idea of health inequalities, 
even the term itself, was politically controversial: 
[It] was called the “health variations research program.” We were 
told we couldn’t use “inequalities” because Margaret Thatcher didn’t 
like the term, so it was dumped and we were “variations”. 
Cluster 1 Researcher, UK. 
Interview data suggests this struggle contributed to a shared sense of 
identity among these scholars, now passed to some students and col-
laborators present in Clusters 1, 4 and 7. There was resistance toward 
adopting any term other than ‘inequalities’ among these UK in-
terviewees, because the term had been fought for by researchers 
perceived as pioneers: 
Interviewer: Would you ever want to apply the term “Health Dis-
parities” in the UK? 
I would rather we stuck with ‘health inequalities’. […] During the 
Thatcher time, you weren’t allowed to talk about health ‘in-
equalities’, I don’t like dodging away from it. 
Cluster 1 Researcher, UK. 
There was also a sense that some UK interviewees considered ‘real’ 
health inequalities research as being concerned exclusively with social 
determinants, and restricted to network Clusters 1, 4 and 7: 
There is that community, and there are factions within that com-
munity […] But we would all be seen as ‘Health Inequalities’ […] 
Some [are] more on the periphery, like [Researcher from Cluster 7] 
for example because [s/he’s] more geography. [S/he] is more on the 
periphery, but a part of the family. And then there are almost like 
‘interlopers’ of the mainstream […] they probably think that they’re 
health inequalities researchers, but [they don’t belong to] this group 
of people who *are* health inequalities, who have carried that tra-
jectory within them, and have been shaped [by], and learned from, 
those pioneers. 
Cluster 4 Researcher, UK. 
In contrast, in the US, the importance of social factors in determining 
health outcomes was catalysed by studies in the 1980s noting differences 
in medical practice across (apparently) similar patient populations 
(McPherson et al., 1982). Responding to this unexplained variation in 
medical care, the US government commissioned the “Health, United 
States, 1983” report, which described, for the first time, significant dif-
ferences in “the burden of death and illness experienced by blacks and 
other minority Americans as compared with the nation’s population as a 
whole” (p ix). The dominance of the term “health disparities” arose from 
this motivating drive to understand the ‘gaps’ in observed health out-
comes and health care access between minority and majority ethnic 
populations (e.g. AMA CEDA, 1990). 
This emphasis continued into the 21st century, with health disparities 
research in the US tending to focus on healthcare (e.g., Fiscella et al., 2000; 
Nelson, 2002), while the European concern with inequalities in health 
relating to social class also persisted (Marmot et al., 2012). Several in-
terviewees noted the longstanding divide between scholars studying 
health inequalities (in class) and health disparities (in race): 
Interviewer: Race is clearly very important to work on health dis-
parities in the USA, it seems to be less of a focus in the UK? 
P: Yeah I’ve noticed that […] and I’m not sure why that is. [..] I 
haven’t gone as deeply into it as I might, because it is not, to be quite 
blunt, it doesn’t interest me that much, in the UK context. 
Cluster 4 Researcher, UK. 
Here [in the US] it is very much on race, we don’t talk about class 
here. […] There is so much focus on race here. Some of it makes 
sense, and some of it is really misguided and misses the point. 
Cluster 3 Researcher, US. 
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US-based interviewees across the network, but most especially in 
Clusters 3 and 6, expressed concern regarding the way race is concep-
tualized in research, particularly within ‘mainstream’ epidemiology. 
NIH requirements to report findings by racial and ethnic subgroupings 
were positioned as contributing to the uncritical treatment of race in 
quantitative analyses: 
Important now is to talk about race and ethnicity, to talk about race 
being a sociological concept and not a biological reality. […] In the 
US, because many of us are getting federal funds, one has to design 
research that covers human variation, and that is designated as sex, 
race and now age. […] This notion that you have to design it into 
your study means then that you have to be able to assign a value […]. 
In assigning that value then you have pretty much said “this is an 
entity, these different racial categories really are entities.” 
Cluster 6 Researcher, US. 
In summary, in Fig. 1 we see the lasting impact of the way research 
about health equity was conceptualized and initiated on either side of 
the Atlantic. Insights from interview data reveal the ongoing importance 
of the way the two fields originated in the 1980s and developed over 
time, trajectories reflected in the structure of Fig. 1. Perhaps more 
importantly, it is clear that ‘inequalities’ and ‘disparities’ are, in prac-
tice, not interchangeable terms for the same phenomena. To use one 
term aligns a project with a particular tradition of research, a group of 
pioneering investigators, and a historical conceptualisation of equity. 
Overlying geographic variation was disciplinary variation in use of these 
terms, discussed in the next section. 
3.5.3. Disciplinary diversity 
The distribution of doctoral trainings is not uniform across the 
network, mostly due to the mix of humanities, political-, life- and social- 
sciences on the network’s left side (which, as Fig. 2 illustrates, tend to 
study ‘health inequalities’), and the dominance of medical, statistical, 
health promotion and epidemiological backgrounds on the right side 
(where ‘health disparities’ dominates as the preferred term). Researchers 
with economic training are similarly concentrated in Cluster 2, as are the 
majority of geographers (Cluster 7). The small, US dominated clusters (5 
and 8) contain many more cancer epidemiologists and health promotion 
scholars than the wider network, and represent a small number of in-
stitutions. Clusters 7 and 8 have the most recent median first publication 
date, and appear to represent regional communities of disciplinary and 
topical specialists. Clusters 1 and 3 (foundational clusters within the UK 
and US, respectively) have the same SNE diversity, though Cluster 1 might 
be considered more diverse as it is smaller. 
One notable anomaly is Cluster 6, which includes a mix of ‘health 
inequalities’ and ‘health disparities’ researchers, appears on the health 
inequalities ‘side’ of Fig. 1 but does not include any members from the 
UK. Many members of Cluster 6 have social science backgrounds, and 
interviewees from this cluster explicitly framed the drivers of health 
inequity as socially-situated, which may explain the location of this 
group in citation space alongside clusters with strong social science 
membership. Nevertheless, interviewees in Clusters 1, 4 and 7 were 
almost universally unaware of the work proceeding in Cluster 6. 
3.5.4. Disease focus 
In addition to varied use of terminology, and different disciplinary 
profiles, the two network hemispheres differ in their disease foci, reflected 
in the algorithmic detection of two cancer-specific, US-dominated citation 
clusters (5 and 8) on the network’s right side. This difference may be at 
least partially due to the data availability landscape within the US 
throughout the 1990s. In 2002, six members of Cluster 3 expressed their 
frustration that “few or no socioeconomic data exist in most US public 
health surveillance databases” (Krieger et al., 2002). In the context of this 
scarcity, the Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results registry (SEER) 
held high-quality cancer incidence and outcome data alongside patient 
demographics dating back to 1973 (National Cancer Institute), repre-
senting a crucial data source for health disparities scholars. Between 2000 
and 2010, several members of Clusters 3, 5 and 8 utilised SEER data to 
demonstrate racial disparities in cancer screening, incidence, and health 
outcomes (e.g., Singh et al., 2004). Analysis of SEER data to investigate 
disparities in cancer-related outcomes was also utilised to demonstrate 
best-practice methodology (Harper et al., 2008). Cancer disparities 
research continues to be well-funded in the US, and is supported institu-
tionally via Comprehensive Cancer Centers. Many interviewees in the US 
suggested that the security of cancer-specific funding powerfully shapes 
research about health disparities: 
Interviewer: Many US researchers who have appeared in my biblio-
metric network study cancer. Why do you think that is? 
Because it’s sexy. And well-funded. 
Cluster 3 Researcher, US. 
For interviewees in Clusters 3 and 8, there was a sense that studying 
cancer is a financial necessity, and that funding streams shape research 
questions: 
We’re pushed and funded to examine disparities in single disease 
conditions. And I am very guilty of this […] There are common un-
derpinnings across a number of health behaviours, health conditions, 
health outcomes […] but in the US it is very disease focused, that is 
how our funding streams are organised. Cluster 8 Researcher, US. 
Interviewees from the UK also discussed the epistemic impact of 
research funding: 
We just ignore the 90% of what causes inequalities and focus on the 
one bit where we can get money and we can have control. I can see 
how that actually impacts on me […] even though you know, 
fundamentally, it will only make a tiny bit of difference. 
Cluster 4 Researcher, UK. 
Partly as a reaction to the dominance of medical and disease-specific 
models in the US (Honjo, 2004), some US-based epidemiologists have 
advanced Social Epidemiology: “the study of how the social world 
influences–and in many cases defines–the fundamental determinants of 
health” (Berkman et al., 2014). These researchers, located in Cluster 3, 
helped cement social epidemiology as a legitimate sub-disciplinary 
specialisation (Galea and Link, 2013). Popular textbooks and key theo-
retical contributions to the field have been authored by members of 
Cluster 3, and the journal Social Science and Medicine (where many such 
contributions are published), is edited by members of Cluster 3. As these 
social epidemiologists are advancing a view of health as socially (rather 
than biomedically) situated, it is unsurprising that these scholars are 
located in the region of Cluster 3 closest to the social-science dominated 
network clusters. 
4. Concluding discussion 
Our bibliometric analysis confirms and for the first time visualizes 
researchers’ accounts of health equity research as a field comprised of 
clusters which are generally not well-connected. Our researcher profile 
and interview data suggest that, although disciplinary training played a 
role in the emergence of these clusters, so too have historical, geographic, 
institutional and financial (research funding) forces. Interpreting these 
results through the lens of Science and Technology Studies theorists Sheila 
Jasanoff and Thomas Kuhn helps to contextualise results within existing 
theoretical pictures of scientific progress. 
4.1. A cartographic model of multi-discipline research 
Jasanoff (2012) described two cartographic models of multidisci-
plinary research. The first, as nations within a continent, uninterrupted 
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territory divided among disciplinary ‘states’, without space in between. 
The second, as an archipelago: wherein “the disciplines are oddly and 
idiosyncratically bounded formations, haphazardly scattered across a sea 
of ignorance, with unexplored waters in between.” (p192). In the conti-
nental model, disciplinary boundaries are broken by the development of 
interstate highways, in the archipelago model, by voyages into the unknown. 
Health equity research, as visualised in Figs. 1 and 2, appears to display 
characteristics of both models, as it presents a central land-mass without 
gaps (Clusters 1, 4, 7 and 3), as well as peninsulas (Clusters 6 and 2), and 
islands (Clusters 5 and 8). 
Social epidemiology might be described as a ‘highway’ between the 
biomedically-dominated, right-hand-side of the network and the social- 
science-rich left hand side. The appearance of social epidemiology as a 
distinct paradigm within mainstream epidemiology appears to be holding 
the two research communities together in citation-space, as this interdis-
ciplinary specialty supports the interweaving of diverse perspectives. 
However, the ‘bridge’ researchers in Cluster 3 do not have strong links to 
the critical, policy-focused strand of health inequalities research produced 
by authors in Cluster 4, pointing to an apparent gap between US-led 
research on social epidemiology and critical policy analysis. 
Collaboration on large-scale projects, and shared historical framings 
of equity pave the intellectual carriageways linking clusters 1, 2, 4 and 7. 
A shared conceptualisation of health as socially-situated links Clusters 6, 
4 and 1. Cluster 2 is a well-connected methodological hub, and its 
central position reflects the high value placed on quantitative method-
ology across the field. 
The ‘unexplored waters’ of health equity scholarship appear to lie in 
the gulf between (mainly) European scholars of the relationship between 
health and social class and the (mainly) US scholars of the intersection 
between health and race/ethnicity. Despite strong links to the 
epidemiologically-driven Cluster 1, Cluster 3 is poorly connected to the 
social science-dominated clusters 6, 7 and 4. We have shown that lin-
guistic differences (‘inequalities’ vs ‘disparities’) do not fully explain this 
lack of connectivity, and are rather themselves a reflection of distinct, 
mature research traditions, each with their own history, disciplinary 
character, and funding landscape. 
4.2. The long shadow of exemplary past achievement and the centrality of 
research funding 
Although our findings make clear that disciplinary training alone 
cannot explain the clusters comprising health equity research, disciplinary 
siloing is clear. Thomas Kuhn’s presentation of science as proceeding 
within independent paradigmatic communities (1962) highlights the 
ways in which early scholarly achievement powerfully shapes the tra-
jectory of enquiry within disciplines. Kuhn’s sense of disciplinary para-
digms as “exemplary past achievement” (postscript to Kuhn, 1970) seems 
relevant, as early framings of health equity in the 1980s have cast long 
temporal shadows across Fig. 1. These early framings also appear to have 
influenced the attraction and recruitment of disciplinary specialists to the 
field; in the UK, where health inequalities research was politically 
controversial, sociology and political science are well-represented, and 
now present established, independent traditions of health equity schol-
arship. In the US, where health disparities began with unexplained vari-
ation in clinical practice, the clinical disciplines such as medicine, nursing, 
clinical epidemiology and psychology are more dominant, and ‘cancer 
disparities’ has emerged as a free-standing research domain, partly in 
response to relevant independent funding streams. The Kuhnian view 
warns against the prospect that these differences might be bridged simply, 
via multi-disciplinary teams, given the challenges of working across dis-
ciplines with fundamentally different paradigmatic assumptions. Indeed, 
future research might explore how researchers’ ontological or epistemo-
logical outlooks impact on collaboration within health equity research, 
and public health more broadly. 
Cutting across these historical, geographical and disciplinary norms 
are challenges relating to research funding. Our analysis highlights the 
importance of funding in shaping research content, and illustrates how 
21st Century work reflects path-dependencies established many decades 
prior, in response to data access challenges and/or the design of foun-
dational studies. Reflecting previous findings (Garthwaite et al., 2016; 
Smith, 2010), interview data illustrate that health equity researchers 
consider what is likely to be funded when making decisions about the 
direction of their work, and this appears to pull researchers towards 
disease-specific questions. Overall, we suggest that the formation of 
insular scholarly sub-networks within health equity research may be a 
consequence of the ways in which broad, motivating questions are 
rendered both scientifically manageable, and fundable. 
Returning to the critiques outlined in our Introduction, an optimistic 
account might suggest that, having provided a visual and descriptive map 
of the field it will be possible for researchers to enhance cross-cluster 
dialogue, by engaging with work in clusters with which they are unfa-
miliar. It might also be feasible for interested funders to further incentivise 
the development of such interdisciplinary links. However, our analysis 
highlights the ways in which the complex nexus of factors underpinning 
the field’s structure may also condition the field’s content. With so many 
intersecting drivers, overcoming fragmentation means more than doing 
different work, it means being open and supported (institutionally and 
financially) to do work differently. The combined influences of funding, 
data availability, disciplinary norms and preferences, and national and 
institutional research cultures may render this flexibility difficult to ach-
ieve, in practice. 
Likewise, interpreting the stable terminological division between 
‘health inequalities’ and ‘health disparities’ research with an awareness 
of the performative nature of language in academia suggests this divide 
may be hard to bridge (i.e. use of particular terms to signal familiarity 
with, and to position new work in relation to what has gone before, and/ 
or to demonstrate authors’ normative values). Finally, as one reviewer 
reflected, competition over research funding can lead to researchers 
trying to protect their ‘territory’, as one interviewee’s reference to ‘in-
terlopers’ implied (see also Gieryn, 1983). Relatedly, these distinct 
territories of expertise may be serving distinct ‘clients’. Yet, without 
greater cohesiveness, lessons from policy studies suggests efforts to ef-
fect policy change to reduce health differences are likely to struggle 
(Smith, 2013). 
At the time of writing, the unequal burden of COVID-19 across social 
groups is intensifying scholarly and public interest in health equity. In 
response to the pandemic, the need for studies focused on racial inequity 
in health in the US and UK has been highlighted (Bhala et al., 2020), 
suggesting that COVID-19 may represent a force capable of more closely 
uniting ‘health inequalities’ and ‘health disparities’ scholarship. However, 
while this study supplies an atlas for scholars to move beyond their 
existing networks, step outside the template of past successes, forge new 
alliances and explore less well-trodden paths, we have also detailed 
several reasons why researchers may be reluctant or unable to take these 
steps. Future studies might aid such efforts further, by examining the 
factors underlying this field’s fragmentation in detail, including resources, 
the role of ontology, epistemology, disciplinary training and 
normative-political values in shaping researchers’ perceptions of what is 
possible, what is feasible, and what is necessary to reduce observed 
inequity in health. 
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Appendix I: The Spectrum of Statistical Literacy  
 
Interviewees had varying confidence in their statistical skills, which in many 
cases seemed inconsistent with my impression of their experience and expertise. 
Some researchers who declared themselves ignorant or unsophisticated went on to 
discuss statistical methods with some nuance and with a critical perspective. I 
detected a generalised anxiety around statistics for many interviewees, which some 
senior academics reported managing within their research teams:  
  
TC: Perhaps we can chat a bit about statistics.  […] 
  
I’m not intimidated by statistics  
 
TC: Have you experienced that other people are?   
 
Yeah. People perform it.[…]  You meet people who do that thing, where you say ‘you might 
need to learn some stats’ and they sort of start to crumple up a bit. You also meet people at 
the other end of the spectrum […] essentially, ‘if you don’t understand this massively complex 
algebraic statement then you are inferior’.  
 
Public Health researcher (Geography PhD) 
 
Statistical proficiency seems to be surrounded by intense emotions (e.g., fear) 
and low statistical literacy was repeatedly connected to feelings of inferiority and 
inadequacy, especially by interviewees with social science backgrounds in Clusters 
4 and 6. 
 
Statistics has this power […] It relates to the whole discussion we are having, including the 
search for legitimacy.  
 
Public Health researcher & Medical Doctor (Social Science PhD) 
 
One interviewee did enthusiastically claim the title of ‘statistical expert’ for 
themselves. However, my impression was that this interviewee had not much more 
understanding than an undergraduate class in regression methods would provide. 
Therefore, an important quality of statistical expertise in the context of research 
about health is that it is relative. An individuals’ status as expert or non-expert 
depends on context. One interviewee who had moved across disciplines (and did 
not consider themselves expert) reflected that being familiar and confident with 
basic regression methods did confer expert status in some scientific contexts, but 
was viewed as grossly inadequate in others:    
 
 I remember thinking “they're all statisticians or demographers in that team, I will never 
understand this stuff.  I’ll just never believe in myself sufficiently”. Whereas, working with 
the social policy people, my open university statistics was absolutely brilliant! [Laughing]  
 
Medical Sociologist, Social Policy PhD  
 
The identity of ‘statistical expert’ therefore takes different forms in varied 
settings.  Despite this variation, the value and importance of statistical literacy was 
acknowledged by almost all interviewees, but most especially interviewees in 
clusters 3 and 8 (highlighted in figure RC5.1 below), who presented statistical 
capability as being key for maximising their research output, obtaining grant 
funding, and maximising individual employability: 
 
Ramp[ing] up your quantitative skills is never going to be a disservice. […] One thing I feel 
allows me to do things quickly, and to accelerate my ability to disseminate work is being 
comfortable quantitatively.  
 
Health Behaviour Researcher (Health Behaviour PhD) 
 
In biostatistics, after 20 years, still the job market is number one - it is so good!  
Biostatistician B (Biostatistics PhD) 
 
 The status of statistical professionals was also noted to have increased over recent 
decades.  
 
Decaying statistical proficiency across the career  
Despite being a valued skill, several senior academics reported declining 
statistical literacy across their careers. Eight interviewees from across the network 
specifically mentioned that while early in their careers they conducted analyses 
themselves, they no longer do so:  
 
I’m not a statistician, I used to be more adept when I was younger,  now I have people 
doing it for me.  
 
Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
My first papers I wrote […] I did my own statistics, which is scary as all get-out. I’m not 
allowed to do that anymore, we have statisticians here who run all that stuff.  
 
Occupational health researcher (Anthropology PhD) 
 
Three of these researchers described their current position as one of 
‘dependency’:  
  
 I’m totally dependent on my statistician friends.   
 
Epidemiologist (Anthropology PhD) 
  
Tellingly, no interviewee in Cluster 2 discussed losing touch with their statistical 
ability over time, or described themselves as being dependent on statisticians. This 
is perhaps unsurprising, as, recalling the findings of RC1, this cluster is notable for 
containing a number of experts in inequality measurement. Interviewees in and near 
Cluster 2 were the most critical of the statistical practice they observed in the 
literature, and at conferences. In this part of the network - dominated by economists 
and epidemiologists -  statistical literacy is essential, statistical ability appears to 
remain important across a career, and potential collaborators are evaluated based 
on (among other things) their quantitative skills.  
 
If statistical literacy carries connotations of legitimacy, productivity and 
employability, and statisticians are the only ones ‘allowed’ to touch research data in 
some settings, statistical expertise appears to be accompanied by a kind of power. 
In some settings, especially medical schools in the UK and Cancer Centres in the 
USA, interviewees reported that statisticians are the only researchers who generate 
analytical products from raw quantitative data. If statistical skill is so highly valued, it 
therefore seems curious that researchers step back from quantitative analysis as 
they advance in their careers. 
 
For researchers lacking confidence with statistical analysis, engaging a specialist 
to perform their analyses was a welcome chance to delegate a confusing and 
stressful element of research conduct. These researchers reported limping through 
early publications without deep understanding, and joyously outsourced statistical 
work as soon as resources permitted. But researchers with confidence in their 
abilities also reported doing less hands-on analysis as they moved up the ranks, 
sometimes with regret:  
 
So, I used to do my own analysis […] now I usually hand it over to people […]  I don’t 
literally do the programming anymore, which I’m a little sad about.  
 
Health Equity Researcher (Nursing PhD) 
 
These interviewees reported that statistical analysis takes too long and gets in 
the way of other tasks - most especially tasks which generate research funding. The 
point of transition from managing individual analyses and papers to driving a funded 
research program (writing competitive grants and guiding/developing research 
questions pursued by others) seems to be the point at which many researchers 
stepped back from conducting statistical analyses themselves:   
 
TC: Do you do your own statistical analysis?  
 
Right now [I do]. I am hoping to transition out of doing that, because it takes forever and I am at 
a point where I need to write a bunch of grants.  
 
Social Epidemiologist A (Epidemiology PhD) 
 
Doing ones own statistical analysis was presented in tension with ‘efficient’ 
research output by interviewees in the UK, Australia, and the USA: 
 
So I used to do my own analysis, and then as I got busier and busier I was less efficient at it.  
 
Health Equity Researcher (Nursing PhD)  
 
Here, then, are competing incentives for some researchers who study health 
equity.  There is a widespread perception that quantitative skills are valuable, even 
essential, but for some interviewees they are not as valuable as the efficient 
generation of grant applications and peer-reviewed publications. Outside of Cluster 
2 there was a general sense that researchers should abandon developing the former 
in pursuit of the latter as soon as practicable:  
 
I used to do all my own stuff […]  I’m always impressed, when people like [blank] used to do a lot 
of the stats herself, I think she really enjoyed doing it, and at one level I was kind of impressed, but 
on the other level I was thinking “This is the most inefficient thing. You could be doing five things if 
you had a team, and you cost a lot.”   
 
Public Health researcher, Social Science PhD 
 
 
One interviewee who conducts qualitative research noted that there are very few 
opportunities to develop quantitative skills in the mid or late career. In a phrase 
reminiscent of the interviewees quoted in RC2 who felt that the need to obtain 
funding acted as a ‘hamster wheel’, restricting the questions they could pursue, 
several researchers described being on a methodological ‘track’ from which they 
found it difficult to deviate: 
 
Funders are investing in training people at an early career stage, it is not something  funders are 
investing in the mid career or late career stage […] that would require an academic context in which 
there is more space. Because if you do that training properly you are taking time out from your 
teaching and publishing, and so on.  
 
Health Policy Researcher (Geography PhD)  
 
This very brief analysis contains two findings of potential significance within 
public health. First, the view of statistical expertise as varying in varied contexts 
aligns with existing studies of  scientific expertise, and Jasanoff (2003) stresses that 
expertise 
 
is not merely something that is in the heads and hands of skilled 
persons, constituted through their deep familiarity with the problem in 
question, but rather that it is something acquired, and deployed, 
within particular historical, political, and cultural contexts. 
(Jasanoff, 2003, p. 393)  
 
Debates in epidemiology and public health tend to treat ‘statistical literacy’ as 
something researchers either possess or lack, however, this brief analysis of 
statistical expertise in HIDR suggests a more nuanced approach may be required.   
  
Secondly, hyper-prolific authors in science have been identified as a topic of 
concern in health-related research. Thousands of authors demonstrating 
‘implausible’ rates of publication were identified by Ioannidis et al (2018) and, 
excluding large physics collaborations, around half of these authors publish in 
health-related fields. A survey of these hyper-prolific authors revealed that 10% of 
respondents read fewer than 25% of papers on which they are named as authors, 
and data from this PhD project suggests that statistical literacy and hands-on 
contact with data may be casualties of the drive - within some disciplines - to 
publish very high volumes of papers. As senior, successful authors delegating 
statistical work become role-models for young scientists,  statistical expertise may 
likewise be viewed as an optional or unimportant part of a successful research 
career in health-related research. A trend away from hands-on contact with data 
may be concerning to those wishing to promote statistical literacy within 
epidemiology and public health, and future studies might explore the mechanics of 
this trend in greater detail.  
 
